Criminal Theft Act 1968 - Case Study Example

Criminal Theft Act 1968 Criminal Liability of John and Jane ____________ _________ ID: __________________ Dated: May 11, 2007-05-11 The English Theft Act of 1968 casts the net of fraud wide enough to include anyone who obtains ownership or possession of any kind and by any means of property by a fraudulent deception1. The Model Penal Code takes a more conservative line, insisting upon the transfer of 'property' as an element in theft by deception. (Cartwright, 1999, p. 84) John according to the s1 Theft Act 1968 is found guilty of theft as he is depriving others from their property and particularly in the case where he steal 'roses' from one of his neighbours he is purely acting dishonestly depriving the roses from his real property owner. Similarly in the case of Jane, under s3 Theft Act 1968, she innocently or intentionally is keeping the money with her, however in the case of candles which Jane borrows refers to the s2 (1) (b) where Jane is not considered under Theft Act s 3 as she has borrowed them and is in intention to gave them back. (Harvey et al, 1998, p. 43) But then she uses the candles which comes under the case of an offence under the Theft Act 1968, where the property in question is recovered, any damage to the property occurring while it was out of the owner's possession shall be treated for the purposes of subsection (1) as having resulted from the offence, however and by whomsoever the damage was caused. This is similar to the case Jackson v. Horizon [1975]2 It is now possible to commit the crime of false pretences in many jurisdictions by borrowing money with the intent not to repay it. Receipt of the money satisfies the element of acquiring title. Though the borrower falsely promises to repay the loan, he engages in no deception about the external world that is subject to proof at the time of his act. His deception, if any, is about his plans for the future, and the best evidence of that is what he does when the debt falls due. Though the crime is technically committed at the time the loan is received, the critical evidence of liability is furnished by his failure to repay at some future time. (Fletcher, 2000, p. 11) Although the result of Jackson's case is sensible and probably correct, Lord Denning's reasoning has since been disapproved in the House of Lords in Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 571, [1980] 1 WLR 277, HL. As a rule of Law, Lush LJ as an insurance broker may sue on a contract which is made by him on behalf of the principal provided the contract gives him such a right and is no authority for the proposition required in Jackson's case 3. However if a person X made a contract for a sum of money to be paid to Y, X can, without notifying the loss he has suffered can sue for damages for non-payment of that sum which would certainly not be an established rule of law, nor was it quoted as such authority by Lord Pearce in Beswick v Beswick4. A similar view was expressed by Lord Russell. Whether the disapproval will make any difference in practice to the quantum of damages awarded in family holiday cases is unclear. A sympathetic judge might choose to place more emphasis on the distress of the contracting party in witnessing the family suffering. (Harvey et al, 1998, p. 44) Jane situation is critical as she receives 70.00 instead of 50.00. Under this situation the law states a person who receives a gift has no right of redress against the donor merely because the gift is of unmerchantable quality or does not correspond with the donor's description of it. The person receiving the gift may have a remedy in tort if the gift causes injury or damage which is attributable to negligence on the donor's part. But that is another matter: he has no remedy in contract against the donor for the simple reason that there is no contract between them. To the extent that the offer of worthless goods, without charge, as part of a sales promotion, is against the public interest it is primarily the concern of the Office of Fair Trading. We therefore do not intend to examine the law of gift in this report. (Harvey et al, 1998, p. 77) Collins v British Airways Board [1982] 1 All ER 302, [1982] QB 734, Court of Appeal On 8 November 1977 British Airways issued two tickets to Mr and Mrs Collins for a round trip from Manchester to Los Angeles and back, with stops at London on the way out and New York on the way back. The tickets were marked plainly 'Passenger ticket and baggage check'. On the outward journey the young lady at the desk at Manchester filled in the little space for 'baggage check' with the figures '2/46', meaning two pieces weighing 46 kg. On arrival at Los Angeles, Mr and Mrs Collins collected their two pieces quite safely. They did some shopping in Los Angeles and came back with three pieces. They arrived, however, late at the airport. There was no time to check in their baggage and put it on their plane. So they went aboard the aircraft with their tickets and no entry whatever in the little space for 'Baggage checked'. There was no time for it. They were told that the baggage would be forwarded on to Manchester by the next British Airways flight. That was done. But, owing to the delay, some thieves were able to ransack the three pieces. They stole the contents and forwarded the three pieces to Manchester. They arrived 24 hours later. When Mr and Mrs Collins took delivery of the three pieces, they were nearly empty. Thereupon Mr and Mrs Collins claimed the value of the contents, 2,000. British airways said that the limit under the Warsaw Convention was 580.20, and paid that sum into court. It is obvious that the airline had no opportunity at all of filling in the little space on the baggage check. Nevertheless because nothing was written there, Mr and Mrs Collins claim full damages. This does seem strange to me. But it all turns on the true interpretation of the Warsaw Convention which has the force of law by s 1 of the Carriage by Air Act 1961. [His Lordship then held that the omission to fill in the baggage check