Fire Investigation on Scarborough Civic Hall - Example

FIRE INVESTIGATION ON SCARBOROUGH CIVIC HALL Insert Name Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service Fire Investigation Report Incident Number: 493 Date of Incident: 6th December, 2003 Time of Call: 0311hrs Date & Time of Investigation Commenced: Address of Incident: Scarborough Civic Hall, Market Street. Owned By: Scarborough Council Occupied By: Scarborough Recreation and Leisure Limited Trade/Business: Entertainment Police Officer Dealing: ADO Smith CRS No: 1.0 Introduction and Curriculum Vitae 1.1 I am an employee of the Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service currently serving as a Watch Manager. My main role in the service relates to an Incident Intelligence Officer that involves gathering evidence into the potential causes of a fire incident. I have worked with the service for 2 years having served in various capacities that includes fire fighting in my previous work stations. 1.2 My roles involve conducting investigations into fire incidents that result into heavy losses and fatalities as well as potential acts of arson. With my number of years in the service, I have conducted investigations into a number of fires of varying natures and magnitudes. As a requirement, I have completed the relevant Fire Service Exams and Courses that are offered at the Service Training Centre. Additionally, I am a member of the Institution of Fire Engineers that I joined after completing the relevant examinations that included fire investigations. Currently I am posted at the Scarborough County where the Scarborough Civic Hall incident falls within my jurisdiction and hence my attendance to the fire. 1.3 Curriculum Vitae Name xxxxxxxxx Fire and Safety Engineer Officer, TEL xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (mobile) E-mail xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxz Date of birth:   xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Marital status:   xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Contact address:   PO Box xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. Tel (Office):    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Educational qualification: Diploma in Mechanical Engineering Degree in Fire & Safety Engineering Trained First Aider of St. John Ambulance Association Specialized Courses: 1. Breathing Apparatus. 2. First Aid Course 3. H2S Protection. 4. Fire Prevention. 5. Safe Rigging & Lifting. 6. Safe Scaffolding. Profile Summary: I’m an expert who can manage and coordinate safety and fire related issues. I have an experience in fire fighting and prevention in both large and small buildings. WORK EXPERIENCE November 2002 to December 2002 Project: Adnoc Ruwais Polythene Project Contractor: Bechtal Sub Contractor: FPI ABU DHABI Position held: Safety Officer Duties: Issuing work permits (if it is required) Issuing of safety notes at regular intervals, Issuing of daily, weekly and monthly activities Report. July 2002 – August 2002 Company: Libya National Oil Company Contractor: Total Sub Contractor: Position held: Safety Officer Duties: Implementation of Safety Rules and Procedures Issue of work permits according to the work in progress, Coordinating with staff during emergency and critical situation Responsible for all safety aspects March 2002 – June 2002 Contractor: BECHTAL Sub Contractor: Position held: Safety Officer Introduction Fire investigation on Scarborough Civic Hall This report seeks to discuss the fire investigation in relation to the Scarborough civic hall through analyzing and defining the structure of the building, the situation under which the fire started, kind incident that occurred, situation that led to the discovery of the fire, areas where the fire outbreak began and conclusions as well as possible solutions to avoid and manage any fire breakouts within the same premises. In this report I attended the place of incident to investigate and produce a full report on what happened through out the place. 2.0 Description of the premise. 2.1 The premise is situated in a small village that is approximately three miles from the nearby Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service station. The site map is indicated bellow for clear view. Scarborough Civic Hall was built as a public amenity in 1965, It in cooperates of a self contained single grand building of about 36m by 22m. The inside walls linings were made from plasterboard together with glass fibres (Mc, 1991). The walls of the building had been maintained with different spray of paint together with varnish. 2.2 The roofing of the building was done using wood or particleboards’ incorporated with numerous superimposed layers made up of bitumen felt, with the concrete floor. From observation in case of any outbreak of fire the hall did not posses any suspended ceiling boards. The clear view is shown bellow. 