Racial discrimination between UK and USA - Essay Example

Running head: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN UK AND USA Racial Discrimination Between UK and USA By ___________________ Racial Discrimination between UK and USA To discriminate against anyone on racial grounds in any matter is unlawful in Britain. Discrimination related Acts of Parliament, must be observed whether it is recruitment of staff or the framing of terms of employment. The Race Relations Act 1976 deals with, among other things such as club membership, discrimination in employment etc. It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a potential employee on the grounds of race, colour, nationality, or ethnic or national origins, which the Act calls collectively 'racial grounds'. Discrimination may be unfavourable treatment of an applicant for a job, offering less favourable terms of employment than other persons might expect or simply refusing a person's application. Discrimination may also occur once a person is actually in employment, through lack of opportunities for promotion, transfer and training, refusal of benefits or facilities normally available to an employee, or unreasonable dismissal. 1 It was not until the 1960s that race became a major public issue in British politics. It was, however over the issue of 'immigration', which became the focus of attention rather than the question of racial equality. In the eighteen months before the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 over 200,000 black immigrants had arrived in Britain almost as many as in the five years 1955 to 1960 and marginally fewer than black immigrants entering the country between July 1962 and the end of 1967. This period was marked by a sharp shift in public opinion towards immigration. In 1962, a few months before the passage of the Act, 62 per cent of the public favoured controls and 23 per cent favoured free entry but by April 1968 the corresponding figures were 95 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. While the diversity of reasons for this shift in public opinion has been well documented 2, one constant theme has been, in the politics of race in Britain, the search by political leaders from the major parties to depoliticise this issue by papering over party differences 3. By the 1960s both major parties subscribed to the view that immigration should be controlled because immigrants placed great strain on employment and housing. It was only the Labour Party, 'albeit' with substantial ambivalence, which supported the idea of anti-discrimination legislation. By the time that Britain's first civil rights law, the Race Relations Act 1965, had been passed, for many, blacks had become synonymous with immigrants. Moreover prior to the Local Government Act of 1966 (Section 11) the general laissez-faire attitude of Central and Local Government meant that virtually nothing had been done to cater for the problems that many immigrants experienced in housing, employment and education. As Burney 4 observed, in the absence of Central Government direction and incentives, many local authorities, frequently in areas of high immigration and Labour controlled, behaved as though blacks did not exist: 'most Labour controlled councils made a habit of resolutely ignoring immigration, to the extent of, wherever possible, ignoring immigrants'. So far as access to housing was recognised as an issue of concern in relation to ethnic minorities, a resolutely colour-blind approach was advocated whereby the real need was perceived to be to alleviate the housing shortage and to provide for those in greatest need. There should be no attempt to discriminate positively in favour of such minorities to remove the racial disadvantage, which they had experienced 5. At the time of the 1965 Race Relations Act the majority of blacks resident in the United Kingdom were immigrants and were likely to experience or to have experienced difficulties in the following areas: Problems associated with settlement and establishment. Differences in the dominant form of household structure and size being met by shortage in the private and public housing sector. Cultural, social, linguistic and religious differences - the ethnic character of the group concerned - forming distinct needs and aspirations from those of the host community. The experience of ethnocentricism by the largely monocultural white majority resulting in racial disadvantage through expectations of social, linguistic and religious 'acculturation' to the dominant norms of the host community. Racism - the experience of direct and indirect discrimination through racially motivated behaviour by the white community.6 It may be artificial to attempt a rigid isolation of these factors, given that they will interrelate more or less significantly in particular situations. Nonetheless, to the extent that they inform both opinion and practice, reference to the law alone may result in an inadequate or misleading explanation of social behaviour and consequently in a distortion of the relevant merits or demerits of legislative provision in achieving the goal of racial equality in access to housing. Britain legislated against racial discrimination at almost the same time as the United States. Although the British experienced nothing equivalent to the American racial troubles of the 1960s, there has been considerable disillusionment with the 1965, 1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts; the disturbances in Brixton, St Pauls, Handsworth and Toxteth in the early 1980s would appear to question either whether the legislation in its present form is capable of effecting significant change towards equality of opportunity or alternatively whether the law, in whatever form, is capable of securing the goals which it sought to achieve. McKay 7in his comparative critique of British and American housing legislation in the 1960s