The Creation and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons as a Military Deterrence Strategy - Essay Example

? The Creation and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons as a Military Deterrence Strategy Michael Gibeaut SOC120 Rokesha (Kay) Green May 28, The Creation and Stockpiling of Nuclear Weapons as a Military Deterrent The issue of the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons has occupied the central position in the debate on international peace and security. As there has been increasing desire within the international community for nuclear disarmament, the argument has persisted whether the creation of such a weapon actually prevents conventional war. Paul, et al (2009) explains that most countries, including the UN Security Councils five permanent members have repeatedly committed themselves in law and word to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in good faith in a bid to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This course of action has been with the belief that international peace and security in the long run would be promoted in the absence of nuclear weapons (Geller, 1990). However, there has been a view that nuclear weapons are useful and indispensable in promoting international peace and security; those who feel protected by the said weapons or possess them argue that they are not meant to be used but rather employed solely as a military deterrent to adversaries thereby preventing war (Berry et al, 2010). The advocates of creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as a military deterrent argue that it helped to end the World War II in 1945, maintained peace during the Cold War, and extended deterrence to military allies of those who possess nuclear weapons. It is on the basis of these two arguments on whether nuclear weapons should be created and stockpiled as military deterrent or should be eliminated that it is critical to examine the ethical issue and problems that the issue presents. Berry et al (2010) observed that there has been a great deal of claims for nuclear deterrence. Most International Relations experts, as well as most leaders of nuclear powers claim that the nuclear deterrence include: stabilizing crises, protect friends of states that possess nuclear weapons, acts as the ultimate national survival insurance, allows states to affect political events from afar, offsets imbalances caused by conventional force, deters attacks, and keeps the world safe. The proponents of nuclear weapons assert that their claims for nuclear deterrence are informed by two different levels of legitimization of the same. The first level is the maximalists’ level of legitimization where nuclear weapons are seen as an infallible shield which is firmly defensive. The second level is that which nuclear weapons are viewed as helpful in anticipation of surprises and is claimed to act as an “insurance” against the unforeseeable (Paul et al, 2009). These proponents also recognize and understand that nuclear deterrence has some limits of validity. They recognize that to a greater extent nuclear weapons deter aggression at lower levels and that at a decidedly higher level of aggression, nuclear may be used. Besides, they recognize that the success of nuclear deterrence requires a care probabilistic analysis because certainty of such success is not tenable (Berry et al, 2010). The nuclear weapons proponents support their assertion of nuclear deterrence by citing the “sixty-five years of safety”. They argue that nuclear weapons have helped to maintain peace in the world since 1945 (Geller, 1990). The efficacy of deterrence is particularly evident in the events of the Cold War where despite numerous confrontations no nuclear war was fought. However, the opponents of nuclear weapons argue that there is no clear evidence that nuclear weapons helped to keep the peace during the Cold War. Actually, there are many cases where nuclear conflicts were avoided by mere luck. It has been argued that no nuclear weapon state has faced a war in which its critical interests are at stake (Paul et al, 2009). So, what ethical issue and ethical problems does this issue present? The ethical issue presented in this situation is one of integrity (Granoff, 1999); if a nation forsakes their nuclear capabilities are they compromising their security? If states are willing to abandon their nuclear enrichment ambitions and eliminate nuclear weapons are they endangering their very existence? This is the greatest ethical issue surrounding nuclear weapons because while they are committed in treaties and in speech to eliminate the horrors of nuclear weapons; yet they seem not to be practically committed as most of them are seeking to strengthen their nuclear capabilities. It is agreeable that the threat of war and terrorism is real and is one of the most critical global issues. Due to this fact, international actors and national governments are always looking for ways of addressing these threats. However, in the process of doing so they are faced with the question of integrity especially the need to preserve global integrity rather than losing it (Burkhardt et al, 2006). Inarguably, nuclear war can be very catastrophic to humankind as it will not only ruin the life-supporting ecosystem, but also create social chaos. Presently, the risk of such an event is unacceptable because of the existence of numerous nuclear weapons that are on trigger alert. It is argued that there is increasing possibility of the loss of global and societal integrity on matters relating to nuclear weapons as military deterrence. The threat is further aggravated by some nation’s clandestine or stated policy regarding their first use of nuclear weapons in an event of a conflict situation. Burkhardt et al (2006) argues that proliferation of nuclear weapons gives malicious states the power to stir up the social structure at the international level. The consensus among nations is that the consequences of the employment of nuclear weapons are serious. It is against this background that the creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as a military deterrence strategy raises the question of integrity. It presents the ethical problem relating to integrity; it is becoming apparent that the United Nations in its current form is not having adequate support of establishing a global rule of law. Therefore, it can find it difficult to prevent war among