2.3 Internal services within the house. The building was fitted with 6 double fluorescent tubes behind the ceiling, positioned about three quarters along the way of the up the vault. It was also incorporated with 9 huge pendant glass light that was identified hanging from the ceiling board comprising a set of three (Mc, 1991). One of the glasses was at the apex of the ceiling board and the other side. Each was identified with nine bulbs, amounting to 81. 2.4 On the other hand the stage lights were fitted to a scaffolding tube towards the ceiling board that was approximately 4m from the boundary of the phase. Another scaffolding tube was seen supporting lights straight over the stage, all the banks of lightening was controlled over the theatre from an elevation of wood or timber platform that was to be accessed by a wood Jacobs Ladder as shown in (Figure 7 Cross Section). 2.5 Scarborough Civic Hall building was circulated with mans gas that its function was to power the heating system. A fan was also introduced in order to assist the heater that is located in the main hall together with the other two heaters that were mounted in the in the bar lounge ,Their main objective was to provide a permanent heating source. However the main halls’ heater was seen to be defective hence it was not in operation during the time the fire broke up. Due to this hazard another alternative heating mechanism was introduced which involved mounting an electric heater within the surface of the bar (Mc, 1991). 2.6 Furniture and fittings Scarborough Civic Hall internal furnishing comprised of a stagnant bench that was made of polyurethane foam seen as upholstered, this was situated or placed within the bar lounge, In approximation there about 200 polyurethane seats found in the main hall of Scarborough Civic Hall (stacked in piles of ten adjacent to the main entrance), another 110 of the same was stacked in cloak room. 2.7 Furthermore there was a proximately 50 polyurethane foam upholstered PVC enclosed stools, 30 of them were found at the main hall of Scarborough Civic Hall with 20 located or placed in the bar lounge. Six chairs and two stools were seen placed on the high quality lighting platform, Together with several wooden tables that were covered with Formica measuring about 1.3m x 0.66m.The openings in between the bar office and the main hall had been draped with cloth and the walls were decorated mainly for the Christmas celebrations. (McCarthy, 1998).The lager decorations incorporated 6 plastic bells suspended in the ceiling. Two wide man-made Christmas trees measuring 2m high were located one of the side of the stage. 2.8 A number of fascinating decorations for instance and streamers used to hang from the ceiling board which was approximately zero point seventy five in diameter was fixed to the walls. The room was set to be Green room which was allocated for the storage of props including 3 rolls of the carpet, fabric or cloths and other miscellaneous items. The flying colonnade above the stage had textile backdrops. The illustration is shown in the figure below see figure. No 9 (McCarthy, 1998). 3.0 Type of incident 3.1 The story narrated below was extracted from the mobilising information and interviews that were carried out with staff or individuals who attended the place where the fire occurred. Every effort has been taken to make sure the report is very accurate according to each and every event that took place at the event of the fire outbreak. However, in some places there are some conflicting testimonies by eyewitnesses regarding the actual cause of the fire break out. 3.2 According to McCarthy (1998), it was at around 0311 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003 when the Scarborough Fire Service received the first nine calls about the Civic Hall Market; the Fire services mobilized predetermined attendance of the two appliances from P73 Scarborough police station, they immediately informed the Assistant Divisional Officer, Mr Smith. It took approximately four minutes for the appliances to reach the place where the fire broke. While on the way to the scene where the fire broke, the officers discussed the place where water supplies were located, on the way to the scene there was only exchange of information and ideas throughout the way. 3.3 Appliance P730 arrived at the scene through Millfold and Industry way, a shown in the figure above. (Stephenson, 1992).he in attendance booking incident was recorded at 0321.56 hours. The crew then sited the appliance within the car park situated at the rear of the building adjacent to the peripheral of the dual fire exit doors. ADO smith was seen at the incident moving towards the rear of the hall and he was ready in the process of wearing fire gear as well as the fire kit. One of the officers namely Jones identified ADO has in attendance, Brown, the commanding fire brigadier inquired sub officer Jones if he needed additional appliances. In response to this a message was send requesting for four pumps, this was at around 0322.54 hours (Stephenson, 1992). 