The concept of Deterrence - Essay Example

Deterrence Introduction It is clear that deterrence can be an effective way to counter non actors. In this essay wefocus on this issue and elaborate on the possibility of deterrence as a tool against non-state actors. The concept of Deterrence There are a number of standard definitions on deterrence. For example in Almog’s article he captures three definitions for deterrence but a more credible one is according to Harkabi, “threat of heavy punishment for an act by the enemy in order to persuade him to desist from that act” (Almog 7). When looked at, all these definitions share the same view, that is, for there to be successful deterrence aggression should be avoided. Using a best example on deterrence is the case of US. There are a large variety of players that could inflict mass casualties upon the US, its allies, or its interests. After September 11, 2001 new players were added on the deterrence debate, terrorists/non state actors. On February 8, 2011 the US released a military strategy that would deter aggression and counteract violent extremism (Mullen, p.4). There is also need for focus on extended deterrence; being concerned and offer assistance against deterrence. Deterrence against non-state actors There are a number of hindrances to deterrence, for example, the level of literacy to the group being deterred can cause a major challenge. Another challenge as Bunn put it that, deterrence to a certain extent towards the non-state actors/terrorists could be seen as an oxymoron, because of their suicidal nature (Bunn, p.4). Looking back at the situation during the cold war deterrence was not a very useful strategy. Evidenced by Almog in his article, US and Soviet Union both used deterrence against each other but failed to prevent the Korean War and Vietnam War (5). He further goes ahead and explains that deterrence can work against non-state actors. For example he gives the situation in Israel where deterrence has worked for over 50yrs and still practiced successfully (6). Almog suggest that for the war on deterrence to be effective it requires: inducements that turn emerging terrorists away from their vicious impulses (6). It is possible to deter rogue states and groups since their leadership is dedicated to staying in power. Group assessment on specific actors has to be carried in order to provide information and analysis to be used in tailoring deterrence on each actor. To deter the enemy must perceive the ally as having the capability and will to carry out the threatened actions (Bunn 5). This is why the US is putting place strategies to strengthen its credibility across the spectrum and a series of deterrence options to act against its adversaries. Conclusion Looking at the article in this essay it is evident that as much as terrorist group may have beliefs that encourage suicide and martyrdom, it is still possible to investigate and target what such groups value most and tailor make an effective deterrence strategy, just as Bunn put it (1). Therefore we can conclude that deterrence can be used against non-state actors as a military strategy although it faces some limitations. War termination Introduction Davis Hanson exposes the modern wars “messy, confused, and non-traditional, but from his point of view, “victory” is a timeless military reality of making an enemy concede through force and diplomacy to your political objectives.”  (National Review Online, 22 September 2010). This statement indeed applies to the modern strategic environment. Why the concept of victory is less relevant in today’s strategic environment The earlier concept of ‘victory’ as historian Davis Hanson put it that “…is a timeless military reality of making enemies concede through force and diplomacy to your political objectives.”  (National Review Online, 22 September 2010). For example ever since World War I, the disintegration of empires has produced over one hundred new states in the international system, and with this has come more turmoil. Additionally, at the end of the Cold War and the end of a bipolar international system, today’s strategic security environment has become more volatile, uncertain, changing and characterized by more asymmetrical threats because of the emergence of nontraditional actors vying for power in achieving their interests. What am I driving at? Within this security environment, more conflicts are expected in the future. The expectation of more conflicts, paired with the United States possessing the relative power to influence outcomes of conflicts and wars in the international system, makes war termination a national interest to the United States. The American leadership must have war termination policy which considers international relations concepts in order to gauge its capabilities towards an appropriate and proportionate response to achieve successful war termination results conducive to balance in the international world order and a lasting peace. Seeing war as a “continuation of policy by other means” as Clausewitz stated indicates that the definition of war termination is not synonymous with the end of physical military operations (Legier-topp 2009). One of the fundamental problems in war termination is that while the physical military operations may cease, the will of the opposing force to fight may still be present. This is often because the actual causes of what started the conflict are never resolved. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil. The approach that the United States takes to conduct war termination can help ensure the U.S. achieves defined political end states focused at resolving root conflicts to help defeated states redefine their roles and interest in ways other than war. Wars need to have clear political ends with complementary war termination strategies defined at the beginning of hostilities which can be refined over the continuum of war. War termination, from the victor’s point of view, has been defined as the last stage in a war once basic political objectives of the war are within reach.8 War termination can also be viewed as the transition from war to peace. In today’s environment, modern wars do not end as they used to in history with a specific winner and loser. How Insurgencies End, outlines that in the case of an insurgency the, the insurgency could be over for several years without either party knowing the winner or loser (Connable and Libicki, xiii). In recent times states at war prefer termination of the war rather than pursuing it to the end towards victory. For United States, the contemporary military doctrine describes “war termination” as the conclusion of “operations on terms favourable to the United States” (Spiller 6). This as opposed to the concept of force and military might, it shows that a war can end without the use of force but through diplomacy alone. In his article Spiller further states that in every war, the aims of all sides, no matter how opposed at the beginning, gradually converge toward an agreement to stop fighting (Spiller 8). Bartholomees et al (2008) describes winning and victory as two different concepts. He states that in war victory may or may not be associated with objective criteria such as territory taken and lost, or casualties. On the other hand in winning a war those things matter. Further in his findings he states that victory should be viewed in three aspects; operational, tactical and strategic. The tactical aspect is seen as straightforward and exclusively military. Operational is similarly transparent with campaigns failing or succeeding based on criteria used. While strategic victory is seen as a more complicated issue (Bartholomees 27). Why in today’s strategic environment it is not possible to win militarily without winning politically and vice versa. In the current environment, wars have to be won both militarily and politically but at varying degrees. Political-military strategy has used military force to accomplish political goals directly, rather than by depleting an enemy’s military force. Clausewitz in his theory advocated Counterinsurgency methods advocate for the war to be 20% militarily and 80% politically. This theory is still relevant in today’s strategic environment as wars cannot be fought only through military might, but a greater extent should be fought politically. War termination methods and strategies such as withdrawal do not incorporate force to attain political objectives. It is for this reason that attaining victory in the battlefield may not necessarily decide anything either politically in terms of the war or militarily from the campaign perspective. (Bartholomees 27) argues that in war one can win or fail to varying degrees. Convincing an adversary that he is beaten For one state to declare victory over the other, it is the task of the strategist to convince his adversary that he is beaten. This can be done by decapitation; targeting the leader and eliminating him. This method is best suited where there is hierarchy leadership but in situations of networks it is unlikely to succeed (Connable and Libicki 82). In ancient times victory was unambiguous, a complete triumph by force of arms to which one’s enemy could not reply. In recent times a strategist beats his adversary by making sure that he has achieved his objectives and the adversary cannot retaliate. War has to be fought militarily rather than just politically alone as it is a soldier’s preference to be stronger than their enemy. The enemy in this state can either surrender or defeated easily if he stands (Spiller 7). Conclusion There is no reliable information for war as warfare develops unexpectedly and unpredictably. Ending a war requires convincing an adversary that he has been beaten through military and political strategies. In today’s environment victory is perceived differently with more of diplomacy instead of force. Just as Even with military might, a tactical or operational victory without favourable political outcomes is sterile (Bartholomees 26). The war termination strategy should evolve from the political end state before the start of any hostilities. In the 1991 Gulf War, there was no termination strategy prior to the cease-fire, nor a clear end state for how the Vietnam War would end prior to the beginning of hostilities; neither war terminated with a lasting peace. Clear policy and political purpose is important in visualizing the entire spectrum of engagement which includes the “political, military, societal, aspects of the strategic environment. Only then can the United States deliberately apply and synchronize the national instruments of power before committing, as is traditionally done, the military instrument of power as the primary means in a war. The political leaders also must understand both foreign and domestic policy in order to implement the most