Leadership Frames Analysis - Essay Example

Leadership Frames Case Study Introduction Bolman and Deal (1991) introduced the conceptual and practical framework of the four different perspectives under which organizations need to be perceived and viewed so that effective management can be feasible within the context of leadership. These four perspectives – frames – actually constitute alternative ‘windows’ or lenses within which leaders understand, realize and analyze the organizational environment and every occurrence that emerges in that environment (Crist, 1999). Developing upon the notion that organizations are multidimensional settings in which there are various forms of actors and factors interacting with each other and eventually contributing to the organizational framework, Bolman’s and Deal’s leadership frames attempt to provide different scopes under which managers perceive issues/problems raised and behave towards implementing solutions (Mabey and Finch-Lees, 2008; Newstrom and Davis, 1997; Sasnett and Ross, 2007). The four frames of organizational leadership are: the structural frame, the human resources frame, the political frame and the symbolic frame. The structural frame underlines the essence and importance of rules, regulations, structures, organizational design and policies; the human resources frame emphasizes the aspect of ‘people’ within the organization by placing significant weight on the fit between organizational structures and employees; the political frame focuses predominantly on the concentration of power and competition between organizational members; and the symbolic frame emphasizes the cultural orientation of organizations as means of inspiring and motivating organizational members (Bolman and Deal, 1991; Bolman and Deal, 2003; Crist, 1999; Sasnett and Ross, 2007). Drawing upon the four frames proposed, this project deals with an analysis and theoretical application of the theory over the case of Nasa’s Challenger and Columbia shuttles disasters in 1986 and 2003 respectively. The aftermath of the Challenger and Columbia disasters revealed that the physical causes of the two incidents were less important than the internal – organizational ones that hindered greater problems in the overall communication and interaction between critical organizational departments. In both cases the lack of an integrated approach towards quality and safety procurement as well as the insufficient and ineffective communication amongst management and organizational members proved to be great contributors to the overall disaster. The Challenger and Columbia Cases under the Structural Frame (Section A: 1) Palestini (2004) states that the structural leadership frame is drawn from the organizational behaviour and sociology theories and highlights that the particular perspective emphasizes the efficient and effective organizational structure which is designed around goals, objectives, rules, regulations and policies. According to Bolman and Deal (1991; 2003) the structural leaders are concerned with allocating properly the resources of organizations, aligning strategically the organizational members and defining clear aims and goals in order to achieve successful results. Under this perspective, organizations are viewed as merely functional units which are developed under the scope of implementing formal relationships between members so as to ensure hierarchy and structural approach to problem solving (Crist, 1999; Mabey and Finch-Lees, 2008). Fidler (2004) argues that the structural framework suggests that leaders are more inclined towards specific and formal procedures and processes and are more concerned with gradually aligning and coordinating organizational functions towards a common goal and common objectives. Structural leaders tend to define clear objectives and in order to achieve these objectives they define clear job requirements, responsibilities and tasks. Similarly as noted by Sasnett and Ross (2007) and Vuori (2009) the structural frame views organizations as rather bureaucratic systems in which every member is assigned specific tasks and is expected to conform to any specifications or requirements that are established in a hierarchical manner. Structural organizational leaders are oriented toward achieving results, attaining goals and allocating particular activities, processes or procedures to each department or individual member in an attempt to meet the objectives targeted. Bolman and Deal (2003) further argue that these leaders in a problem solving situation place emphasis on restructuring and expect organizational members to assume responsibilities for their actions. In the case of the Challenger’s disaster a manager undertaking the structural perspective, therefore, would be dominantly concerned with the rigid and inflexible organizational design of NASA. As noted in the case study, NASA’s operations were actually conducted in four different centers signifying a rather fragmented flow of information between the various departments and functional units (Palmer et al., 2006). The organizational structure of NASA simply could not favor and facilitate the effective interaction between those responsible for the various areas of the project (including safety procurement) and eventually was accountable for the Challenger disaster. The structural frame, moreover, would suggest that there had been no proper allocation of responsibilities and tasks to the different centers as well as there had been no clear goals and objectives set for each of the centers. Drawing from this assumption, the structural manager would place emphasis on the inefficient design of operations and the lack of standardized procedures and processes that could eventually prevent the Challenger disaster. Palmer et al. (2006) in their case study mention that the Marshall space center, the Headquarters of Nasa, the Mission control as well as the assembly line in Florida were all responsible for different operations and functions and eventually proper and effective coordination of activities was hampered by first the over – pride of the Marshall center (due to successful previous launches) and second by the inability to accept that Thiokol’s engineer’s suggestions towards delaying the project due to safety reasons. The structural frame – preoccupied with rationality in both problem solving and decision making – would perceive this fragmented communication as a lack of efficient allocation of power, control and authorities. In the case of Columbia’s