3.4 Thick smoke was seen from the building rooftop although ADO Smith together with Jones the sub Officer, assumed that the scene was not very demanding as it was just a minor incident, same implied to rest fire fighters for instance, Gordon, Laycock and O, Roley, at some point occasions the Commanding fighter fighters believe that the location of the fire was well identified. At that point no flames were identified within the rear of the elevation. 4.0 Situation prior to discovery 4.1 At this scenario machine P731 approached the scene by use of off market road and reserved the in attendance for only I minute and 12 seconds appliance e P730. On arrival the crew members identified a well spread fire outbreak within the main foyer alongside with the bar lounge area (Stephenson, 1992). The breathing apparatus (BA) Wearers Fire brigadiers Oaks and more inquired from the sub fire officials. “If were allowed to penetrate though the air”. The officer advised them to secure a water supply and hence they were to secure a jet so that they could sprinkle water from an aerial view of the building. 4.2 On the other hand, Machine P731 landed on the South West corner of the premise within the sight of machine P730; significantly the fire fighters did not remove any of their BA sets. Smith then walked all over the premises following the direction where machine P731 was located to in order to identify the problem and carry out investigations. The Sub officer identified as Jones gained entrance through the door by the key holders and finally gained access into the kitchen. In the kitchen, some light was seen at the ceiling board, the officer opened the windows to allow smoke out of the house, the officers then deployed the hose reel through the air to the fire location and started fighting the fire though the hall’s ceiling. 4.3 The commanding fire brigadier Brown took the step in assisting to control the fire by using the present stand pipe, Laycock also assisted in the identification of water supply source, The BA team broke into the room carrying a Motorola MT2100 radio that they used to set a channel 1, During the incident, fire-fighter Orks acted as the team commandeered hence he carried the Motorola radio. The figure shown below indicates the rout that was followed by the first BA squad; it’s indicated by the red arrow. 5.0 Discovery of the Fire 5.1 The following account was given to the Watch Manager by the hall keeper, David Moreton and recorded in the duty diary on 6th December, 2003. 5.2 nominated key holder, Frank Davies noticed flames near the hall’s entrance while attending to an emergency call that the intruder alarm in the premises had been set off. The ADT alarm call centre had alerted him to attend to the alarm and check if everything was alright. This took him approximately five minutes and as he approached the facility from Market Street, He saw fire inside the building and flames emerging from the roof’s vent. 5.2 Mrs. Earnshaw who lived in the building overlooking the civic hall had earlier seen the flames through her bedroom’s window and immediately contacted the fire service. She stated that she initially saw the flames in the area near the main entrance at the South East corner of the hall. 6.0 Area where fire started first 6.1 When the fire fighting team gained hall access, the heat intensity was very high and there was poor visibility due to the smoke that had covered the entire civic hall. At that point the fire fighters did not identify any kind of flame; they could only hear what believed to be serious fire that was on transit above their controls. Finally after P731 crew had been deployed, Lobby officer then joined Jones location in the kitchen where he alerted him of the fire progress inside the building. 7.0 Development of the fire 7.1 It took approximately 38 minutes for the fire to fully consume the Scarborough Civic Hall. This was such a fast rate that signifies a large amount of combustible material present with the hall at the time of the fire. Propellants within the building accelerated the heat intensity and thus it is crucial to assess the possible development of the fire (Hartin 2003). 