In-Country Work of by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Detract from His Main Mandate - Essay Example

In-country activities by UNHCR detract from its primary man What everybody expects from a responsible international humanitarian agency is to act in all possible ways to protect human rights. But human rights is such a vast and multi-faceted topic that it is not possible for one single agency to function as an umbrella organization in monitoring and intervening in all kinds of human rights violations. This kind of a situation can generate many complicated issues around it. The inability to widen the scope of intervention beyond a boundary, could invite valid and invalid criticisms. And if the agency in question instead tries to stay strictly within the earmarked territory of its intervention, that position also may cause allegations of relapse from some other circles. Controversy will follow every footstep of such an organization, as it is very difficult to decide where to draw the lines. This is the case with the activities of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The agency has been intervening in many external and internal conflict situations and thereby finding itself at the receiving end of a lot of criticism. On one side, UNHCR has been accused of failing to properly support the refugees and on the other hand, the organization has been criticized for not doing its maximum in helping internally displaced persons. But the problem with these two closely related aspects of refugee issue is that when one aspect is dealt with, that can go against the solution derived for the second aspect. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees was formed basically for the “protection and assistance” of international refugees (Beigbeder, 1991, pp.27). UNHCR has an internationally accepted “legal mandate to protect and assist” the refugees (Korn, 1999, pp.36). But “for the internally displaced, it has nothing of the kind” (Korn, 1999, pp.36). Thus, legally, for UNHCR to interfere in an issue causing the persecution of a particular group of people, that group has to be living outside its country of origin. This is the primary meaning of the word, ‘refugee’. Given this socio-legal ambience, the agency was expected to play within its demarcated area of action which has been not the case in many instances. The reason behind is that, as the nature of conflicts changed with time, the world is witnessing the problem of internally displaced persons getting more and more severe, even more serious than refugees. And there is lot of pressure on UNHCR to help this category as well. UNHCR has been redefining its mandate in tune with this changing scenario. Though there can be no doubt that this issue needs immediate attention, the question is whether UNHCR is the agency to act in this regard. It has been clearly stated that “UNHCR has a primary function in the field of international protection and material assistance to refugees, persons displaced outside their country of origin and returnees” (Beigbeder, 1991, 28). But there is a lot of demand and pressure from various international victim groups and others on UNHCR to intervene in issues outside this mandate, particularly for the assistance of internally displaced persons. The definition of the word, ‘refugee’, in this context has been very flexible in the statute of UNHCR itself (Kourula, 1997, pp.174). Article 6 of UNHCR statute has named persons and groups as refugees, who primarily are “individuals for whom UNHCR has competence to provide international protection” (Kourula, 1997, pp.176). The definition with reference to the beneficiary side is as follows (UN, 11 December 1948): Person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no nationality, the country of his formal habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion or is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, to return to the country of his formal habitual residence. But it is not this single definition alone that determines the scope of action of UNHCR. There are a number of other decisions and binding rules that are also being considered as the basis for deriving a definition for the concept of a refugee. These include, UN “General Assembly resolutions…specific authorizations by the United Nations Secretary General” and also “as defined in the 1957 Convention and the 1967 Protocol as well as in complementary regional refugee instruments” (Kourala, 1997, pp.174). But it is the paragraph 9 of the statute of UNHCR that has imparted the greatest flexibility to the term, “refugee” (Kourala, 1997, pp.176). Paragraph 9 stated that the United National General Assembly can entrust the High Commissioner “to engage in such additional activities including repatriation and resettlement” (Rauschning, Wiesbrock and Lailach, 1997, pp.433). This has given rise to a new situation where, any humanitarian issue can be taken up by UNHCR, despite it is involved with the real refugee problems. All these definitions and directives put together have made the definition of refugee very broad and somewhat vague. Though this situation has broadened the humanitarian action paradigm for UNHCR, there have been criticisms that UNHCR is moving away and getting distracted from its primary mandate, which is the protection of international refugees. The problem is that a part of UNHCR’s mandate is legally binding while the other part is “of an operational nature” (Beigbeder, 1991, pp.27). The operational part has been determined largely by discretion, based on the above discussed aspects and norms. It is into this area that UNHCR has brought in several humanitarian activity plans. And slowly this operational aspect has been overshadowing the legal aspects. Criticisms have been prevalent because the “refugee problems are (always) a source of friction” between many countries (African Convention Governing Refugee Problems, 1969, pp.1). Also, the concept of providing relief can include a wide range of activities which will again widen the scope of intervention. One definition of the word, ‘relief’ has been, “providing protection from death, malnutrition, disease, hypothermia, depression