disaster the symbolic frame would once more suggest that there was inappropriate setting of goals and objectives; although the goals should be oriented towards achieving successful launch by maintaining maximum safety standards and specifications, the objectives targeted by the NASA administrator were rather pushed towards “faster, better and cheaper programs”. In that sense, the entire organizational mission assumes an approach to cost reduction and efficiency as opposed to the ‘should be’ safety and quality of operations. The structural perspective allows managers to understand and realize that the way that the goals are established and communicated is rather ineffective and organizational members fail to share common targets. The benefits attached to the particular frame are associated with the rather objective criterion that structural perspectives entail. Such an approach would provide rationality and objectivity in the problem solving process and would eventually identify those organizational structures that need re-design or re-structuring as well as provision for clarified procedures and chain of command in decision making. On the other hand, the limitations of the structural frame involve the lack of management attention towards other interactive factors that are not predominantly associated with organizational architecture (Morrill, 2007). For example structural leaders tend to neglect the need for empowerment and engagement of organizational members towards the goals set by the management and therefore fail to take into consideration that organizations are not mere hierarchies of power but are composed of individuals and members who need to be enhanced towards this view. The Challenger and Columbia Cases under the Human Resources Frame (Section A: 2) What is neglected by the Structural frame, is overly emphasized by the Human resource frame. According to Jacobs and McGee (2001) the HR frame within the leadership context suggests that organizations are more than sums of processes and functions but they are rather mediated by the most important input which is the human input. Similarly, Deal (2005) claims that organizations are made up of people and are operating for people; in that sense, the human input constitutes the most significant and critical ‘mechanism’ in the overall organization. Crist (1999) following the proposals of Bolman and Deal (1992) suggest that the human resource frame is drawn from psychology and assumes that the core and central element in each and every organization is the individual. Moreover, as Vuori (2009) posits the specific frame focuses on the fit between organizational structures or functions and people’s needs, feelings and expectations. The organizational design needs to be developed on the basis of fostering personal relationships and empowering members to participate and eventually express positive attitudes towards the organization itself. Bolman and Deal (2003) state that under the HR perspective leaders assume that only if people align their personal goals with the organizational goals there can be organizational success. For this very reason, this frame values the individual and views organizations as collective societies of members with different dispositions, attitudes and perceptions (Palestini, 2004; Sassnett and Ross, 2007). Given that the human resource frame implies a focused consideration to the relationships between organizational members (Bolman and Deal, 1991; 1992; 2003) it is rather clear that a manager undertaking this perspective would allocate responsibilities for the Challenger and Columbia disasters to the lack of management support and absence of people’s empowerment towards expressing their views or suggestions over issues of safety and quality. With regards to the Challenger case, the HR frame allows leaders to identify and realize that people were reluctant to communicate with supervisors or managers problems that might have occurred basically due to the inability of managers to accept views and opinions of subordinates. Particularly, the Marshall center was very rigid and inflexible in enhancing communication and information flow with the rest of the centers and as Palmer et al. (2006) indicate whatever problems were raised were to be kept in doors. Management suppressed employees’ free expression by hampering empowerment as in the case of the Thiokol’s engineers who were declined to oppose the launch due to safety reasons. In addition to that the HR frame would allow managers to understand that the lack of confidence in disclosing critical information was also a result of Marshall’s failure to establish two – way communication with the organizational members and this is evident by the fact that those who did not comply with the notion “what happens in Marshall stays in Marshall” did actually receive “public admonishment” (Palmer et al., 2006). The Columbia disaster more or less implies similar considerations regarding the human resource frame as well. Managers undertaking the HR perspective would realize that once more the effective communication between organizational members was not established even after the Challenger disaster. Palmer et al. (2006) note in the case study that there were organizational barriers that refrained people from communicating critical information and for this very reason issues in terms of safety became central to the Columbia incident. The HR frame allows leaders to spot the failure of management to promote and enhance members’ participation and support interaction that would prove significant in avoiding the disaster. Another important element that the HR frame would explore is that of aligning organizational goals with members’ goals and objectives. It is evident from the case that while the ‘people’ were oriented towards taking measures for safety, the administration of NASA was more concerned towards taking measures for efficiency (cost reduction). This gradually created a gap in the shared goals and targets and organizational members ‘learned’ to ignore any failure or safety errors. In general the HR perspective would attribute the Columbia disaster in ineffective communication and lack of empowerment and participation of members, originating from the lack of management support and management openness. The human resource frame suggests that problems arising in any organization need to be viewed from a ‘people’s relationship perspective’ (Bolman and Deal, 2003; Vuori, 2009). This is actually very important in identifying