and mid 1970s suggested that in general British and American civil rights commentators have been divided. On the one hand there are those who dismiss the laws as at best irrelevant and at worst a deliberate attempt by white elites to manipulate actual or potentially rebellious blacks into political quiescence. On the other hand there are those who believe the legislation has failed not because it is doomed to failure, but because it has been inadequately formulated and/or implemented. Crudely the radicals, eager to construct theories explaining the discrepancy between expressed goals and performance, have focused on linking the alleged existence of an elite consensus, or of institutionalised racism, to the subordinate position of non-whites without a thorough examination of the nature of the enforcement of law itself. Conversely, the liberal approach has been to focus on the details of the administrative process or on the nature of discrimination in isolation from structural, political and economic forces. The one, then, studies theory divorced from practice while the other studies practice but fails to locate it in any theoretical structure. Moreover, the difficulty that social scientists have experienced in accommodating racial inequality and conflict within broadly based theories of class stratification and conflict has resulted in such theories lacking an empirical base compatible with the evidence available. It has been suggested, even at a purely theoretical level, that there is often failure to produce a theory worth testing in that the principal assumptions were refuted, in part or in whole, by a cursory examination of empirical evidence. Thus Katznelson 8 claimed that in both the United States and Britain there had been a conscious attempt of white elites to depoliticise the race issue through the creation of 'buffer institutions' community relations agencies) whose function had been not to improve race relations and reduce discrimination but to isolate black aspirations and reinforce institutional racism. This theory appears to be at one and the same time a confirmation and a refutation of conflict management and suffers from such inconsistency: it is difficult to reconcile the purpose of political elites in removing race from the political arena to defuse conflict situations with the practice of setting up buffer institutions with the function of frustrating demands to the extent that they are then expressed in the formulation of political organisations outside the accepted political arena. Given that such influences are more or less extraneous to the legal process in respect of anti-discrimination provision it becomes apparent that a description and critique of that process provides a very partial view of the nature of racial discrimination and the prospects for legislation affecting substantial social change. Despite this we must judge legislation and its enforcement on its own terms. The extent to which extraneous influences provide a context for legislation is a truism, which Government accepts and the objectives of legislation assume that there are countervailing forces with which it has to contend. While we may not expect a Government to be omniscient we do expect it to be honest, well informed and intelligent. But when Governments have consistently juxtaposed race relations with immigration and, in respect of the latter, have demonstrated, at least to the satisfaction of many critics, that they have shown dishonesty, ignorance and wilful disregard for rational analysis it does raise serious questions regarding their bona fides in respect of the other side of the equation, race relations: it may be naive, therefore, to assume that all is what it is said to be. Race Discrimination and the Courts As Bindman and Lester 9 have observed, cases of racial injustice have come before the courts in three different situations, each involving conflicts because of the movement of members of an ethnic or national group from one country to another. The traffic in African slaves was perhaps the earliest and most dramatic legal issue, which came before the courts either because merchants sought to enforce agreements for the sale of slaves or because masters sought forcibly to remove unwilling slaves from England to the colonies. Second, a diversity of courts, including the Privy Council, were involved in determining legal issues involving discrimination against Chinese and Japanese migrants to Canada and, third, problems of discrimination have arisen in relation to the immigration of Jewish refugees and black Commonwealth citizens. As an aftermath of the Spanish wars black slaves first appeared in Britain at the end of the sixteenth century and by the end of the eighteenth century about one-third of the British merchant fleet was engaged in transporting 50,000 negroes a year to the New World. By this time the slave trader was not only socially respectable but his business was a recognised route to gentility and was officially approved by the Board of Trade, the navy, and the nobility 10. It would appear that both French and English colonial law assumed that the slave had essentially the attributes of personal property, and like a horse or cow could be moved, sold or rented at the will of his owner. 