nations, and particularly the nuclear war (Burkhardt et al, 2006). The integrity problem is evident by the fact that while nations are committed in treaties and in speech to eliminate the horrors of nuclear weapons; they seem not to be practically committed as most of them are seeking to strengthen their nuclear capabilities. The problem of integrity is further compounded by the threat that creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons present to the international peace in the background of widened gap between the rich and the poor nations. While powerful nations are able to create and stockpile nuclear weapons as a military deterrence strategy, power nations lack economic and military power to do so and therefore become increasingly vulnerable and weak players in this kind of strategy (Burkhardt et al, 2006). This problem can be termed as other ethical problem of equality in regard to nuclear weapons; only the economically and military powerful states possess nuclear weapons (Paul et al, 2009). Therefore, the less powerful ones may not be able to have the advantage of nuclear weapons as a military deterrent thus rendering them vulnerable. Granoff (1999) notes the second issue is that of legitimacy; it is yet to be established whether the claims for nuclear weapons as military deterrent are genuinely legitimate. This issue puts into perspective the question of whether nuclear weapons should be eliminated or should be considered as military deterrent and be left to thrive. There is no consensus that nuclear weapons can serve rational ends; and as such it cannot be argued that it can serve as a policy instruments. The question that has always been lingering when the issue of nuclear weapons as military deterrence strategy is discussed is: “do nuclear weapons serve any legitimate purpose?” This question has been getting two fold responses: the primary purpose of establishment of military is to win wars; and its other primary purpose is to avert wars (Burkhardt et al, 2006). Both responses seek to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons. However, since there is a consensus that nuclear war is not desirable in the world and may have catastrophic consequences, the common ground has been the use of nuclear weapons should be prevented. This can only be achieved in two ways; eliminating them completely or being used as a military deterrence, that is, should serve the purpose of preventing their use. As has been noted, deterrence is the attempt to create risks which will make the opponent not to engage in a certain action or policy. Therefore, for deterrence to be effective the risks must actually and perceived to be higher than any likely. This is the argument that has been used to give legitimacy to stockpiling of nuclear weapons as a military deterrence strategy (Green, 2010). Utilitarianism theory can help resolve the ethical problems presented by nuclear weapons. The theory states that any entity, and in this case the world should pursue a course of action that maximizes the overall wellbeing of the world. Nations should weigh between the consequences of having nuclear weapons as military deterrent and not having them at all. This theory holds that any kind of action always have consequences (Cohen and Lee, 1986). The utilitarians thus believe that any action that has overall best and desirable consequences is morally correct and vice-versa. In regard to creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as a military deterrence strategy, utilitarianism theory demands that the costs and benefits of the same be debated and measured so that a appropriate determination can be made regarding whether this strategy should be pursued, or if the world should abandon this strategy and pursue alternative strategies (Burkhardt et al, 2006). Bernstein (2008) argues that the costs of nuclear deterrence seem to be much higher than its benefits. The critics of nuclear deterrence are of the view that there are huge entries on the debit side that make this strategy untenable. Nuclear deterrence is expensive as it demands that a considerable percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) be used in maintaining nuclear threat that is credible. Utilitarians find this inappropriate because these huge resources could be used for other highly prioritized aspects such as education and healthcare among other social services (Cohen and Lee, 1986). They do not see any sense in using significant quantity of resources in something that is never to be used. The utilitarianism theory can help in resolving the ethical issues of integrity and legitimacy as it will help provide response to the question of commitment to nuclear deterrence, and whether such a commitment is legitimate or not (Bernstein, 2008). In terms of financial costs, the theory will help nations to realize that nuclear deterrence puts heavy emphasis on future and probabilistic state of affairs, instead of placing emphasis on considerations that can make real differences in quality of lives of the people (Burkhardt et al, 2006). In addition, utilitarianism will resolve the ethical problems of integrity and legitimacy by providing basis for analysis of psychological costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence. Cohen and Lee (1986) observe that the utilitarians are of the opinion that when people are living inn the world where the national defenses stance is predicted on “balance of terror” strategies, the citizens may suffer psychologically either constantly or at given intervals. Whereas there is no reliable measure to ascertain this claim, utilitarians argue that people who lived in the wake of Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombings, and generally around 1950s and 1960s can attest to this (Burkhardt et al, 2006). Apart from the financial and psychological costs of nuclear deterrence strategy, the utilitarians assert that the most costly part of this strategy is the worst imaginable state of affairs that may occur as a result of nuclear war. Based on this theory, there is no sense in putting the world at the increased risk of “lose-lose” likelihood, in the name of nuclear deterrence (Bernstein, 2008). Looking at the issue of creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as the military deterrence strategy through the eyes of utilitarianism theory creates a consensus that the dynamics of nuclear deterrence create a riskier and very dangerous