Ad Fire and Rescue Service - Report Example

AD FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE: Incident Number: INCIDENT 493 Date of Incident: 6TH DECEMBER 2009 Time of Call: 0311 Date and time of investigation: 26/03/2010, 1100hrs Address of Incident: Scarborough Civic Hall, Market Street Owned By: Scarborough Borough Council Occupied By: Scarborough Recreation and Leisure Limited Trade/Business: Public Hall Police Officer Dealing: PC CRS no: 1 INTRODUCTION AND CURRICULUM VITAE 1.1 Having been employed by the AD Fire and Rescue Service as a member of the watch manager's team with a current role of Incident Intelligence Officer. My employment with the AD Fire and Rescue Service started way back in…….and my main role with the company is that of supporting and conducting fire investigation in AD when the fire in question involves financial loss, criminal arson, serious injury and fatalities. Having investigated fires of varying magnitude and nature in my career and having completed all Fire Service statutory promotion exams, I would say my entry into the Institute of Fire Engineers through examination was a great achievement in my career. 1.2 My current posting is based at the AD FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE, as a Watch Manager which falls under fire investigations department. 1.3 photographs that are/will be mentioned in this report will be found in the Appendix section. 1.4 It is very important to note that the comments and/or opinions that may/will be expressed in the report will/are based on the information provided to me meaning that any additional information provided will lead to an alteration to the same or amend them. 2 DESCIPTION OF THE PREMISES 2.1 The Scarborough Civic Hall was constructed in 1965 as public utility hall that comprised catering facilities, a bar and recreational facilities (stage and dance floor). The hall had consisted of laminated timber portal frames that had stud framed walls, there was fibre boarding to the inside while the cedar boarding was on the outside. Internally, the wall linings had been of plasterboard with glass fibre to fill in. There was a vaulted roof mainly made of timber particle board that had layers of bitumen while the floor of the building was that of concrete (see Appendix A). The main hall had six double fluorescent tubes were used to illuminate the main hall, the tubes were designed to ran down on either sides of the ceiling, the tubes were situated approximately past midway up the vault. Each fitting had been fitted with nine bulbs, all totalling to eighty-one. Stage lighting had been fitted to a scaffolding tube that was at the ceiling level, some three meters from the stage. The Scarborough Civic Hall had been served by a mains gas that had been used to power the existing heating systems then. There was also a fan assisted heater that was located in the main hall while two other wall mounted heaters had been situated in the bar lounge thus providing the primary heat source n the building. The heater that was initially in the main hall had been inoperable and defective when the incident occurred. The defect with the primary hating source had been replaced with supplementary heating systems of a mounted electric heater that hung on the wall situated within the bar area. 2.2 fittings and Furniture In the beginning, the Scarborough Civic Hall's seats were those of polyurethane benches that had with time been stacked in the main hall of the premises after they were replaced. There were also another stacked pile of the same benches in the cloakroom (110 seats) while an additional six seats and stools had been placed on the high level platform. The openings between the bar, hall and lounge had all been suspended with fabrics while the hall ad then been decorated for the Christmas festivities. There was also a room that had been designed as a Green Room and was then being used as a store; stage props, clothes and roles of carpet had been placed there. 2.1 2.3 Access from the outside into the building was mainly through four main entrances, two on the northern side and the other three situated on the east and southern sides of the hall. 2.4 stairs were located on the northern side of the hall. 2.5 The hall was supplied with gas and electricity but there was absence of smoke detectors within the building. 2.6 The Scarborough Civic Hall is owned by the Scarborough Borough Council 2.7 Scarborough Civic Hall has an agreement with the Scarborough Recreation and Leisure Limited on the renting of the hall. 3 THE OF INCIDENT 3.1 The accident was reported at 0311 on 6/12/03 by a neighbor who had seen flames from the southern main entrance to the hall. Flames could be seen from the neighbors window ad thus she dully called in the authorities. 4 SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY An approximate three hundred people had used the premises prior on the day of the actual incident on 5th Dec 2003, there had been a talent event that had taken place and had ended at around midnight.The bar finally closed soon after all the visitors and patrons had left, there had been around £3000 that had been taken, (the original float of £4000 which was in notes and coins). The bar person responsible for the safekeeping of the money then decided not to deposit it in the hall's safe that was situated in the bar store, his argument being, the doors between the bar the store and bar lounge had been previously removed for maintenance purpose and thus the safe was in direct view to the public. The patron then felt that placing the money in the safe would thus lead to a security risk. The patron was last to leave the hall's premises and had thus left t ready for the next days event, he had thus been able to clear the hall by stacking two hundred chairs in groups of ten near the halls main entrance, he then left the hall secure at 0255 hourss. At exactly at 0306 