7.2 Fire spread within the building is determined by a number of factors that include the hall’s ventilation profile, ability of the individual sections to contain the fire and common constructions that can facilitate the spread of fire from a compartment to another (Hartin 2003). The Scarborough hall had a common roof that contributed to the fast spread of the fire upon ignition. Secondly, the hall was wholly constructed of timber that is fire-friendly in comparison to other structural material such as timber. These material easily caught fire during the growth phase of the fire and hence the occurrence of the flashover. 7.3 The building’s fire load levels were very high especially due to the additional presence of flammable material such as ribbons used for decorating the event, pieces of fabric, oil-based paints that were used in the hall’s interior and the polyurethane made stools that were initially ignited by the smoking materials. The presence of these flammable materials within the building positively contributed to the enhanced fire development (Hartin 2003). Specifically, the Jacob’s ladder contributed to the spread of fire to the building’s upper section. 7.4 The building’s ventilation profile was meant to allow easy air flow within the building as it could hold a high number of individuals at a single time. With the wind blowing from the north at 5mph, the fire was most likely to spread towards the southern end of the hall where it started. However, given the presence of combustible material within the building, the fire also spread northwards. The hall’s ventilation profile contributed to the acceleration of the ignited fire and hence increased the fire’s development pace (Hartin 2003). Additionally, the members of the fire service accessed the building during the growth stage and this allowed more air into the building hence accelerating the fire. 7.5 The nature of the fuel being held at the hall at the moment of the fire contributed to the escalation of the fire. Categorically, the fuels were both of solid and gaseous nature that has different heat levels unlike the polyurethane materials. The hall was mainly served on gas and the presence of loosely fitted lighting bulbs could have easily ignited a fire. Additionally, the gas leakage could have possibly facilitated into the fast escalation of the fire. Flashover Heat Release Rate Ignition Growth Fully Developed Decay Time 8.0 Causes of the fire 8.1 Smoking materials 8.1.1 Scarborough Civic Hall’s internal furnishing comprised of a stagnant bench that was like a polyurethane foam seen as upholstered, this was situated or placed within the bar lounge. Approximately, there about 200 polyurethane seats found in the main hall of Scarborough Civic Hall (stacked in piles of ten adjacent to the main entrance), another 110 made of similar material was stacked in the cloak room south of the hall. 8.1.2 Furthermore there was a proximately 50 polyurethane foam upholstered PVC enclosed stools, with 30 of them placed at the main hall of Scarborough Civic Hall and 20 placed in the bar lounge all at the south-east end of the hall. Six chairs and two stools were seen placed on the high quality lighting platform (Stephenson, 1992). 8.1.3 A number of fascinating decorations for instance and streamers used to hang from the ceiling board which was approximately 0.75m in diameter was fixed to the walls. The room was set to be Green room, which was allocated for the storage of props including 3 rolls of the carpet, fabric or cloths and other miscellaneous items. The flying colonnade above the stage had textile backdrop, from this evidence this could have been the cause of the wide spread of the fire within the building. 8.1.4 Cigarette remnants were found near the hall’s main entrance that was believed to be the initial source of ignition. This is because of their proximity to the seat that were covered of flammable material. Additionally, this confirms to the numerous statements from Mrs. Earnshaw and the Mr. Davies who state that they initially saw the fire at the main entrance on the hall’s south east end. The cigarette pieces ignited the seats that later transferred the heat to the other flammable materials within the hall’s south end due to the wind factor. 8.2 Electrical System and appliances 8.2.1 According to the research it was clearly identified that the building were built in the year 1965 without the stage area being included. It was then rewired within the past 7 years by the Nichols and Company contractors L.T.D. According to the records, Nichol carried regular inspection and maintenance exercises especially during May 2002. Unfortunately, the troubleshooting excluded the testing of the lights that were meant for the stage which are considered satisfactory (Stephenson, 1992). It was identified that the additional lights had been put in place by professionals and were also been certified during the month of September 2003. 