world. Therefore, it is important that the increasing dangers of this strategy should be taken into account (Bernstein, 2008). The theory, however, has not lost sight of the fact that this strategy has worked quite effectively in the couple of years; humanity has been in possession of nuclear capabilities for nearly sixty years without actually using it (Green, 2010).. Despite clear military and political hostility that existed among nations with nuclear weapons, there was no direct military conflict or even conventional war. Various reasons have been cited for this scenario, key among them being the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. The proponents of this strategy point out that such a scenario which spanned for a considerably long period of time could have been unlikely in its absence as evidenced by sporadic international conflicts before 1945 (Bernstein, 2008). A utilitarian assessment of nuclear deterrence shows that both the opponents and proponents of nuclear deterrence can point to relevant consequences that vary wildly; that notwithstanding, it is clear that the consequences are tilted against nuclear deterrence and it can therefore be said that it is not a legitimate strategy and should not be maintained. However, this perspective is contrasted by the theory of relativism; there is no absolute validity on the perspectives of nuclear weapons. The perceptions and considerations on nuclear weapons are subjective or relative and therefore, absolute position on the subject may not be easily attainable (Berry et al, 2010). There is a consensus among sociologists and scholars of politics that discussion of international affairs ethics cannot get very far without actually confronting the basic and fundamental ethical issues. It is argued that since an international ethics issue such as nuclear weapons is not an autonomous subject and there always exist alternative moral judgment standards (Green, 2010). Therefore, it cannot be said that there is one standard of right or wrong. Since there is more than one standard of moral judgment, there are implications for ethics on international matters such as the nuclear weapons. Existence of more than one standard of moral judgment makes it hard to justify whether creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as military deterrence strategy is legitimate or not (Berry et al, 2010). While it may seem acceptable and legitimate by one divide of the debate, it may seem totally unacceptable and illegitimate by another. Another issue that relativism brings up in regard to this debate on nuclear deterrence is the question of whether there is a common international morality that can be used in considering the moral and physical implications of nuclear deterrence (Bernstein, 2008). If different nations are observing different standards, then it becomes very difficult to figure out by what standards are relations between them to be judged or guided. The theory of relativism holds that there is no absolute validity on the perspectives of nuclear weapons. As such, it cannot be said with certainty that creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as military deterrence strategy is not legitimate, or whether it is legitimate. It is no doubt that there are good reasons for recognizing the likelihood of alternative for standard of conduct and equal rationality on the subject; this is the essence of relativism, and therefore attempting to avoid relativism of these issues may prove futile (Nardin, 1999). Since this is an undisputable reality, the kind of relativism that focuses on the alternatives and possibilities relating to nuclear deterrence is not only morally but also intellectually tolerable. The efforts by different nations, policy makers and other international actors to create a single moral system on the subject of nuclear deterrence has failed and have only served to open door to relativism (Green, 2010). This has happened even though most ethical theories relating to nuclear deterrence such as utilitarianism and deontology are sternly anti-relativist. In this light it is not enough to rely entirely on ethical theories when focusing on this subject for burden of proof on whether nuclear deterrence is legitimate or not. Nardin (1999) argues that in the face continuing disagreement, it is only reasonable to rely on rationalist to provide the burden of proof on the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. The positions taken by political relativists on the subject of nuclear deterrence notwithstanding, they accept that nuclear deterrence has both the benefits and problems. Unlike those who hold upon ethical theories regarding the matter, political relativists are concerned with the political character of nation states that are acquiring arms rather than the technical properties, type, or number of the weapons systems (Berry et al, 2010). What has been evident is that the relativists in this debate do not, for example, defend the decision by Pakistan, India, or Israel to acquire nuclear weapons because they have a relatively desirable perspective on the political character of these states. On the other hand, political relativists consider Iran, North Korea, and Iraq as rogue states whose political character are questionable and are therefore advocating for coercive diplomacy against them so as to prevent their programs on nuclear weapons (Bernstein, 2008). Political relativists believe that there are nuclear weapons programs that work for stability and peace on the international and regional fronts, and as such they are not concerned with them (Nardin, 1999). Similarly, they are not bothered with states that run nuclear weapons programs and are democratic. Apart from these perspectives, political relativists favor nuclear deterrence for the same regions as this act as nuclear deterrence strategy. As it can be noted, relativism is bringing into perspective the fact that there is no absolute validity on the perspectives of nuclear weapons. Bernstein (2008) argues that the history of nuclear weapons, however, seem to be supporting the notion held by the optimists that nuclear weapons are effective deterrence strategy and that they make wars unlikely. The pessimists on the other hand fear that creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons will eventually culminate into nuclear war which will be devastating and catastrophic to human kind (Berry et al, 2010). The fears by the