Rational Choice Theory - Essay Example

6. ‘The act of voting out of a sense of duty is not a utility maximising act’ (Stephen Parsons 2006: 295). Do you agree with Parsons? Rational ChoiceTheory, Utility Maximization, Collective Action and The Paradox of Voting. Voting is the key process of making collective decisions in representative democracies and is employed in the election of political leaders, as well as the selection of government policies (Rowley and Schneider, 2004, p. 530). Voting can also create inefficiency and delay, and may not be sophisticated enough to reveal the preferences of society to leaders in governments. In the event that the preferences are unknown, the leaders are not able to implement policies in a manner that will address the needs of society. A set of voting issues originates from rational and utility maximising choices made by the prospective voters, and if the costs outweigh the benefits, it is considered rational ignorance (Rowley and Schneider, 2008, p. 121). On the other hand, they might decide not to take part in an election because the costs outweigh the benefits, in what can be considered rational abstention (Cooter, 2000, p. 22). Other problems may develop from the voting itself, where, for instance, the median voter decides the result in majority-rule elections, and this creates a situation where the preferences of other voters are ignored. In this case, a voting paradox develops, since when three or more people vote, a consistent ranking of their preferences cannot be achieved. Based on rational choice theory, therefore, voting is considered an irrational act, since the possibility of a single vote affecting an election is negligible, but voting still incurs costs and people continue to vote. Keith Dowding attempted to solve this paradox by making modifications to the rational choice framework, arguing that people vote based on a sense of duty. The modification reserves the notion that people achieve utility maximisation. Stephen Parsons (in the paper quoted above in the question) does not agree with this claim, and is of the opinion that, in order to have any explanatory backing, “duty must be modelled as a modified lexicographic preference” (Parsons, 2006, p. 295). Therefore, I agree with Parsons since, these preferences are proscribed by the continuity axiom that is needed so that a preference ordering can be represented by a function of utility which supports the statement, “The act of voting out of a sense of duty is not a utility maximizing act” (2006, p. 295). Utility maximisation Maximising utility is an economic concept, denoting that, when deciding what to buy, a consumer tries to attain the biggest possible value while spending the smallest amount. In this case, the goal of the consumer is maximisation of the total value that can be obtained from the resources at hand. This guiding standard underlies the choices people make, which are analysed using demand theory as well as utility analysis. It therefore makes sense to consider that people are usually motivated to take the actions that are most optimal for them to pursue the most satisfying activities, and to choose aspects that are more beneficial than harmful in order to maximise utility. Why people vote In Dowding’s (2005) view, people vote as a sense of duty, however, this is an invalid claim since duty is not a rational choice hence making it an act that does not necessarily maximize utility. In his argument, he considers that this solution is well matched with the assumption that people are able to maximize their utility through definition. Nonetheless, the problem that arises from trying to incorporate duty is not mitigated through relaxation of self-interested assumptions, as the issue is that the person who votes out of a sense of duty is not actually maximizing their utility. Voting may not be influenced by a sense of duty, but there are rational choices that influence the decision to vote. According to Dowding, the three main reasons why people vote are that they seek to express their preferences, increase chances of winning and that they feel they are obligated to (Dowding, 2005, p. 442). However, in categorizing voters in these three classes, Dowding does not consider the people who voted because they have been forced to through bribes and other means. Individuals are forced to vote in numerous nations such as Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia among others, and countries were voting is compulsory also exist, where citizens are subjected to fines when they decide not to vote. In countries like Belgium, Australia and Venezuela, people who do not vote are considered to have violated the law and are required to pay fines or penalties if they do not have valid reasons like illness. The existing argument for compulsory voting is that it is the duty for all the people to take part in voting, and in most cases, people who are thought to have not voted are not allowed to criticize governments. However, staying away from elections is an individual’s democratic choice and even when an individual votes for the lesser of two evils, it is still considered as choosing an evil. The view that Parsons (2006), differs with is that the efficient governments can be achieved when all the voters express the preferences they would have in the event that their votes were the decisive ones. It is important to note that no single vote is decisive, as it usually gets lost in a sea of numerous other votes. Therefore, regardless of whether the voter is informed, he or she is not likely to get any tangible effects on the resultant benefits. When all other people express their actual preferences, they will reap the benefits of a well-informed