Fire Investigation: Scarborough Civic Hall - Report Example

Incident Number: 493 Date of Incident: 6TH DECEMBER 2009 Time of Call: Date & Time Investigation Commenced:  Address of Incident: SCARBOROUGH CIVIC HALL  Owned by: PUBLIC HALL  Occupied by: PUBLIC Trade/Business: PUBLIC FACILITIES/SERVICES Police Officer Dealing: CRS No: 1. Curriculum vitae and introduction 1.1 I am employed as a Watch Manager by Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS), my present function/role is that of Incident Intelligence Officer. I have been in employment by this company for 15 years now and my key role has been that of performance and provision of support for investigations of fire incidences in Scarborough, and particularly fire investigations involving serious injuries, high financial losses, fatalities and those that involve criminal arson. So far I have conducted several fire investigations of varying nature and magnitude during the course of my career. I have also complied with all Fire Service statutory promotion examinations including successful completion of Fire Investigation courses at Service Training Centre. In addition, I have also attained admission as member to the Institution of Fire Engineers through examinations that involved investigation of fire. 1.2 My present posting is the Market Street within the Municipality of Scarborough since Scarborough civic hall falls within this area, I have been requested to attend, address and conduct investigation of fire that broke out there. 1.3 The camera angles that relate to the photographs are found in Appendix B while photographs themselves that have been mentioned in this text that follows can be found in Appendix A. 1.4 The opinions and comments that are expressed in this investigation report have basis on the available information to me at time of my compilation, and any provision of any additional information to me may cause alteration/amendment of this report. Specifications of the building 2.1 The Scarborough Civic Hall was a building for the purpose of public amenities built in 1965. it was made up of an isolated one storey building, with specifications of 36m x 22m. The building basically provided services in terms of catering for functions and housed a licensed bar along with other recreational facilities that included a big dance floor and staging area. The structure of the hall consisted of a laminated timber portal frame with stud framed walls, cedar boarding to the outside and fibre boarding to the inside.  The internal wall linings were plasterboard with glass fibre in fill.  During the life of the building the walls had been treated with several applications of gloss paint or varnish.  2.2 The linings of the internal wall were plaster boarded with fibre glass in fill, and in the course of the building’s life, the walls had been treated with several applications of varnish and gloss paint. Timber particles board had been used to construct its vaulted roof, in addition to numerous superimposed bitumen felt layers and its floor was made of concrete. Hence, considerably, as pertains to fire dynamics, there were no suspended ceilings on the building’s hall. 2.3 Internal services-The main hall was illuminated by six double fluorescent tubes down each side of the ceiling, situated approximately three quarters of the way up the vault. Additionally, nine glass pendant lights hung from the ceiling in sets of three, one at the apex of the ceiling and one either side.  Each fitting had nine bulbs, eighty-one in total. Stage lighting was fitted to a scaffolding tube at ceiling level approximately four meters from the edge of the stage. 2.4 A further scaffolding tube supported lights directly over the stage, both banks of lighting being controlled from an elevated timber platform accessed by a timber Jacobs Ladder (see Figure 7 Cross Section).  The building was served by mains gas which powered the heating system.  A fan assisted heater in the main hall and two wall mounted heaters in the bar lounge provided the primary heating source, however the heater in the main hall was defective and inoperable at the time of fire. Because of this defect supplementary heating was being provided by a wall mounted electric heater situated in the bar area. 2.3 Furniture and fittings- the furnishings of the internal hall involved fixed bench style polyurethane foam upholstered seating in the bar lounge, approximately two hundred polyurethane foam upholstered chairs in the main hall stacked in piles of ten adjacent to the main entrance, one hundred and ten similar chairs stacked in the cloakroom and approximately fifty polyurethane foam upholstered PVC covered stools, thirty situated in the main hall and twenty in the bar lounge.  2.4 A further six of these chairs and two of the stools had been placed on the high level lighting platform.  A number of wooden Formica covered tables measuring approximately 1.3m x 0.66m were situated in the main hall and bar lounge. Openings between the bar lounge and the hall were draped with fabric and the hall had been decorated for Christmas.  2.5 The largest decorations consisted of six plastic bells suspended from the ceiling.  Two large artificial Christmas trees measuring approximately 2m in height were situated either side of the stage.    A number of other decorations such as tinsel and streamers hung from the ceiling and approximately eight plastic fan decorations approximately 0.75m in diameter had been fixed to the walls. The room designated as the Green Room was being used to store a number of stage props, consisting of three rolls of carpet, clothes and other miscellaneous items.  The flying gallery above the stage had fabric backdrops.    Type of Incident: 3.1 Receipt of Alarm: the building was last secured by David Moreton. He left it prepared for a craft fair that was to take place the next day. He left at approximately 0255 hours. 3.2 The first intruder alarm went off and was received by ADT alarm call centre at about 3: 06. ADT made a call and alerted Davies who refused to be disturbed leading ADT to call the secretary. When he could not be contacted, Davies attended the premises. 