Fire investigation on Scarborough Civil Hall - Essay Example

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT The Scarborough Civic Hall Incident Report of Watch Manager LANCASHIRE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT Incident Number: ___________ Date of Incident: ___________ Time of Call: ___________ Date & Time Investigation: ____________________ Address of Incident: _____________________ _____________________ _____________________ Owned by: _____________________ Occupied by: _____________________ Trade/Business _____________________ Police Office Dealing: _____________________ CRS No. _____________________ 1. INTRODUCTION AND CURRICULUM VITAE 1.1 My name is ____________ and I am an employee of Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service and assigned as a Watch Manager doing an Incident Intelligence Officer work. I have been working with this company for almost 5 years and my primary duty is to conduct and support the investigation of fire occurring within Lancashire jurisdiction particularly those that involve fatalities, severe injury, large property damage, and arson. I have completed the required Fire Service statutory exams and passed the Fire Investigation Course at Service Training centre. During the last few years, I also completed several investigations of various types. 1.2 My current work is based on instructions from my supervisor and I was asked to conduct a fire investigation on Scarborough Civil Hall. 1.3 The pictures taken during the investigation and being mentioned in the following section can be found in the Appendix section. 1.4 The information presented as well as the remarks and views in this report are based on the available data in the incident scene. The emergence of any relevant data or information in the future may cause the amendment of this report. 2. DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES 2.1 Constructed in 1965, the Scarborough Civil Hall is a detached single storey building measuring approximately 792 square metres. 2.2 This building is being used in business offering services from catering to dance hall. 2.3 The building is generally constructed using laminated timber portal frame with stud framed walls. 2.4 The internal boarding is cedar while fibre boards were use for external walls. 2.5 Plasterboard with glass fibre in fill was used for internal wall linings. Timber particle board overlaid with layers of bitumen felt were used to construct the vaulted roof while the floor is made of concrete. 2.6 Gloss paint or varnish were repeatedly applied to walls during the life of the building 2.7 There is no suspended ceiling installed in this building. 2.8 At the main hall, at about three quarters of the way up the value, six double fluorescent tubes are fixed in every side of the ceiling. In sets of three, nine glass pendant lights with nine bulbs are hanging from the ceiling. One set is at the apex while the rest are on either side. At about 4 metres from the edge of the stage is the stage lighting fitted in a scaffolding tube at ceiling level. The same type scaffolding tube supported lights can be directly above the stage. The control for these lights is in an elevated wooden platform that can reach through a wooden Jacobs Ladder. 2.9 The power for the heating system of the building comes from the main gas line. Primary heating source is provided by a fan assisted heater in the main hall but not working at the time of the fire. For this reason, the two wall mounted electric heaters in the bar lounge is being use to provide the heating. 2.10 About internal furnishings, seating in the bar lounge are provided by several fixed bench upholstered with polyurethane foam while about 200 similarly polyurethane foam upholstered chairs are being use in the main hall. These chairs are stacked in piles of ten near the main entrance. More than a hundred chairs of thee same type are stacked in the cloakroom. Aside from these chairs, there are 30 pieces stools with polyurethane foam upholstery in main hall while 20 in the bar lounge. Six polyurethane foam upholstered chairs and two stools made of the same material mentioned earlier are in the elevated lighting platform. 2.11 Tables measuring about 1.3 metres x 0.66 metres Formica cover are in the main hall and bar lounge. 2.12 The hall had been decorated for Christmas and the openings leading to the bar lounge are draped with fabric. Decorations consist of six plastic bells hanging at the ceiling and a 2 metre artificial Christmas tree are placed in both sides of the stage. Tinsel, streamers, and other type of decorations are hanging from the ceiling including 8 plastic fans measuring about 0.75m in diameter that were fixed to the walls. Fabric backdrops can be found in the flying gallery about the stage. Stage props such as rolls of carpet, clothes, and other related items are in a designated store called the Green Room. 3. TYPE OF INCIDENT 3.1 The incident was initially reported to the Fire and Rescue Service at around 0311.11 hours of December 6, 2003, a Saturday. 3.2 The initial call was made by Mrs. Earnshaw when she saw a fire in the hall from her bedroom window. The flames according to her was visible at the main entrance are located at the South East corner of the building. 3.3 Another call was made by Frank Burgin when he saw flames coming out of the roof vent and a well developed fire in the building’s South East corner. 3.4 The building was used to hold a talent contest a day before and about three hundred people were present during the event that lasted nearly midnight. 3.5 The event earned around £3000 but Frank Davies, the bar person and key holder did not deposit the amount in safe thinking that it was a security because the safe was in view of the public. There was an incident in 2002, when the hall keeper was attacked right after the event and stole the collected monies. 3.6 The last person to leave the building that night was David Moreton because he was preparing to another event the following day, He cleared the hall and stacked around 200 polyurethane chairs in groups of ten near the main entrance. After the preparation, he secured and left the building at around 0255 hours. 