Fire Investigation Analysis: Scarborough Civil Hall - Report Example

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT SCARBOROUGH CIVIC HALL PRESENTED TO ( ) BY ( ) (DATE) 1. INTRODUCTION AND CURRICULUM VITAE Academic Background: I graduated with an MSc in Structural & Fire Safety Engineering at University of Edinburgh in 2008. I have also successfully completed Fire investigation courses at the Service Training Centre. In addition, I have completed all Fire Service Statutory promotion exams. Further to that, I have secured membership into the Institution of Fire Engineers through examination which included fire investigation. Background and Professional Experience: I am an expert in Fire Investigation with my area of specialization being fires, explosions, industrial incidents and codes. I am employed by Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service as a Watch Manager and my current duties and responsibilities are primarily to conduct and supervise all aspects of fire investigations from the start of an assignment to its completion. More specifically, I am tasked with carrying out and supporting the investigation of fires that involve serious injuries, fatalities, great financial loss and criminal arson incidents. During the course of my career, I have investigated several fires of different natures and scales. Previously, I worked for the Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service where I was responsible for origin and cause investigations. I likewise supervised follow-up on non-compliance; fire company assessments of commercial occupancies; plan review and assessment of modern fire suppression/ protection systems; assessment of high risk properties; and the assessment of construction of high risk buildings. I am also a member of the Fire Protection Association and the Association for Specialist Fire Protection actively involved in the related committees. Brief: I am currently posted at Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service as a Watch Manager and I was requested to conduct this investigation within this capacity. My brief was to carry out the fire investigation detailing areas such as the fire development and potential causes of the fire and summarily compile a fire investigation report on the same. 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PREMISES 2.1 The Scarborough Civic Hall was constructed in 1965. The Scarborough Civic Hall was a public amenity building and its main function was to provide catering facilities, recreation facilities such as the stage area and dance floor. 2.2 It consisted of a detached single storey building measuring 36m x 22m (see figure 1). The hall structure comprised of a laminated timber portal frame with stud framed walls, fibre boarding to the inside and cedar boarding to the outside. The internal wall linings were plasterboard with glass fibre in fill. 2.3 From its construction in 1965, the walls of the building had variously been treated with different applications of varnish or gloss paint.1 2.4 Significantly, with regards to the fire dynamics the hall did not have any suspended ceilings (see figure 2). 2.5 The main hall was lighted by six double fluorescent tubes along each side of the ceiling about three quarters of the way up the vault. Nine glass pendant lights hung from the ceiling in sets of three, one at the apex of the ceiling and one either side. 2.6 Each fitting had nine bulbs totalling eighty-one. 2.7 The building was supplied with mains gas which powered the heating system and electricity. The main source of heating was a fan assisted heater contained in the main hall and two wall mounted heaters in the bar lounge and a wall mounted electric heater located in the bar area. 2.8 The internal furnishings of the hall comprised of fixed bench style polyurethane foam upholstered seating in the bar lounge, about two hundred polyurethane foam upholstered chairs in the main hall and approximately fifty polyurethane foam upholstered PVC covered stools in the main hall and bar lounge (see Figure 3). 2.9 There were several wooden Formica covered tables measuring approximately 1.3m x 0.66m in the main hall and bar lounge. Several decorations such as tinsel and plastic fan decorations hung from the ceiling and walls. 2.91 The Green Room stored stage props, comprising of three rolls of carpet, clothes and other miscellaneous items. 3. TYPE OF INCIDENT 3.1 The Caretaker of the hall secured the premises at 0255 hours. 3.2 The incident was reported at 0311.11 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003 as a civic hall fire in the form of an initial nine calls to the Civic Hall Market Street Scarborough. 3.3 Two appliances from station P73 Scarborough were the first to arrive at the scene of the incident taking about 4 minutes to arrive. 