Is Deterrence Still a Useful Concept in the Post-Cold War World - Research Paper Example

Is deterrence still a useful concept in the post-cold war world? Historically, literature pertaining to the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear policy in international relations has been overwhelmingly shaped by the presumption of deterrence and mutual assurance. However, the analysis in this paper demonstrates that whilst the “First Nuclear Age” of the pre-Cold War era clearly supports a link between deterrence and nuclear weapons; the post cold war gradual proliferation of nuclear programmes in states such as Israel, India and Pakistan clearly point to a shifting justificatory rationale for nuclear weapons. It is submitted in this paper that the deterrence theory is no longer appropriate as a comprehensive theory for explaining the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. As such it is propounded that further research is needed to examine the interrelationship between motivational factors and the changing of international norms to truly evaluate the stabilising or potentially destabilising impact of nuclear weapons in international relations. 1. INTRODUCTION In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, international policymakers became increasingly preoccupied with the potential ramifications of nuclear warfare in creating an imbalance within the world political order. After the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin asserted that “A single demand for you comrades… Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us1”. From a historical perspective, the Cold War phase following the Second World War led to what has been termed the “First Nuclear Age”2. This phase highlights how nuclear weapons’ programmes were rooted in the need of both superpowers to assert power in the arms race3. Moreover, Walton & Gray submit that the demise of this superpower rivalry has re-ignited the nuclear proliferation question in arms control measures within the world political framework4. This in itself highlights that the stability of international relations and the political balance at international level is inherently dependent on the axis of nuclear control. Therefore, whilst the deterrence theory undoubtedly plays a central role in the relationship between nuclear war programmes and international relations, the inherent weakness of the theory is the failure to account for the changing global political climate, whereby nuclear strategy and proliferation is shaped by a correlation of complex, multifarious objectives. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the “First Nuclear Age”5 and as such, Howard posits that the termination of US/Soviet polarity marked the end of the most peaceful period in contemporary European History6, which in particular brought new security issues pertaining to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations to the fore7. Whilst during the Cold War Era, nuclear weapons were not utilised, their existence was arguably effective as a deterrent8. In stark contrast, the current “Second Nuclear Age” has clearly shifted the dynamic and the role of nuclear weapons in international relations remains the subject of much debate with no international consensus as to whether they are stabilising or destabilising. Moreover, this is compounded by the critics of the deterrence theory, which is undermined as being an inappropriate justification for nuclear weapons in contemporary world politics. These complex issues on international stage have fuelled polarised academic debate and it is submitted that it is important to consider the national policy rationale for going nuclear. 2. RATIONALE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT The reasons for embarking on nuclear programmes are multifarious and complex and Sagan highlights the obvious point of states intending to counter balance the perceived military power of other states9. This is particularly evident with the weaker international states in alleviating political power imbalances as nuclear development programmes are often cheaper than conventional forces whilst simultaneously providing instant security10. A prime example of this is China and Iran, whose nuclear ambitions are arguably directly correlated to the mistrust of the West and the United States’ disproportionate policies in the Middle East11. Directly correlated to this is the proposition of human’s innate need for power and influence in the international arena12. However, if we consider the wider ramifications, the capacity of “inferior” states to develop nuclear programmes under the domino effect arguably escalates horizontal and vertical proliferation, and by extension can stimulate the domino effect, whereby states solely develop nuclear capability because of their neighbour’s nuclear capabilities13. On the other hand, some commentators have propounded that in this way the domino effect is a stabilising factor in ensuring deterrence14. This further highlights the fine line between the potentially stabilising and destabilising impact of nuclear weapons in international relations, which is further underpinned by heavy reliance on the deterrence theory. Another reason posited for explaining nuclear weapons’ development is simply that of international prestige15. Moreover, Waltz comments that the development of a sophisticated nuclear weapons’ programme is perceived as the optimum tool to display wealth in the international arena16. This therefore raises an important issue outside the traditional deterrence paradigm justification that nuclear weapons are viewed as an effective tool of power in international relations. Therefore, it is submitted that the extent to which nuclear weapons are stabilising or destabilising forces within international relations will ultimately depend on the world political framework. Whilst the deterrence theory was clearly a relevant explanation in the first nuclear phase, the motivation for nuclear programmes in the second nuclear phase has adopted a different dynamic. Moreover, it is submitted that end of the Cold war arguably implemented a new world order and the creation of a