3.7 The intruder alarm signal was received by ADT alarm call centre at around 0306 hours and Frank Davies (key holder) was informed. However, instead of addressing the problem, he asked the ADT to look for the company secretary Ron Smith but he was unavailable. ADT call Davies again and finally agreed to check the matter. As he approached the from market street five minutes after, he saw fire inside the building near main entrance foyer and flames in the roof vent. 3.8 The fire started from an electrical fault caused by strained suspended power supply cables connecting the portable lights at the stage to the dimmer units. 3.9 Records shows that there has been additional stage lighting installed last 2003 and from then onwards, a recurring problem had been noticed with the four amp circuit breakers that controlled the newly installed dimmer units. They are tripping out without cause. 3.10 Two days before the fire, an electrician was called to service and rectify the re-occurring problem with the circuit breakers. However, the electrician refused to do any rectification and told Dave Moreton that work for electrical installation should be carried out properly otherwise a fire could occur. 3.11 Another electrician by the name of Mr. Arnold Addis who attended the talent contest claims that the problems in the circuit were all resolved before the event. He also denied any tampering to prevent it from tripping during the event. However, Addis disclosed that while switching off the stage lightings after show he heard buzzing noise but cannot find its source. David Moreton also confirmed that he had switched off the rest of the lighting before leaving the premises through the main switch located at the command override unit. 3.12 During the incident response, although the building seems secured while the first appliance arrived, Frank Davies noticed that internal fire exit door from the blue room was open while unlocking the door for the fire crews to enter. The exit door was equipped with panic bolt and can only be opened from the inside. David Moreton on the other hand said it could have been left open by performers during the event but also agreed that it should be normally closed. 3.13 Mortise locks and a Yale secure the external doors while the kitchen’s internal door was secure by a lone mortise lock. The key officials holding the keys for these doors are Frank Davies, Dave Moreton, and Ron Smith. 3.14 The intrude alarm was not completely effective according to Davies and Moreton as the three sensors are not working properly to cover the whole area. Therefore, it is possible to have access and move around in the ancillary without tripping the alarm. 3.15 The tills that have some metal components and contain the earnings of the previous events were missing after the fire. Although it has been suggested that they were probably completely destroyed by the fire, bar person Barry Davies who was at the scene and examining the bar area confirmed that it is not possible as glass bottles and tea towels near the tills are not damaged by the fire. Moreover, there was a lot of coinage in the tills that should be found. 3.16 The gas powered heating system for the main hall was defective during the fire and the other heaters located in the bar loung were turned off according Davies. The electric heater adjacent to the stage was also reported defective but Dave Moreton said that it was working as he had knowledge of complaints filed by guest that someone had burnt his leg from this heater while watching the show. The other wall mounted electric heaters and two portable electric heaters were turned off. 3.17 Smoking in the bar lounge is permitted and ash trays were provided to the customers. Three large plastic swing lid waster bins are being use for garbage disposal. One is located near the entrance foyer, one in the male’s toilets, and the other is in the bar store. 3.18 The Watch Manager was called to assist in the fire investigation of the incident at around 19:00 of the December 7. 3.19 At around 11:00 hours of the same day the investigation was officially handed to me. 4. SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY 4.1 In the evening before the fire occurs, the building was used to hold a talent contest. Three hundred people attended the event and left around midnight. The last person to leave the building was Hall Keeper David Moreton who was preparing for a craft fair that will be held the following day. The building was secured at around 0255 hours. 5. DISCOVERY OF FIRE 5.1 The following information was submitted by witnesses to the Watch Manager on duty and was recorded at around 9:45 of March 3, 2008. 5.2 At around 0311 hours of December 6, 2004, a call was received from a certain Mrs. Earnshaw of 667 Market Street that she saw a fire in the area of the main entrance located at the South East corner of Scarborough Civil Hall. 5.3 Mr. Frank Davies was called upon by the ADT alarm call centre and saw the fire near the main entrance layer and in the roof vent as he approached the building from the Market Street. 5.4 It took approximately 4 minutes for the Scarborough fire and rescue service to reach the incident. Smoke coming from the building can be seen from the appliance location but there were no flames visible yet on the back of the building. 5.5 The wind velocity at that time was around 5 miles per hour. 5.6 The key holder directed the fire fighters to the entrance door near the kitchen at the North gable elevation. 6. AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED 6.1 The fire stated at the main hall where the stage is located. The stage contains several portable lighting lights connected to dimmer units. The link was set up in a way that weight of the suspended power supply cables was supported by the plug conductor lamps. 7. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE/PERFORMANCE OF BLDG. CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIALS 7.1 Generally, the fire rapid spread due to the significant amount of combustible materials in the area such as internal furnishings upholstered by polyurethane foam and Formica. The area was filled combustible decorations such a fabric and plastics. The flying gallery above the stage had fabric backdrops. Moreover, the designated store room was also filled with highly combustible materials such as clothes, carpets, and other items being use for the show. 7.2 The materials used in the building were generally laminated timber, cedar and fibre board, plasterboard for the internal walls with gloss paint finish. 7.3 There were no suspended ceiling and the vaulted roof was made of timber particle board with layers of bitumen felt. 7.4 The only non-combustible part of the building is the concrete floor. 7.5 The fire inside the building grew rapidly with the help of oxygen supply coming wide open internal fire exit door. More over, the roof vent also influences its growth. 7.6 Oxygen supply was increased when the fire fighters opened several small windows to vent the smoke in the kitchen. The hot gases will flow out through the top of the window while fresh air will flow in through the lower part. Although the actions of the fire fighters would ease the thermal load inside the building, the oxygen in the fresh would increase the energy release rate further causing a flashover. 7.7 Fires inside an enclosure behave differently as shown below. After ignition, the fire grows and generates energy depending on the fuel available. At this stage, the enclosure does not effect the development of the fire. The energy that is being release is slow at the beginning but toxic and non-toxic gases may be produced (Karlsson & Quintiere 2000, p.4). As shown above, the fire grows due to ignition of secondary fuel packages while the upper layer temperature rise producing heat radiation that can ignite combustible materials inside the enclosure. In a certain time, due to the rapid increase in the release rate of energy being generated by the growing fire, a flashover will occur. A flashover is commonly viewed as an abrupt and swift transition from a growing fire to a fully developed. At this stage, the fire becomes more powerful and destructive. After the flashover and in the fully developed stage and as shown above, the heat continues to rise. In a fully developed stage, as discussed with fire development in Scarborough Civil Hall, the fire extends out through the enclosure openings. This is the reason why witnesses saw flames at the roof vent. And because there are significant oxygen coming in and considerable amount of highly combustible materials inside the building, the fire burns continuously. In contrast, an enclosure without openings or limited oxygen leakage would starve the fire and the hot layer would go down toward the flame region. With little or no oxygen the fire may soon die. This is shown by the dotted line at lower part of the diagram. However, with abundance of oxygen supply, the fire will continue until it consumed all combustible materials including the enclosure (Karlsson & Quintiere 2000, p.6). 8. CAUSES CONSIDERED Electrical Defect 8.1 Although nobody admits that a rectification was made to the 32 amp circuit breaker to prevent it from tripping during the event, one possible cause of fire was from an electrical fault. The supply cable connecting the portable dimmer lights to the dimmer units may have strained to the point that it short circuited but did not trip the circuit breaker due to rectifications done earlier. However, there is no direct evidence suggesting that the circuit actually did not trip. This cause is possibility and should be considered. Heating Equipment 8.2 The gas powered heating units at the main hall was defective but there is a possibility that the remaining wall mounted electric heater was never turned off as evidence by confusing statements from both Davies and Moreton. However, the possibility of fire occurring from these heaters is too small considering that the fire was noticed only an hour after the last person left the building. If overheating caused this fire, it could have been a much later than the first discovery of the fire. This cause is therefore eliminated. Smoking Materials 8.3 Although cigarette smoking was allowed, it is unlikely to have started the fire considering the fact that some of the combustible items in the bar are still intact after the fire was suppressed. This cause therefore is eliminated. Deliberate Ignition 8.4 Another possible cause of fire is deliberate fire starting or arson. This is because there is a doubt concerning the missing tills and the wide open internal exit doors. The most likely motive is to cover up the real reason for missing the tills containing the earnings from the previous event. The coins inside the till were never found while combustible items near the tills were still intact. The notion that the tills were completely burned should be put aside. Moreover, both Davies and Moreton were aware that the intruder alarm was defective and only three people have the keys. 9. CONCLUSION 9.1 Based on gathered information, the cause of the fire was more likely deliberate and done by the same person who took the missing tills. 9.2 The possibility of electrical fault is minor since there was no substantial evidence to prove that the circuit breakers were modified for the event. There was no direct evidence to link a short circuit supply cable. In addition, all witnesses claim that they have turned off these lights before they left the building. 9.3 The most possible cause of the fire therefore is arson motivated by cover-up. Evidence shows that the tills is missing, the internal exit door was wide open, only three people have the keys to the building, the intruder alarm was faulty, and conflicting statements from the people who are supposedly managing the affairs of the building. 10. REFERENCES Karlsson & Quintierre (2000), Enclosure Fire Dynamics, CRC Press, US 11. LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX A Read More