Fire Investigation in Lancashire Fire and Rescue Services - Report Example

Lancashire Fire and Rescue Services Incident Number: 493 Date of Incident: 12/6/2009 Time of Call: 03:11 Date and Time of Investigation: Address of Incident: Scarborough Civic Hall, Market Street Owned by: Scarborough Borough Council Occupied by: Scarborough Recreation and Leisure Limited Trade/Business: Police Officer Dealing: CRS No: 1 . Introduction and Curriculum Vitae 1.1 My name is [], an employee of Lancashire Fire and Rescue Services (LFRS). My main designation in the organization is [] whose main responsibility includes [], [], and []. I have been in the position for [] years. I have attended various seminars and trainings that are designed to reinforce my knowledge and skills in fire-fighting. My exposure to fire and risk management has also been considerable particularly since my main tasks involve me in various fire emergency responses involving serious injuries, major destruction in properties, fatalities, and crime-related fire emergencies. I am also a member of the local and national societies of fire fighters where members were constantly updated to the techniques, approaches, and modern methodologies of fire fighting. 1.2 I was stationed in the [] area in Lancashire. When the distress call was made and the location was identified to be within our area of responsibility, I, together with [] and [] responded on the scene to investigate the fire emergency and conduct fire investigation. 1.3 The photographs mentioned in the report below refer to the photograph attached in the appendices. 1.4 The comments and opinions expressed in this report are based on the information available as of this writing. It is highly likely that the information contained in this report be altered to suit the facts indicated by the evidences gathered and analyzed in the course of investigation; or when new testimonies of witnesses outweigh the previous ones. 2. Description of Premises 2.1 The property is a detached single storey building whose external dimension is 36m x 22m. The floor houses the dance hall, stage area, catering facilities, and licensed bar. The main structure of the building is consisted of laminated timber portal frames with stud framed walls. The exterior is composed of cedar boarding while fibre boarding dominates the interior walls. The walls show numerous treatment of gloss paint or varnish during its lifetime. The vaulted roof was constructed using timber particle board with layers of bitumen superimposed to each other to provide additional support. The floor is concrete. No suspended ceilings were noted. 2.2 The foyer opens directly to the main hall and the stage. Entry to the main hall from the outside can be done through the door on the west side and through two separate doors on both sides of the gabble elevation of the building. 2.3 From the foyer in a clockwise fashion, one can see the following rooms: cloak room, store, store, WC, DIS WC, WC, Kitchen, blue room and green room (located at the back of the stage), store, bar store, and bar lounge. Access from foyer to cloak room, store, store, WC, DIS WC, and WC is through separate doors from the main hall. Access from the main hall to the kitchen is through a series of doors. A door adjacent to the kitchen opens at the gabble elevation of the building. The blue room and the green room is accessed by going through the stage. 2.4 Access to the stage from the main hall way is through the stairs located on the sides of the stage. The stage wall separates the stage from the green and blue room. Access to the green and blue rooms from the stage is through another set of stairs leading to the raised platform where the blue and the green rooms were located. 2.5 The lighting control panel is located directly above the main entrance hall on the foyer side. Access to the lighting control panel is through a service ladder that leads directly to the lighting control platform. 2.6 The electric supply of the property and the gas supply were centralized. The main gas powered the property’s heating systems. Heating system is consisted of two wall mounted heaters and fan assisted heater. The heater in the main hall was defective during the fire incident and the wall mounted heater on the bar area serves as the primary source of building heat. 2.7 The main hall is illuminated by six double-fitted fluorescent bulbs (located on the sides of the ceiling) and nine glass pendants (three per set) are fitted in the apex of the ceiling. Additional lighting fixtures are noted on the stage by a scaffolding tube at a ceiling level. All lights directed to the centre stage is controlled by a raised platform about 4m in height accessible by a timber Jacobs Ladder. 2.8 The furniture and furnishing present during the event of fire includes polyurethane foam upholstered chairs, wooden Formica covered tables were also found on the main hall and bar lounge. 2.9 The interior decorations of the property during the event of fire include six plastic bells suspended from the ceiling, two large artificial Christmas trees measuring 2 m tall, tinsel streamers, and eight plastic fan decorations. 2.10 Flying gallery is note din the stage backdrop. Stage props were stored in the Green room. Props include rolls of carpet, clothes, and other small items. 2.11 The property is owned by Scarborough Borough Council. 2.12 Scarborough Recreation and Leisure Limited occupied and operated on the property during the event of fire incident. 3. Type of Incident 3.1 The incident reported on 0311 hour, Sunday, December 6, 2003 involves major destruction of properties. 3.2 During the fire incident, the property located at Market Street does not contain any human inhabitants. The fire broke out a few hours after a local talent show was held in the premise and it was completely evacuated. 3.3 Witnesses reported fire on the South-Eastern corner of the building. The two responding appliance confirmed the location of the fire on the building. 3.4 With the aid of Frank Davies, the person key holder, responding fire fighters gain access into the building to attempt a fire fight. The fire fighters were in full breathing apparatus (BA) equipment gear. 3.5 The BA team noticed that the smoke evidence in the kitchen suggests that the fire has not yet enveloped the entire area of the building. 