Incident at the Civic Hall - Reasons of the Fire, Performance of Premises Construction and Materials - Example

1. Introduction and curriculum vitae a) I am the Chief Fire Investigator with Scarborough Fire Consultant, where my role includes determining the origin and cause of fires. This involves conducting and supporting investigations of fires that results in loss of life, financial assets, cause serious injuries, and are started by arsons. I have investigated a number of fires that vary in nature and magnitude. b) Beside taking and excelling in a number of promotion exams, I have completed my fire investigation course at the Fire Service College. I am also an active member of the Institution of Fire Engineers, where I was accepted after excelling in a fire investigation exam. c) I am certified to operate in United Kingdom within which the Scarborough Civic Hall is located. This allows my investigation of the fire that burnt down the hall to provide a report to the building insurer. 2. DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES a) The property is a public facility that consists of a detached one storey building of approximately 36m x 22m in size as well as the hall and stage section, a bar, and catering and recreation facilities. Its structure is of laminated timber portal frame. The outside part of the wall is made of stud frames and cedar boards, whereas the internal wall consists of glass fibre plasterboards linings. The walls are also coated with gloss paint. The arched roof is of timber grain boards covered with several layers of bitumen felt. There are no suspended ceilings. The floor is made of concrete. b) The lighting consisted of fluorescent tubes and glass pendant lights suspended from the roof as well as stage lighting supported in scaffolding tubes. The control of these stage lights was located at a raised platform made of timber. The building was supplied with electricity and main gas, which were used in the heating system. c) The hall’s had chairs, seats, and stools made of polyurethane foam located at the main hall, bar and cloakroom respectively. Some chairs were in the lighting control platform. There were wooden tables of Formica finishing in the hall and bar lounge. d) Doorway between bar and main hall as well as the flying gallery were covered by fabric curtains. e) Plastic decorations including bells, streamers, tinsel hung from the ceiling, while two Christmas trees were placed on the both sides of the stage. Plastic fans decorations were fixed on the wall. Roll carpets, clothes, and other stage props were stored in the green room. 3. TYPE OF INCIDENT a) The Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) received a notification of the fire occurrence at 03:11 on Saturday 6th of December 2003 and released two fire appliances for the incident. The fire appliance P730 reported being on site at 03:21. At the time, Assistant Divisional Officer Smith had already arrived at the site. He had been notified of the occurrence by FRS. After deliberation with the Leading Firefighters Brown, Sub Officer Jones requested for two more fire appliances. b) Smoke arising from the building was visible through the rear side the building although no flames could be seen. Jones and Smith Jones as well as three other firefighters - Gordon, Laycock, and O’Riley viewed the fire as minor, while Firefighter Dodson and the Leading Firefighter saw it as a well developed fire. The hall’s key holder - a former fire-fighter who arrived at the scene at about 5 minutes after the FRS notification described the fire as well developed. He had observed the fire through the Eastern side of the building and noticed flames at the roof vent and under the eaves on the South East corner of the hall. He, however, did not know the extent of the fire. c) The fire appliance P731 reported being in attendance at 03:22.12, that is one minute and twelve seconds after appliance P730, and its crew observed a well developed fire at the bar and in the main foyer while approaching the site through the Eastern entrance. d) Two more appliances were requested by Sub Officer Jones. Through ADO Smith orders, Sub Officer Jones to entered the building in an attempt to try to locate the fire for extinguishing. Earlier, Sub Officer Lobby had refused Mores and Oaks - the Firefighters with the breathing apparatus (BA) - to go into the building but instead asked them to source a water supply and a jet for fire extinguishing. After an assessment, Sub Officer Jones went in the building through the kitchen doorway and instructed the BA wearers to go in start extinguishing the fire. Some little smoke was visible at the ceiling. e) Firefighter Brown and Laycock secured a water supply and the BA wearers entered the building under the command of Firefighter Oak. Their progress into the building was reasonably easy because only light smoke and low temperatures were initially felt, but the building became less visible with smoke and much hotter after they entered the main hall area. The crew could notice fire travelling above them although they did not observe any flame. f) The building became very hot while visibility diminished and Smith ordered the withdrawal of the crew when he saw the extent of the fire. Through ADO Smith orders, two more fire appliances were requested by Firefighter O’Connor at 03:23.53 hours, making the total number of appliances to reach to six. The period between the booking in attendance of P730 and withdraw of BA team is 10 minutes and 30 seconds. g) Other requests for assistances were made by Ado Smith. An aerial appliance was requested at 03:42.47, while the Environmental Protection Unit was requested at 03:42.53. A Sector Command was set up at 03:49.46, and at 04:09.06 D.O. Bowerman took charge of the incident. The end of the operation was reported at 0608.54 hours. h) The premises was seriously destroyed by the fire and later in the same day demolished without an assessment being conducted. Firefighters who entered the building on the opposite Northern Gable Elevation (2) reported that the ancillary rooms were completely free of heat or smoke and that they only encountered smoke once they had entered the main hall. 4. SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY a) On the evening of 5th