Analytical Assignment on Frankfurts Account - Essay Example

Analytical Assignment on Frankfurt’s Account The definition of what a person is and what differentiates a person from other creatures such as animals is a concept which has taken on various meanings according to whoever defines the person. In the case of Harry G. Frankfurt’s definition of a person, a person is someone who has the ability to decide on what actions to take, as well as being able to reflect on the effects of deciding to or not deciding to take on such actions, or simply just the ability to have a will that is able to retrospectively create insights on possible outcomes of acting either thoughtfully or thoughtlessly. The idea of being a person as being a person rather than an animal is that while animals are mainly acting on impulses and instincts without thinking whether their action is morally sound or not, a person on the other hand is able to weigh in the consequences of partaking in the action or not, if choosing to act or not will be beneficial or destructive to the self or to others, as well as to whether the action is morally-befitting or not. It can be said that the basis of being a person would be dependent on whether the person is able to freely think of possibilities in the effect of choosing what actions to take or if a person would rather act on physiological impulses (Frankfurt 7). In order to define a person, consider Frankfurt’s examples about three kinds of drug addicts: the unwilling addict; the wanton addict; and the willing addict. Among the three kinds of addicts, only one of these can be considered to be a true person, one would be something like a pseudo-person, and one would simply be human, but being an agent of action not thinking of consequences, thus not fully a person. In a human being solely an agent of action, but not being person, submitting to one’s impulses or desires but not thinking of or reflecting on long-term results of such actions can be likened to how animals respond to basic instincts, such as foraging or hunting for food as the hunger arises, or procreating during certain times of the year. In the case of a wanton addict, there is a similar scenario of taking in drugs because the need arises, and fulfilling this need is the main source of action and motivation for the person, no reflecting on the effects of the drug to the body and mind, no choices to ponder on, as well as a complete disregard to society. In a sense, the wanton addict only acts on first-order desires, wherein there is only a need to fulfill the desires without thinking or reflecting about the positive or negative effects of fulfilling such wants. The idea of having a free will is seen on both the unwilling and willing drug addicts, since they both have first-order and second-order desires. Both have first-order desires to get high on drugs, both also have second order desires, but their second-order desires are different. In the willing addict’s case, taking the drug is both first-order and second-order desires, mainly because the addict is willing to take the drug, and choosing to take it is a means to an end. Thus the willing addict has choices, taking the drug or not, but in the end chooses to get high anyway. On the other hand, the unwilling addict has conflicting first and second order desires: first-order is to get high; second-order is to kick the habit and get away from drugs. The unwilling addict has two choices, taking the drug and entering relapse, or deciding to stop drugs and live better in the future. However, in this case the unwilling addict’s desire to get away from drugs weighs heavier between the two, and stopping drug intake not only fulfilled the addict’s higher-order desire (not succumbing to hunger pangs), but also fulfilled a second-order volition: being able to do the opposition of first-order or impulsive desires, and overcoming the main impulse of getting high. Among the three, the unwilling addict is considered to be a person, while the willing addict is a pseudo-person, and the agent of action but not a person is the wanton addict. The person (unwilling addict) recognizes moral responsibility (taking drugs is bad in any way) and also shows freedom of will (freely thinks of all possible consequences of taking or not taking drugs), but has limited freedom of volition due to choices (has difficulty choosing whether to take drugs or not due to perceived morals). While the willing addict also experiences free will since there is also a choice to not take the drugs, in this case there is no recognition of moral responsibility in taking in the drugs, making the willing addict a pseudo-person experiencing full freedom of actions (takes drugs according to will). Based on the examples, being a person shows that aside from recognizing moral responsibility, a limited freedom of actions is also recognized to fulfill higher-order desires. Peculiar cases of persons having moral responsibilities can be seen among persons choosing to amputate parts of their limbs so that they could be better persons, and the doctors that have moral obligations of keeping people healthy and putting them away from harm. What is queer about the scenario is that for doctors, amputation must only be done when the person would benefit from the loss such as having a prolonged life (like in diabetes patients having gangrene on the limbs), but amputees by choice want to have their limbs removed because they do not feel like their limbs are part of their bodies, and wanted to remove them despite them being fully functional and healthy. It is hard to define whether the amputees as agents of action and having first-order