3.4 From the appliance location smoke could be seen from the building. Both ADO Smith and Sub Officer Jones believed at this stage that the incident was relatively minor though Leading Fire-fighter Brown and Fire-fighter Dodson felt that the fire was well established. 3.5 The key holder, a former fire-fighter directed them to the entrance door next to the kitchen, situated on the North gable elevation (see Figure 4 and 5). 3.6 At this point appliance P731 approached the incident through the entrance off Market Street and booked in attendance only one minute and twelve seconds after appliance P730. On approach the crew observed a well developed fire in the main foyer and bar lounge area. The breathing apparatus (BA) wearers secured a water supply and got a jet to work on the fire from outside the building. Significantly they did not remove their BA sets. 3.7 ADO Smith instructed Sub Officer Jones to gain access to the building and attempt to locate and fight the fire. He then walked around the building in the direction of appliance P731 in order to carry out a full assessment. 3.8 Sub Officer Jones entered the door unlocked by the key holder and went into the kitchen. There was some light smoke evident at ceiling level. He opened some small high level windows for ventilation. On the instruction of Sub Officer Jones a BA team was ordered to go under air and enter the building with a hose reel, locate and fight the fire. 3.9 Leading Fire-fighter Brown took the standpipe key and bar and assisted Fire-fighter Laycock in obtaining a water supply. The BA team entered the building carrying a Motorola MT2100 radio believed to be set on ‘channel 1’, a hose reel fitted with the Delta Branch and a Dragon Light. Fire-fighter Oaks was ‘team leader’ and carried the radio, Fire-fighter Mores carried the Dragon Light. The team made reasonably easy progress experiencing only low temperatures and light smoke. When the team entered the main hall it became much hotter and the level of visibility was reduced by the smoke to approximately half a metre. 3.10 ADO Smith observed the extent of the fire on the other side of the building, returned to the entry point and ordered the withdrawal of the Breathing Apparatus Team. The order for withdrawal was made but conditions were now very hot and visibility negligible. On receipt of the order to withdraw all BA wearers exited the building together. 3.11 At 0328.53 hours ADO Smith instructed Fire-fighter O’Connor to make pumps six. 3.12 The time between appliance P730 booking in attendance at 0321.56 hours and informing Control that BA teams had been withdrawn at 0332.26 hours was just 10 minutes and thirty seconds. Within this period of time the driver sent an assistance message, re-sited the appliance and a hose reel was pulled off and made ready. Consequently the time from the initial team entering to both teams exiting can only have been approximately 7 minutes. 3.13 At 0342.47 hours ADO Smith requested an Aerial Appliance 3.14 At 0342.53 hours ADO Smith requested the Environmental Protection Unit 3.15 At 0349.46 hours Sector Command was established 3.16 At 0409.06 hours DO Bowerman took command of the incident 3.17 At 0608.54 hours Stop Message sent 4. SITUATION PRIOR TO THE DISCOVERY 4.1 Prior to the fire on the evening of the 5th December 2003, the hall was being used for a talent contest. There were roughly three hundred people in attendance that ended at around midnight. The patrons however left some timer after the events conclusion. 4.2 When the bar closed, there was about £4000 in two tills. Frank Davies was the key holder and bar person in charge the money. He decided not to deposit it in the safe located in the bar due to security concerns because in 2002, David Moreton the Hall Keeper had been attacked on the premises after a function and monies stolen. 4.3 David Moreton was the last person to leave the premises; he prepared it for a craft fair which was to take place the following day. This involved clearing the hall and stacking two hundred polyurethane chairs in groups of ten near the main entrance. He secured the building at approximately 0255 hours. 5. DISCOVERY OF FIRE 5.1 The following account was given by the key holder Frank Davies to the Watch Manager. This information was recorded in the duty diary on the 7th of December, 2003. 5.2 On the 6th of December, 2003 at 0311.11 hours, nine calls were placed reporting a fire. The first call to the Fire Service was made by Mrs. Earnshaw of 667 Market Street. Her home overlooked the hall and she could see the fire in the main entrance and south- east corner of the building from her bedroom window. 