Fire Incident at the Scarborough Civic Hall - Case Study Example

Name : xxxxxxxxxxx Institution : xxxxxxxxxxx Course : xxxxxxxxxxx Title : Fire Investigation Report Tutor : xxxxxxxxxxx @2010 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND CURRICULUM VITAE I am Hamad AL Mazmi employed by UAE Fire and Rescue Service (UAEFRS) as a watch manager, my current role is that of Incident Intelligence Officer, I have been employed by UAE Fire and Rescue Service since 2002. My role is to support and conduct the investigation of fire in UAE, but my government decided to send me to the UK to learn more and get experience because I have completed all Fire Services statutory promotion exams and have successfully completed Fire investigation courses at Service Training Centre. Furthermore, I have got Bachelors in Fire Safety and Risk Management which include fire investigation. Thus, my function is to investigate the fires involving fatalities, serious injury, high financial loss, and those of criminal arson. By the way, I was asked to attend fire incident which was occurred at the Scarborough Civic Hall as a new mission to do fire investigation procedure. 2.0 DESCRIPRION OF PREMISES 2.1 General Description Scarborough village is located approximately three miles from the Scarborough fire station. The village holds a population of approximately seven thousand people. The Scarborough civic hall is a public facility which was constructed in 1965. It is a single storey building measuring 36 by 22. Inside the hall, there are several facilities such as catering facilities, a licensed bar, a dance floor and a stage. The hall was built of laminated timber, a doorway frame and properly framed walls. The outside was fitted with a cedar board and the inside with a fibre board. The linings of the inside wall were made of plaster boards filled with glass fibre. For the period that the building was in use, it had been treated with gloss paint for varnishing. It had an arched roof which was made of timber element board with several overlaid layers of bitumen felt, and the building had a concrete made floor. The hall did not have any hanging ceilings that could be dangerous in case of fire dynamics (Cote, & Bugbee, 1988). 2.2 Internal Description Inside the main hall, six fluorescent tubes illuminated the area arranged facing down on each side of the ceiling. Other nine ornamental glass lights were hanging from the ceiling, placed together in sets of three lights, one placed at the peak of the ceiling and the other two, each on either sides of the ceiling. Each of the fittings on the inside had nine bulbs, making a total of eighty one bulbs. At the stage, lighting was fitted into a scaffolding tube placed at the top of the ceiling at about four meters from the edge of the stage. A mains gas served the room, which also powered the heating system in the room. The basic heating source in the bar lounge was provided by a heater that was supported by a fan, and two heaters that ascended on the wall. At the time of fire outbreak, the heater in the main wall was out of order and not operating. Heating was therefore being done by an electric heater that ascended on the wall in the bar area. 2.3 Furniture and fittings The equipments inside the hall consisted of a permanently fixed bench upholstered of polyurethane foam placed at the bar lounge. There were other around two hundred polyurethane foam upholstered seats kept in the main hall, arranged in stacks of ten chairs and kept adjacent to the main door. One hundred and ten others kept in the cloakroom and fifty polyurethane foam upholstered PVC covered stools, twenty in the bar lounge and thirty in the main hall. Two stools and six chairs were placed on the high level lighting platform. Inside the hall, there were a number of tables covered with Formica placed in the main hall and at the bar lounge. At the time of fire outbreak, the hall was decorated for Christmas with the openings between the lounge and the walls were dressed with a fabric. The largest decorations included six plastic bells hanging from the ceiling and two Christmas trees with the height of approximately two meters each. Other decorations in the room included glitters and ribbons hung from the ceiling and about eight plastic fans for decorations measuring 0.75 metres in diameter were fixed on the wall. The room which was termed as the Green Room was used as a store for carpets, clothes and other varied items (National Fire Protection Association, 2001). 3.0 TYPE OF INCIDENCE 3.1 Foreword The following information was obtained form the mobilising data and from the interviews conducted with the personnel who were present at the time of the incident. Efforts have been made to ensure accuracy of the information, however at some points there were conflicts on the information provided on the testimonies of what happened. Where conflict on the testimonies occurred, the narrative is based on the weight that supported a particular cause of events. 