December 2003 the building was used for a talent competition where about 300 people attended. The event ended at about midnight and after sometime all the patron left the premises. Approximately £4000 was contained in two tills behind the bar when it closed. Frank Davies – the bar man and key holder – who was in charge of the money did not put the money in the safe within the bar store because the safe was exposed to the public as the doors between the bar lounge and bar store had been taken out for maintenance. He believed that depositing the money into the safe would be risky. In 2002, money was stolen after hall keeper David Moreton was attacked on the building after a function was concluded. b) It was David Moreton who left the building last after preparing it for craft fair that was to happen the next day. The preparation required clearance of the hall as well as piling the polyurethane chairs in sets of ten close to the main doorway. He locked the building at about 0255 hours. c) The ADT alarm call centre received an intrusion alarm signal at 0306 hours and notified the key holder Frank Davies. He first refused to respond and directed them to contact the company secretary Ron Smith. However, ADT did not manage to reach him and they resulted back to Frank who arrived at the fire site after about fives minutes. d) The building was constructed in 1965 where after it was rewired about seven years ago by Rishton’s Nichols Contracting (Barrow) Limited, but the stage area was left out. This company also inspected the building in May 2002 as part of the regular inspection and concluded that the situation was satisfactory. However, they had left out the testing of stage lighting. Extra stage lighting had seemingly been well installed with Southern Stage Services certifying the installation in September 2003. After this new fitting a recurring problem of tripping of the four 32-ampere circuit breakers that controlled the newly fitted dimmer packs had been experienced. Seemingly, the circuit breakers were tested in the periodic inspection. e) Dave Moreton had asked electrician Andy Townsend on Wednesday of 3rd December - two days before the incident – to try and fix the problem so that the talent contest would not be disrupted. Townsend inspected the stage lighting and did not remedy the problem he observed but instead warned Dave Moreton of the risk of a fire break out because of the current situation of the electrical installation. The problem discovered involved the supply cables being strained and possibly resulting in the tripping of the circuit breakers. That is, many portable lights were joined to dimmer units so that the plug conductor clamps supported the weight of the supply cables. f) The Scarborough Amateurs Association lighting technician Arnold Addis was in the 5th December talent competition. He agreed that Townsend’s conclusion was exaggerated noting that the problems observed were rectified before the event. However, he admitted that a stage light had tripped during the show and was restored by plugging it into another socket. Arnold Addis denied any tampering of the circuit breakers to avoid tripping. It appears that the stage lighting was regulated from a command override unit situated on the stage area and from the switch unit situated on the raised lighting platform. Arnold Addis turned off all the stage lighting leaving out the four lights for the DJ, but Dave Moreton confirmed about turning off the four lights through the main switch situated on the command override unit before he left. He further pointed out hearing a buzzing noise while clearing the hall after the event. However, he could not trace the source and was unclear and unsure, and there was not witness to support his statement. g) Frank Davies noted when he led the crew of the first appliance that the internal fire exit door that leads to the blue room was unusually wide open. Furthermore, the door had panic bolt and could only be opened from inside. Dave Moreton agreed that he left the door not completely open, but did not provide assurance that it had not been left unlocked because during the show performers went in and about the blue room. h) There is also doubt on the number of available access keys. Only three sets of keys for external doors are officially recognized. One Yale lock and two mortise locks were used to lock the external door, while a single mortise lock was used to lock the internal door. Frank Davies, Dave Moreton, and Ron Smith are officially responsible for the keys. i) Frank Davies and Dave Moreton stated that the intruder alarm was not fully effective. Also, the gas-fuelled main heating unit located in the main hall was not working at the time of the fire. Frank Davies said that he had switched off the two wall-mounted main gas heaters located in the bar lounge in the evening because the hall had become warmer. He further claimed that a wall-mounted electric heater located on the other side of the bar close to the stage area was not working and not in use, but Dave Moreton disputed that claiming that it had been reported to him that someone had burnt his/her leg on this electric heater as the show went on; this individual has not been known yet. j) There were three other wall-mounted electric heaters besides at least two portable electric heaters being used in the rooms at the back of the stage during competition. Dave Moreton claimed to have confirmed that all these heaters were turned off. 5. DISCOVERY OF FIRE a) Mrs. Earnshaw a resident of 667 Market Street whose house faced the Hall saw the fire through her bedroom window and was the first to call the Fire Service and Rescue at 03:11.11 hours. She was among the nine people who called the Fire Service and saw fire flames at the main doorway at the South East corner of the building. b) The ADT alarm call centre had received an intruder signal at 03:06 hours and alerted Key holder Frank Davies who arrived at the incident in five minutes. Davies Frank saw a well developed fire under the eaves and in a roof vent and at the main entrance foyer of the building as he approached the building. c) The appliance P730 crew including Sub Officer Jones and ADO Smith observed smoke coming out of the building on their arrival at the incident at 0321.56 hours. The appliance P730 crew observed fire in the main foyer and bar lounge as they approached the building through the entrance off the Market Street. 6. AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED a) The fire started around the main entrance foyer in the main hall on the south west corner of the building. The observation of Frank Davies, Mrs. Earnshaw and appliance P730 crew supports this claim. This area was stacked with chairs made of polyurethane foam, which is a highly flammable material. There was a plastic dust bin close to this area. 7. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE / PERFORMANCE OF PREMISES CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIALS a) The fire begun around the main foyer where the polyurethane form chairs provided fuel for the fire to grow and spread. The openings between the hall and bar lounge did not prevent fire from spreading into the bar lounge area, but instead the fabric curtains fuelled the fire and accelerated its growth to the next room. The polyurethane foam fixed bench in the bar lounge, the polyurethane foam stools, and the wooden Formica-covered tables in the lounge accelerate the fire growth and spread. The polyurethane foam chairs in the cloakroom and the high-level lighting platform also assisted the fire to develop and spread. b) The growth and spread of the fire was further accelerated by the availability of bitumen felt roofing. This substance is highly flammable and allowed the fire to burn well. Lack of a suspended ceiling allowed fire to reach the flammable bitumen roof easily from its origin. c) The wooden structure of the building and flammable construction materials as well as availability of flammable materials within the building made easy for the fire to develop quickly. The timber portal flame and cedar boards walls with gloss pain made a lot of contribution to the fast spread of fire as did the. Although the frame’s timber was laminated and the boards were reinforced with glass fibre, the application of gloss paint made them easy to catch and spread fire. d) The rest of the building consisted of a number of flammable materials that accelerated the fire growth and spread. The plastic material Christmas decorations including the plastic Christmas tree, plastic bells, and fans decorations as well as the carpet rolls and clothes in the green room fuelled the fire to develop and spread. Furthermore, the bench seats, chairs, and stools in the main hall and bar lounge were close to the walls which made it easy for fire to spread. The polyurethane foam stools in the main hall as well as the fabric backdrops in flying gallery also assisted fire to spread. 8. CAUSES CONSIDERED Electrical defect a) The circuit breakers had a problem of tripping which electrician Andy Townsend concluded was related to the straining caused to the supply cables. He warned of a fire risk, although he did not rectify the problem. This problem was however resolved before the start of the event by Arnold Addis who agreed that Townsend had overreacted. b) Nichols Contracting limited had conducted an inspection of the circuit breaker and concluded that its situation was satisfactory. The stage light that tripped during the event was restored by plugging it in a spare socket. The circuit breaker therefore did not trip during the talent show. All the lights and circuit breaker were turned off after the event concluded. c) This cause therefore is unlikely to have started the fire. Smoking materials d) Smoking was permitted in the bar lounge and ash trays were available. Furthermore, three big plastic swing-lid waste bins were place close to the entrance foyer, outside the gents toilets, and outside the bar store. e) This is however considered to be unlikely. Heating system appliances f) The gas-fuelled main heating unit located in the main hall was not working at the time of the fire. Frank Davies said that he had switched off the two wall-mounted main gas heaters located in the bar lounge in the evening because the hall had become warmer. He further claimed that a wall-mounted electric heater located on the other side of the bar close to the stage area was not working and not in use, but Dave Moreton disputed that claiming that it had been reported to him that someone had burnt his/her leg on this electric heater as the show went on. This individual has not been known yet. Besides, there were three other wall-mounted electric heaters and at least two portable electric heaters being used in the rooms at the back of the stage during the competition. Dave Moreton also stated that he confirmed that all these heaters were turned off. In addition g) The only potential source of heat could have been from the electric wall-mounted heater situated opposite the bar. However, besides its operability being disputed, it was far from where the fire appeared to have originated. h) This cause is not likely to have caused the fire Deliberate ignition i) The cause of the fire is likely to have been deliberate. The fire appeared to have started at the area where the polyurethane foam chairs were stacked close to the main entrance foyer. There is no evidence to support that the fire could have started from the dust bin close to the entrance foyer. The pattern of the fire spread to the bar lounge indicate the fire begun at the chairs stacked close to the main entrance. The intruder alert and the discovery of open emergency exit door as well as the time of fire point to the presence of an intruder as the possible cause of the fire. j) This is the most likely cause of the fire that burnt the Civic Hall building 9. Conclusion a) The available information on the incident at the Civic Hall has made me to conclude that the fire was started deliberately. b) The fire initial stages are identified to be the South East corner of the building at main entrance foyer; fire flames were also observed in the roof vent and eaves. The potential causes such as electrical defect, smoking materials and heating system appliances are ruled out. Both electrical and heating systems were switched off after the event. There is also no evidence of smoking materials having been a cause of fire. The intruder alert and discovery of open emergency exit door further support deliberate fire cause. Read More