How Compelling Are Mackies Argument from Relativity and Queerness - Article Example

The puzzle is this: if an error theory provides the correct descriptive account of moral dis how, if at all, ought we to adjust our practices after having discovered the error?’ (John A. Burgess). Discuss Introduction In order to understand the role of error theory in the development of appropriate practices towards errors, we should primarily refer to the general characteristics of error theories as they are observed by philosophers around the world. In this context, it is noticed by Lillehammer (p. 93) that there is ‘a tendency to underestimate the different forms that a moral error theory can take’. In other words, error theories can be effectively used in order to adjust our practices after discovering error; however their role can be differentiated in accordance with the form of the specific error theory and its relation with the conditions in which the error was developed. The particular paper refers to the explanation of the view of John A. Burgess (as described in the title of the paper) related with the error theory and the potentials for adjustment of human practices when the error is discovered. The research made in the work of four theorists (Mackie, Widdings, Lillehammer and Kalderon) proves that error theory can provide the necessary framework for the development of an effective human behaviour regarding errors. In other words, the principles of error theory can be used by humans in order to make the appropriate adjustments in their behaviour when error is discovered. Of course, as it is highlighted throughout the paper, the identification of a ‘perfect’ method of handling errors is not a feasible task. Just proposals can be made taking into account the conditions of the particular case, the personal attitudes and the social and cultural values of the region involved. Chapter One Error theories – characteristics and role A primary description of error theory could be based on the presentation of personal assumptions on error. In accordance with this view, Lillehammer (pg. 94) assumed that ‘a moral error theory is a non-obvious truth discoverable by either a priori or a posteriori reflection’. On the other hand, regarding the characteristics of moral values (that will be used as a basis for a particular error theory) Mackie (1977, 15) stated that ‘there are no objective values; the claim that values are not objective, is not part of the fabric of the world, is meant to include not only moral goodness, which might be most naturally equated with moral value, but also other things that could be more loosely called moral values or disvalues – rightness and wrongness, duty, obligation, an action being rotten and contemptible and so on’. In accordance with the above views, the formulation of a particular error theory is not an easy task. More specifically, because there are many issues that can be considered to have an influence on the characterization of a specific action or discourse as a moral or not, the development of an error theory that covers all possible aspects of ‘error’ is not possible. Only particular comments on error can be included within an error theory. In order for the above issues to be analytically explained a series of theoretical schemes have been developed explaining the particular aspects of error and its most common forms and elements. In the case of Mackie (1977) error is faced as part of the social behaviour which has to be handled in the context of moral theory as developed through the years. In this way, the relation of error with moral ethics is direct. In this context, Mackie (1977, 17) supported that ‘what I have called moral skepticism is a negative doctrine, not a positive one; it says what there isn’t, not where there is; it says that there do not exist entities or relations of a certain kind, objective values or requirements, which many people have believed to exist’. Mackie refers to moral skepticism in an effort to explain its role in the development of a particular behaviour regarding error. In other words, moral skepticism is proposed as an appropriate theoretical scheme for the explanation of the relation between morality and error. In fact, human behaviour regarding error should be based on the principles of morality as this ‘value’ is developed within the social framework of each particular era. More specifically, because social structures change and ethics follow the same ‘route’ it is natural for morality to be differentiated in accordance with the cultural and the social principles and values of each period. At a next level, ethics and principles related with a specific geographical region can also have an influence on the ‘interpretation’ of error and its ‘handling’ by people within each society. The role of moral theorist in the above context is crucial. However, moral theorists have to follow a specific behaviour when interpreting errors. In this context, it is suggested by Lillehammer (pg. 98) that ‘moral error theorist has three options: The first is to renounce moral thought in favour of other means to pursue valued social ends; the second option is to continue with moral thought which should be revised in order to avoid the convergence – claim; the third option is to retain the convergence-claim thereby aiming to secure the benefits of moral thought by the continued acceptance of an acknowledged falsehood’. However, all the above comments are based on the criterion that the behaviour