and evaluating the degree of human contribution to the entire organizational success. The benefits of undertaking this perspective involve the leader’s orientation towards establishing commitment, participation and engagement to the organizational goals. Bolman and Deal (1992) state that HR frame leaders address problems by tailoring the organizations to fit organizational members; in that sense the HR perspective would direct managers to develop an organizational climate that welcomes individuals’ free expression of views and seriously considers alternative ideas and beliefs. The limitations of this frame in the particular case study relate to the obstacles that would be faced by the rooted cultural and organizational dimensions that hampered individuals’ empowerment. The Challenger and Columbia Cases under the Political Frame (Section A: 3) The political frame according to Bolman and Deal (1991) is a perspective that views organizations as interactions of political power and conflict. Crist (1999) suggests that this frame draws upon political science theories and focuses mostly on the notion that there are different interests in various organizations due to the variation of individuals. Glegg et al. (2005) claim that the political framework places emphasis on the competition within an organization stemming from the rather scarce resources; eventually competition emerges from the desire to take upon these limited and finite resources. Power is central to this perspective and is interpreted as a product of the dominance over the competition (Mabey and Finch-Lees, 2008). At the same time power determines the allocation of resources to those groups or individuals that possess it. Conflicts as a result of competition and strive over power are perceived as natural consequences of the organizational complexity where there is a distinction between personal and groups’ interests. As Bolman and Deal (2003) indicate leaders assuming a political perspective tend to develop networks and build power bases. This enhances them to negotiate over the power and the resources available. After all bargaining and negotiation are important elements in leaders adopting a political frame simply because these allow individuals to better serve their interests and through this assume greater control and power. According to Palestini (2004) the political frame mainly constitutes a perspective in situations where conflict arise; interests have to be at stake, so taking over another’s role or position is optimal. The political frame of leadership suggests that this orientation views problems as products of wrong and inappropriate allocation of power and resources. Bolman and Deal (2003) state that the concentration of power in the ‘wrong hands’ is predominantly the cause of failures under the particular perspective. In the case of the Challenger disaster, a manager through the political frame would attribute the fundamentals of the failure to the increased power and autonomy assumed by the Marshall Space center. As noted in the case, William Lucas (the head of Marshall) was rather autocratic and maintained that his department was the most credible, successful and reliable of all operations of NASA. Opposite to this the reduced power of the Mission control and of the outsourcing company Thiokol created an inequality in power distribution and therefore resulted in an unbalanced allocation of decision making. The problem therefore emerged due to the differential power expression by virtually all organizational functions of NASA. With regards to the Columbia disaster, once again the political frame would suggest that power and control (which eventually translate into decision making) were unequally granted. The teams organized around the measurement of safety and quality – after the Challenger disaster – where gradually diminished and disregarded contributing to losing any power in the overall decision making. Despite the fact that engineers had spotted safety problems, the lack of power to influence the final decision eventually drove them away from their responsibilities. In addition to that as William Lucas was rather eager to launch the project and conform to the time constraints, his personal interests actually overweighed the organizational interests which led to the Columbia incident. Therefore, the political frame would imply that the problem emerged due to the different interests between engineers or those responsible for safety procurements and management or heads that were more inclined towards achieving efficiency and success through meeting deadlines. The benefits of the political frame are highlighted by Vuori (2009) who stresses that actually every organization, that is comprised by individuals and that effectively hosts interactions between individuals, becomes subject to politics. In that sense, taking a political perspective allows management to identify and understand the problems that may arise for unequal distribution of power, control and autonomy and thus direct the solutions towards establishing balanced allocation of such resources. In both cases if there was not a particular interest group (Marshall Space center and NASA administration) that would not favor from neglecting safety issues raised, then it can be argued that more strict measures and considerations would have taken place. The political frame therefore would seek solution to the strategic allocation of significance and weight in operations and departments. One very important limitation of this frame however is the very same issue that it poses benefits; politics are everywhere in all organizations, therefore this perspective fails to attribute significance in other constructs of organization such as structures, designs, and interpersonal relationships amongst members. Identifying the best way to manage changes in NASA and the most successful leadership style (Section B: a and b) NASA’s organizational design was and still is (on the basis of what the case study reports) rather fragmented in that it does not foster communication and information flow amongst the various departments which are equally important and critical for any project implementation. A second very significant issue is that organizational members are discouraged to actively participate in the decision making process either due to the lack of management support or due to the overall culture of the organization that calls for ‘avoiding responsibilities’. Moving on another area that needs to be emphasized is