11By this time the courts had already decided that slavery was legal in England because negroes were infidels who therefore had no entitlement to enjoy the rights enjoyed by Christians. In 1749 Lord Hardwicke opined from the Bench in Pearne v Lisle (1749) Amb. 75 that a slave did not become free on coming to England nor did he become free by being baptised and further that any master might lawfully force his slave to return with him from England to the plantations. This view conflicted with that of the Lord Chancellor in Chanley v Harvey (1762) 2 Eden. 126 where he stated that a man became free as soon as he set foot in England and that a negro could maintain an action against his master for ill usage as well as having a writ of habeas corpus if restrained of his liberty. Eventually, and most reluctantly, in the case of James Somersett (1772) 20 St. Tr. 1 slavery was pronounced to be unlawful in England 'Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be discharged. ' While Sommersett's case was decided thirty-six years before Parliament prohibited the slave trade and sixty-two years before it abolished slavery in the colonies (in 1834) its importance, as Bindman and Lester have observed, has been vastly exaggerated. In essence slavery had not been proscribed but its continued existence had been allowed in attenuated form and only the worst abuse - the forcible removal of negroes back to the colonies - rendered unequivocally unlawful despite the fact that it undoubtedly continued. Given this ambivalence towards the legitimacy of applying public policy in the development of common law generally, it is not surprising that the history of judgments relating to the application of common law, prior to the first race relations legislation in 1965, lacks any clear-cut espousal of principle. With few exceptions when they have addressed issues relating to private persons discriminating against other private individuals, the courts have not been prepared to invalidate such discrimination, indirectly giving it the force of law. In Weinberger v Ingles (1919) AC 606 the court took the view that Hugo Weinberger, a naturalised British subject for thirty years but who had been born in Germany, had not been unlawfully discriminated against when the Committee of the Stock Exchange, of which he had been an exemplary member for twenty-one years, had refused to re-elect him. The decision followed pressure from the Stock Exchange Anti-German Union who had objected to his re-election on the sole ground that he had been born in Bavaria. Even where the courts have found against the discriminator the public policy element has often been ambiguous. Thus in Scala Ballroom (Woverhampton) v Ratcliffe (1958) 3 All ER 220 the Musicians Union, which had many black members, was held to be entitled to advise its members not to play in the Scala Ballroom, which, from its opening, had denied entry to black people. The court in indicating, although obiter to the judgment, that the ballroom proprietors were entitled to maintain the colour bar 'in their own business interests' did not outlaw racial discrimination. The court merely allowed the Musicians Union to act on its own initiative to protect its members' interests. This non-interventionist character of the common law, as portrayed by the courts, also made it incapable of combating racial discrimination in the field of housing. Thus prior to the legislative provision in the 1968 Race Relations Act, because there was no common-law duty to do business with anyone, the courts would not intervene to help someone who was refused housing accommodation or the services of an estate agent solely on the grounds of race. However, there were, potentially, at least two major exceptions to this proposition. First, in England and Wales, conspiracy might be involved leading to an action for damages where two or more people agreed to prevent someone of a particular race or colour from obtaining a house or flat where the purpose was not primarily to protect their own interests but to inflict harm on the victim. Second, where property transactions are bound by restrictive covenants, when there is an expressed reference to the consent of the owner or landlord, which should not be arbitrarily withheld, then, at common law, the courts would regard it as arbitrary to withhold consent on grounds of race or colour.12 In summary, then, although this examination of common-law provision prior to the enactment of race relation's legislation in 1965 has been cursory, it is suggested that the illustrations are sufficiently typical of the approach of the courts to indicate the inchoate nature of the development of public interest and public policy in the common law on matters of racial discrimination. The Race Relations Act 1965 The Labour Party manifesto for the 1964 General Election contained a commitment to legislate against racial discrimination and incitement in public places and, at the beginning of 1964, the Shadow Cabinet and the Society of Labour Lawyers were both asked to draft proposals which would give effect to this commitment. The Shadow Cabinet's working committee, under Sir Frank Soskice, confined the scope of legislation against racial discrimination to public places, thereby ignoring some of the provisions contained in Lord Brockway's Bills which would have banned discriminatory leases or provided for the withdrawal of licences from discriminators or the bringing of civil proceedings against them. It was the view of the working committee that racial discrimination should be a criminal offence and prosecutions would be brought only with the consent of the Attorney General or, in Scotland, the Lord Advocate. The Committee on Racial Discrimination established by the Society of Labour Lawyers under the chairmanship of Andrew Martin QC, while recognising the importance of racial discrimination in employment and housing similarly confined the focus to discrimination in public places. Meanwhile a group of Labour Party supporters, who had been impressed by North American evidence that anti-discrimination laws were more likely to be effectively enforced by administrative machinery than by proceedings in the criminal courts, presented proposals to the Prime Minister in late November 1964. They suggested a citizens' council should be created with powers to investigate discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, religion, sex and national origin in the fields of education, employment, housing, insurance, credit facilities and the administration of