Mr Smith and the Evil Scientist - Essay Example

? Mr. Smith and the Evil Scientist: A Critical Discussion of Free Will, Coercion and Responsibility It is my thesis that, while the chip is in his head, Smith is not responsible for his actions. Under these conditions, he has no free will. I will discuss the will to power, Holbach, Hume, Chisolm, Frankfort and Strawson’s theories as they relate to Smith, and examine two objections to this thesis. The Will to Power It is my argument that Smith’s neural implant renders him powerless to make his own decisions, even if the choices he appears to make appear to conform to his usual choices. If the fundamental drive in life is for power, Smith, in his powerless state, is as good as dead. The dead can bear no responsibility for their actions. At best, Smith is a zombie, under the control of the scientist. An animated corpse is simply an instrument being used to fulfill the will of the master. Within this system, the scientist is fully alive. He feels pleasure by overcoming displeasures, which in this case would be technical difficulties with his zombie and his chip that prevent Smith from carrying out his master’s will. With every victory over Smith, the master (the scientist) stimulates his will to power and therefore is fully alive. The scientist follows all the rules of Master Morality, and is able to do this with a good conscience. Smith can’t subscribe to the Slave Morality because, ostensibly, he does not know he is being subjugated. He cannot see his master as evil, because he is unaware that his mind has been manipulated by an outside person. Therefore, he bears no responsibility for his actions while under the influence of the neural chip. Holbach: Causal Determinism: All Events are Caused Holbach states that because we are parts of the greater whole, which is nature, we cannot think, perceive or act without nature influencing us. In order to be free of nature, we would have to be free of “physical sensibility” which means coma, or death. If we are alive, we are subject to nature’s influence, therefore no actions performed while we are living are free. Under this theory, I say that Smith is doubly “un-free” in that his master’s (the scientist’s) actions upon him are also caused by nature. Holbach: “It is the actual essence of man to tend to his well-being.” The scientist tends to his own well-being. Smith does not, even though it does no obvious harm. As a result, Smith, while under control of the chip, has no “actual essence” (Holbach) and is not truly alive. Under this system, a person is punished or rewarded due to his acting or not acting on his motives, which we all carry within us. Smith’s volition to act or not act is compromised by the chip, so he should not be punished or rewarded for any actions. “To be free is to yield to the necessary motives he carries within himself” (Holbach, 113). Smith’s processing of what his motives are, and what to do or not do about them, is controlled by the scientist. It is my position that the scientist alone experiences Holbach’s limited freedom. Hume: On Knowing and the Liberty of Spontaneity Hume defines the will as “when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or a new perception of our mind” (57). If Smith’s thoughts are influenced by a neural chip, then Smith’s actions, which are directed by this chip, are not mindful actions, but compulsions that have been generated by the chip’s impulses. Smith acts unknowingly, therefore he has no will. Hume’s main argument states that “2. All mental events (thoughts, feelings, etc.) and actions are constantly conjoined with some other (preceding) type of event, and the mind passes from a consideration of one to a consideration of the other (class notes, italics mine). Smith’s mind is altered by the chip, thus altering the process of consideration from E to F. This makes for a false causal relation in terms of the will. If causation depends on a determination of the mind, then Smith’s mind is being determined by the scientist. There ends up being a sort of double-causation: a) like causes yield like effects b) electronically stimulated causes yield like effects. According to Hume, Liberty of Spontaneity=Freedom of Action. Freedom of action is: “The ability to act without restraint, to do what one wants. It is undermined by violence, restraint, coercion.” Liberty, Hume states, means a power of acting or not acting, “according to the determinations of the will”(79). I don’t think that Smith can choose based on his own will when his will is controlled by the chip. This removes Liberty of Spontaneity, and by this removal, Freedom of Action. Liberty is “also necessary for responsibility: if a person is acted upon by external violence, he cannot be responsible” (Hume, 82). In Hume’s day, they didn’t have neural chips. But I assert that the implantation of such a chip is an act of external violence against Smith. The scientist, with his experiment, is depriving Smith of his liberty. Then there is the God question: “Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause, or