of the person involved is governed by morality. Therefore, it is doubted if all the above suggestions could be applied generally in any case where an error has been discovered. The reaction of people involved in this error or those who discover the error cannot be precisely estimated in advance; On the contrary, just general suggestions can be made regarding the response of people to the framework proposed by the error theory. As the theory itself can be differentiated in accordance with the circumstances of the particular case and the personal attitudes of the participants, the proposals of Lillehammer as described above can provide a general framework for handling errors in several circumstances. Other ‘philosophical’ principles and ideas like ‘fictionalism’ can be also used by error theorists in order to identify the most common aspects of error and propose the appropriate amendments in behaviour when the error is revealed. Regarding the above, Lillehammer supports that factionalism can offer to error theorists the following four advantages: ‘a) it promises to continue serving the valued social ends which moral thought functions to promote; b) second, it promises to serve the end of convergence (whether or not actual or reasonable convergence is forthcoming); c) third, moral make-believe is prima facie analogous to non-controversially sound factionalist strategies in other areas of thought and d) factionalism offers a unified approach to moral disagreement’ (Lillehammer, pg. 100). In accordance with the above view, individuals can formulate a judgement which will be the same for all moral issues that are put under consideration. In fact fictionalism creates the appropriate framework for the common treatment of all moral issues through the sharing of a particular judgement. On the other hand, Kalderon (2005, 298) tried to explain moral factionalism using the principles of error theory. In order to complete the above task he proceeds to the following example: ‘suppose that a moral error theory is the case – or at least suppose that a group of people has become convinced on this – what should they do with their faulty moral talk? The conclusion that they should just abolish it, that it should go the way of witch discourse is certainly a tempting possibility, and may turn out to be the correct response’. In accordance with the above view, moral factionalism has a significant role in the application of a specific error theory; however the intervention of personal attitudes and values can lead to the false interpretation of the principles of error theory. As a result false assumptions are going to be made regarding ‘error’ and the appropriate methods for its limitation (or elimination). The above views are in accordance with that of Mackie who also supports the creation of a moral judgement which will be common for the evaluation of all moral issues that are set under investigation. In order for the above target to be achieved, moral judgement should be free from subjectivity otherwise the evaluation of the moral issue will be influenced by personal attitudes and values. In accordance with Mackie ‘ordinary moral judgements include a claim to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values… Any analysis of the meanings of moral terms which omits the claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity is to that extent incomplete; and this is true of any non-cognitive analysis, any naturalist one, and any combination of the two’ (Mackie, 1997, 35). However, it is not made clear by Mackie whether the analysis of moral terms should be differentiated in accordance with the conditions of a particular case (i.e. the events involved) and the social, cultural or personal values of the participants. Even in the case of error theorists the absolute absent of subjectivity when formulating moral judgements is not achievable. In fact, it should be noticed that subjectivity will be always a risk for error theorists (as for all people). The limitation of subjectivity and the promotion of objectivity is a fact that should be evaluated in accordance with the circumstances of a specific case and the willingness of participants to review more analytically the moral issues related with this case. Regarding this issue, it is accepted by Mackie (1977) that objectivity value is difficult to be measured with accuracy. However, it is noticed by the above researcher that ‘if second order ethics were confined, then, to linguistic and conceptual analysis, it ought to conclude that moral values at least are objective; that they are so is part of what our ordinary moral statements mean: the traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as of the main line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value’ (Mackie, 1977, 35). In other words, the existence of subjectivity at some level when formulating moral judgements should be expected. However, because moral concepts are usually common among a large number of people (especially if referring to a particular region) they are characterized by objectivity and only when having to evaluate a specific event (as of its moral aspects) subjectivity can intervene but even in this case the ‘objective moral values’ will be the main criterion for the evaluation and ‘subjective values’ will have just a supplementary role. Another issue that usually appears when having to apply an error theory is the use of the principles of generality and universality. In fact, error theory should include