justice. It would publish findings and make recommendations and attempt to end discrimination by persuasion and conciliation. About this period a multi-racial Campaign against Racial Discrimination (CARD) was established after meetings between representatives of the main immigrant groups. Its legal committee developed these proposals and presented them to a meeting of the organisation in February 1965, where they were approved. The resolution approving the recommendations agreed that the scope of the legislation should include employment, housing and the provision of commercial services and that a statutory body should be established with power to investigate, conciliate, hold hearings and make legally enforceable orders against those found to have breached the law: the object of the legislation, it was agreed, should be to alter conduct and provide individual remedies rather than to punish. The first reading of the Race Relations Bill was on 9 April 1965: under the Bill racial discrimination was to be made a criminal offence, punishable by a maximum fine of 100, if practised in hotels, public houses, restaurants, theatres, cinemas, public transport or any place of public resort maintained by a public authority. Discrimination in employment was ignored and the only reference to housing was a clause dealing with discriminatory restrictions on the disposal of tenancies. There was no reference to a conciliation agency and no civil remedy was available for those harmed by racial discrimination. The publication of the Bill met critical acclaim by a number of newspapers, by CARD and by the Society of Labour Lawyers, who issued a further report recommending the extension of the Bill to discrimination in housing, employment and certain credit and other service industries and the establishment of a conciliation commission. The Shadow Home Secretary, Peter Thornycroft, who had had meetings with the representatives of CARD at which the principle of enforcement by conciliation had been urged, moved the Opposition amendment to the second reading. The Opposition opposed the Bill because it would 'introduce criminal sanctions into a field more appropriate to conciliation and the encouragement of fair employment practices while also importing a new principle into the law affecting freedom of speech'. 13 During the three weeks before the second reading and the committee stage, the Home Secretary drafted amendments to his own Bill: criminal sanctions were to be dropped in cases of discrimination and retained only for racial incitement. A Race Relations Board with local conciliation committees would investigate complaints of discrimination, settle disputes and generally secure compliance with the law. Only where this conciliation process had failed and the Board considered it likely that discrimination would continue would there be reference to the Attorney General or Lord Advocate, who might then seek an injunction or interdict to prevent further acts of discrimination being committed. This change of heart largely appeased the Opposition, who had seen the conciliation process, in tactical terms, as a softening of the Bill rather than as a strengthening of the process whereby discrimination would be diminished in public places. Furthermore Soskice refused to widen the Bill's coverage in any way and was, therefore, assured of carrying his Bill with Conservative support before the Standing Committee. Indeed the damage that was done was to Labour Party unity: seven of the thirteen Labour MPs on the Standing Committee openly expressed their view that the Bill was inadequate. The Race Relations Act 1965 was brief: it contained eight sections and one schedule. In addition to providing for racial discrimination in a place of public resort being unlawful it established the Race Relations Board and Conciliation Committees (Section 2), set out proceedings in England and Wales (Section 3) and in Scotland (Section 4), made provisions relating to incitement and public order (Sections 6 and 7) and contained provisions dealing with racial restrictions on the transfer of tenancies (Section 5). Section 5 comprised the following: 5(1) In any case where the licence or consent of the landlord or of any other person is required for the disposal to any person of premises comprised in their tenancy, that licence or consent shall be treated as unreasonably withheld if and so far as it is withheld on the ground of colour, race or ethnic or national origins: provided that this subsection does not apply to a tenancy of premises forming part of a dwelling house of which the remainder or part of the remainder is occupied by the person whose licence or consent is required as his own residence if the landlord is entitled in common with that person to the use of any accommodation other than accommodation required for the purposes of access to the premises. 5(2) Any covenant, agreement or stipulation which purports to prohibit the disposal of premises comprised in a tenancy to any persons by reference to colour, race or ethnic or national origins shall be construed as prohibiting such disposal except with the consent of the landlord, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. Racial Discrimination Law in USA The Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed blacks basic economic rights to contract, sue, and own property. The intention of the law was to protect the civil rights of all males in the United States including blacks and to furnish the means of legal recourse when those rights were violated by giving them the right to sue for personal damages. The Fourteenth Amendment, which overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford, declared, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside" and, with particular relevance to the Brown decision, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."14 The Slaughterhouse cases of 1873, a group of cases seemingly having nothing to do with racial segregation, narrowly defined federal power and weakened the Fourteenth Amendment by asserting that most of the rights of citizens should remain under state control. 