3.3 He took about five minutes reach the building and saw a fire inside on his draive from Market Street. Smoke was coming out of the main entrance foyer and from the roof vent. 3.4 The first call to the fire services was made by Mrs. Earnshaw who noticed the fire first from her vintage point residence at 667 Market Street. He house overlooked the hall facilitating her observation of the fire from her bedroom window.  She also observed flames in the area of the main entrance at the South east corner of the building. Situation prior to discovery  3.1 the situational analysis that has been done below is based on the information that has been gathered by the data collection and information gathered in the context of interviews taken and a survey of the fire site. Efforts have been made to ensure that the report is accurate. There is some scope of conflict in terms of evidentiary support. Where comments received have not been generally supported, but are considered essential in painting an accurate picture and informing any subsequent debate, they have been included.  3.2 The premises were secured by the caretaker at 02:55 hours. At 0311 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003 Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service received the first of nine calls to the Civic Hall Market Street Scarborough. Control mobilized the predetermined attendance of two appliances from station P73 Scarborough and informed Assistant Divisional Officer Smith.  The appliances took approximately 4 minutes to reach the incident. Appliance P730 sited the appliance in the car park at the rear of the premises half-way down the building adjacent to the external double fire exit doors. 3.5 From the appliance location smoke could be seen issuing from the building.  Both ADO Smith and Sub Officer Jones believed at this stage that the incident was relatively minor as did Fire-fighters Gordon, Laycock, and O’Riley; although leading Fire-fighter Brown and Fire-fighter Dodson felt that the fire was well established.  There were no flames showing on the rear elevation at this time.  There was a Northerly wind blowing at approx 5mph. 3.6 The keys for the premises were retrieved from the key holder; he also directed the crew to the second entrance gate that was entrance to the kitchen located on the North gable elevation. 3.7 Appliance P731 approached the incident through the entrance off Market Street. When the crew approached the building they came face to face with a fire that was well developed in the main foyer and bar lounge area. The crew went under the air without removing their BA gear. 3.8 Immediately after Sub Officer Jones had made pumps 4, appliance P730 was reversed and re-sited to the corner of the building adjacent to the door being opened by the key holder. ADO Smith instructed Sub Officer Jones to gain access to the building and attempt to locate and fight the fire.  He then walked around the building in the direction of appliance P731 in order to carry out a full assessment.  3.11 the main hall became clouded with smoke leading to a reduction in visibility levels. Flames could not be seen but the fire could be heard traveling overhead. The kitchen which was free of fire though smoky. The fire was going well inside the building. ADO Smith observed the extent of the fire on the other side of the building, returned to the entry point and ordered the withdrawal of the Breathing Apparatus Team. The order for withdrawal was made but conditions were now very hot and visibility negligible. On receipt of the order to withdraw all BA wearers exited the building together. 3.12 At 0328.53 hours ADO Smith instructed Fire-fighter O’Connor to make pumps six.  This was before the BA teams were accounted for.  At 0332.26 hours a message was sent informing control that BA teams had been withdrawn and that the ‘tactical mode’ was ‘defensive’.  4. Circumstance/ situation prior to discovery 4.1 The premises had been used for a talent contest on the evening of the 5th December 2003.  Approximately three hundred people attended the event, which concluded around midnight, although it was sometime after this when all patrons left.  When the bar closed, approximately £3000 had been taken, which combined with the original float amounted to a cash sum of £4000 in notes and coinage, being held in two tills behind the bar.  Frank Davies (bar person and key holder) who was responsible for the money decided not to deposit it in the safe which was situated in the bar store, because the doors between the bar store and the bar lounge had been removed for maintenance and the safe was in view of the public.  He felt that putting the money in the safe would be a security risk.  In 2002 David Moreton the Hall Keeper had been attacked on the premises after a function and monies stolen. 4.2 David Moreton was the last person to leave the premises; he prepared it for a craft fair, which was to take place the following day.  This involved clearing the hall and stacking two hundred polyurethane chairs in groups of ten near the main entrance.  He secured the building at approximately 0255 hours. 4.3 At 0306 hours an intruder alarm signal was received by ADT alarm call centre (contract number 1004240).  ADT alerted Frank Davies as a nominated key holder.  He initially declined to attend and asked them to contact Ron Smith the Company Secretary.  ADT were unable to make contact with Mr. Smith and rang Frank Davies back.  He attended the premises taking approximately five minutes to arrive.  As he approached from market Street, he observed fire inside the building in the area of the main entrance foyer and flames coming from a roof vent. 4.4 The initial call to the Fire Service was made by Mrs. Earnshaw of 667 Market Street.  Her dwelling overlooked the hall and she observed the fire from her bedroom window.  She also observed flames in the area of the main entrance at the South east corner of the building. 