multi-tiered system in contrast to the US/Soviet bipolar system17. Waltz further argues that by the 1990 bipolarity was coming to an end and predicted the emergency of a multi-polar system in line with Hobbes view of foreign policy that the international system is technically anarchical because there is no enforcement authority, which creates a complex myriad of multi-polar institutions and interstate relations18. Additionally, in the first nuclear phase, Western Europe was given protection by the US, which became the subject of scrutiny as the Soviet Union built up nuclear capabilities to counter the growing power of the US. In response and in line with the domino effect theory, France and Britain began developing their own nuclear programme to enable counter action if necessary and as a deterrent against Soviet attack19. Similarly, in Asia, the aftermath of the Korean War left China fearing a US attack and by 1964, China had a fully developed nuclear warhead system in place for self preservation purposes. However, whilst these five traditionally nuclear states may have been a direct result of the aftershock of the Second World War and rooted in deterrence, the dynamic has clearly shifted post cold war. Indeed, the second nuclear period has resulted in countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel developing nuclear programmes, where the state motives clearly appear to go beyond mere deterrence. 3. DETERRENCE THEORY: CRITICAL ANALYSIS Proponents of nuclear weapons as a stabilising factor in international relations point to deterrence as main justification argument20. Towle highlights the point that whilst during the Cold War the development of nuclear weapons paradoxically existed only to prevent their actual use21. Many theorists posit that the deterrence is still relevant in the contemporary international relations context, citing the Cold Ward First Nuclear Age era as an example of lessons to be learned in the current Second Nuclear Age. Interestingly, Kenneth Waltz argues that the more states have nuclear weapons, the more the less likely they are to be used: “Nuclear weapons restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are replaced by multi-polar ones”22. Waltz’s rationale is rooted in the concept that costs of war between two nuclear states clearly outweigh the actual benefits, making any nuclear victory ultimately pyrrhic23. Therefore, deterrence theory extrapolates that nuclear weapons primarily play a stabilising role in international relations, which is underpinned by the presumption that no state would actually initiate a war that would lead to obliteration. This is further referred to as the “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) deterrent theory24. Waltz further asserts that having nuclear weapons is therefore preferable to conventional military resources and that the nuclear threat is all that is needed to maintain their security, with the resultant effect of international balance25. Moreover, according to this theory, the threat of nuclear war reduces the actual occurrence of conventional conflict, which would clearly be more costly and destabilising to a successfully mutual international relations framework26. Waltz summarises six security focused motives as justification for the deterrence theory: 1) Intimidation of other great powers; 2) Fear that a great power ally will not retaliate if another great power attacks; 3) Country without nuclear allies wants nuclear weapons more if adversaries have them; 4) Fear of adversaries’ strength; 5) Cheap alternative to other economical and ruinous weapons; and 6) Offensive purposes However, a common flaw in the six tiered security centred approach is that whilst nuclear states may well fall into the above six categories, most non-nuclear states also fit into one of these categories and therefore most of threats identified in the first five motives apply to other security environments where nuclear programmes are not developed27. Nevertheless, Waltz rejects the notion of the pride policy and emotions as a motivational factor: “the nuclear military business is a serious one, and we may expect that deeper motives than desire for prestige lie behind the decision to enter it28.” However, arguably the rejection of this notion explains the flaw in the contemporary relevance of the deterrence theory. Indeed Crawford argues that the “main raison d’être of neo-realist theory is based on its claim to reflect the world as it is, not as it should be. By dismissing a wider range of motives underlying cognitive processes as inappropriate for guiding important decisions (like the acquisition of nuclear weapons), Waltz describes how arming decisions should be made rather than how they are made in actuality”29. Indeed, the inherent difficulty in considering existing norms and emotions in nuclear policy and international relations is the subjective nature as they exist beyond material or legal dimensions and lack of empirical evidence. Some realists have tried to reconcile this by arguing that the emotional norms are part of a state’s struggle for power gains30. Conversely, Mearsheimer further lends support to the deterrence theory utilising NATO’S nuclear policies as support for the argument. The overall objectives of NATO require member states to share risk and responsibilities of preserving international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. With regard to nuclear weapons, these comprise part of NATO’s defence plans and collective defence policy. According to the defence doctrine of NATO laid down in 1949 the defence policy ensures “the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb, this is primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations” (NATO Strategy Document 1949 -1969, M.C.3/2). Mearsheimer argues that with regard to the NATO nuclear deterrent “with the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons, there is good reason to be very confident about NATO’S deterrence posture”31. He further argues that it is vital in international arena to keep the military risk high in order to make deterrence more effective32. However, it is submitted that the inherent flaw in