provisions regarding its universal application. However, because the above two terms cause confusion as of their content, it should be important to present their characteristics – since its role in the application of error theory as explained above is significant. Regarding the above issue it is supported by Wiggins (2005, 23) that ‘a confusion between generality (as understood in contrast with specificity) and universality (a judgement’s holding over all of the so specified or stated range of cases or instances)’ is a common one. It should be noticed that despite their differences (as they can be revealed through their definition presented above) both these principles are valuable in the formulation of moral judgements. The first of these principles can help the error theorist to come to a specific conclusion – by applying the principle ‘from the general to the specific’ (i.e. whatever is considered to be applied to the general it should also be regarded as applicable to the specific) or other similar principles. On the other hand, universality can help error theorist to formulate moral judgements that could be applied in all regions around the world (i.e. judgements that will be free from the influence of local culture and attitudes, in other words, more objectives). Chapter Two Error theory and moral discourse As it has already stated above, morality has a significant role when having to choose the appropriate aspects of error theory that are appropriate for handling a specific error. In this way, moral discourse should be considered as closely related with error theory. Regarding this issue it has been stated by Lillehammer (pg. 104) that ‘morally serious persons can recommend valued social ends to themselves and others without making the convergence-claim on their behalf; yet intelligent moral thought is impossible without the presupposition of some (potentially defeasible) framework of norms and assumptions taken for granted at least for the shake of argument’. In other words, morality cannot be considered as independent from the social and cultural framework of a specific society. In fact, the principles of morality are formulated in accordance with the existed social principles and cultural values of each region and it is for this reason that moral though can have a different form in countries around the world. Towards this direction, Wiggins (2005) refers to the work of Mackie regarding the development of moral thought and particularly of moral constructivism on which Mackie supported that ‘in the tradition instituted by Protagoras, the Athenian sophist, this was to built up from the idea that morality was a device, a system of particular sort of constraints on conduct – ones whose central task is to protect the interests of persons other than the agent and which present themselves to an agent as checks on his natural inclinations or spontaneous tendencies to act’ (Wiggins, 2005, 3). In accordance with the above views, moral thought is considered to be mainly a constraint towards the development of a particular behaviour within the society. In this way, moral thought can be considered as ‘controlling’ the human behaviour setting rules and principles that should be followed in all cases. In other words, moral thought is a decisive criterion in the development of appropriate social behaviour in a particular region. Moreover, in order to identify the appropriate principles of morality that should be applied in a particular case people could proceed in a cost-benefit analysis. Using the above procedure, people can have the following options: ‘abolitionism and factionalism; for moral factionalism to be viable it must win this pragmatic comparison; it is not required that taking a fictional stance towards moral discourse will supply all the benefits that come with sincere moral belief’ (Kalderon, 2005, 299). In accordance with the above in order for people of a specific region to apply the appropriate principles of error theory in case that an error is revealed, they should all have the same believes on morality. However, such a situation cannot be feasible. On the other hand, a common framework of moral thought can exist containing just general principles on morality which could be adapted in the conditions of each particular case. Chapter Three Personal practices regarding errors – application of error theory Despite the fact that error theory is used in order to proceed to appropriate amendments in behaviour when an error is revealed, there are cases where a person is differentiated from the existed framework (error theory) and reacts in accordance with the personal attitudes and values. In this case, personal moral thought can be considered to be different from the social moral thought for a number of reasons. Because of the above Lillehammer (pg. 108) suggested that ‘the case for a convergence-based moral error theory is a reasonable cause for concern for morally serious persons; the consequences of accepting it also include at least the partial abandonment of the convergence-claim’. In other words, error theory should be expected to be followed by persons that are morally driven. In the particular case, there is no intention for making criticism on people for their morality, but just to notice that people can differentiate in accordance with their aspects on morality. In any case, moral thought cannot be exactly the same in all countries around the world. There is always the intervention of cultural and social characteristics