and second-order desires are persons or not. However, according to Frankfurt’s definition, amputees by choice are persons, since these are actual functional people that are able to fulfill moral responsibilities and recognize their limited freedom. They are people because they are able to weigh in the choices of losing their limb and keeping their limbs, on whether keeping their limbs could help them become better persons in the society, or if they could gain better quality of life. If the amputees by choice only wanted to have their limbs removed because of impulses, then they are not considered to be persons but merely only agents. They would be acting on the impulse of removing the alien arms or legs because it is in their first-order desires, but not thinking why they wanted it to be removed. But in the case of amputees by choice, it must be taken into consideration that they were able to reflect on what it feels like to have the limb, if it would make them feel better to have the limbs removed, and it they could have better lives and perform better responsibilities if the limbs were completely removed, since they were able to choose between freedom from having an alien limb and becoming a whole and fulfilled person in the process. This can be similar as to how Frankfurt defined the unwilling addict’s choice of actions, wherein “…the latter desire, and not the former, that he wants to constitute to his will…” (12). First-order desire for the amputees would be to remain having a whole set of limbs, and this is not different from any other person. This is a form of life-preservation, and is a basic impulse. However, the second-order desires of amputees and other people differ, since most people have coinciding first and second-order desires (preserving limbs), while the amputees by choice have conflicting ones (second-order desire of removing alien-feeling limbs). But, it cannot be said easily that the rest of the world are willing addicts. It just so happens that for people that want to keep their limbs, this is because they have reflected that they could function better in the society by keeping their limbs intact. They have higher-order desires to become morally responsible citizens. It can be said true to amputees by choice, and that they also want to become morally responsible and capable citizens, but they only wanted their “diseased” limbs to be removed so that they could fulfill their second or higher-order desires, of removing the limb to become better persons. Thus their need to attain second-order or higher order of desires is a way by which they could obtain higher forms of volition, and attaining higher forms of volition makes them fulfilled despite having limited freedom. It is hard to be fully judgmental to see amputees as unfit to be defined as persons because this is similar to disapproving their free will and their ability to reflect on decisions, or simply their decision-making. Also, not all amputees by choice are able to fully redeem their desires because they are also limited by the code of conduct of surgeons or doctors. They could choose to take action such as mutilating themselves, but doing that makes them similar to willing addicts, and in the end they choose to keep their limbs for the time being, since they have recognize moral responsibilities as well as social codes. It can be said that due to amputees by choice being able to recognize the results of having their limbs removed or not having them removed, they are able to reflect on both their first-order desires (wanting the body to be whole) and second-order desires (wanting to remove the limbs to become whole). For an ordinary person, it seems conflicting, but it is just similar to the unwilling addict that wants to remove the drug habit to become morally-upright. Just like the addict, the amputees are also presented various choices or wills, such as not having the limbs removed, having the limbs removed either through decided surgery or by other means. They are also able to think and reflect why they wanted to remove the limbs (it does not feel right, it feels weird, it has a life of its own, etc.), and why they wanted to keep their limbs (it might hurt when removed, there would be limited actions after, costs, many doctors might not do it, etc.). Amputees by choice can be designated as either willing or wanton addicts if they try to find ways to remove their limbs, because it is their choice and they are governed by their free will. But because more often than not they just choose to keep their limbs due to possible problems that could arise, such as code of conduct issues with doctors or surgeons especially since they are physically healthy with the limbs attached, they are seen as persons that have free will but limited freedom. If they do not have such ideas or they do not recognize such moral responsibilities not by them, but by the doctors, then it should be expected that many of these amputees would have already went to doctors by the hundreds or thousands, and it would create a disturbance in society. But somehow at this point it has not happened yet, mainly due to the amputees realizing that they have to fulfill other higher orders of desires, such as wanting to remain whole despite wanting to remove the limb despite having troubles wanting to remain whole, which in a way is similar as to how the second-order of desires counteract first-order of desires, and they keep having higher-order volition by keeping their limbs despite being torn between wanting to remove and not wanting to remove them. Work Cited Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy (1971): 68(1):5-20. Print. Read More