3.6 Upon entry to the main hall, the BA team encountered thick column of smoke on the ceiling level. Smoke visibility is at 0.5 meters. BA team did not encounter any flames as they were enveloped in thick smoke. The team hears something above their heads that they believed to be jets of fire. 3.7 Upon the advice of ADO Smith, the BA team withdraw from the main hall as the temperature becomes very hot and visibility becomes negligible. 4. Situation Prior Discovery 4.1 The recreation facility of the property was used for a talent contest on the evening of December 5, 2003. There were approximately 300 people in attendance to the said event. 4.2 David Moreton, the Hall Keeper, was the last person to leave the premise at 0255 hours after preparing the hall for a craft fair that is to take place the following day. He stacked 200 polyurethane chairs (stacks of ten, 20 stacks) and placed it near the main entrance. 4.3 About 0306, ADT alarm call centre received an intruder alarm signal from the property. ADT immediately made contact to Frank Davies, the elected key holder, to inform him of the alarm. 4.4 Frank Davies declined to attend to the situation and referred Ron Smith, the property’s secretary, to ADT. 4.5 ADT was unable to establish contact with Ron Smith. ADT made another contact to Frank Davies. 4.6 Frank Davies arrived at the property about the same time Mrs Earnshaw from 667 Market Street made a call to the fire station. 5. Discovery of Fire 5.1 The following were the information obtained from witness accounts, the dispatcher’s transcript, and the notes provided by the on-site fire respondents. This information was recorded in my duty diary on []. 5.2 The incident was reported at 0311 Saturday, 6th of December 2003 as a fire on property by a Mrs Earnshaw of 667 Market Street. She reported visual sighting of the fire as her dwelling overlooked the property. 5.3 Mrs Earnshaw reported seeing flames in the area of the Main Entrance at the Southeast Corner of the building. 5.4 At approximately the same time, Mr Frank Davies, the bar person and key holder for the property arrived to the scene because of the call made by ADT to him about the tripping of the property’s intruder alarm signal about 0306 hours. His observation on the building was similar to the observation reported by Mrs Earshaw over the telephone 5.5 Two teams of fire fighters were deployed. Frank Davies introduced himself to the fire fighters and reported what he saw to the team. He also directed the fire fighters to the entrance door adjacent to the kitchen using the property’s keys in his possession. 5.6 The property was empty of human inhabitants during the event. There were no reported casualties or injured during the whole duration of the fire. 6. Area where the Fire started 6.1 There is no way to determine where exactly did the fire start in the property but the evidences and the statements of the witnesses suggest that the fire broke on the south-east area of the property. The thick smoke and the absence of visible fire in the main hall as observed by the BA team suggest that the fire was somewhere overhead. 6.2 Inspection of the floor plan of the property suggests that the fire could have originated in the raised control room found directly overhead the main door from the foyer leading to the main hall. The arrangement of the furniture during the event suggests that the fire has spread to the nearby 200 chairs stacked atop each other. 7. Development of the Fire/ Performance of Building Construction Materials 7.1 The fire was started and raged for a long period of time due to the highly combustible materials present in the physical construction of the property. The walls separating the main hall from the outside is composed only of cedar boarding to the outside and fibre boarding to the inside supported by laminated timber portal frames which are all made of highly combustible celluloid serving as fuels for the fire. 7.2 The fire could have started in any of the faulty electrical wiring in the raised control platform. Debris from the elevated fire could have fallen to the stacked chairs, igniting fire in the lower area. The thick smoke emission during the fire could have come from the burned polyurethane foam upholstered chairs whereas the jet of fire overhead observed by the BA team could come from the raised control room. 7.3 The fire is localized on the south-east area of the property. The containment of the fire is partly due to the general lay-out of the floor plan and the addition of the combustible furnishing in the area. When the fire broke out on the South East part of the property, the adjacent combustible materials like the internal fibre boarding and the external fibre boarding were easily consumed. 7.4 The absence of a good ventilation of the structure contributed to the production of thick smoke inside the main hall. Visible fires were noted on the roof vent and under the eaves where the amount of oxygen present in the area is sufficient for complete combustion. Well-developed flames were also noted in the foyer and in the bar lounge area. 7.5 The location of the fire makes it difficult for the BA team to access, identify the source, and initiate an aggressive fire safety measures in the main hall. 7.6 The Northerly wind blowing during the event of fire could have contributed to the combustion and the spread of the fire (Bovyn, 2009) sas it provides enough amount of oxygen for combustion inside the property (Gula, 2009). 7.7 The direction of the wind could have contributed to the localization of the fire (Bovyn, 2009) as fire direction is kept away from other highly combustible materials inside the building premise. 7.8 The fire rescue team decided to tackle the problem with a defensive tactic. 7.9 The part of the building that was consumed with fire was severely damaged that thorough inspection of the cause of the fire does not yield anything relevant or inspection is impossible to perform. 8. Causes Considered Electrical Defect 8.1 The following information was obtained from the existing building documents, interview with the key persons and witnesses, and the facts and evidences obtained during the investigation. 