of each region that intervene on the development of moral thought. For this reason, Lillehammer (pg. 108) supports that ‘it is mistaken to expect there to be, hidden somewhere in logical space, an error theory which avoids all practical doubts about the universalistic ambitions of morality’. In fact, error theory – because of the differentiation of moral thought in each particular country – can adopt different values and criteria in accordance with the social, political and cultural characteristics of each particular region. Towards this direction, it is suggested by Wiggins (2005, 20) that ‘on the level of agreement in moral judgments themselves, maybe it is better to bracket the question of identifying verdicts that already command universal agreement’. In accordance with the above, the application of specific practices regarding error could be considered as influenced by the aspects on morality accepted in each region. In other words, moral thought is the primary criterion for the development of a specific behaviour towards error; however general principles and rules (error theory) that have been developed in the area of theory can also have an influence in human behaviour regarding error but only if these principles reflect the social and cultural values of the specific region. Chapter Four Conclusion and Recommendations The application of the principles of error theory in every case that an error is revealed has been often related with the existence of an appropriate legal framework that will enforce the amendments in human behaviour when an error is revealed. In other words, the application of error theory could be not just optional but obligatory. Regarding this issue, Kalderon (2005, 300) supported that ‘a person may have many reasons for acting in accordance with a moral requirement: the fear of punishment, the desire for an ongoing beneficial relationship, the motivation to maintain a good reputation, the fact that one has been brought up such that acting otherwise makes one feel bad’. All the above explanations of human behaviour towards error can explain the fact that the application of principles of error theory (or simply the amendment in human behaviour because of an error) is still a significant issue for people around the world. Error theory itself does not have the appropriate strength to enforce its application. However, social and cultural trends and personal attitudes (as explained above) can be used as a logical explanation for the promotion of application of error theory around the world. Moreover, it should be noticed that the application of error theory is not a fact that can be identified and measured with accuracy within a specific society. It is rather a fact of personal choice that is developed fast within the social context and without any promotion of its involvement in human behaviour. In this way, only observing the behaviour of people within a particular region, such a trend can be revealed. On the other hand, the theories presented above offer the appropriate framework for the explanation of the role of error theory within the modern society. In fact it has been proved that error theory can influence the formulation and development of social principles and ethics leading to the formulation of specific rules of morality. At the same time, error theory can intervene in the development of legal principles within a particular society alternating existed punishments or introducing new forms of actions that should be punished in accordance with the law. Moreover, error theory can influence the formulation of judicial view regarding certain cases. Of course, this intervention of error theory in the legal and judicial framework of a society cannot be directly but it can be achieved only through the development of social principles and ethics applicable in a particular region. In all the above cases, morality has to be a decisive criterion when formulating the principles and rules of error theory (which is going afterwards to be applied in the social and cultural framework of a specific country). Towards this direction, it is supported by Kalderon (2006, 306) that ‘the decision to adopt morality as a fiction is best through of as a kind of precommitment; it is not being suggested that someone enters a shop is tempted to steal, decides to adopt morality as a fiction, and thus sustains prudent though faltering decision not to steal’. In other words, the amendment of human behaviour in accordance with the principles of error theory is a fact closely related with the specific person’s personal attitudes. Generally, it could be stated that there is no way of enforcing the application of the principles of error theory (not referring to the legal principles) within a particular society. Perhaps, this weakness of error theory is one of the reasons that its application is not extended in all regions worldwide. Only in countries where the social and political system allows the development of theories related with human behaviour (this is mainly the case of developed countries) the application of error theory can be achievable. References Lillehammer, H. ‘Moral Error Theory’ Hallvard Lillehammer, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, p. 93-108 Mackie, J. (1977) ‘Ethics’ Penguin Books Wiggins, D. (2005) Objectivity in ethics: Two difficulties, two responses. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Kalderon, M. (2005) Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press Read More