hours (7minutes after the patron had left) an intruder alarm signal was set off ad thus appropriately received by the ADT alarm call centre. ADT then alerted Frank Davies a nominated key holder of the premises who initially declined to attend to the matter referring them to Ron Smith the Company's Secretary. ADT unable to get to the Company's secretary, Mr. Smith then rang Frank Davies back. Frank Davies then attended to the premises in approximately five minutes. In his approach from market Street, Mr. Smith then observed fire inside the building mainly in the main entrance foyer with flames coming from a roof vent. Initial distress call to the local Fire Service department was made by a Mrs. Earnshaw whose dwelling overlooked the Scarborough Civic Hall, she had seen the fire from her bedroom window. She was also able to observe flames in the main entrance of the Scarborough Civic Hall at the South east corner of the building. 4.1 5 DISCOVERY OF FIRE After approximately 16 minutes after the hall's patron left at 0311.11 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003 the Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service received the initial nine calls to the Civic Hall Market Street Scarborough. Their control centre then mobilised two appliances from station P73 of the Scarborough fire department, the Assistant Divisional Officer Smith was then informed of the incident. It took approximately 4 minutes for the fire engines to arrive at the incident scene. Ire engine P730 then approached the incident scene via the Millfold and Industry Street. The fire engine was initially parked in the car park that was at the rear of the premises half-way down the building adjacent and to the external double fire exit doors. ADO Smith was already in attendance at the rear of the hall and in the process of getting dressed in fire kit and this was dully noted by Sub Officer Jones. From where the fire engine was, there was visible smoke issuing from the building. Since there were no flames showing on the rear elevation at this time, this lead to the fire fighting team to assume that the fire was at its initial stage. The key holder had then approached the incident site via the main entrance off the Market Street opposite the war memorial; he had then seen what seemed to be a well developed fire with flames showing at a roof vent and under the eaves. This lead him to inform Fire-fighter O’Riley that he had actually observed fire in the hall on his approach and is belief was that the flames were from the South East corner of the hall, though he did not have a clue of the extent of the damages to the hall. It is at this point that fire engine P731 approached the incident site through the entrance off Market Street only a minute and twelve seconds after fire engine P730. On arrival, the crew was able to see a well developed fire that was in the bar lounge and main foyer. Fire engine P731 then parked on the South West end corner of the hall way in sight of fire engine P730. Fire engine P730 was then reversed and re-sited to the corner of the building adjacent to the door that was then opened by the key holder. ADO Smith then instructed Sub Officer Jones to try and gain access to the building to help attempt location of the fire and thus fight the fire. Sub Officer Jones then entered the unlocked door into the kitchen, after walking around the building and dully surveying the incident, he saw evidence of smoke at the ceiling level of the kitchen thus opened some windows to help vent some of the smoke. The BA team entered the building carrying a Motorola MT2100 radio believed to be set on ‘channel 1’Directed by the key holder towards the main hall. Fire-fighter Oaks was team leader and thus carried the radio, while the other Fire-fighter carried the Dragon Light. The route taken by the first BA team is shown in appendix A. the team then entered the main hall and it was then that it became hotter with visibility levels reduced by smoke to approximately half a metre. The crew did not see any flames but they could hear what they then believed to be fire travelling above their heads. ADO Smith was able to observe the extent of the fire on the other side of the hall, he then returned to the entry point and then he immediately ordered the withdrawal of the Breathing Apparatus Team this was due to poor visibility and the hot state of the building then. At 0332.26 hours is when a message was sent informing control that BA teams had been withdrawn. the time between fire engine P730 booking in attendance at 0321.56 hours and the informing of Control that BA teams had been withdrawn at 0332.26 hours was just a 10 minutes and thirty seconds interval. Within which time the driver sent an assistance message, re-sited the fire engine and pulled off hose reel ready to fight the fire. 5.1 This is the account given to the Watch Manager at the AD fire and rescue service the information was recorded on 6TH DECEMBER 2009. 5.2 Some time after, the neighbors had reported that something was burning in the house. The neighbor then called the fire department stating that she had seen fire from her bedroom window in the hall. 6 AREA WHERE FIRE STARTED The fire is thought to have started on the southern main entrance side of the building according to a neighbor who saw the first flames and reported immediately. Wind was blowing from the southern end of the premises and this had greatly accelerated the fire, had the fire started on the northern side with the wind blowing from the south, the fire would have been easily contained. The stacked seats in the bar lounge had accelerated the fire since they were also in close proximity to the electrical control centre. Since the building was severely damaged during the fire and thus demolished later the same day, an examination of the fire scene was hard to carry out but the fire is believed to have started in the main hall