How Does the Constitution Mitigate Collective Action Problems - Essay Example

11 October How does the Constitution mitigate collective action problems? I. Introduction Collective Action can be traced to the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, whereby man signed a contract with a. individual or a group of individuals acting to promote the interests of all. Man thus became a political animal. Politics therefore is an ideology by which a group of people make decisions for to promote the common interests of a larger number of people. This is done in most democratic countries, by means of elected representatives that work for the public good. This essay will explore this field of collective action, its problems and how the same are mitigated by the Constitution. II. Collective Action The most basic question then, is ‘what is collective action’. The foremost treatise on the subject is the Logic of Collective action by Mancur j Olsen. Olsen, in his book, studies the notion of a group in so much, he examines that individuals with common interests form groups or organizations. These groups or organizations are formed to promote and advance the common interests or work for the well being and benefit of the members of the organization and this action is called collective action. For example in the case of a labour union, the union strives to get between wages, working conditions etc for its members. In modern democracies, the government is a group which performs collective action - made up of elected representatives; it strives to work for the well being and to promote the interests of the public. The government provides healthcare, free education, infrastructure, defence and other civil liberties for the well being of its citizens. III. Problems of Collective Action The basis of collective action is an input made by members towards an organization which then promotes the common interests of all the members of the same. This implies that, as far as possible, persons must contribute to the organization to avail of the promotion of their interests. However, this is not always the case. Problems arise with the collective action model because individuals by their very nature do not agree on the common interests, how it should be advanced which interest should be advanced. The main problems with collective action are with respect to: i. Coordination ii. Disagreement iii. Defection/Instability iv. Free Riding v. Alternatives/Prisoners Dilemma The most important of these are the problems of Free Riding and Prisoners Dilemma. In certain organisations, individuals do not contribute for the benefits they enjoy. This is the problem of Free Riding. Such a problem can be seen clearly in the case of ‘Public Goods’. Economists use the term public goods to refer to goods provided by a government on the basis of taxation and not prices. These are goods, the enjoyment of which by one person does not diminish the enjoyment of another enjoying the same goods, For example, where two people look at a work of art, one person enjoyment has no relevance to the others; however the work of art is available to be enjoyed by all. This is in contrast to private goods where an owner of such good can prevent others from using it. Individuals in these groups’ feel that the benefit to them is too negligible and disregard the benefit of such a good to others, thereby refusing to contribute, thee ride free; enjoy the benefits based on the contribution of other members . For example as in the cases of environmental pollution, where all individuals by polluting less can protect all from harmful rays of the sun. However, if an individual feels that pollution is of no importance and the benefit to him is minimal, he will be a free rider on the contributions of others. An individual in a group may pursue an activity that rewards him individually rather than pursuing the interests of the group which causes the problem of prisoner’s dilemma. III. The Role of the Constitution Article 1 section 8: The federation of states that make up the United States of America are bodies which all work along the principles of collective action. The framers of the constitution envisioned the inevitable, that these states would succumb to the problems of collective action and to prevent such a scenario, embodied in the constitution a provision by which, the central or union government could legislate on behalf of the federal states for the general interest of the union, or in such cases as where the states themselves were incompetent to handle the same or where an individual legislation would disrupt the harmony of the federation. Article 1 section 8, empowers the center to collect taxes, pay debts etc and to provide for the general welfare of states. This section then can be appropriately read as a response to Collective Action Problems. However, this general welfare clause, was lost on constitutional interpreters of the 19th century, until, a number of debates between government taxing and spending powers were brought about before Congress at the centre, where the meaning and scope of ‘General Interest’ as embodied by Article 1 section 8, was discussed. For example, debates held with respect to federal spending on victims of disasters, whereby, Congress considered whether such expenditure was for the general good of the union, or how the bonus bill to construct road ways between the west and New Orleans was vetoed as being irreconcilable with the constitution. The Supreme Court however, has held the stand that, that the Congress possesses the authority to tax and then spend for ‘general welfare’ of the public provided that constitutional provisions are not violated, at the same time, restricting the powers of Congress to collecting tax and general welfare only. As per Article 1, section 8, the centre provides for common defence. This means that the centre provides an army for all states. This clause solves the Free ride problem. In the absence of a common army, each state would make provisions for its own defence. In cases of armies of different states spilling over or collaborating, it would become a case of defending those who did not contribute towards the upkeep of the army as one sate cannot collect funds from another. The centre by providing for a central army eliminates this problem, thereby solving the free rider problem. The same can be said for the provision of a post office, for the provisions of intellectual property, communications, free intestate movement of goods etc. In the twenty-first century, Article 1 section 8 should be interpreted so as to be applied to contemporary problems. One such problem is that of environment pollution. When pollution spreads across states or a question of protecting endangered species, spread over multiple states is raised, the centre may and should interpret this article to be able to regulate such pollution, thereby eliminating the detrimental effect collective action has on governance. The constitution by embodying this clause eliminates the problems of collective action. The problem of coordination is eliminated, as the centre takes up the responsibility of the same. The problem of alternatives, better known as prisoners dilemma are eliminated as individuals are compelled to contribute mostly in the form of taxes to the centre for fear fear of sanctions imposed by the same. Resolution VI.: In recent times, constitutional scholars are of the opinion, that the interpretation of Article 1 section 8 must move from limited power of centre and regulation by the judiciary to empowering the centre to reach all matters involving the ‘general interest of the Union’. This line of thought has been expressed in Resolution VI presented during the Philadelphia Convention as part of the 1787 Virginia Plan. As per this resolution, the courts should not maintain a line between state and federal powers but rather decide whether a matter involves national importance or beyond the competency of states and once done so, allow centre then to regulate and be part of the decision making process as Congress can solve problem that the states separately may not be able to. This rule of construction however conflicts with the Literal rule or the rule of strict construction. Advocates of Resolution VI claim that this resolution embodies the ideals of the framers of the constitution and should therefore be considered by modern day interpreters. IV. Conclusion However, while there is an the effort on the part of the constitution to mitigate the problems of Collective Action, by giving the union the power to make laws for the general interest of the same, a question arises with respect to the extent of the power of the union make such laws. Advocates for this can argue that public goods are numerous and can include education, research, poverty relief, the arts, and the environment, even extending to national markets. If ‘general interest’ is interpreted to include all matters of national importance and all public goods, as suggested by Resolution VI, the Separation of Powers Doctrine is threatened and in doing do, the danger of a federal system of government becoming a unitary system exists. Only time will tell if the balance between the general interest and the distinct nature of the federation persists. Work Cited • Cooter & Neil, “Collective Action Federalism: General theory of Article1 section 8”. Stan L.Rev 65 (2010): 115, Web. 11 Oct. 2011. • Collignan, Stephen, THE EUROPEAN REPUBLIC: Reflections on the Political Economy of a Future Constitution Federal Trust 2003. • Holzinger, Von. Katharina, The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach, Bonn: 2003 • Lash, Kurt, Resolution VI: “The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems” Illinois: paper 10-40, 2011, Web. at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1894737 • Olson, Mancur J., The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Goods, New York: 1971, Print. • Somchat Visitchaichan, rev. “The Logic Of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory of Goods”, by Mancur J Olson. New York: 1971, Web. 11 October, 2011 Online Resources • Ginsburg, Tom, Public Choice and Constitutional Design 2010. Web. at. http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=tom_ginsburg. • Collective Action Problems, Web. at http://faculty.washington.edu/wtalbott/phil240/trcap.htm • Hardin, Russell, "The Free Rider Problem", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Read More