if they have any…they must involve our Creator in the same guilt” (Hume, 82). God created all, including Smith, the scientist and the chip. Therefore, God is ultimately responsible for whatever actions arise in the universe. Chisolm : Human Freedom and the Self Frankfort: PAP I maintain that Smith, “at the time of the action, [did not have] the ability to either do A or not do A” (Chisolm). For this reason, Smith is not responsible. According to Chisolm, “An action for which an agent is responsible cannot be caused by another event.” The cause of Smith’s actions are the signals from the chip. This constitutes another event. The brain event, says Chisolm, “must have been caused by the man.” Smith does not cause the brain event. The scientist does. This lets Smith off the hook. In Frankfort’s theory (PAP), “ a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.” I say that Smith, when the chip is activated, acts in a way that the chip dictates, and could not have done otherwise. I disagree with the analysis of Situation 4, specifically with the premise “Black’s presence makes no difference, since even if Jones did have the ability to do otherwise, he would have done A anyway.” This premise pre-supposes the willingness of Jones. How can we know that Jones would have done A anyway? The way I see it, Black’s presence can’t be removed from this argument, because Black acts upon Jones to coerce him into doing his (Black’s ) will. I think I need to see more evidence of proof that, even if Black wasn’t there at all, Jones would have done action A. When Jones does the action against his will, that means Jones is not responsible. I break it down like this: Black wants Jones to do A Jones will not willingly do A Black intervenes--neural implant Jones does A under coercion Therefore, Jones is not responsible The dictionary definition of will: The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course (thefreedictionary.com) Jones’ mental faculty is impaired by the implant. Therefore, Jones cannot deliberately choose or decide upon a course, but instead is acting according to Black’s will (examples of deductive rules, Solomon). According to Frankfort’s theory, Smith can only have First Order Desires when “on the chip”. Smith’s desires are being dictated by the scientist. The scientist has the Second Order Desire that Smith desire KFC. The scientist activates the chip, and Smith has a FOD for chicken. On free will and action, Frankfort states: “S acts of his own free will if and only if 1) S has a Second Order Volition that W (a First Order Volition) be his will and 2) W is S’s will. Smith with the chip can only experience First Order Volitions, and therefore cannot act of his own free will. Under Frankfort’s system, Smith would not be held morally responsible. As far as Strawson’s theory is concerned, I would see Smith as someone to view under the Objective Attitude. While he is under the scientist’s control, he is “less than a full person or agent” (Strawson). Objections to the Thesis Objection 1. When the chip is not activated, Smith is a full person who bears responsibility for his actions. According to Hume, under these conditions, Smith would have the Liberty of Spontaneity--the ability to act without restraint. He would have his own free will. There would be no false causation in terms of the will. Even though all actions according to Holbach are predetermined, Smith would now be free to act on his own inner motives. This freedom bears moral responsibility because our actions within the influence of nature have consequences. If Smith’s chip were deactivated, my whole argument in Situation 4 would be invalid, because Smith would not be coerced. Smith would be free to act on the rules of Master Morality. His actions, in Chisholm’s theory, would be caused by him and not by “another event”, and Smith would then be responsible. Smith would have Second Order Volitions which would lead to First Order Volitions that would represent his will. But, I maintain that Smith is subject to the scientist’s will as long as the chip is in his head. It can be activated or de-activated according to the will of the scientist. Therefore, Smith is not a free agent until the chip is removed. Objection 2. Compatibilism: Some events (voluntary human actions) are free Smith’s actions were voluntary Therefore, Smith’s actions were free. I say that Smith’s actions while under control of the chip were not voluntary, therefore not free. This absolves him of moral responsibility for his actions. As far as compatibilism accepting both the premise that ALL events are caused, and the premise that SOME events are free, I don’t understand. If you have a valid argument but one of the premises simply can’t exist alongside the other, then it could very well be a fallacy. Works Cited “Definition of ‘will’”. Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus and Encyclopedia. Web. 15 April 2011. “Syllogism” The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia. Web. 12 April 2011. Read More