15 As a result, states that practiced segregation were able to justify their policies based on the theory that segregation in public school systems was an issue for the states to determine, an argument that was repeatedly upheld until the Brown v. Board of Education decision. Although Congress attempted to counterbalance the effect of the Slaughterhouse decisions with passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination in inns, theaters, and other places of public accommodation (the last federal civil rights act passed until 1957), it was quickly overturned. The Supreme Court decided in the civil rights cases in 1883 that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violated states' rights. That decision charted a direct course for segregation in public education. Florida became the first state to enact a statute requiring segregation in places of public accommodation. Eight other states followed Florida's lead by 1892. By that time in the nation's history, discrimination against blacks at the state and federal level had become such common practice, and white America's belief in the inferiority of black people was engrained enough, that the Supreme Court was able to codify the antiblack sentiment into law with their ruling in the case Homer Adolph Plessy, Plaintiff in Error v. J. H. Ferguson, Judge of Section "A" Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The Plessy decision was largely responsible for the rise of the Jim Crow era beginning in the late 1890s, when the practices of comprehensive racial segregation emerged, and racial separation became entrenched. Homer Plessy challenged an 1890 Louisiana law that required separate train cars for blacks and whites. The Supreme Court held that "separate but equal" facilities for white and black railroad passengers did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Plessy v. Ferguson established the "separate but equal" doctrine that became the constitutional justification for segregation. Justice John Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy, argued that forced segregation of the races stamped blacks with a badge of inferiority. The Supreme Court, in its Brown v. Board of Education opinion, referenced six previous cases that had been heard relative to the "separate but equal" doctrine. The first of those cases was Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, State of Georgia in 1899. 16 In Cumming the Court upheld a local school board's decision to close a black public school due to fiscal constraints, despite the fact that the district continued to operate two white public schools. The opinion stated that there was no evidence in the record that the decision was based on racial discrimination and that the distribution of public funds for public education was within the discretion of school authorities.17 The Gong Lum v. Rice case of 1927 was another case in which the Court applied the "separate but equal" formulation of Plessy v. Ferguson to public schools. In this case the Supreme Court held that a Mississippi school district could require a Chinese American girl to attend a segregated black school rather than a white school.18 Race relations apart, law unquestionably is often an appropriate and effective mode of regulating behavior. Statutes forbid murder and false advertising, adultery and larceny, and assert thousands of other rules which society enforces through the machinery of state. Moreover, as Dean Roscoe Pound has pointed out, laws may not only set standards but may also help to create habits of conformity to them. Although we know that legal canons generally are always being violated to some degree, we know too that they are usually being obeyed. There has never been much support for a regime without law. The debate has almost always been over whether a proposed law is good, desirable, enforceable, or otherwise proper, not over whether there should be laws. Moreover, alleged choice that is required between law and education as a means of persuading men to change their practices and attitudes usually is not meaningful. Law itself educates and lawsuits, especially if well publicized as they often are in the field of race relations convey at least as much information about fundamental rights as most civics courses or religious sermons. 19 Apart from constitutional questions, some common law doctrines deserve attention in connection with public accommodations: for example, the innkeeper's obligation to serve all travellers, the common carrier's (or utility's) duty to treat the public without discrimination. Most important of all is the growing body of state civil rights statutes forbidding discrimination in places of public accommodation, which we shall examine. With the exodus of middle and upper classes to the suburbs, lower-income groups constitute a larger and larger fraction of the population of the central cities. Members of these groups generally exhibit a greater degree of intolerance and racial prejudice than do other whites. And the increasing juxtaposing of the Negro and the low-income non-Negro populations produces increased interracial tensions. Shirley Star of the National Opinion Research Center has shown that the greatest white animosity towards Negroes is found on the edge of the expanding Negro residential areas where whites fear their block or neighborhood will soon be 'invaded.' In these lower class and lower-middle class transitional areas, violence is incipient. Individual differences within the minority group are ignored. A young white resident of such an area in Chicago recently beat a Negro to death with a hammer. 'I just wanted to get one of them,' he explained, 'which one didn't matter.' 