electorate notwithstanding the degree of awareness, since if they are poorly informed, they will not be able to produce these benefits by themselves. Consequently, in all the occurrences of indivisible benefits, a person is usually inspired to avoid his part of the costs therefore refusing to seek information that will allow him to discover his actual preferences. Since all the people usually do this, elections never reflect the actual consent of the people who are governed by the chosen leaders. It should be pointed out that Dowding (2005) does not consider the social benefits associated with voting as people vote in a strategic manner when they are able to while avoiding to vote for the candidates they think will lose. However, not all the people vote in this strategic manner, but since majority of them do, it implies that they vote so that they can make a difference and not as a means of satisfying a civic duty. The knowledge that an individual has assisted to secure a win is simply claiming that the individual attains utility from his contribution to the collective efforts. This is permissible if it is an empirical claim, but it should not be used to defend the rational choice approach. People are not obligated to vote and the fact that a person can fail to vote for various reasons makes it a democratic act. Detractors of rational choice theory have argued that rational elucidations of the manner in which human being behave are nullified by the clear fact that numerous people actually vote, regardless of the fact that it is an irrational act. These detractors are not swayed by the opinion that voting is a rational act as people have a sense of duty to participate. Considering voting as an irrational act creates the question of whether failing to vote is a rational act. Additionally, the argument that the possibility of one vote being decisive is insignificant makes it paradoxical. Even though one vote may not be decisive, a collection of votes may be significant for the election and regardless of the fact that the fact that elections are not won by a single vote, the possibility of the chosen person being elected into office is higher when an individual votes (Parsons, 2006). Rational Choices in Voting In various ways, voting can be compared to consumption, as through voting people in society attempt to maximise their personal happiness as well as the good of society. Every voter has his or her personal perceptions concerning what a government is supposed to do for them and the rest of the society, and they express this by voting (Parsons, 2005, p. 35). The costs of voting entail registration as a voter and (for voters who wish to make an informed choice) becoming aware of the proposed policies associated with the candidates seeking votes. If voting in person, an individual must also schedule his or her day around going to a polling station (Margolis, 2007, p. 211). Becoming familiar with the preferred policies is considered among the benefits of voting, but it is never really the case. This is because the candidate may fail to win; there is also a possibility that the candidate might fail to support the promised policies once elected. Additionally, in the event that the candidate wins the election, and is able to pass the policies that were promised, then there is a very negligible chance that the individual’s single vote is what put the leader into the office. This is what creates voter apathy, and rather than focusing on why very few people vote, economists concentrate on why so many people take part in the voting process (Franklin, 2004, p. 15). However, this does not mean that voting is not rational, or that people are not ‘supposed to’, vote as the ostensible wisdom of abstention results in people questioning why rational, sensible and intelligent individuals take part in activities that consume time while not providing benefits. This is equivalent to the issue of people littering their environment, which is bad and makes surroundings ugly; everyone is aware that it is a bad habit. However, everyone else will think that if they litter too, they will not worsen the situation since their own individual litter will be insignificant in the wider context of the environment. In this example, the people are aware of the benefits of littering, but do not consider the associated costs to wider society. Since all the people think in the same way, the question becomes why a few people litter, and not why so many people do. It can be assumed that individuals vote for the same reasons, in that voting has its associated costs, but failing to vote will result in dealing with questions as to why the individual did not vote (Utter and Strickland, 2008, p. 52). Voting to Maximise Utility Voters are individuals who make decisions that are supposed to maximise their utility. In the same manner that people endeavour to maximise utility when buying commodities and employees who strive to maximise utility when choosing employers, potential voters wish to maximise utility when making the decision to vote (Rolfe, 2012, p. 78). It is important to note that maximisation of utility is the process of settling on options that can provide the optimum degree of satisfaction. The satisfaction can originate from the consumption of commodities or from other actions, such as taking part in political activities (Lopus, 2003, p. 11). Nonetheless, since choices have associated ramifications, and the maximisation of utility entails weighing the costs against the benefits. Choices are founded in a comparison of the benefits created when opportunity costs have been foregone. For instance, a decision to consumer a certain brand of soft drink is founded on an assessment