at Los Angeles was merely an 'irregularity' which did not bar the airline from claiming the benefit of the limited liability under the Convention. Hence the appeal should be allowed. Eveleigh LJ agreed that the appeal should be allowed. Kerr LJ dissented] Therefore Appeal was allowed. (Harvey et al, 1998, p. 390) Davies v Leighton (1978) Times, 29 June, (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 4, [1978] Crim LR 575, Queen's Bench Division The prosecutor was appealing on a case stated by Clwyd Justices who had dismissed an information against the defendant, Myra Leighton, alleging theft of one bag of apples and one of tomatoes, contrary to ss 1 and 7 of the Theft Act 1968. Mr Justice Ackner said that the defendant was alleged to have stolen the apples and tomatoes, valued at 13p and 20p respectively, at a store in Wrexham, in May, 1976. The store had a self-service area for the purchase of foodstuffs. Within that area there was a counter for the sale of fruit and vegetables manned by an assistant, who weighed the quantity required by a customer, and bagged and priced it. The bag was handed to the customer, who was expected to pay the cashier at the exit. On the day in question the defendant was observed by a store detective to acquire the bags of apples and tomatoes from the assistant and to carry them in her hand to an off-licence section of the store. There she bought some wine, which she paid for and placed in her own shopping trolley. She also placed the apples and tomatoes in the trolley and, after joining a queue at the exit, left the store without paying for the apples and tomatoes. She was stopped outside by the detective, and when she returned to the store she claimed that she had paid for the goods although she could not produce a receipt. At the conclusion of the prosecution case before the justices, a submission was made on behalf of the defendant that ownership of the goods in question passed to the defendant when she received them from the assistant and, therefore, unless there was prima facie evidence that she had not intended to pay for them before they were handed to her, the justices could not convict because the Theft Act required that there should be a dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another. The contention was that when she took the goods through the checkout, the property had already passed to her. The law was well settled in relation to purchases in a supermarket. There was no reference to the assistant being in a managerial or other special category, when a different situation might arise. The justices had come to the wrong conclusion, namely, that the property had passed when the defendant received the goods. In fact and in law, the property never passed because she never paid for the goods. Mr Justice Talbot and the Lord Chief Justice agreed. The appeal was allowed, and the case was ordered to be sent back for the hearing to continue. (Pattenden, 1996, p. 78) Many crimes may be committed without giving anyone a right to bring a civil action: e.g. treason, and forgery where no one has been defrauded, so too perjury. On the other hand, many or most civil wrongs are not crimes: e.g. trespass where no wilful damage is done is no crime, and the notice that 'trespassers will be prosecuted' has been well described as 'a wooden falsehood'. Only in some exceptional cases can punishment and redress be obtained in the same proceedings. Thus, in the case of a conviction for theft, the court may order the restitution of the goods to the owner; and a court may, upon convicting an accused person of any offence, order the payment of compensation by the accused for any personal injury, loss, or damage to property caused by his offence. A judicial separation may be obtained in proceedings by a wife against her husband on the ground of aggravated assault. (Geldart, 1995, p. 176) The core of this branch of the law is the crime of theft (stealing). It involves, as its essential elements, a dishonest appropriation of others property with an intention of depriving the other person of it. The offence will be committed even if there is no intention to benefit from the theft. 'Appropriation' involves an assumption of the rights of an owner, and it may include the keeping of property which a person has come intentionally or unintentionally, unless he purchased it in good faith. Thus, if William takes a book out of Steve's brief-case as a practical joke, but then decides later to keep it, he will be guilty of theft. (Pattendon, 1996, p. 48) The 1968 Act, however, provides that the accused will have a defence to a charge of theft if the appropriation was made with a claim of right, however mistaken, or in the belief that the owner would have consented, or that the owner could not reasonably be discovered. The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 creates the offence of interference with a motor vehicle or trailer, an interesting modern example of an offence resulting from an act which falls short of theft. The poaching of game, and killing or taking of deer or fish, are, however, still punishable under certain nineteenth century statutes, and under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 an aggravated trespass is committed by anyone going on to private land with the intention of disrupting a lawful activity. (Geldart, 1995, p. 192) References Cartwright Peter, (1999) Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law: Law, Theory, and Policy in the UK: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England. Fletcher P. George, (2000) Rethinking Criminal Law: Oxford University Press: Oxford. Geldart William, (1995) Introduction to English Law: (Originally Elements of English Law): Oxford University Press: Oxford. Harvey W. Brian, Miller C. J. & Parry L. Deborah, (1998) Consumer and Trading Law: Text, Cases, and Materials: Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pattendon Rosemary, (1996) English Criminal Appeals, 1844-1994: Appeals against Conviction and Sentence in England and Wales: Oxford University. Read More