pessimists are informed by a number of concerns such as conventional conflicts can escalate to nuclear war (Lavoy, 1995). Whereas the optimists believe that some of the concerns brought about by nuclear weapons pessimists have merit, they argue that such concerns are still very debatable. The optimists are of the view that these concerns cannot be used to predict the consequences of nuclear deterrence strategy. The optimists further argue that nuclear arms race within the minimum requirements of nuclear deterrence would not considerably undermine international and/or regional security. The pessimists have raised the concern that nations could produce massive nuclear weapons (Lavoy, 1995). This concern has been dismissed by the optimists who have argued that since nuclear weapons have destructive effects, a limited number is sufficient to deter. Actually, new nuclear states would be trying to obtain minimum deterrence capabilities because of the realization that many weapons are not only uneconomical, but also unnecessary. It is also argued that there has been a realization that nuclear weapons acts as instrument of political and military leverage, as well as instrument of coercion and therefore need not to be seen as a threat to international and/or regional peace and security (Green, 2010). Since relativism is relativism is bringing into perspective the fact that there is no absolute validity on the perspectives of nuclear weapons, it is calling for rationalists to provide burden of proof on ethical issues regarding the subject: integrity and legitimacy (Nardin, 1999). Within the peace and war realms, security threats are very central and cannot be ruled out. Within this context, therefore, peace can be defined as an international state devoid of war, but not with total absence of security threats. Whereas instability may be introduced by new nuclear proliferation in a given region, the region can still remain in peace without war. It is agreeable that nuclear weapons can increase minor concern regarding preemptive and preventive war, would-be nuclear target in an event of war, and nuclear accidents (Green, 2010). On the other hand, it is agreeable that nuclear weapons can decrease major concerns relating to major military conflicts that can pose a considerable national and regional security threat. It is on this platform of argument that relativism is founded upon, and therefore calling for evaluation of strategic consequences of nuclear weapons on the national, regional, international peace and security based on diverse criteria rather than limited and strict criteria. Relativism advocates that evaluation of such consequences should not focus on objective analysis that seek to evaluate how presence or absence of nuclear weapons can create a more secure, peaceful, and stable world (Nardin, 1999). My own view is that creation and stockpiling is not a legitimate military deterrent and that it should not be maintained. To ensure that the overall wellbeing of the whole world is maximized as utilitarianism theory demands, states with nuclear weapons should not be allowed to engage in further nuclear enrichment programs, while states with no nuclear weapons should not be allowed to develop them (Paul et al, 2009). My view is informed by how I have looked at the subject at hand. While I must admit that I concur with relativism that there is no absolute validity of the perspectives of nuclear weapons, I still believe that the dynamics of nuclear deterrence create a riskier and more dangerous world. My view is further bolstered by the concerns that have been raised by the pessimists regarding the creation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as military deterrence strategy (Lavoy, 1995). This strategy is not legitimate in the sense that it will encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons across the world thereby further threatening international and regional security. Similarly, nuclear proliferation increases the risks of catastrophic nuclear war. In addition, I consider this strategy as illegitimate because of the concern that conventional conflict may eventually culminate to nuclear war whose effects may be devastating. Besides, there is a concern that nuclear weapons may be used for aggression and coercion especially by the rogue states (Paul et al, 2009). The recent event of North Korea threats to the South Korea with its nuclear weapons provides a good example of the possibility of this concern materializing (Kreisberg, 2010). Moreover, primitive command and control, as well as natural events such as earthquakes increase the risks of nuclear accidents which may have catastrophic effects on the population of the world. The Chernobyl accident and the recent Japan accident are examples of how nuclear accidents can cause devastating impact on people’s lives at various parts of the world. Another concern that makes nuclear deterrence strategy illegitimate is that nuclear arms racing is inevitable and undoubtedly increases the risk of war (Lavoy, 1995). Paul et al (2009) observe that more worrying is the concern that nuclear proliferation raises the possibility of the conventional military conflicts because involved nation states would “feel” equal to task and that they have all it takes to engage in war with increased chances of winning such a conflict. Also, there is a concern that new nuclear states may limit the military and political influence of major powers (Lavoy, 1995). While the major powers have made faulty and inappropriate decisions in some cases, they have been central in promoting and maintaining international and regional peace and security, either directly or indirectly. When the costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence strategy are debated and measured, it is clear that the former outweighs the later thereby giving credence to the view that creation and stockpiling is not a legitimate military deterrent and that it should not be maintained. References Bernstein, J. (2008). Nuclear weapons: What you need to know. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berry, K et al. (2010). Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Burkhardt, H et al. (2006). Handbook on Global Issues and Viable Solutions: Presentation at the World Peace Forum, Vancouver, June 23-28, 2006. Retrieved from http://c-g-i.info/handbook.html Cohen, A., & Lee, S. (1986). 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