on the southern side's main entrance according to an eye witness. The firefighters who were able to enter the building on the opposite Northern Gable Elevation dully noted that the ancillary rooms were completely free of heat or smoke and that they only encountered smoke once they had entered the main hall. 6.1 The area where the fire started was in the hall according to the firefighter's crew. 7. Development of the fire/performance of building construction and materials In any development of a fire, there are three critical stages that the fire will go through; growth period is when the fire has just started and the fire at this stage will burn at a constant slow speed. The next stage is the flashover being the most dangerous stage of a fire (this will happen within vey few seconds). The then goes into the fully developed stage and lastly the decay stage/period when the fire slowly dies out. See figure 2 below, (Figure 2) In the case of the Scarborough Civic Hall incident, the flashover occurred within seconds with the acceleration of the fire being the wind blowing from the southern end of the building and the fact that the fire had rapidly and easily got to the stacked seats in the lounge in close proximity to the electrical control unit of the building. The flashback period in this incident was greatly increased by the fact that wind was blowing from the southern side of the hall this added to the staked seats and the building materials used then, the fire had thus rapidly spread. The fact that the fire crew members had only entered the hall from one side also accelerated the incident's rate of burning since the crew members were fighting against the wind. 7.1 The fire was able to rapidly develop due to the stacked seats and the dry wood present, the fire had been initially been seen and reported by a neighbor to the civic hall, the lady had clearly observed flames through her bedroom window in the main entrance of the hall at the South east end of the building. The wind was blowing from the south and since the fire had started from that end, the fire was rapidly accelerated when the seats in the bar lounge caught fire (the seats were in close proximity to the electrical control switch). . 8 CAUSES CONSIDERED 8.1 Smoking materials The bar had allowed smoking and thus ash trays dully were provided to the smokers within the Scarborough Civic Hall.hree large plastic swing lid waste bins had been situated within the hall premises: one adjacent to the entrance foyer, another was set at the gents toilets and the last one located outside the bar's store. 8.2 Heating system appliances There was a gas fuelled primary heating unit in the main hall that was defective at the time of the fire this lead to the management using a wall mounted electric heater that was situated opposite the bar adjacent to the stage. There were more wall mounted electric heaters and at least two portable electric heaters within the rooms at the rear of the stage. Dave Moreton confirmed that he checked these rooms before he left the premises and thus he confirmed that all these heaters were switched off. 8.3 Deliberate ignition Deliberate ignition could have been another cause to the fire since it was evidently concluded that the contents of the tills were missing during the incident of the fire, the other reason for this line of thought is due to the fact that the intruder alarm had gone off meaning that someone may have had access to the building after it was secured. This was also proven when the key person let in the fire crew members into the incident's premises and found the fire exit widely open despite the fact that he clearly remembered securing it from the inside. The fire exit could only be opened from the inside meaning that someone either had access to the building prior to the incident or they were deliberately left within the building after lockdown. This could have been the thief who had previously stolen from the hall and had come in for a second time only that this time they did not want any evidence left behind. 9 Conclusions The fire could have been an arson attack although one can not completely rule out electrical and/or gas fault. The reason as to why one may consider an arson attack is due to the fact that the contents to the till were missing (£4000), an intruder alarm had been set off and the fat that a fire escape route was widely open once the key person let into the building the fire fighters. The other mystery that points to arson and/or robbery is the fact that the premises had been previously broken into and money stole and the fact that the building was immediately destroyed after the fire meaning that someone could have been trying to cover up something they did. The previous tampering of the hall's circuit breakers may have also been a trigger to a second fire within the building, this is due to the fact that a technician called in to repair the circuit breakers had declined saying that this would to a higher risk of a fire incident within the hall premises. One important question that comes into mind is why the building was demolished on the same day of the incident, usually the site of an incident is secured until full investigations are carried out, and this then leaves an accusing finger o the management of the hall's premises. The contents f the till may have been taken by e bar person and due to an electrical tampering, the incident occurred and since the management did not want to be discovered that they had actually tampered with the circuit breakers, they ordered the building be demolished. LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX A: PHOTOGRAPHS Signature: Fire investigator: Rank name and number of investigating officer in full: Date of completion of report: Report endorsed by: Signature: APPENDIX A (INITIAL VIEW OF THE SCARBOROUGH CIVIC HALL) APPENDIX B (ENTRY ROUTE OF FIRE FIGHTERS CREW) ()() Read More