this argument is that the potentially cost of such measures may outweigh the deterrent effect. Conversely, critics of the deterrent theory highlight its inherent flaw as being outdated and the underlying assumptions being naïve and inapplicable to contemporary state leaders and international relations policy33. Deterrence theory is underpinned by the assumption that the opponent is rationale and mutually vulnerable and that the opponent is in fact a state34. Opponents of the deterrence theory also highlight the fact that as a theory, deterrence has not actually been practically tested and it cannot be unequivocally conclusive that the Soviet Union was actually deterred by the USA during the Cold War (Segal, 1988: 21). Moreover, even such restraint was attributable to deterrence during this period, the political and social context of the Cold War era was is considerably different from the contemporary climate, particularly with the proliferation of non-state terrorism, state terrorism and the rise of rogue states. As such, it is submitted that the intrinsic presumption of “rationality” as the core of the deterrence theory is no longer relevant or reliable and fails to account for the complex ideologies influencing state leaders whether rogue or others in the contemporary climate of international relations. Additionally, it is submitted that the underlying weakness of a Cold war influenced deterrence theory is the presumption of an international consensus and predisposition to generic hegemony with American ideals35. Additionally, it is submitted that in order for deterrence to work in any meaningful way, both states need to be mutually vulnerable, which is undermined by the proliferation of nuclear capabilities of powerful states such as Israel, further bolstered by unwavering US support. Indeed this undermining of the deterrence theory is further compounded by the proliferation of nuclear development in Iran and Iraq36. Therefore, it is submitted that whilst the original aim and purpose of nuclear development may have ostensibly been rooted in the notion of mutual deterrence, the second phase and proliferation of states and non-state terrorist sectors with nuclear weapons and the wider usage of such weapons indicates that they clearly have potential for being utilised as destabilising tool in international relations. Additionally, influence of political and economic factors are further evidenced by the demise of the Soviet Union. Initially, Manning refers to a societal move in the latter part of the twentieth century towards a nuclear taboo and that “under current arms-reductions accords, entire categories of weapons (intermediate-range missiles) have been eliminated, and after START II and III are implemented, U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals will have been reduced by nearly 90 per cent from their Cold War peaks”37. Moreover, the international treaty banning nuclear testing (CTBT) was hailed by Greenpeace hailed “opening up the way to a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons”38. However, it is evident that financial incentives clearly played a part and the efficacy of any treaty or enforcement measure restricting nuclear weapons use is inherently dependent on compliance. Moreover, these states were given protection assurances from major western powers, which highlight the fragility of the deterrence theory (Manning, 1997). For example, regime changes in Brazil and Argentina resulted in democratisation replacing unaccountable military regimes, which had been actively pursuing nuclear programmes. However, the policies of successive governments will often change and there is no guarantee that this will not change in the future39. Indeed in the late 1990s, the fractures in the “nuclear taboo” were beginning to manifest40. This is further evidenced by Russia’s continuing slow progress in implementing plutonium and uranium disposition programmes and the nuclear testing of India and Pakistan41. Walker further posits that in this period, increased utility was attached to nuclear weapons in nuclear states and whilst they didn’t have the same roles as in the Cold war, they in fact gained fresh importance in political and military contexts42. The result of this shift culminated in the result that arms control measures involving restraints on nuclear programmes became transitory. Additionally, Walker submits that the nuclear arms control objectives and processes became tangled and confused, partly out of deliberate intent and partly due to increased state autonomy43. Indeed, the significance of this shift in context of contemporary world politics is demonstrated by the political standoff between Pakistan and India44. For example, India’s emphatic refusal to endorse the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and the subsequent testing of nuclear capabilities highlighted concern and destabilising factors pertaining to nuclear testing in international relations: “there was a palpable sense of violation, of hard-won and cherished norms being trampled by an exultant India, and of neighbours being threatened with intimidation” (Walker, 1998:1). These concerns were compounded by Pakistan’s decision to respond with their own tests in 199845. This diminished the notion that the post Cold War Second Nuclear Age had marked an eradication of nuclear issues from the international political agenda. Indeed Walker’s question highlights the importance of the nuclear issue in international relations thus: “what kind of India, and what kind of Asia, is emerging in these late years of the century? Are we threatened by a renewed militarisation and nucelarisation of interstate relations?”46. This further undermines the contemporary relevance of the deterrence theory particularly in light of the then Indian Prime Minister’s response to what lessons had been learned from the 1996 testing “Never fight the US without nuclear weapons47.” This further highlights the complexity of international relations as the international political climate is controlled by state alliances, support treaties and bilateral agreements48. Sagan further argues that the three main reasons for nuclear weapons