the inconsistency between the organizational goals as a whole and the personal aspirations and goals of the leaders (as in the case of NASA’s administration); a fact that hinders greater than simple structural or design obstacles. In a similar manner, there appears to be a rather misfit between the organizational infrastructure (in terms of relationships and networks) and the people’s orientation towards achieving goals and objectives (the organization itself poses obstacles in members’ fulfilling their tasks and responsibilities). Palmer et al. (2006) in the case study state that after the Challenger disaster, NASA had actually proceeded into a number of restructuring and reforms in order to properly address communication problems and increase as much as possible the measurements of safety and quality prior to any project or launch. However, nearly twenty years later similar problems contributed to a second disaster – that of Columbia shuttle. Introducing and managing change is a complex process that involves each and every organizational member. In that extend, the changes over the procedures and functions need be incrementally and step – by – step implemented in order to provide the basis for successful results. Radical changes will not eventually produce the desired outcome and will alienate organizational members; most probably this has actually been the case for the changes after the Challenger incident. Changes in the processes need to be understood and shared by everyone and therefore communication plays a vital role in the overall dynamic nature of the organization. Restructuring, redesigning and reconsidering the context within which members interact in order to mutually contribute to increasing quality and safety procedures should initiate from the management of the organization (especially the headquarters) and eventually spread to organizational members. The issue of change needs to be embedded in the overall goal and objectives of NASA and needs to constitute an integral component of the organizational culture and strategy. Change will initiate and will be implemented by the people; thus it is the people that should adopt such a perspective and gradually not only accept but further facilitate change. Having briefly discussed in the previous sections the fundamental assumptions and perspectives of each of the three frames (structural, human resource and political frames) it needs to be stressed that all (including the symbolic one) feature benefits and limitations as well. According to Bolman and Deal (1992) and Mabey and Finch-Lees (2008) leadership styles in the process of managing change or any other problem solving situation need to incorporate aspects and notions from all frames. Crist (1999) states that the frames in practical manner are indeed ‘windows’ from which leaders understand a given situation, analyze it and eventually conclude upon particular actions or solutions. In that sense, from the three discussed perspectives there are indeed problems arising from either of the frames. However, due to the fact that change appears to be the most important process for avoiding any future disasters as those of Challenger and Columbia, leaders should be rather inclined towards the human resource frame. This frame will provide the management (the leaders) with the appropriate direction toward communicating to the organizational members the need for change and the need for redesign or restructuring. Additionally, the HR frame leadership will gradually develop the basis for building solid and sound relationships between people under the scope of a common goal and common interest. Finally, it needs to be pointed that NASA seems to be lacking the necessary empowerment and participation on the part of its members; thus the HR leadership frame will prove more effective in enhancing people to express their views, opinions, beliefs and towards both the change process and the overall organizational process. Conclusions The Challenger and Columbia disasters were highly attributed to the insufficient communication and interaction between the organizational members. Additionally the dominance of personal interests over the organizational or group interests significantly contributed to an ineffective allocation of resources and eventually to little attention being paid to critical issues of safety. This project has analyzed the problems emerging and the factors that led to the disasters from a leadership perspective. Analyzing and practically applying the leadership frames proposed by Bolman and Deal (1991; 1992; 2003) in an attempt to investigate the different underpinning assumptions that each of these frames entail, gradually led to conclusions with regards to the strengths and the weaknesses of the different perspectives. Vuori (2009) suggests that the leadership frames constitute ‘methods’ for enabling leaders to interpret a problem and find practical solutions over this problem. For this very reason it is very important to integrate those methods and strategically undertake the different perspectives in order to conclude to the most - fit action with regards to problem solving. In the case of NASA all frames need to be taken into consideration as all actually provide leaders with additional dimensions of the very same problem. However, leaders need also to be consistent with their style and exhibit behaviour that reveals integrated approach. Particularly for NASA it is suggested that leaders should commit to the HR frame in order to be able to thoroughly and deeply analyze the problems and create the basis for any procedural or functional forthcoming changes. References Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (1991). “Leadership and management effectiveness: a multi –frame, multi sector analysis”. Human Resource Management. Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 509-534 Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (1992). “Leading and Managing: Effects of Context, Culture and Gender”. Educational Administration Quarterly. Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 314-329. Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (2003). Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership. (3rd ed). San Fransisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons Clegg, S., Kornberger, M. and Pitsis, T. (2005). Managing and Organizations: an introduction to theory and practice. London: Sage Publications, Ltd. Crist, B.E. 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