5.3 At 0306 hours an intruder alarm signal had been received by ADT alarm call centre (contract number 1004240). ADT alerted Frank Davies as a nominated key holder. He initially declined to attend and asked them to contact Ron Smith the Company Secretary. ADT were unable to make contact with Mr. Smith and rang Frank Davies back. He attended the premises taking approximately five minutes to arrive. As he approached from market Street, he could see fire inside the building in the area of the main entrance hall and flames coming from a roof vent. 6 AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED 6.1 According to the testimony of initial witnesses of the fire, the fire began inside the building in the area of the main entrance hall and flames were seen coming from a roof vent. 7 DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE 7.1 From the time the hall was closed until the fire was first reported, it apparently took less than thirty seven minutes and twenty six seconds for the building to fully catch fire. This was a relatively short period considering the resultant damage the fire caused and it is thus necessary to understand the fire development. 7.2 In terms of the building construction, this was a structure fire due to the interconnectedness of the building. For one, it had a common roof thus increasing the chances of fire spread. In addition, the hall was a wood frame type of building as opposed to a more fire- resistant type such as a concrete and steel structure. The interior framing and exterior walls were made of wood thus it had both combustible interior and exterior walls (Dunn, 2001). The combustible walls were thus highly significant in the fire spread. 7.3 With regards to the fire loading, the hall contained several combustible materials such as Formica covered tables, several pieces of fabric, varnish/ gloss painted walls, polyurethane foam upholstered PVC covered stools and plastic decorations. All these materials are highly flammable therefore quick fire spread is very likely. 7.4 The building was initially secure until entry by the fire service thus it may point to the fact that the fire was about to self- extinguish. When a door of a place where a fire has occurred is opened just before self- extinguishment is attained the entire compartment may burst into flames. This situation is known as back- draught and can create a hazardous situation during a fire (Beard and Carvel, 2005, p. 233). This is probably the main reason why the rate of burning increased so quickly after the fire fighters gained entry as more oxygen became available for combustion to thrive. 7.5 In addition, the increase is possibly attributable to the fact that the fire may have been in the flashover stage. Here, the combustible gases already produced have not been wholly consumed. They thus rise to create a very hot layer of gas (easily reaching temperatures of above 1500 degrees Fahrenheit) at the ceiling. As the gas layer grows, it heats all combustible objects beneath it regardless of their proximity to the burning object. With an increase in oxygen, the flashover occurs with all items in the room simultaneously erupting into at open flame (Beard and Carvel, 2005, p. 233). This could very likely have happened in this incident. 7.6 Fire growth in compartments occurs in stages as seen in the diagram below. Fire development is consists of two separate stages- the pre- flashover stage and the post- flashover stage. Within both stages, there are three time periods: the growth period, the fully developed fire and the decay period. In the growth period in compartment fires such as this one (pre- flashover stage), when there is enough oxygen to allow combustion to take place and the fire growth depends on the fuel’s flammability and geometry, the fire is termed as being fuel- controlled. In this stage, the fire continues to grow to a point beyond which it leads into the flashover or it will begin to decay as a result of fuel deficiency or oxygen inflow (UC Davis, 2005). From this description, it is probable that the growth of fire in the hall occurred thus: first, it experienced the growth stage. With the inflow of oxygen, it grew into the flashover stage and was only brought to control with the fire fighting actions of the fire fighters who arrived four minutes after the fire was reported. DIAGRAM 1: Fire Development Stages 8 CAUSES CONSIDERED. 8.1 In such an incident, the cause of the fire was unknown and thus determining the possible causes is crucial. In this case, there were four possible causes: the smoking materials; the electrical system; the heating system applications; deliberate ignition and the building security. Each of these four possible causes is the subject of this investigation. 