and similar socio-economic ills” (Forsyth, 2001, pp.5). And this concept is “codified in ….international law” as well (Forsyth, 2001, pp.5). Such internationally binding definitions and their supporters have an effect of putting pressure on UNHCR to interfere in all kinds of internal issues of a nation. A 1999 UNCHR report has stated that “the daily practice of providing protection” to certain identified sections of people includes, “identifying vulnerable groups and prioritizing assistance to ensure their physical security, access to food and safe accommodation, and primary education” (UNHCR, 1999). From 1970 onwards, UNHCR started assisting internally displaced persons as per these new policy shifts (Davies and Glanville, 2010, pp. 25). In the position paper of March 2000, UNHCR had made clear what its connection was with the internally displaced persons (Davies and Glanville, 2010, pp. 25). This paper said that out of the humanitarian mandate of UNHCR, it naturally became mandatory that the agency help those who are “displaced by persecution, situations of general violence, conflict or massive violations of human rights” (Davies and Glanville, 2010, pp. 25).Though paragraph 2 of the statute of UNHCR says that its “work shall be of an entirely non-political character”, the refugee problems are of very sensitive and political in nature (UNHCR, 14 December 1950). This political nature of refugee problem has further complicated the situation. The government of a nation might have a difference of opinion with the international community regarding whether a person or a group comes under the category of refugee or not. Such a conflict may be more prominent in the case of internally displaced persons. The difference of opinion about “refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fermenting subversion from outside” can lead to aggravate the refugee crisis, if not handled carefully (African Convention Governing Refugee Problems, 1969, pp.1). In such a situation, UNHCR will even be forced to keep away from helping the refugees which is part of its primary mandate. For example, in Sudan, which is the “country with the largest number of internally displaced persons (about 4 millions)”, UN declined to carry out assistance activities for the internally displaced because the agency did not want to invite the wrath of Sudanese government which may affect the well being of the refugees inside the country (Korn, 1999, pp.36). But in several other instances, UNHCR could not maintain this neutral, non-political position and it was the refugees who had to face the consequences. In Iraq, UNHCR was viewed by Saddam Hussein regime as “a part of the UN system, ….which was supporting “economic sanctions” (Forsythe, 2001, 16). This attitude had greatly limited the scope of UNHCR intervention in the crisis, during the beginning months of Iraq war. When 131 Thai Muslims fled to Malaysia, the Thiland government had criticized UNHCR for giving support to them (Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, September 22, 2005). As there are effective in country norms in many nations to help and protect asylum seekers, an intervention UNHCR circumventing these rules may viewed as unethical decision, even a violation of the sovereignty of a nation. It has to be acknowledged that “primary responsibility for the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons rests with the territorial state in virtue of its sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention” (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.7). For example, the African countries have a Convention governing internally displaced persons and refugees which says that “the country of asylum in collaboration with the country of origin, shall make adequate arrangements for the safe return of refugees” (African Convention Governing Refugee Problems, 1969, pp.5). In 2005, there was yet another development in defining the role of UNHCR in the matter of internally displaced persons (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.9). The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee entrusted the responsibility of protection of “conflict-generated” internally displaced persons with a “cluster chaired by UNHCR” (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.9). To opt for such more autonomous platforms for action was a viable way out for UNHCR. But this idea failed drastically on the implementation side. And the operation aspect of humanitarian assistance continued to haunt the refugee friendly actions of UNHCR. In another resolution adopted in 15 December 2005, the role of UN in such matters was realigned so as to focus more on enhancing “coordination, effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance” (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.12). Such a participation means coordinating other “competent agencies, and organizations including NGOs” (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.12). If UNHCR had followed this resolution in its true spirit, it could have kept its head out of many conflicts entrusting other competent agencies to carry out relief. But instead UNHCR showed a tendency to pose itself as a big humanitarian policing agency for the globe. It was never examined whether the refugee protection mandate will in any way get diluted by this focus shift. The first thing to be realized by an agency like UNHCR is that though it professes a policy of non-political action, its “actions are often severely constrained by the political realities of the context in which it is operating” (Morris, 1997, pp.1). And many times it has been noticed that “parties with a political interest in the situation often seek to manipulate the humanitarian action” (Morris, 1997, pp.1). It is in this context that UNHCR should insist that its primary mandate is “to protect the refugees” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007, pp. 427). Refugee protection is a sensitive area in which only a perfectly neutral agency can play a role. But going beyond the limit of refugee protection mandate, UNHCR had diluted its capacity to remain neutral. Being involved in the issues of