include reasons of security, domestic politics or because of the creation of “norms” throughout international society. The security point refers to the need for a country to be able to compete on an even scale with its adversaries49. Sagan highlights the paradoxical domino effect “every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons programme to maintain its national security”50. With regard to international norms, Sagan extrapolates this as the process by which international beliefs become legitimised and appropriated internationally. This concept of norms, whilst important in evaluating the resultant impact of nuclear policy in international relations; further links to the concept of psychology of such norms. For example, in the First Nuclear Age, nuclear development was perceived as socially and internationally more acceptable as: “nuclear weapons programmes serve symbolic functions reflecting leaders’ perceptions of appropriate and modern behaviour”51. Therefore the fact that UN Security Council’s “Big Five” had nuclear programmes lends support to a convention of international norms52. Indeed, much of the controversy and issues surrounding nuclear weapons has been borne from international issues; namely Russia and the US (Walker, 1998). In the last decade of the twentieth century, Walker argues that Russia has felt increasingly weaker and isolated as an economic and military superpower, which has fuelled nuclear development as “an unassailable emblem of Russian power”53. Additionally, the growth of rogue states and Russia’s poor relationship with the US led to US fears regarding the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands and thereby being used as a destabilising force in international relations. As such, this has shaped US’ foreign policy, with Israel using nuclear weapons as a bargaining tool “its alarm was infectious in the United States, and indeed may deliberately have been relayed to Washington in an attempt to bind America into the protection of the Israeli government’s political and security agendas”54. Moreover, the increased terrorism of non-state sectors and destabilising risk played by nuclear weapons in international politics means that smaller nations play a larger part in contemporary world politics in what Manning describes as the “ultimate insurance policy”55. Moreover, Manning asserts that “whether as a hedge against uncertainty in the case of China and Russia, as a means of security assurances for allies, or as a means of reversing proliferation, nuclear weapons remain part of the global and regional security equation”56clearly outside any overriding notion of “deterrence”. This further lends support to the proposition in this paper that there is a difficult and thin line between stability and destabilisation in the consideration of nuclear weapon’s role in international relations. Ultimately the resultant impact of a nuclear weapons programme is inherently dependent on the political and social climate at any time. 4. CONCLUSION This analysis demonstrates that there is no contention with regard to the potential destabilising nature of nuclear weapons in international relations per se. However, it is interesting that nuclear weapons strategy is centred on the prevention of their use and the inconsistency of current theory in this area is rooted in the direct failure to properly address the issue of causality triggers behind nuclear policy. Whilst the deterrence theory undoubtedly plays a central role in the relationship between nuclear war programmes and international relations, the inherent weakness of the theory is the failure to account for the changing global political climate, whereby nuclear strategy and proliferation is shaped by a correlation of complex, multifarious objectives. It is further submitted that stability of international relations and the political balance at international level is inherently dependent on the axis of nuclear control. Moreover, the deterrence theory was appropriate to explain the “stabilising” effect of nuclear policy in the First Nuclear Age, which is in stark contrast to the current political climate. As such, the resultant impact of a nuclear weapons programme is inherently dependent on the political and social climate at any time. In any event, the risk of destabilisation remains potent as long as nuclear weapons exist as a potential tool in the battle for international clout, which is further perpetuated by the lack of effective enforcement under international law. Moreover, the deterrence presumption has clearly been subverted by India and Iran with the anti-colonial undertones motivating nuclear strategy. However, paradoxically, the bolstering of anti-proliferation legislation and the inception of the CBT in 1996 only served to fuel India’s fear and sense of urgency in commencing the testing process regardless of the weak infrastructure57. Not only does this again highlight the weakness of the deterrence theory in contemporary politics, it further highlights the failure of official measures to consider causality in foreign policy motivation, which in turn renders the nuclear weapon a potent tool for destabilising international relations. In order to redress this risk and achieve the overall purpose of the idealistic deterrence theory, it is submitted that in addition to considerations of causality, institutional frameworks assuming responsibility for international nuclear enforcement should consider actively working towards a compromise co-operative model with these “rogue” nuclear states. BIBLIOGRAPHY Barnaby, F. (2003) How to Build a Nuclear Bomb. Granta Books: London, Bidwai, P. & Vanaik, A. (2000) New Nukes: India, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Disarmament. Interlink Publishing Group. A, Cassese., (2005) International Law. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press Crawford, Neta, C (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and Emotional Relationships. International Security, 24(4): 116-156. Epstein, W. (1977). Why States Go – And Don’t Go – Nuclear. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 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