of the satisfaction achieved and the one that has been foregone by not buying other commodities with the income that purchased the soft drink. In the process of seeking the maximisation of utility, individuals make rational decisions when settling on the activities, which provide the highest degree of satisfaction, and generate the biggest benefits over the associated costs (Brams and Fishburn, 2007, p. 85). The decision on whether to vote in an election can be equated to any other decision that seeks to maximise utility. Voter Apathy In the process of seeking to maximise utility, people might make the decision to be unaware of or take part in political processes. In the cases where people follow this rational direction, the outcome is what can be considered as voter apathy; therefore, politicians can act in a manner that does not reflect the will of society in general. This is likely to create a situation where resources will not be allocated efficiently. It should be noted that voters are human and they make decisions that they hope will result in the maximization of their own personal utility (Rana, 2006). Two choices remain critical when studying public choice along with the inefficiency that can be attributed to public voting: rational abstention and rational ignorance. It is also important to note, “Agents in rational-choice models are typically assumed to have ‘selfish’ preferences” (Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 2007, p. 294). Rational ignorance defines the choice not to seek information concerning a particular issue, including what the political candidates have promised to do, since the costs associated with acquisition of this information are higher than the benefits that are expected (Schmidt, 2010, p. 975). The acquisition of information can be compared to production and consumption of customer commodities, as it incurs an opportunity cost while at the same time providing a benefit. People usually compare the benefits of the acquisition of information against the cost, and in the event that the cost is more than the benefits they will acquire, then they do not endeavour to get the information. In such a case, they have rationally chosen to remain ignorant. On the other hand, rational abstention entails a decision not to take part in an activity such as an election, since the costs of the action are higher than the expected benefits. Participating in political activities such as voting in elections can also be likened to the production of commodities, since it incurs opportunity costs, while at the same time providing benefits. Usually, people make a comparison of the benefits of participating in political activities against the associated costs in a rational manner. In the event that the costs are higher than the associated benefits, the people do not make an effort to take part in the election and do not vote. When people rationally choose to refrain from participating in political activities, they are rationally choosing not to vote. The main issue associated with this rational voter apathy is the fact that leaders have no awareness of the opinions of non-voters, and therefore are not obliged to pursue policies that will benefit them. Consumer preferences are easy to determine, but in the case of rational voter apathy, the preferences of non-voters are virtually unknown (Blokland, 2011, p. 86). Political leaders lack awareness of the best ways of allocating resources and do not have an idea concerning the aspects that result in the most satisfaction, therefore creating inefficiency. Rational abstention and rational ignorance among some of the society’s members creates an environment where other members can get more information and increase their participation in political activities. The people who make this decision rationally often do so through interest groups, which are groups of people who have the same mutual interests and gain or lose more from a specific candidate or policy, and thus try to make sure that the political structure knows what they prefer (Polsby, 2012, p. 116). Therefore, even though “one cannot reject the possibility that some voters vote instrumentally, it appears highly implausible” that the degree of actual voter turnouts has some instrumental explanation (Geys, 2006, p. 19). Since interest groups have more to benefit or lose from specific actions by governments, there is a higher likelihood that their involvement in political processes will be higher (Dautrich and Yalof, 2012, p. 332). They have a higher probability of voting in elections, which have an effect on their interests and may participate in active campaigns for specific issues and candidates. Additionally, there is a higher likelihood of them providing financial support and this will make their preferences develop a stronger influence on the overall political processes, thus creating an unbalanced environment (Spiers, 2008, p. 128). Problems in the Process of Voting Social preferences may not be well represented in political processes, and thus voting might fail to maximise the utility of voters as a result of three more problems: the voting paradox, trading of votes via logrolling, and the significance of the median voter. The principle of the median voter is an aspect that politicians are well aware of, as being one that decides the result of an election. Median voters are those in areas where there are equivalent numbers of votes on both sides of the vote and thus the votes cast by the median voters become the deciding votes (Rowley and Schneider, 2004, p. 385). Nonetheless, this implies that the preferences of the median voters might not create the best and efficient outcomes. When considering the voting