internally displaced persons also has a meaning that UNHCR is taking a political position regarding the internal matters of a nation. This puts the neutrality of this agency at stake and in the long run, the refugee problem is being sidelined because of the political colours gained by supporting IDPs (internally displaced persons). But the precedence of assisting internally displaced persons on the part of UNHCR has been established for long. It was the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration that first gave “emergency aid to those displaced by the conflict in Europe” (Goodwin-Gill, 2007, pp.2). It has also been noticed by researchers (Forsythe, 2001, pp.6) that in between 1992 and 1995, when UNHCR started to act in such a way as to contain the refugee problem by acting more aggressively in the internally displaced persons’ issues, the right of the refugees to ask for asylum was blocked to an extent. Analyzing such incidents, Forsythe (2001, pp.7) has stated that in that situation, “relief protection undercut traditional protection.” The norm is that, “Unless specifically requested by the General Assembly”, it is very rare that UNHCR acts inside a country to help internally displaced persons (Martin, 2006, pp.25). And the six requirements for involvement have been delineated as: A request or authorization from the Secretary General or a competent principal organ of the UN; consent of the state concerned and where applicable, other entities in a conflict; access to the affected population; adequate security for staff of UNHCR and implementing partners; clear lines of responsibility and accountability with the ability to intervene directly on protection matters; and adequate resources and capacity” (Martin, 2005, pp. 86). But in several instances, UNHCR has been acting beyond these norms. It was the UN special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Nicholas Morris who had drawn attention for the first time to this issue (Barutsiski, 2002, pp.365). But Morris (1997, pp.492-499) had supported the UNHCR position in this regard by arguing out the concept of “instrumental humanitarianism.” But the truth is that in many cases, the pressure put on UNHCR by a group of countries can be very influential regarding its decisions (Halder, 1999, pp.6). Another problem involved is that the countries who give fund to UNHCR will sometimes expect the agency to act according to its foreign policies and pressurize the agency to do the same (Halder, 1999, pp.6-7). All these pressures have drawn UNHCR into taking certain steps which might be clearly interpreted as moving outside the limits of its primary mandate. Haider (1999, pp.7) has drawn attention to the instance when UNHCR was forced to choose between “either accepting Muslim and Croatian prisoners handed over to them by the Serbian militia-which would have effectively made them accomplices to the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing- or refusing to free them from internment in camps or from risk to their lives in conflict zones.” To take any of these decisions was to stand against the agency’s own mandate. The involvement of UNHCR in the issues of internally displaced persons is complicated further because, such interventions may have an influence on “who governs (in a country) or contradicts the general nature of governance, or is linked to military coercion” (Forsythe, 2001, pp.3). And also the issue gets more complex when UNHCR resorts to indirect coercion, by “closing down refugee camps or reducing goods and services in an effort to compel refugees to move” (Forsythe, 2001, pp.3). The core aspect of these circumstances is that by entering into the humanitarian realm rather than sticking on to its legal paradigm, UNHCR has created a confused scenario for itself as well as others (Forsythe, 2001, pp.3). Here, the agency is found to forget that the humanitarian policy milieu is a totally political one and a forced entry into that space may demand a series of political positions to be made by UNHCR, which is against its declared policies. It was the inter-ethnic conflicts that erupted in different countries in 1980s and 1990s that dragged UNHCR into actions beyond its mandate. The developed countries who kept their asylum seeking policies very strict were also hampering the free refugee movement across countries (UNHCR, 1 August 2004). UNHCR has also been accused of being very keen to “cultivating the largesse of its patrons- the donor and host state community (Loescher, 2001, pp.358). The criticism of UNHCR has grown up to a level where it is alleged that UNHCR “is largely unaccountable to the populations it is mandated to protect” (Loescher, 2001, pp.358). In the Kenyan conflict of August 1997, UNHCR was seen “hiring buses to transport refugees to the camps with a police escort”, that too in a secretive manner (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.303). UNHCR’s role in “repatriation of Rwandans form Tanzania” and “its silence on arms movements” have also come under fire from critics in the same manner (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.303). In certain instances where it could effectively assert its mandate, UNHCR remained a silent spectator while in certain other circumstances, in which it had no mandate at all, UNHCR was seen going out of its way to intervene and act. Indiscriminate interventions in conflict areas have caused many of the staff of UNHCR being “subjected to rapes and sexual assaults, armed robberies, attacks on relief convoys, carjackings, arrests and detentions” (Loescher, 2001, pp.361). After when its policies underwent a shift from protection to operational activities in mid-1980s, the total focus was on humanitarian action (Loescher, 2001, pp.363). Thus though the agency could provide food, medicines and similar services in conflict-ridden areas, it became less inclined to protect people form “human right abuses, expulsions and ethnic cleansing” (Loescher, 2001, pp.364). And it is being inferred that UNHCR is more concerned about quantitative achievements rather than qualitative ones (Loescher, 2001, pp.364). While discussing these matters, UNHCR has been accused