8.2 Smoking materials: Smoking was permitted in the bar lounge and ash trays were provided. Furthermore, there were three large plastic swing lid waste bins situated next to the entrance foyer; outside the bar store; and outside the gents toilets. As such, a smoker could have thrown a smouldering cigarette in any of these waste bins and this could then have smouldered into a fire which subsequently spread to the rest of the building 8.3 Electrical Systems: The building was rewired seven years ago by Nichols Contracting (Barrow) LTD of Rishton who also carried out a ‘Periodic Inspection in May 2002 which was believed to be satisfactory. Additional stage lighting had apparently been professionally installed and certified in September 2003 by Southern Stage Services. However, there had been a reoccurring problem relating to four 32 amp circuit breakers which controlled newly installed dimmer packs. These circuit breakers kept tripping out. Two days before the fire, Moreton called in an electrician Andy Townsend to fix the problem and prevent disruption of the forthcoming talent contest. Mr. Townsend examined the stage lighting and refused to carry out any remedial work, advising Moreton that there was a real danger of a fire occurring should electrical installation work not be carried out properly. These faults in the electricity system are a very likely cause of the fire. 8.4 Heating system appliances: The gas fuelled primary heating unit in the main hall was defective. There were two wall mounted mains gas heaters in the bar lounge but Davies claimed that he had turned these off during the evening as it became warmer in the hall. A wall mounted electric heater situated opposite the bar adjacent to the stage was reported by Davies as being defective and therefore not in use although Moreton disagreed with this and in fact, claimed that it had been reported to him that a member of the public had burnt her/his leg on this heater during the show. Moreton stated that he checked these rooms before leaving the premises and confirmed that all these heaters were switched off. If this is true, the only potential heat source could have been the electric wall mounted heater opposite the bar and its operability is disputed. 8.5 Deliberate ignition and building security: The fact that the door was inexplicably found opened points to the possibility of foul play. In addition, the curious behaviour of the key holder on that day is unaccounted for and further investigations need to be conducted to ascertain whether this was a case of arson. Building security: The building was apparently secured by Moreton at 0255 hours yet the internal fire exit door from the blue room was found wide open which was very unusual. This door was fitted with a panic bolt and could only be opened from the inside. There is also some doubt about the number of access keys available. It was also reported that the intruder alarm was not completely effective since the three sensors failed to give adequate coverage. It was thus possible to enter the building and walk around the other areas without activating the alarm. In addition, the tills containing the £4000 takings were missing. While it has been suggested that the tills and contents were completely destroyed in the fire, the tills had some metal components and there were also a lot of coins inside. The likelihood of ALL these coins being destroyed in the fire is slim, pointing to an attempt to cover up a theft. In addition, next to the tills was a fridge, glass bottles and towels which despite suffering heat damage were still intact. 9. CONCLUSION Conclusive evidence from this initial investigation is not possible as a result of the large extent of the destruction. Taking into account evidence provided by fire fighters, eye witnesses, a thorough scene analysis and CCTV images the cause of this fire is currently recorded as unknown. Nevertheless, the evidence obtained by the Investigation Team points to the fact that the most likely cause was an electrical fault from the previously detected defects in the circuit breakers. All other potential causes, while plausible, have been currently ruled out due to lack of conclusive evidence. Overall, the evidence has been limited because of the severity of the fire. REFERENCES Beard, Alan and Carvel, Richard. 2005. The handbook of tunnel fire safety. London: Thomas Telford Publishing, p. 233 Dunn, Vincent. 2001. Structural Fire Spread. Working Fire. Retrieved 2nd March, 2010 From http://www.workingfire.net/misc7.htm UC Davis. 2005. Fire Suppression: How we Fight Fires. Retrieved 1st March, 2010 from http://fire.ucdavis.edu/supression.htm APPENDICES Figure 1: Scarborough Civic Hall Figure 2 (cross- section): Figure 3 (Floor Plan Showing Internal Fittings and Furniture) Figure 4: Gable Elevation Figure 5: Floor Plan Read More