3.2 The incident The incident occurred at 0311 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003. At this time, a call was received at Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service from the Civic Hall Market Street Scarborough. The control at the Scarborough Fire and Rescue services mobilise the programmed attendance of the fire equipments from the station p73 in Scarborough and also informed Assistant Divisional Officer Smith. After four minutes, the equipment had already reached the incident. At the incident, the equipments were situated at the car park at the back of the premises half-way down the building bordering the outer double fire exit doors. Smith was already at the back of the hall and in the process of dressing up in the fire kit. From where the equipments were located, smoke could be noted coming out from the building. At this time, there were no flames showing up at the back and both the Division Assistant Officer Smith and Sub Officer Jones, and other fire fighter felt that the fire was well established. The key holder, who was a former fire fighter, led the team to the entrance adjacent to the kitchen. He had reached at the incident through the main entrance and had noticed well established fire with flames escaping through the roof under the eaves (Kirk, 1999). After the team entered the hall, they noticed a well developed fire in the main hall and at the bar lounge. The fire-fighters who were wearing the breathing apparatus were advised to secure a water supply and get a jet fight the fire while o the outside of the building. The key holder opened all the corners of the building from where the Sib Officer could fight the fire from. At the point where the team entered the main hall, it had become much hotter and the level of visibility was reduced to almost half a meter by the smoke in the hall. They could not see any flame but they could hear fire travelling above their heads. 4.0 SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY The premise had been inspected in May the previous year which did not include the lighting on the stage. The lighting was said to have added, professionally installed and certified in September 2003. However, following this new installation, there had been a reoccurring problem relating to four 32 amp circuit breakers which controlled newly installed dimmer packs. The new circuit breakers however kept tripping down. On 3rd December, two days before the incident, the hall keeper had called an electrician to try and correct the problem to avoid any disruptions on the day of the contest. The electrician, Mr. Townsend, examined the stage lighting but refuse to correct the situation but advised Dave Moreton that there was a danger of fire occurring if the electrical installation will not be done properly. The electrician identified faults on a number of portable lights connected to the dimmer units in such a way that the weight of the supply cables was being supported by the plug conductor clamps. This was supposedly causing a strain on the supply cables and possibly causing the circuit breakers to trip. Mr. Arnold Addis a lighting technician for Scarborough Amateurs Association attended the talent contest on 5th December. He challenged Mr. Townsend had over-reacted and that any problems that he had noted were attended to before the contest, however he disagreed to the fact that during the show one stage light tripped out, but was put back by plugging the light into a spare electrical socket. He denied that any circuit breakers had been tampered with in order to prevent them from tripping. After the contest ended, at 2310 hours, Mr. Arnold Addis switched off all the lights apart from four that were left for the DJ. However, Dave Moreton confirmed that he had switched the remaining lights through the main switch. The event had been attended by approximately three hundred people and it ended at around mid night, and the patrons left sometime after mid night. At the time the bar closed, they total money that had been collected was approximately three thousand dollars, which when combined with the original floating cash mounted to four thousand dollars both notes and coins, and was held in two tills behind the bar. Frank Davies, the bar person and the key holder, who was responsible for the money decided not to keep the money in the safe since the doors that protected it had been removed and it was in the public view. He felt that keeping the money in the safe was a security risk since the hall keeper had been attacked on the premises after a function on the previous year and money stolen form him. The last person to leave the premises was David Moreton, the hall keeper and he left the hall prepared for a craft fair that was to take place the following day. This involved clearing the room and leaving the two hundred polyurethane chairs in groups of ten near the main entrance. He left the premises at 0255 hours. 5.0 DISCOVERY OF FIRE The fire was first discovered by Mrs. Earnshaw of 667 Market Street, who made the initial call to the Fire Service. Mrs. Earnshaw lived in the neighborhood and her house overlooked the hall. She noticed the fire through her bedroom window and also observed flames in the area of the main entrance at the South east corner of the building. This is when she decided to make a call to the Fire station. At 0306 hours, less than one hour after the hall keeper had left, an intruder alarm signal was received at ADT call center, who then alerted Frank Davies as a nominated key holder. He initially declined to attend and asked them to contact Ron Smith the Company Secretary. ADT were unable to reach Mr. Smith and rang Frank Davies back. He attended the premises taking approximately five minutes to arrive. As he approached from market Street, he noticed fire inside the building in the area of the main entrance lobby and flames coming from a roof vent. 6.0 AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED The building appeared safe when the first set of equipments arrived, but