8.2.2 Immediately after this reconnection this is when the problems started, the problem has been persistence especially in the relation to four 32 amp-rating circuit breakers that managed the currently installed dimmer lights. The circuit breakers always kept tripping out, In contrast the said protective devices were seen to be tested and approved in the events of regular checkups. 8.2.3 In reference to the reports, on Wednesday 3, Dec 2 days before the incident, the findings identified that Moreton had conducted an electrical engineer by the name Andy to solve the power problems that were being witnessed within the building so that the forth coming talent event could be secure from any power related issues. In reference to the study, Mr. Townsend did investigation on the nature of the lightening system and ignored to implement any remedy in case of a fire outbreak. This was clear evidence that the fire outbreak was due to the faulty electronic appliances and this could have been the cause of the regular circuit breakers and trips. 8.3 Heating systems 8.3.1 According to the study, the heating systems contributed a lot to the fire breakout, as the primary gas unit that was situated in the main hall was found to in bad condition or defective when the fire broke up, Also on the wall two mains gas heaters were seen hanging in the lounge of the bar. 8.3.2 From the entire mentioned incident we are able to conclude that the fire outbreak may have been caused by the defective electrical appliances and fitting within the hall, Furthermore the public reported that member within the congregation had been burnt during the occasion by a heater, and the personality was not identified within the given time (Stephenson, 1992). 8.4 Possible Arson 8.4.1 Mr. Davies was contacted to attend the hall because the intruder alarm that was received at the call centre had been set off. The intruder alarms signify that there was the possibility of a break in given the fact that monies collected during the event could possibly be held within the premises. 8.4.2 According to Mr. Davies, upon his arrival to the hall, the internal fire exit door that is accessible from the blue room was unlocked which was unusual. However, Mr. Davies could not guarantee that the door was left by the time he left the premises. 8.4.3 Frank Davies and Dave Moreton confirmed that the intruder alarms were faulty and that it was possible for an intruder to scout the ancillary areas without being detected. Additionally, when the fire was put out, the tills holding the cash were found having being emptied without any trace of burnt monies that were held therein. 9.0 Conclusion 9.1 Fire safety engineering In all buildings there are supposed to be safety measures in order to protect the buildings from fire, and the first measure should be life safety, in the buildings that there are occupants as the offices ,they require enough time and facilities to help them escape in times of fire , the second measure that should be put into consideration is prevention of conflagrations this is preventing of fire from spreading to other buildings in the surroundings like it happened in horizontal spread of fire amongst timber made buildings at Scarborough Civic Hall .the third measure is property protection these is where we should consider protection of contents such as furnishings, fittings objects of value and other forms of property the most important fire regulations, the most important requirements have been basically placed towards the necessary fire resistance principles for walls and floors to avoid the spread of blaze and the stipulation of an appropriate way of escape to guarantee life safety.(Stephenson,1992). 9.2 Finally, according to (McCarthy, 1998).there are other special precautions ,required in houses and work place like keeping of combustible liquids in the process areas ,workrooms laboratory and other working areas ,the rooms should also be ventilated to dilute and remove flammable gas ,making use of equipments that may not act as source of ignition ,use extraction systems to be able to remove flammable materials like wood dust. Appendices Fig. 1: Scarborough Civic Hall Fig 2: Hall’s Rear Elevation Fig 3: Hall’s Cross Section Fig 4: Hall’s Floor Plan Fig 5: Hall’s Floor Plan indicating Internal Fittings References Hartin, E. 2003. Fire Dvlpmt & Fire Behaviour Indicators. Accessed from < http://cfbt- us.com/pdfs/FBIandFireDevelopment.pdf > on March 23, 2010. Kimberly, 1993. Advanced Warnings, Context, No. 38, June, p. 12. Emerald. Mc, I. 1991, Fire and its Aftermath, Conservation Bulletin, Issue 13, February. Emerald. McCarthy, S, 1998: Emergency Preparedness for Museums, Art Galleries and Historic Buildings”, Disaster Management, Vol.1 No. 2, 1988, pp. 30-5. Stephenson, J., 1992.The Building Regulations Explained: 4th ed., Methods, London. English Heritage. Read More