8.2 The electrical wirings of the building which was built in 1965 have been rewired in the last seven years by Nichols Contracting (Barrow) Ltd. Subsequent electrical inspections made by the contractor showed satisfactory results. 8.2 The stage lighting was professionally installed in September 2003 by Southern Stage Service. 8.3 Recurring electrical issues on the stage lighting system were reported. Four 32 Amp circuit breakers controlling the newly installed dimmer packs kept tripping out. 8.4 Two days before the December 5, 2003 event in the property, David Moreton made contact with an electrician to fix potential electrical problems which could disrupt the function of the dimmer packs during the talent show. The electrician, Andy Townsend, opined and gave his opinion that there is a serious risk of fire incident if the electrical wiring will not be tested and necessary repairs will not be performed. 8.5 It was identified that the weight of a particular supply cable was supported by plug conductor clamps which is not a standard practice for this type of electrical installations. It was hypothesized that such set up introduces strain on the supply cable which could have caused it to trip the circuit breakers. 8.6 No corrective actions and preventive maintenance was performed (as per record and witness accounts) to correct this potential threat, even after the warning /precauation made by Townsend. David Moreton conferred with Arnold Addis, a lighting technician from Scarborough Amateurs Association and took his advice with regards to the functionality of his electrical system. 8.7 There was an incident during the talent night where one of the stag- light tripped out. The issue was resolved by plugging the light into a spare socket. 8.8 According to Moreton, he switched off all the electrical connections to the stage lighting via the main switch panel before he left the premise a few minutes before the fire incident was reported. Smoking Materials 8.9 Fire ignition due to smoking materials could also be considered as one of the possible causes of the fire since the location of the risk factors of smoking materials are very adjacent to the location of fire (Henderson & Ginger, 2008; Brown, 2009). 8.10 Smoking is allowed in the bar lounge of the premise. Ashtrays were provided. 8.11 In addition to ash trays, three large plastic swing lid waste bins were provided in strategic locations – outside the gentlemen’s room, outside the bar store, and adjacent to the entrance foyer. Heating Appliances 8.12 There were two wall-mounted main gas heaters located in the bar lounge operating during the talent show. Davies attested that these heaters were turned off before he left the property. 8.13 The heaters in the main hall were defective and thus non-operational during the whole duration of the talent show. 8.14 Moreton verified this information and added that he checked that all the heaters were turned off before he left the premise. Deliberate Ignition 8.15 There are some evidences that suggest that deliberate ignition or arson was the main cause of the fire incident. 8.16 Moreton attested that he secured all locks when he left the premise. 8.17 At 0306 hour, the ADT intruder alarm system was tripped. ADT made a call to Frank Davies and informed him about the alarm. 8.17 When Frank Davies opened the rear door to let the BA team inside the property; he noted that the internal fire exit door from the blue room is wide open which he believes an unusual thing. The fire exit door can only be opened from the inside of the property. 8.18 There were only three people who possess the access keys for the building. 8.19 Neither Davies nor Moreton could assure that the internal fire exit door was close and secured. 8.20 Davies and Moreton agreed that the alarm system is somehow defective as anyone can walk right through it and reach the main hall without tripping the alarm. 8.21 There were no reported losses of valuables inside the building premise. Conclusion 9.1 Based on the results of the investigation and by the evidences on the matter, it is highly probable that the cause of the fire was electrical failure. 9.2 A professional electrician has pointed earlier that corrective means must be performed in order to avoid any fire incident. However, there was no appropriate action taken on the part of the property caretakers. 9.3 Loose wirings, stressed electrical fixtures, and unsecured electrical connections could easily cause fire once spark is initiated and the protective covering of the electrical wire is melted or the conducting live wire is exposed to air (Henderson & Ginger, 2008). Moreover, previous incidents where the circuit breakers were tripped because of the wrong electrical installations are good indications that such event will occur again in the future. 9.4 There are no other possible sources of ignition. All the heaters were turned off before the premise was vacated; the doors were securely locked; ignition of the plastic bags in the waste bins could not have spread so rapidly or could not have caused a fire emergency of such magnitude. 9.5 The tripping of the alarm system could have been caused by a short circuit in the alarm system’s electrical wiring which could have been induced by the major short-circuit occurring in the control platform. 9.6 The location of the fire is consistent with the location of the control room. The only fire risk identified in the control room is the unsafe electrical fixture which could cause fire incident, as was opined by Townsend. 9.7 Debris containing fire elements must have fallen into the stacked chair resulting to the spread of fire in the area and the production of thick smoke. References Bovyn, B. (2009). Is Emergency Management Meeting Public Expectations? IAEM Bulletin. 26(1). 5 Brown, N. (Autumn 2009). Victoria’s New Building Code: Quick Fix or Long-term Solution. Fire Australia. 24. Gula, N. (Spring 2009). Pulling Together During Disaster. Disaster Management Canada. 3(1); 19-20 Henderson, D. & J. Ginger. (2008). Role of Building Codes and Construction Standards in Windstorm Disaster Mitigation. Australian Journal of Emergency Management. 23(2). 40-46 Read More