when Frank Davies opened the door to let in the fire fighting team, he noticed that the fire exit door on the inside was wide open, a situation that appeared unusual to him. The door was fitted with a strong panic bolt and could only be opened from inside. The fire started on the front elevation of the building near the main entrance and its flames could be seen when the rescue team first arrived. By the time the rescue team arrived, it was fully developed at this section of the building. The graph below indicated the path taken during the development of the fire in the building. The incipient stage is the first few minutes of fire development where the fuel leading to the burning has just caught the fire. There is localized burning with a lot of free space and open flames. At this moment, the room temperature remains the same and the oxygen concentration is low. At the growth stage, when there is adequate oxygen, heat release gets higher. Gas temperature appears to be in two layers where there is a hot layer coming up from the ceiling and a cooler layer towards the floor. Gases are in high pressure due to excessive burning and they expand pushing down the building and getting out through the openings. Convection from the plume and radiant heat form the fire and hot particles in the smoke lead to increase in temperature along the lining and in other compartments in the building. The flash over stage is the transition from the fire growth to a fully developed fire. At this time, all the materials in the building are totally involved in burning. During the fully developed fire stage, there is total burning with very fierce fire. The fire is consuming almost all the materials in the building. The decay stage is when the fire has already consumed all the materials and is slowly decreasing. This is also the time when the fire is attacked by the fire services and the putting off process starts. 7.0. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE/ PERFORMANCE OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIALS 7.1. Fire was able to develop so fasts due to the building materials that had made the hall. Most of the materials were of glass and wood which are very good in spreading fire. The ceilings of the hall also contributed to the spread of the fire. 7.2 The hall was a single storey house, and research shows that fire develops faster in single storey than in multi storey buildings. This is because the single storey buildings have low height which is supportive of fire development. The space is limited and therefore fire can spread very fast (Robertson, 2004). 7.3 After the broke out, time elapsed before the firefighting operations started. This offered a humble time that allowed the fire to spread. This also contributed to the losses that occurred due to the fires. 7.4 Upholstered chairs and other furniture in the hall were also another major contribution to the fire spread. They are highly ignitious and spread fire very easily. The presence of smoking materials in the hall also contributed to the fire. Investigations found that smoking was allowed in the bar and the smokers were provided with ash trays. 7.5. The hall provided catering facilities where gas and electricity were the sources of fuel. When a house catches fire while gas is present, the fire spreads faster than in cases where it is absent. This gas also led to the faster development of the fire. 7.6 There was lack of an active fire protective system in the hall. Thus there was no source of protection that could have derailed the spread of the fire. During the concert, the systems of the hall could have experienced too much pressure due to the large number of people. 7.6 This pressure could have weakened the systems. 7.7 There were plastic waste bins with swing lids, one placed adjacent to the entrance of the hall, the other one outside the gents’ toilets and the other outside the bat store. These contained a lot of rubbish after the incident and this could have accelerated the rate at which the fire spread. 7.8 The Scarborough civic hall did not have fire emergency services that could have responded immediately to the outbreak. Fire fighting services had to come from outside. This created some time between the fire outbreak and the time fire fighting started. This was a humble time for fire to spread to other areas. 7.9 The hall was well ventilated with several doors and vents on the roof. These allowed in air which supports burning. This kept the fire burning making it hard to put off. The huge smoke that had developed inside the hall lowered the visibility giving the fire fighters a hard time in their operations. 7.10 There were no workers residing in the hall compound who could have noticed the fire early. By the time it was noticed from the neighbourhood, the fire had become well established and this contributed to the losses it caused. 7.11 Fire growth was also accelerated by the burning rate of the materials that were in the hall. This includes the mass loss and the rate of energy release of the materials. The fire was fully developed and growth was therefore increased due to the ventilation of the room, the temperature that was rising gradually as burning continued and the duration taken for the fire to be put off. In the usual fires, as the size of the fire continues to grow, the rate at which energy is released increases and this increases the rate at which the fire grows, as shown in the table below. 