Structures of Organised Crime - Assignment Example

1) Review the problems of meaning and definition that have dogged this since theorists began to examine it more systematically in the 1960s.Following Thomas Schelling’s (1966) pioneering paper on organized crime, attempts to define it have focused on determining either the characteristics of organized crime activities or those of the groups committing them (Schelling, 1971). These definitions of organized crime vacillate between seeing it as a firm or government. Organized crime is seen as a firm when an internal structure of an organization is under investigation; it is seen as a government when its relationships with rival groups are to be investigated (Fiorentini & Peltzman,1995).When characteristics such as corruption, violence, sophistication, continuity, structure, discipline, multiple enterprises, legitimate businesses and bonding are examined as indicators of organized crime, different combinations of them are judged to be appropriate to describe the activities of only certain kinds of organized crime groups, thus recognizing the need for a general definition (Maltz, 1985). Despite a growing recognition of the vulnerability of developing societies and emerging democracies to this problem, and continued study of this phenomenon in mature economies, no consensus exists on the definition of organized crime. Academic definitions abound. One leading organized crime text defines organized crime merely as a “nonideological enterprise that involves a number of persons in close social interactions, organized on a hierarchical basis for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in legal and illegal activities. (Abadinsky, 1985)” Another posits that organized criminal groups are simply business organizations operating under many different management structures and dealing in illegal products. (Pace & Styles, 1983). Posner (1992), on the other hand, provides the following definition of organized crime: “criminals organized into illegal firms…operating in such illegal fields as loansharking, prostitution, gambling, and narcotics, but also in legitimate fields as well, and employing violence and the corruption of the police as key business methods.” Gambetta describes the Italian mafia as “that set of firms that are 1) active in the protection industry under a common trademark with recognizable features; 2) acknowledge one another as the legitimate suppliers of authentic mafioso information; and 3) succeed in preventing the unauthorized use of their trademark by pirate firms. (Gambetta, 1993)” Policymakers likewise disagree with a common definition. Since 1992, the United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has struggled without success (Bassiouni & Vetere, 1998). This document has distinguished between organized crime from other criminal groups and legitimate enterprises occasionally employing criminal means. In the US, the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L No. 91-452, 84 Stat 941, codified at 18 USC 1961-68, the primary legal weapon for organized crime in the United States, contains no clear definition of its target. Although it initially included an amendment that would have criminalized membership in the “Mafia” or “La Cosa Nostra”, the amendment was eventually rejected, both on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, and its underinclusive definition of organized crime (Lynch, 1987). (2) Explore the idea that organised crime may not be organised at all, or not in the sense that is generally recognised in other, more legitimate forms of organisation. Traditionally, there have been two views on the structure of criminal organizations. One, shared by many scholars and law enforcement agencies, describes organized crime groups as a hierarchical, centralized, and bureaucratic structure similar to that of a modern corporation, such as the Mafia (Abadinsky, 1990; Cressey, 1969). Like their legitimate counterparts, these groups seek to monopolize criminal enterprises by expanding in size and forming large cartels of national and international scope. They operate gambling casinos, prostitution rings, drug trafficking, and offshore banks (Block & Scarpitti, 1986). In some cases such as in Italy and the former USSR, crime syndicates have developed a symbiotic relationship with the government to the point that they gradually assume political and administrative functions (Jennings, 1993). They is a clear division of labor and chain of command: tasks and responsibilities are assigned according to members’ abilities; rules and regulations govern members’ activities; and membership is restricted. Cressey (1969) describes organized crime as corporate-like entities that are hierarchically structured with a clear division of labor, such as the Mafia and Colombian drug cartels. Similar to the Italian crime families (Jacobs & Goldin, 1999), many triad societies, while working independently, share a common and consistent internal composition. They are all distinguished by a rigid hierarchical structure surrounded by an extreme emphasis on secrecy. “Godfathers” at the top of the organizational structure direct local and overseas branches to engage in a variety of criminal activities (Black, 1992; Booth, 1990). Although contemporary triad societies are said to be far more fragmented than their traditional counterparts, they still possess well-defined organizational structures with at least five levels of hierarchy and clearly defined roles and responsibilities at each level (Chu, 2000). These organizations are governed by rules, and members are recruited through ritualized procedures. The other view argues that the concept of organized crime should be abandoned in favor of an “enterprise” model (Block & Chambliss, 1981). This model implies flexible and adaptive networks that can easily expand and contract to deal with the uncertainties of the criminal enterprise. The entrepreneurs are organized to the extent that they can effectively carry out illicit activities, which is a utilitarian or rational behavior, as the economists have indicated (Reuter, 1983). A number of studies have emphasized on the entrepreneurial nature and described the transitory alliances of bold risk takers who seize opportunities to make large profits on their investments (Dobinson, 1993). Apart from a relatively small core group, most associates are brought in as needed to provide special services. To reconcile these two perspectives on the structure of organized crime, Hagan (1983) and Smith (1980) purport that the continuum perspective is more conducive to our understanding of organized crime. Criminal organizations respond to varying market demands by contracting or expanding in size; their organizational structures are shaped by external social-legal factors rather than by design. Certain crime groups, such as those involved in construction or gambling businesses, may require an elaborate hierarchy and clear division of labor. These are necessary organizational prerequisites to remain viable in these illicit businesses. On the other hand, crime groups such as those involved in pawnshops and the fencing of stolen goods must respond rapidly to the changing demands on the street, and therefore, require little or no organizational structure. It is clear that the two major schools on the nature of organized crime describe realities that stand on two opposite ends of a continuum. Another view projects organized crime as a “familial” activity. For instance, the Sicilian mafia. This group represents themselves as “men of honor” who solve their problems (their own and others’) without resorting to state-established laws. The nucleus of their organization is the localized fraternity or cosca (plural, cosche), named for the tightly bundled leaves of an artichoke. In fact the mafia has always been a predatory and mutual-aid society that enforces loyalty and secrecy among its members and supports those who are arrested, convicted and sentenced to jail. Mafia cosche are territorial, usually bearing the names of their rural towns or urban neighborhoods. Each commonly extorts “tribute” (a “pizzo”) from businesses in its territory and demands that the territory’s employers employ mafia dependents. At the same time, through entrepreneurial coalitions that cut across several cosche and include many strategic outsiders, mafiosi pursue more far. Meanwhile, their carefully cultivated cultural connections and capacity for violence give them considerable leverage in competing for access to and control over public goods. To some extent, cosca organization reflect kinship or familial organizations, for membership may be passed from father to son, uncle to nephew. Mafiosi also exploit the fictive kin tie of co-godparenthood, often naming each other as godfathers to their children. In families where the father, uncles, older brothers, and godfathers are cosca members, it is almost obligatory for up-and-coming boys to consider criminal careers. Yet, becoming a mafioso is also a matter of talent. Sometimes a mafioso’s son lacks the fegato or guts for “criminal reliability.” As his brothers yield instructions in becoming “men of honor,” he is permitted to go his own way (Schneider & Schneider, 2003). Not only does the mafia pass over inapt kin; some cosche have rules against admitting too many kinsmen, asserting that the mafiosi seeking to induct more than one son or brother is planning a grab for power within the cosca (Paoli, 1997). The mafia also recruits non-kin; indeed, young delinquents go out of their way to commit petty crimes in order to impress would-be mafia sponsors. Antonino Calderone, a justice collaborator in the antimafia trials of the mid-1980s puts it this way: “Around every man of honor of a certain rank is always a circle of twenty or thirty kids – nobodies who want to become something… there to do small favors, be put to a test…like rock stars looking up to Madonna” (in Arlacchi, 1993). All told, while the term family is usually applied to the cosca, it is a metaphor, an evocation of the presumed solidarity of kinship. Mutual goodwill is further encouraged by idiosyncratic ways of speaking, terms of address, and linguistically playful nicknames. Beyond this, the mafia offers its members the privileges of exclusivity and belonging. A symbolically laden rite of entry and effort at lifelong socialization situates them “outside” of normal society, and in their view, “above” it. Scholars