Gideon v. Wainwright - Case Study Example

1 Gideon v. Wainwright The Supreme Court had earlier ruled in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the famous case of the Scottsboro boys, that the right to counsel was essential to the safeguarding of American freedoms, but left it up to the states just how far this right extended. In Betts v. Brandy, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the court modified this doctrine slightly, ruling, "that whether or not a lawyer was required would depend on the circumstances of whether a lack of representation affected a denial of due process, rendering the trial unfair. Due to the difficulty of proving the high standard of a due process violation, nearly all such cases involved the death penalty. This view had not changed by the late 1960's. Today when an individual is apprehended by the police, he is informed of his constitutional rights; through being Mirandized, wherein he is informed that he is entitled to have representation and that if he can not afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. In 1961 Clarence Earl Gideon had been charged with burglary for breaking into a pool hall in Panama City Bay County, Florida and taking money from the vending machines He appeared in court too poor to afford counsel, whereupon the following conversation took place: The Court: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I can not appoint counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the state of Florida, the only time the court can appoint counsel to represent a defendant is when the person is charged with a 2 capital offence. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint counsel to defend you in this case. The defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by counsel. Gideon had been forced therefore to act as his own counsel, and conducted a defense of himself in court, emphasizing his innocence in the case. Nevertheless, the jury returned a guilty verdict, sentencing him to serve five years in the state penitentiary. From his prison cell and making ample use of the prison library, Gideon appealed to the United States Supreme Court based on the fact that he had been denied counsel and therefore his fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated without due process of law. Mr. Gideon brought habeas corpus proceedings against the Director of the Division of Corrections. The Florida Supreme Court, 135 So 2 d 746, denied all relief, and Mr. Gideon brought certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review judgment of the Florida Supreme Court denying habeas corpus on the ground that indigent defendant in criminal prosecution in state court has no right to have counsel appointed for him (372 U.S. 335) Mr. Justice Black held that the sixth Amendment to the federal constitution providing that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to assistance of counsel for his defense is made obligatory on the states by the 3 fourteenth amendment, and that an indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution in a state court has the right to have counsel appointed too him. Like Gideon, Betts sought release be habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the fourteenth amendment, Betts was denied any relief, and on review this court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which for reasons given the court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said: Asserted denial (of due process) is to be tested by an appraisal of all the facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may in other circumstances and in the light of other considerations fall short of such denial.316 U.S. at 462. The right to be heard would be, in many cases of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Ledt without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks the skills and knowledge to adequately prepare 4 his defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him. Without it though he may not be guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 287 U.S., at 68-9. The court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the court holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other states, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left in tact. Twenty-two states, as friends of this court, argue that Betts was an anachronism when handed down and that it should be overruled. We agree. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. Murphy v. Florida The petitioner first made himself notorious in 1964 for his part in the theft of the star of India sapphire from a museum in New York. Due to his flamboyant lifestyle, the press was keenly interested in him, and he was generally referred to as "Murph the Surf". The question in this case is whether Mr. Murphy was denied a fair trial because members of the jury had learned from news accounts about prior felony conviction or were aware of certain facts about the present case which he was being charged. This case is used today to assess whether any amount or level of pre-trial 5 Publicity on any given perpetrator or crime(s) committed by the perpetrator will result in an unfair trial... If a claimant can show that his case meets the test laid out in Murphy, the proceedings will receive a change in venue. Mr. Murphy was convicted in the Dade County Florida criminal court in 1970 of breaking and entering a home, while armed, with the intent to commit robbery. The charges stemmed from the January 1968 robbery of a Miami Beach home and petitioner's apprehension, with three others, while fleeing the scene (Marshall) Before the date set for petitioners trial on the instant charges, he was indicted on two counts of murder (421 U.S. 794, 796) Broward County Florida. Thereafter the Dade County court declared the petitioner mentally incompetent to stand trial, he was committed to a hospital and the prosecutor nolle prossed the robbery indictment. (Marshall). In August 1968 he was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiring to transport stolen securities in interstate commerce. (Ibid) After petitioner was adjudged competent for trial, he was convicted on one count of murder in Broward County (March 1969) and pleaded guilty to one count of the federal indictment involving the stolen securities (December 1969). The indictment for robbery was refilled in August 1969 and came to trial one year later (Ibid) At trial the petitioner did not testify or put in any evidence, assuredly in protest of the selected jury, he did not cross examine any of the state's witnesses. 