5. Discovery of fire: 5.1 The fire was discovered at 0306 hours by the neighbor Mrs Earnshaw who then alerted fire services 5.2 The fire and the extent of its development was first predicted by the key holder who believed that he had seen a fire that was well developed. The characteristics of the fire were that it had flames bellowing from the roof and the vents along with the areas below the eaves. 5.3 The basic place of the discovery of the fire meant the main hall in general and the South East corner of the hall in particular. The discovery was also magnified with the entrance so the appliances who encountered lot of smoke and low visibility on entering the premises through the main gate. 7. Development of Fire 7.1 The fire began in the main hall and was aided by the presence of the polyurethane chairs in groups of ten near the main entrance. The main hall also had a bar, stacked with spirit all of which aided the development of the fire in terms of the material being combustible. The open spaces and the painted polyurethane coated walls also helped the spread of the fire. 7.2 Moreover, the decorations within the room all were material that were combustible. There were present a number of chairs made of wood, and wooden. Fabric and cloth that catches fire easily again was draped between the bar lounge and the hall given the fact that the hall had been decorated for Christmas. Most of the plastic that decorated the hall was fire friendly as well, in terms of the bells, the large artificial Christmas trees and decorations such as tinsel and streamers. Moreover, the stage props like the carpet and clothes along with the fabric backdrops in the flying gallery also aided the fire. 7.3 The fact that much of the building was made of timber was factor in the fire given the nature of the wood to quickly catch fire. The fact that there was no suspended ceiling meant that the determination of fire safety ratings would have to be suspect by itself. 8. Possible causes of fire considered 8.1 Heating systems-the first major cause that could be considered is the faulty heating system given the fact that the gas that fuelled the primary heating unit in the hall was damaged when at fire happened. 8.2 Gas- There was also the case of the fact that there was the presence of two wall mounted mains gas heaters in the bar lounge. Here it has to be considered that it was claimed by Davies that he had turned both off during the evening as it became warmer. 8.3 A few days prior to the fire, an electrician had been called to rectify problem that had been encountered with the stage lighting. The electrician stated he could not perform these and advised a real repair work because in that particular form it was dangerous. A second electrician however claimed that no such danger prevailed and gave a clean chit to the electricity systems. One particular light had tripped out during the show but this had subsequently been repaired. Moreover, the switches for the electricity had already been turned off by Moreton before he left the premises for the night. 8.4 Smoking materials- Smoking was allowed in the bar lounge and ash trays were provided. In addition there were three large plastic swing lid waste bins situated in the hall. 8.5 Deliberate Ignition My contention in this report is that the fire was the result of arson. Two evidences though circumstantial that come to light: First when the key holder opened the door it was noticed that the building to appearing to be secure when the appliances arrived had actually been compromised. When Moreton unlocked the doors of the building it was noticed by the fire crews that the internal fire exit door from the blue room was wide open. This was unusual because he remembered having locked it clearly and also due to the fact that the door was fitted with a panic bolt and hence could have only been unlocked from the inside. It was agreed by all that this particular door had not been opened in a normal manner. he also stated that when he had locked up for the night it was not completely ajar like it was when the services arrived. Although there is no guarantee for this it is a thought that bears further investigating. It is apparent that there is some doubt about the number of access keys available. Officially there were three sets of external door keys. The external door was secured by two mortise locks and one Yale lock. The internal door to the kitchen was secured by a single mortise lock. The second point that needs to be noted here is that on further inspection of the fire it was found that the tills of money that had been secured on the night of the fire by the manager had gone missing. Altrh0ough it is a possibility that these had been completely destroyed in the fibre, there is still doubts over the fact that the fire could have completely destroyed the considerable amount of coinage and metals that were inside these tills. The tills in question had some metal components. It has to be remembered here that the intensity of a fire such as this one would at best harm and damage the coin. Complete destruction of the coins is not a possibility and the fact that no coins of metals were found points to arson and robbery. The point here is that it has been confirmed by Barry Davies (bar person) that even the area close to the place where the tills had been located that the fridge that was there was relatively unharmed by the dire along with the glass bottles and even tea towels in the same area had remained relatively undamaged. Reference: Vacaviulle fire Department. Things to do. Retrived March 31, 2010, < http://www.ci.vacaville.ca.us/departments/fire/resources/residents/after_the_fire.php> Ward, M., (2005). Fire Officer: Principles and Practice. Jones and Bartlett publication. p355 Fire protection. Center for Polyurethane study. Retrived March 31, 2010, < http://www.polyurethane.org/s_api/sec.asp?CID=936&DID=3671> Polyurethane products in fire. Retrieved March 31, 2010, < http://www.polyurethane.org/s_api/bin.asp?CID=936&DID=4041&DOC=FILE.PDF> Read More