Frankfurts notion of Second Order Volition - Essay Example

?Frankfurt’s notion of Second Order Volition vis-a-visits Impact on Freedom of Will and Action (Essay) Harry G. Frankfurt (born May 29, 1929) is an American philosopher and a retired professor of philosophy at Princeton University. His major areas of interest include moral philosophy, philosophy of mind and action and 17th century rationalism. He is best known for his account of freedom of the will based on his concept of higher-order volitions. He has written numerous important papers on this subject and this essay seeks to elaborate on his paper on “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. This essay is an attempt to analyseFrankfurt’s notion of a second order volition in the light of its impact on the freedom of will and action. (Shook, 2005, pp. 854-56) Frankfurt’s essay opens with his views on the concept of “person”. When his contemporaries seek to define a person as merely a body with states of consciousness, Frankfurt begs to differ. He states that a person is not just the singular form of ‘people’. It does not merely refer to the members of certain biological species with a set of specific physical and mental characteristics that are supposed to be uniquely human. Humans are not the only creatures with desires, motives and choices. But it is the capacity of reflective self-evaluation and a desire to be different from what they are that makes the persons a class apart from the other living beings.The primary feature that differentiates a person from other creatures is his structure of will. (Frankfurt, 1988, pp. 11-12) To define “will”, one needs to first understand the concept of first order desire. A first order desire is simply a desire for something or a desire to do or not to do one thing or another. For example, a desire to smoke a cigarette or to watch a movie or to read a book is a first order desire. And a first order desire that motivates a person all the way to perform an action is called effective desire or ‘will’. A will is not same as a first order desire. If one desires to read a book, he may not necessarily go and start reading a book. Even though a person may have an intention to do something, he may not ultimately do it because the desire for doing that action may prove to be weaker or less effective than some conflicting desire. Therefore, a desire which determines the behaviour of a person at a critical moment and leads him to action in the presence of other conflicting desires is termed as will. (Frankfurt, 1971, pp. 4-5) To define “free will”, Frankfurt introduces another type of desires- second order desires. A second order desire refers to a desire about a first order desire or a desire to have or not to have a first order desire. Or in other words, a second order desire is a manifestation of the uniquely human ability of reflection on one’s first order desires. For example, a habitual smoker may have a desire to smoke but a smoker who is trying to quit may want “not to have a desire to smoke”. The latter is a case of second order desire.It is these second order desires that are regarded as a mark of ‘personhood’. (Frankfurt, 1971, p. 3) Second order desires which refer to effective first order desires are termed as second order volitions. In simpler terms, when a person wants a second order desire to be his will, it becomes a second order volition. To illustrate the concept better, we may take the example of a psychologist dealing with a drug addict patient. To understand his patient better, he may want to have the desire for drugs (second order desire). But he does not want his desire to be effective (to actually take drugs). The doctor thus demonstrates a second order desire but no second order volition. It is not second order desire but second order volition that is essential to being a person and this leads us to the definition of free will and freedom of action.((Frankfurt, 1971, p. 5) Free will is a situation wherein a person’s second order volition determines his behaviour. The definition of “freedom of will” can be understood better in analogy to “freedom of action”. If freedom of action means “one can do what one desires to do”, then freedom of will would mean “one can desire what one wants to desire”. Free will therefore is not concerned with the relationship between what one does and what he wants to do. It is not just the translation of one’s first order desires into actions. It is the conformity of will to second order volition which ensures that a person enjoys freedom of will. (Bratman, 2004, pp. 21-23) There is no freedom of will if there is a discrepancy between second order volition and will or theawareness that their coincidence is not one’s own doing but just a matter of chance. Animals have no second order desires at all and therefore have no free will. Conflicting first and second order desires lead to a situation where a person lacks freedom of will. For instance, the desire of a student to sleep till 10 am is an effective first order desire but if he wants to have the desire to get up early for the 8 am lecture, it is a second