6 He was convicted on both counts. And after an unsuccessful appeal he sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Marshall) The district Court denied the petitioner relief, 363 F. Supp. 1224 (1973) and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed 495 F 2d 553 (1974). The United States Supreme Court granted certioran 419 U.S. 1088 (1974), in order to resolve the apparent conflict between the Third Circuit in United States exrel Doggett v. Yeager, 472 R 2d 229 (1973), over the applicability of Marshall v. United States 360 U. S. 310 (1959), to state criminal proceedings. In Marshall v. United States, the trial judge decided after interviewing the jurors that he was assured the jurors could maintain impartiality and denied the request for a mistrial. However, the U. S. Supreme Court later reversed the decision in Marshall because it was convinced that the judge had erred in his administration of justice, and the Supreme Court made it clear that Marshall was not reversed on any constitutional compulsion, at 313 [421 U.S. 794,798]. Albeit Marshall was found not applicable to the petition of Mr. Murphy, he further claimed that Irvin v. Dodd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), Bideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.333 (1966). In each of the above-mentioned cases, the court over turned a state court conviction obtained in a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage. 7 In these cases the influence of the news media, either in the community-at- large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the proceedings. (Marshall) In Bideau the defendant "confessed" to the police for the murder which he stood convicted. A television in the community where the murder occurred and the jurisdiction of the trial, broadcasted the 20 minute police confession three times. Justice Marshall points out that the court did not voir dire for evidence of actual prejudice because it considered the trial under review "but a hallow formality" - the real trial had occurred when tens of thousands of people, in a community of 150,000, had seen and heard the defendant admit his guilt before the cameras. The trial in Estes had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to intrusions of the press. Similarly, Sheppard arose from trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity but also by a court house given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival. (Marshall). The constitutional standard for fairness requires that the defendant have "a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors" Dowd, 366 U. S. at 722. Qualified [421 U.S. 794,800], jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. The majority opinion of the court concluded, we are unable to conclude, in the circumstances presented in this case, that the petitioner did not receive a fair trial. Petitioner has failed to show that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process of which he complains permits an 8 inference of actual prejudice. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be affirmed. Barker v. Wingo Was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that determination of whether or not the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial for defendants in criminal cases has been denied, must be made on a case by case basis. One factor recognized by the court was the length of the delay, but the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled that some particular time limit must apply. Another factor recognized by the court was the reason for the delay. The prosecution may not excessively delay the trial for its own advantage, but the trial may be delayed to secure the presence of an absent witness. The other factors to be considered are the time and manner in which the defendant has asserted his right, and the degree of prejudice to the defendant which the delay has caused. If it is found that a defendants right to a speedy trial was violated, then the indictment must be dismissed and/or the conviction overturned. A reversal or dismissal of a criminal case on speedy trial grounds means that no further prosecution for the alleged offense can take place. On July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool. Two suspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker, the petitioner, were arrested shortly thereafter. The 9 grand jury indicted them on September 15. Counsel was appointed on September 17, and Barker's trial was set for October 21. The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning, and it believed that Barker could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him. Manning was naturally unwilling to incriminate himself. Accordingly, on October 23, the day Silas Manning was brought to trial, the commonwealth sought and obtained the first of what was to be a series of 16 continuances of Barkers trial. Barker made no objection. By first convincing Manning, the commonwealth would remove possible problems of self incrimination and would be able to assure his testimony against Barker. On February 12, 1962 the commonwealth moved for the twelfth time to continue the case until the following term. Barkers counsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion to dismiss was denied two weeks later, and the commonwealth's motion for a continuance was granted. The commonwealth was granted further continuances in June 1962 and September 1962, to which Barker did not object. The final trial date was set for October 9, 1963. On that date, Barker again moved to dismiss the indictment, and this time specified that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion was denied, the trial