in the 1960s were skeptical that initiation rites existed, attributing accounts of them to the imagination of journalists and prosecutors. The depositions of the pentiti who are collaborating with the state have compelled a reevaluation of this criticism, as they consistently describe a ritual in which the novice holds the burning paper image of a saint while his sponsor pricks his finger and, mixing the symbolically laden blood and ashes, has him swear an oath of loyalty to the solidarity and silence before outsiders (Schneider & Schneider, 2003). (3)Discuss the theoretical perspectives on organised crime generated by sociologists, economists and political scientists, to illustrate the vale of the different ways in which the subject is viewed. Organized criminal activities have been evaluated as major economic and social issues since the early 1900s. While Fiorentini & Peltzman (1995) purport that there have been substantial research interest on the topic, economists have done relatively limited work, particularly on investigating the economics of organized crime. Much of this work has followed Becker’s (1968) theoretical framework, presenting that the target is the individual’s allocative decision between legal and illegal activities in the face of various deterrent set-ups. Among the handful of exceptions, a criminal organization is frequently thought of as a monopolistic firm, and the theory of monopoly is predominantly utilized to analyze organized crime. Schelling (1967), Buchanan (1973), Backhaus (1979), Gambetta and Reuter (1995), and more recently Garoupa (2000) studied the optimal public policy toward organized crimes through a welfare comparison between a monopoly (organized criminals) and competitive supplies (individual criminals). Given that criminal activities are often assessed as “social bads,” the monopolistic market is assessed to be better than a perfectly competitive one, because its output of crime is smaller. Criminologists sometimes perceive terrorist groups as criminal organizations; thus some studies consider criminal organizations as a state, within which members carry out their own legal or illegal activities. Along this line of research, Grossman (1995) and Posner (1998) model the Mafia as a competitor of the state in the provision of public goods and services. Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) purport that the association between the state and the criminal organization is not completely antagonistic. It is usually a symbiotic, live-and-let-live arrangement. The monopolistic model suggests that prospective offenders do not have any other criminal choices but are instead compelled to join the criminal organization if they choose to commit a crime. Apparently, it is less than exhaustive in terms of describing agents’ choices in relation to criminal behavior. For instance, the criminal organization may not be monopolistic after all, as asserted by Dick (1995) and others. Criminologists Johnson (1962), Rubin (1973), and Reiss (1986) present that majority of criminal organizations are endemic and/or restrictive in some specific illegal businesses. These criminal activities such as bootlegging, drug dealing, pimping, and prostitution, are often less organized and would be hard to effectively monopolize. Dick (1995) also asserts that prostitution, smuggling, fencing, and narcotics importation frequently engage substantial competition among downstream suppliers and can hardly be considered as monopolistic entities. In other similar investigations, Klein and Crawford (1967), Morash (1983), and Sarnecki (1986) conclude that majority of youths who are involved with delinquency are at most street gangsters and cannot be considered as members of a highly structured organization. Sociological literature, in contrast, has traditionally emphasized on the cultural and ethnic linkages that dictate the structure and cohesiveness or organized crime groups, largely bypassing the more fundamental question of why such groups emerge. More recently, sociologists have argued that the primary market for organized crime services is in “unstable transactions in which trust is scarce and fragile (Black, 1983). Thus, for example, the rise of organized crime in Europe and Russia is explained as an outgrowth of Communism, which is said to have systematically destroyed trust in the government (Varese, 1994). Neither approach, however, is fully satisfactory. First, consider the recent fascination of the sociologist with trust. Many of the services that organized criminal firms around the world offer involve not risky black or gray market transactions, but intervention in transactions that ought to be “stable,” in that they are formally supported by the legal system – debt collection or labor dispute resolution, for example. Even more damaging than the proposed correlation between low trust and organized crime is the case of Japan, which no sociologist has managed to explain. Japan has extensive organized crime, yet Japan’s social system is widely viewed as founded on trust. For instance, Japan is defined as a “high trust” society in which social capital is in abundant supply (Fukuyama, 1995). 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