order desire. The situation demonstrates lack of free will. On the other hand, if a smoker has the desire to smoke (effective first order desire) and also wants to have the desire to smoke (second order volition), the situation is an example of freedom of will. (Bratman, 2006, p. 200; O'Keeffe, 2012, p. 52) There may be two cases of consistency between first and second order desires. In the first case, the second order desire can be stronger than the first order desire. A smoker, who is satisfied with his addiction and can also decide to stop smoking the next day, has a free will. In the second case, the first order desire can be stronger than the second order desire, and the consistency is just a lucky coincidence. A smoker who is satisfied with is satisfied with his addiction but would be unable to stop smoking the next day has no free will. (Frankfurt, 1988. p. 18) A wanton is a creature who has first order desires and second order desires, but no second order volitions. He does not care about his will and just passively yields to the forces that move him. This includes non-human animals and very young children, and at times adult humans who sometimes act wantonly in response to first order desires due to lack of second order volition. A wanton drug addict, for instance, has no second order desire but only first order desire. He neither has the will he wants nor has a will that defers from the will he wants. However, not all his first order desires are translated into actions due to the existence of conflicting desires and the intervention of deliberation. On the other hand, a rational creature is marked by a suitability of desires. Reason helps in the awareness of one’s will and in the formation of second order volitions. Therefore we may conclude that a creature without reason is not a person. A person is one who has second order volitions and cares about his will and has an identity apart from his first order desires.(Watson, 1971, p. 218) Ambivalence, conflict and self-deception are some of the complications associated with second order desires. In some cases, there may be a conflict between second order desires and the person may not have a preference regarding which first order desire should be his will. In such a case no second order volition arises until the conflict is resolved. In a severe situation, the person cannot identify with a any of his first order desires and cannot arrive at a decision. This conflict either paralyses his will or prevents him from acting at all or removes him from his will. The will operates without the person’s participation and the person,instead of being an active participant, becomes a “helpless bystander to the forces that move him”.(Lewis, 2000, p.70) At other times, the person may obsessively refuse to identify with any first order desire and subsequently form desires of a higher order. Conformity to higher order volitions may sometimes be thoughtless and spontaneous leading to a series of acts culminating in total destruction of the person. The only solution to this would be an application of common sense and submission to a saving fatigue. (Swindell, 2008, pp. 28-30) Freedom of will is, beyond doubt, a desirable trait. Enjoyment of freedom of will ensures satisfaction of second and higher order desires, whereas its absence means their frustration. Enjoyment of free will comes easily to some, while some must struggle to achieve it. But having a will of one’s own is always a better option than getting estranged from oneself. Bibliography Frankfurt, H.G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5-20, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~schopra/Persons/Frankfurt.pdf Frankfurt, H.G. (1988). The Importance of What We Care About, New York: Cambridge University Press, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0521336112 Swindell, J.S. (2008). Respecting Autonomy in Cases of Ambivalence Regarding End of Life Decisions, United States: ProQuest, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0549845275 Bratman, M.E. (2006). Structures of Agency: Essays, New York: Oxford University Press, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0195345991 O'Keeffe, K.O. (2012). Stealing Obedience: Narratives of Agency and Identity in Later Anglo-Saxon England, Canada: University of Toronto Press, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0802097073 Bratman, M.E. (2004). Three Theories of Self-Governance, Philosophical Topics, 32(1 & 2), 21-46, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?id=m7RCzuAI_RUC Watson, G. (1975). Free Agency, The Journal of Philosophy, 72 (8), 205-20, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101506!/file/Watson-Free-agency.pdf Lewis, D. (2000). Dispositional Theories of Value, Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy,3, 68-94, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from: books.google.co.in/books?isbn=0521587867 Shook, J.R. (2005).Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, Vol.1, England: Thoemmes Continuum, retrieved on November 9, 2013 from:books.google.co.in/books?isbn=1843710374 Read More