commenced with Manning as the chief prosecution witness, Barker was convicted and given a life sentence. Barker appealed the conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, relying in part on his speedy trial claim. The court affirmed Barker v. Commonwealth, 10 385 W 2d 671 (1964) in February 1970 Barker petitioned for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the western District of Kentucky. Although the District Court rejected the petition without holding a hearing, the court granted petitioner leave to appeal informa paupens and a certificate of probable cause to appeal The Appeals court held that the remaining period after the date on which Barker first raised his claim and before his trial - which it thought was only eight months but which was actually 20 months - was not unduly long. In addition the Appeals Court held that Barker had been shown no resulting prejudice, and that the illness of the ex-sheriff was a valid justification for the delay. In the uproar which followed the Barker decision, the U.S. Congress decided to pass legislation called the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. It applies to federal courts, but it sets specific time limits, requiring indictment within 30 days of arrest, arraignment within 10 days after indictment, and a trial 60 days after arraignment. This stringent set of precautions goes beyond what the Supreme Court think is fair, and this area of the sixth amendment jurisprudence is one of the few areas where there is a hotly contested battle going on between two branches of government. Most states passed their own version of the federal speedy trial act, the most common time period is 90 days from arrest to trial. Pate v. Robinson Mr. Robinson was convicted in 1959 of murdering his common law wife. It 11 was conceded at trial that he shot and killed her but counsel claimed the respondent was insane at the time of the incident and also not competent to stand trial. It was in contradictable that respondent had a long history of disturbed behavior, had been confined as a psychopathic patient, and had committed acts of violence, including the killing of his infant son and an attempted suicide. Four defense witnesses testified that the defendant was insane. The trial court denied rebuttal testimony of the respondents sanity, deeming sufficient a stipulation that a doctor would testify that when respondent was examined a few months before trial he knew the nature of the charges and could cooperate with his counsel. The trial courts rejection of contentions as to respondents sanity was challenged on appeal as a deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on grounds that no hearing on mental capacity to stand trial had been requested and that the evidence was insufficient to require the trial court to conduct a sanity hearing sua sponte or to raise a "reasonable doubt" as to respondents sanity at the time of the homicide. The Appeals court denied certioran. The District Court denied respondents subsequently filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the unduly hurried trial did not provide a fair opportunity for development of facts on the insanity issues and remanded the case to the District Court for a limited hearing as to the sanity of respondents at the time of the homicide is whether he was constitutionally entitled to a hearing upon his 12 competence to stand trial, we direct that the writ of habeas corpus must issue and Robinson be discharged, unless the state gives him a new trial within a reasonable time. This disposition. accords with the procedure adopted in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961), we determined since the state court had applied an erroneous standard to judge the admissibility of a confession, the defendant should have the opportunity issues which may be determinative of his guilt tried by a state judge or a state jury under appropriate state procedures which conform to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. At 547-548 [383 U.S. 375,387]. It has been pressed upon us that it would be sufficient for the state court to hold a limited hearing as to Robinsons' competence at the time he was tried in 1959. If he were found competent, the judgment against him would stand. But we have previously emphasized the difficultly of respectively determining on accused's competence to stand trial. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) The jury would not be able to observe the inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to testify from information contained in the printed record. That Robinson's hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties. The need for concurrent determination distinguishes the present case from Jackson v. Denno, 376 U.S.368 (1964) where we held that on remand the state could discharge its constitutional obligation by giving the accused a separate hearing on the voluntariness of his confession. If the state elects to retry 13 Robinson, it will of course be open to him to raise the question of his competence to stand trial at that time and to request a special hearing thereon. In the event a sufficient doubt exists as to his present competence to stand trial, Robinson would have the usual defenses available to an accused. The case is remanded to the District Court for action consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Bibliography Barker v. Commonwealth, 385 W. 2d 671 (1964) Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) Bideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 495 F 2d (1974) Doggett v. Yeager, 472 R 2d 229 (1973) Dowd, 366 U.S. at 722 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.402 (1960) Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) Florida District Court 363 R. Supp 1224 (1973) Florida Supreme Court, 135 So, 2d 746 (372 U.S. 335) Irvin v. Dodd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) Jackson v. Denno, 376 U.S. 368 (1964) Marshall v, United States 360 U.S. 310 (1959) Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) Speedy Trial Act of 1974 United States Supreme Court, 419 U.S. 1088 (1974) Read More