paradox, even though individual preferences are considered as dependable and transitive, the preferences associated with voters may not be dependable (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2011, p. 80). For instance, a particular group may prefer the candidate 1 to candidate 2 and candidate 2 to candidate 3, but then prefer candidate 3 to candidate 1, therefore creating a paradoxical situation that is confusing and time-inefficient. Lastly, logrolling entails voters trading their votes in order to make sure that two distinct issues pass, when none of them is able to get a majority when put to the vote alone. This often occurs in legislative bodies and is another aspect that may result in inefficient resource allocation and utilities failing to be maximized. Effect of Voting As a Collective Action on Utility Maximization Every voter makes the decision to vote notwithstanding the fact that the chances that his or her vote will have an impact on the results of the election are infinitely small. Researchers have estimated that the probability that a single vote, even one in the areas that are considered battleground, will have a change effect on an election is one in ten million. Regardless of these minimal probabilities, people still decide to vote, most of them expecting to maximise their utility (Laver, 1997, p. 67). Collective action dilemmas develop when all the people in a certain group seek the achievement of some public good while at the same time preferring other members of the group to make an effort to produce it. This worsens when the groups become bigger, and when the effects of the contribution of each person decrease. Voting in a society that is large and democratic usually creates extreme collective action dilemmas and the paradox of voting questions why voting does not create more of a collective action issue. It is clear that in this case, the costs far outweigh the benefits and an individual has a minimal effect on the outcome of the election. However, in the event that no one votes, then there is a high likelihood of economic collapse (Basili, Franzini and Vercelli, 2006, p. 210). Luckily, numerous people usually expect too much from their own efficacy as far as democracy is concerned and studies have revealed that people who belong to economic firms usually overestimate the degree to which their personal dues and contributions would assist the organisation to attain their objectives. One probable evolutionary elucidation of why people usually overestimate their efficacy starts with the simple observation that many individuals have a poor understanding of large numbers (Reason, 1990, p. 91). Even though the contemporary world may oblige people to deal with large numbers daily, in the past people only had to deal with small numbers. Even presently, numerous languages have counting systems that are not large; therefore, even common and fundamental things to the modern society like voting may be dependent on the trouble people have with large numbers and the resultant tendency to overestimate the effect that votes have in the outcomes of elections (Hollingsworth, Muller and Hollingsworth, 2002). Another reason that people usually overestimate their individual efficacy originates from the evolutionary understanding associated with the manner in which people make personal mistakes. Natural selection could have designed the human mind with an ability to make the correct decisions always, and therefore precisely weigh the benefit against the costs of various options. The errors human beings make have corresponding ramifications, and when the cost of making a single error is bigger than the one associated with making another, there will be asymmetrical pressure in how this kind of choice will be made. A propensity to choose the errors that are associated with comparatively low costs, instead of those with higher costs, can be considered as an inherent aspect of human beings. Therefore, the decision to vote with the aim of maximizing utility may be based on choices that weigh the highest and lowest costs of the outcomes. Conclusion In the rational choice model, voters are seen as people who act in a rational manner while seeking to maximise their utility and have concerns about numerous issues in order to vote for the parties offering policies that can provide maximum utility. However, voting does not assure the voters that their decision to vote will provide them with maximisation of their utilities. Issues associated with voting are not the only ones that results in the utilities of voters not being maximised as interest groups, the politicians and bureaucracies also play a role (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2011, p. 321). The politicians wish to be elected and issues of lack of maximisation of utility can arise when the politicians decide to maximise their own personal utilities. This endeavour directly conflicts with acting in a manner that will be beneficial to the society as a whole. Additionally, even though some people do not have substantial involvement in political processes, others are involved greatly. These people also endeavour to maximise utility and have more riding on specific government actions; this motivates them to act accordingly, often through the formation of interest groups. Lastly, bureaucracy entails implementation of government policies by complicated organisations with the people behind the bureaucracy also seeking to maximise their utility. This effort towards utility maximisation by the bureaucrats usually creates conflicts as far as efficient allocation and implementation of policies by the government is concerned. 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