20 The total situation produces Negro communities in which people live their whole lives without, or with minimum, contact with the other race. With a Negro population numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and with this population densely concentrated, one can live, eat, shop, work, play, and die in a completely Negro community. The social isolation of the northern urban Negro is, for very large numbers, more complete than it ever was for the Negro rural resident in the South. According to Hornberger, "the biggest failure waged by the United States government against the American people has been the War on Racism. Racial bigotry in America is at an all-time high despite an all-out, concerted effort by the U.S. government to stamp it out. The Civil War may have freed blacks from slavery, but it did not erase the sentiments, which many whites had against blacks. The mind-set, which considered the black man inferior to the white man, continued to exist in America. And since blacks could no longer be held in legal bondage, the white bigots had to figure out ways 'to keep the Negro in his place.'"21 "In the 1960s, the U.S. government declared its war on racism in America. Unfortunately, however, the government failed to take any steps to end economic regulations by state and local governments. And rather than simply ending state-mandated segregation in both the public and private sectors the government took two additional, devastating steps. First, people were forced to integrate their private enterprises, that is, discrimination on a purely private and voluntary basis was made illegal. Second, through affirmative-action programs, the legal and political system was used to benefit blacks at the expense of whites." 22 Racial Discrimination Legislation There are two basic, rival, and quite different concepts to be found in different kinds of anti discrimination legislation in countries like UK and USA. Both these concepts originate with the same underlying recognition that certain members of particular groups in society are disadvantaged because of discrimination. The difference is in the type of action to be taken to remedy this situation. The first concept has been prevalent in legislation in the United States and in the Northern Ireland Fair Employment Act 1989. In these jurisdictions a common theme of anti-discrimination legislation has been the imposition of a requirement of positive action by government bodies and employers, to redress the impact of past discrimination by taking steps to ensure that members of minorities which have been discriminated against in the past are given special assistance. The aim of the special assistance is to redress the imbalance by ensuring a fair representation of those minorities in the employment market. In India this has been attempted by means of reserved quotas for members of Scheduled Castes. In the United States, it has centred on the concept of affirmative action, while in Northern Ireland the legislation requires steps to be taken by those employers with more than 10 employees to ensure that the Roman Catholic minority is adequately represented in their workforce. 23 In Britain a much less interventionist approach has been adopted. The aim of the British race discrimination legislation has been to outlaw acts of discrimination, but not to require positive steps to correct the results of past discrimination. The only recognition of the need to correct the results of past discrimination is in the recognition of the lawfulness of training opportunities limited to one group, which would otherwise be discriminatory, where the purpose of the training is to overcome disadvantages previously faced by members of that group. Studies of British race discrimination legislation, which was introduced in three stages in 1986, 1968 and 1976, showed that in the decade between its the early 1970s and the early 1980s it had little effect on patterns of discrimination, with about a third of employers continuing to discrimination against non-white job applicants. However in more recent years there has been evidence of major changes in employment patterns. According to Bourne & Whitmore "Anti-discrimination Law in Britain", by 1990 the proportion of persons of Indian, African or Chinese origin in managerial or professional positions was similar to the proportion of white people. The UK legislation refers to discrimination "on racial grounds" and in some contexts refers to "racial groups". "Racial grounds" is defined as meaning on the grounds of colour, race, and nationality, ethnic or national origins. This definition has been subjected towards statutory and legislatory interpretation in both countries, UK and USA.24 References Collins Valerie, 1993. "Recreation and the Law": E & FN Spon. Place of Publication: London. Macewen Martin, 1991. "Housing, Race, and Law: The British Experience": Routledge. Place of Publication: New York. Rose, E. J. B. and Associates, 1969. "Colour and Citizenship", London: Oxford University Press (for Institute of Race Relations) McKay, D. H. (1977) Housing and Race in Industrial Society, London: Croom Helm. Burney, E. (1967) Housing on Trial: a Study of Immigrants and Local Government, London: Oxford University Press. Katznelson, I. (1973) Black Men, White Cities, London: Oxford University Press. Anderson James & Byrne N. Dara, 2004. "The Unfinished Agenda of Brown v. Board of Education": Wiley. Place of Publication: Hoboken, NJ. Greenberg Jack, 1959. "Race Relations and American Law": Columbia University Press. Place of Publication: New York. Raab Earl, 1962. "American Race Relations Today": Doubleday. Place of Publication: Garden City, NY. Hornberger Jacob, 1992. "Race, Power and Repatriation". Accessible from < http://www.fff.org/freedom/0392a.asp > Racial Discrimination Legislation, Accessible from < www.hkhrm.org.hk/0905seminar/paul_seminar.pdf > Read More