of lacking in “organizational accountability”, and afflicted with “organizational ego” and “inappropriate personal interest from organizational goals” (Stainer, Gibney and Loescher, 2003, pp.43). And UNHCR is always forced to elicit negotiated assistance from rich countries to intervene in a humanitarian crisis in conflict-ridden nations (Stainer, Gibney and Loescher, 2003, pp.59). The rich nations may give funding and assistance as far as their interests are pursued (Stainer, Gibney and Loescher, 2003, pp.59). But to expect assistance from them in all situations and every time will most probably end up as a foolish assumption. While assuming so, UNHCR is putting itself in a vulnerable position in which, it is not able to carry out the protection function in all its capacity. Another fear being expressed is that “an over-reliance on the human rights regime” could reduce the importance of the refugee law (Bayefsky, Fitzpatrick and Helton, pp.77). During the Vietnam War a controversy erupted when UNHCR repatriated minor children by separating them from their families in order to discourage them to escape from the country and become refugees (Greenhouse, Mertz and Warren, 2002, pp.216). This incident shows how slippery a humanitarian intervention can turn into. But if UNHCR had tried to limit its actions under the purview of its basic mandate, such a situation might not have arisen. This might have enabled the agency to take a much more focused and sharp position regarding the refugees. The Kosovo tragedy also had witnessed similar error adaptations of humanitarian cause by UNHCR (Booth, 2001, pp.172). It has been revealed that in order to get funds from donor countries, UNHCR had diluted its stand on refugee repatriation and had allowed the refugees to be taken back to their countries of origin against their will (Booth, 2001, pp.172). For example, in the 1990s, “the United States ans West European governments have continued to override UNHCR protests and disregard widespread criticism of their forcible repatriation of thousands of Haitians and Albanians” (Booth, 2001, pp.172). Thus the rights of refugees were put on back burner in order to secure a financial base for the organization. This was made possible by the assumed role of flexible humanitarian mediator by the agency. Booth (2001, pp.173) had also criticized the “perceived need of enterprising humanitarianism” by UNHCR and had pointed out that in the disguise of this need, UNHCR had even collaborated with NATO which had strategic rather than humanitarian interests in any conflict situation. In cases with a “high international profile”, there was nothing that came in the way of UNHCR to prevent it from taking an active and even political role. It was the ambition of the agency that gained the upper-hand in such decisions rather than the beneficiaries of its primary mandate. The Macedonia refugee crisis has also been cited as an example for this. In the Kosovo War, “65,000 refugees (had) attempted to enter Macedonia at the Blace crossing”, which was blocked by UNHCR by insisting on the “obligation of first asylum states” (Booth, 2001, pp.173). But Macedonia had opposed this position by saying that “the international community had a political responsibility for the crisis” (Booth, 2001, pp.173). Later UNHCR had to change its position in the face of aggravating refugee crisis. All these stand evidence to the way UNHCR had diluted its primary mandate of protecting refugees and how it had made a confused mess of its ideological base. The humanitarian interest of UNHCR has also been blamed as an attempt towards “self-promotion and image management” (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.303). It has also been accused that UNHCR itself has been violating refugee laws (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.303). Many voices have been raised to demand that UNHCR leave the humanitarian activities to the competent humanitarian agencies and seek a “rediscovery of protection” in its own activities (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.306). It is also observed that the refugees do not have any channel to express their sense of deprivation regarding the enforcement of refugee laws (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.306). Though they can write directly to UNHCR head quarters, first of all, only the literate persons benefit from this provision (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.307). Also such letters are usually sent to the local offices of UNHCR for reference which in turn will become a provocation for the local office holders and in certain cases, the refugees “were (even) punished” for writing complaints (Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005, pp.307). Rwanda was another example of this humanitarian adventurism. UNHCR was accused of being indifferent to the Tutsi refugee and generous to the Hutu refugee (Khan, 2000, pp.72). Also it was found that UNHCR entrusted the RGF with the task of running refugee camps which was again a decision having many political connotations (Khan, 2000, pp.72). Also it was seen that the “soldiers in Goma” started to wear the disguise of civilians so that they can avail the humanitarian aid from UNHCR (Khan, 2000, pp.72). All these led the researchers (Khan, 2000; Verdirame and Harrel-Bond, 2005) to conclude that the humanitarian face of UNHCR was becoming a means to satisfy the political pressures it has been facing from its donor countries. The prospective refugees are more and more getting trapped inside the conflict zones itself with no option to find a way out. They are facing an indifferent friend in UNHCR. On the other side, the internally displaced persons are lacking systematic support as they are getting a little humanitarian assistance alone, that too solely from UNHCR. A competent and all–encompassing agency need to take up their cause so that there are internationally binding legal norms to protect their rights. While UNHCR has to concentrate on its primary mandate and become a reliable protector for the refugees of wars and conflicts, in all circumstances. 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