effective ways towards a peaceful end state following the termination of wars. Counter insurgency theory Introduction Austin long in his journal identifies two basic COIN theories the first was the ‘Hearts and Minds’ or HAM theory (long 21). This theory was as a result of efforts to restore peoples hopes and get their support for the government, a move referred to as “winning the hearts and minds of people” (23). The second theory was the ‘Cost/Benefits theory’ or C/B, the theory was developed by Wolf a RAND Economist he believed that “….increasing the standard of living through development would reduce insurgency” (25). Elements of Hearts and Minds Approach that have been applied in Afghanistan Scholars observed that as a result of the negative economic development by the developing countries, put pressure on emerging governments. Many of which had just acquired independence, many of them could not keep up with the changes leading to instability and disorder. This instability made them vulnerable to communist influence (Long 22). This in turn ended up weakening the government as insurgents took advantage of the situation to capitalize on popular support (22). The key elements that Sir Gerald used to coin the name include: increasing political rights of the people, reducing abuse and corruption of government power, providing security to the people against insurgent forces and predations from government. Further this involved enhancing positive aspects while minimizing on the negative (23). This theory was applied in Afghanistan after president Obama took office where he started off by stressing partnership with Pakistan (West 89). The next step by the US in Afghanistan was the coalition strategy of COIN, “to secure and serve the population” according to the 2006 U.S. Army and Marine Corps manual (90). General Stanley further explains that COIN methods would best work on the war against Afghanistan as it would be easier to mobilize the “… local civilian population, seeking to secure the population from the enemy and to obtain popular support through effective governance…” (Fulk 1). Stanley was generally referring to the HAM theory. Petreaus promoted this theory in his speech when he emphasized that the soldiers should insist on building relationships with the citizens in Afghanistan (Petreaus 2). Elements of Cost-Benefit Theory applied in Afghanistan Wolf argued that for the lesser developed countries popular support was not a necessity instead insurgents required supply of inputs that were acquired at a reasonable cost in terms of coercion and money (Long 24). Wolf further reasoned that as opposed to HAM theory increasing standard of living for the people in a move to earn their trust was not the best idea. Insurgents could as well acquire resources from this citizen through persuasion and, or coercion in the end reducing their cost (25). The key element in this theory as identified by Wolf was that instead of just supporting rural improvement as a way of countering insurgency, there must be something in return for each benefit the citizens got. The population was to be given resources but in exchange they were to cooperate with government in reducing the accessibility of the resources to insurgents. In the US strategy for combating war they applied this theory in Afghanistan where they give out money and fund projects so that the tribes can align with the US and provide information the military called it ‘money for bullets’ to the US (West 91). Metz and Steven in their article stated that the United States should still emphasize on the information campaign in order to win the war in Afghanistan (Metz & Steven 28). Theory most favoured by US in dealing with Insurgencies As evidenced above, the US and Coalition have employed elements of both COIN theories in Afghanistan at different times in the conflict, however, more recent US actions have tended to favour Hearts and Minds. This is because in a military review of 2011 it stated that for the last ten years the US has been based on population protection and nation building. These are elements associated with the HAM theory, although it has failed but has been the main strategy by the US. Even President Obama has insisted that his strategy is “not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation-building” (West 92) West further states that persuading the population to turn against the Taliban was fruitless as most of them were related (91). Conclusion In my opinion I would agree with the military strategies on COIN. Even though recent evidence has shown that US application of COIN theory has not been very effective in the cases of Iraq and/or Afghanistan. According to West a full military pull-out would result to unbearable consequence. He states that “…A civil war likely to be won by the Taliban. This would invigorate Al-Qaeda, imperil a nuclear-armed Pakistan, and shake global confidence in America” (West 93).therefore my best bet would be to maintain COIN. Work Cited West, B. "The Way Out of Afghanistan." Military Review 91, no. 2 (March-April, 2011): 89- 95. Bunn, M. E. "Can Deterrence be Tailored?" Strategic Forum no. 225. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, January 2007. (8 pages) Bartholomees, B.J. "Theory of Victory."   Parameters. (Summer 2008): 25-36. (12pages) Legier-topp, L. “War termination: Setting conditions for peace”, (2009). ) Department of Army Civilian Read More