8.0 CAUSES CONSIDERED 8.1 Heating systems Frank Davies had reported that the electric heater mounted on the wall was defective. However, Dave Moreton disagreed with this following a report that one member of public who had attended the concert had burnt his or her leg on the heater during the show. There were two wall mounted mains gas heaters in the bar lounge but Frank Davies claimed that he had turned these off during the evening as it became warmer in the hall. Within the rooms at the rear of the stage there were three more wall mounted electric heaters and at least two portable electric heaters which were in use during the show. Dave Moreton stated that he checked these rooms before vacating the premises and confirmed that all these heaters were switched off. In view of this information the only potential heat source could have come from the electric wall mounted heater opposite the bar and its operability is disputed. However, there was no evidence to support the claims that he had truly switched off all that he stated. 8.2 The lighting system Before the concert, the electrician had noticed a fault on the lighting system which was not corrected. The electrician had also explained that there was a danger of fire occurring if the installation will not be corrected. This stage lighting system could have been the cause of the fire (Lentini, 2006). 8.3 Gas appliances The other suspected fire cause was the gas appliances in the catering facilities. Due to the much heat that was in the wall, pressure imbalance could have arisen leading to the explosion of the gases. 8.4 Smoking materials Smoking was allowed in the bar and there was a lot of it during the concert. Dust bins were strategically located in the hall and this is where the remains of smoking were being disposed. Some of the remains had fire in them and could have lighted fire on others materials in the dustbin (Rethoret, 1998). 8.5 Deliberate Ignition After the fire incident, the money that had been kept on the till was found to be missing. This money was totaling to four thousand dollars. The discovery of the money by some people with evil intentions could have led to deliberate ignition of the hall so that no evidence could be recovered. Since there was a past experience of robbery after a concert, this could have been another planned one. The hall could have been deliberately ignited so that blame could be laid on it as the consumer of the money which has already been stolen. 8.6 Other possible causes of fire include: Excessively heat sockets. Due to the many appliances that were used during the concert, the sockets might have been excessively heated, or a lot of pressure put on them. This could result into fire and especially if a building is mot well installed. The bar keeper confessed that sparks had been seen coming out from one of the lighting bulbs at the dance floor. Sparks are a serious cause of fire and outbreak and should be corrected when noticed. However, the bar keeper said that the light was replaced with another one and the concert continued. The replacement did not solve the problem of sparks and this could have been a possible cause of the fire. Another possible cause of fire can be from a fire triangle that forms from the mixture of heat, fuel and oxygen. The hall contained some fuels including the cooking gas. It became very hot during the concert and received enough oxygen through its properly laid ventilation. A mixture these three elements can cause a very reactive explosion that can lead to a big fire. It is therefore necessary to eliminate fuels in a hall that is going to be used for activities that will lead to a rise in the level of heat (Chandler, 2009). 9.0 CONCLUSION From the investigations done, it could be obviously concluded that the fault in the lighting system at the stage was the major source of the fire outbreak. This was due to ignorant since the staff operating the hall was aware of the fault and had been notified by the electrician who did the inspection. It could have been more serious if the fire could have started while the concert was still on. This could have led to loss of lives attributed to by ignorance. It is therefore very necessary for the management of any premises to ensure that the electrical system of any building is in order before it is used by the members of the public. For such a public utility is very necessary to call the professional electrician to do the installation so as to ensure perfection of the work. Electric system is a very sensitive area and needs proper attention which can be achieved by the use of a well qualified electrician. If one is well qualified, he or she will ensure that everything is on order before finishing his or her work. The equipments used in a public utility should be made form a material that does not promote burning. A hall that is regularly used by large number of people is very prone to fire and should be well guarded. Smoking should also not be allowed in the bar since it is also a likely cause of fire. BIBILIOGRAPHY Cote, E., & Bugbee, P., (1988), Principles of Fire Protection, New York, Jones & Bartlett Publishers. < http://books.google.com/books?id=a8jU-2xyw5EC&pg=PP11&lpg=PP11&dq=Cote,+E.,+%26+Bugbee,+P.,+%281988%29,+Principles+of+Fire+Protection,&source=bl&ots=RJpec0jtdF&sig=uWxL8lxjEcVSq_e1va5Szp9USBM&hl=en&ei=4VGFSOzBpDglAfzx831AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CAYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=&f=false> National Fire Protection Association. 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