Efficacy of the Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence - Essay Example

? [EFFICACY OF THE STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE] Majorityof the world’s countries uses nuclear energy at present. In addition, most of these countries have nuclear weapons, or have the capability of making such weapons, if need arises. Nuclear energy is the energy released from the controlled release of nuclear transformation of materials such as unstable neutrons when they decay during fission or fusion of atoms (Murray, 2009, p, 1). At the same time, nuclear energy can be used as a weapon for conquest or self-defence. The use of weapons of mass destruction may not be a realistic option to solve issues because it goes against the principle of life (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Some countries use nuclear deterrence to impose sanctions on their enemies and prevent them from using their nuclear weapons. This is because they inflict fear on their adversaries such that if the adversary used their nuclear weapons in an unacceptable way, the threatening state will react by using it supposedly superior, nuclear weapons against the adversary, and the damage will be devastating for both countries. Therefore, nuclear deterrence is an attempt to create risks that may make the opponent not to engage in a certain policy or action (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). This essay discusses the merits and demerits of the strategy of nuclear deterrence to evaluate its efficacy. As mentioned earlier, nuclear deterrence is the act that involves the prevention of using nuclear weapons (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). This means that the threatening nation prevents its adversary from using Nuclear weapons against it or its allies, lest the threatening nation will attack its adversary, using nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear deterrence is the threat to strike back with nuclear weapons (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). It involves an attempt to build hazards that may make the opponent not to take on in a certain strategy or act. The risk imposed by the threatening nation is normally, extremely higher than any probable gain of using nuclear weapons for the adversary (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). This can be done by imposing some prerequisites, which are both physical and psychological. A threatening nation must be capable and willing to use its nuclear weapon, as well as, effectively communicate this to the nation that is to be deterred to ensure the success of nuclear deterrence (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). This means that a deterrent force inflicts unacceptable damage on the nation to be deterred. Secondly, the threatening nation must have the ability to exact payments by disallowing the opponent to accomplish its objectives of using nuclear weapons or by charging the opponent a disproportionate price for achieving the objectives to use nuclear weapons (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Alternatively, the threatening nation can combine the two aforementioned strategies. Further, the threatening nation must ensure that the safety of its nuclear arsenal is guaranteed. Additionally, the opponent must not access a way or method of eliminating the deterring capability of the threatening nation. Therefore, the threatening nation must ensure that technical and policy means do not allow the opponent to access a way or method of eliminating the deterring capability of the threatening nation (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Finally, the threatening nation should ensure that it is always ready to demonstrate to its adversary that it can deliver on its message. Therefore, the threatening nation must show that it is willing to engage in a nuclear war that it tries to deter or prevent, if circumstances dictate so (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Having known the preconditions that should be met to ensure the success of nuclear deterrence, it is worthy to analyse the benefits that may accrue from nuclear deterrence, when it is carried out successfully. First, it has been argued by Waltz (1994, p, 2), that when there are more nuclear weapons in the world, the world may be safe. This is supported by the fact that nuclear weapons give a nation a bargaining power in international diplomacy (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). For instance, if a country creates its nuclear weapons, it can use this fact to negotiate or threaten other nations. In turn the threatened countries will seek to make their nuclear arsenals efficient so as to counter their adversary. In the end, most of the countries will have nuclear weapons, which may be of the same capability of causing destruction. This means that the nations involved will not result into using of their nuclear weapons against each other for fear that if their enemies retaliate, massive damage will occur. Therefore, the presence of numerous nuclear weapons in most countries will lead to safety and security in the world. Secondly, it may be deduced that nuclear deterrence is effective because of the absence of large scale conflicts after Second World War (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). This may prove that nuclear deterrence works. There has not been any major war since the Second World War, implying that nuclear deterrence has been preventing various countries or groups of countries from using their nuclear weapons for fear of the intense damages that may result, if their enemies retaliated to such actions. When countries are able to determine the kinds of threats that nuclear weapons can deter, in actual sense, and how many of those weapons are needed to do that, nuclear deterrence may be effective (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). Therefore, a threatening country should have sufficient nuclear weapons that can deter a specific nuclear weapon threats before imposing the deterrence. This will prevent the adversary from engaging in an unacceptable action that may lead to devastation when counter reactions occur. It should be noted that a state has the right to use nuclear weapons in self defence (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). This is because possession of nuclear weapons gives a country bargaining power in international diplomacy, and nuclear states are given priority in such platforms. Therefore, the imposition of nuclear deterrence is effective when the threatening nation has sufficient weapons for elf defence. Such a nation can threaten its enemies of mass destruction and maintain a status quo. For instance, the nuclear deterrence between the United States of America and USSR between 1950s and 1990s led to the belief that any nuclear attack would lead to massive destruction in either countries, or maintained temperatures between the involved parties (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). Other benefits of nuclear deterrence that increase its efficacy include protection against attacks with nuclear weapons. When a country imposes nuclear deterrence, it reduces the possibility of being attacked by its enemies with nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear deterrence is effective because it inflicts fear on enemies and prevents them from attacking. Secondly, nuclear deterrence protects a nation against attacks with conventional forces, which increases and maintains high levels of security. Finally, nuclear deterrence provides a country, nation or group of countries with indefinable, additional diplomatic influence (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). However, superpowers have to cooperate in the interest of alliance security because the removal of threat reduces incentives of caution and cooperation (Waltz, 1994, p, 2). On the other hand, nuclear deterrence has proved ineffective in many instances. First, it should be noted that nuclear weapons cannot deter the outbreak of hostilities. This is because effective nuclear deterrence depends on psychological components which are communication and perception (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Therefore, the threat of nuclear deterrence by the threatening nation must be capable of inflicting the perception of fear among its adversaries. Additionally, the possible mass destruction that is to be expected if the threat was put into effect should be communicated appropriately to influence perception. It should be noted that nuclear deterrence leads to increased risk. This is because when a country threatens another with nuclear attack, the threatened country will seek to improve its nuclear weapon stock so as to compete with the threatening nation. Consequently, many countries will own nuclear weapons. The more the nuclear weapons there are, the greater the risk of accidentals or a crisis driven nuclear war (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Separately, it has been argued that there should be total abolition of nuclear weapons to enhance morality and comply with humanitarian and international law (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013).. This is because nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction which can lead to loss of many lives, when used. Therefore, countries should not threaten others will nuclear weapons, expecting to block them from engaging in nuclear policies and actions because mass damage may result. Also, nuclear deterrence may only be effective if it is capable of preventing the policies and actions, and therefore, it may not be proved (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Nuclear deterrence requires that the threatening nation must inform the opponent the price associated with the opponent’s attempt to achieve an unacceptable objective (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). If the opponent gets a way of meeting the objective, nuclear deterrence may not be effective. For instance, if a nation threatened another that if the latter uses nuclear weapons, the former will react by using its superior nuclear weapons, problems may arise. This may be so when the latter develops nuclear weapons, through technical means, which may be as superior as those of the threatening nation or more superior to those of the threatening nation and uses them for attack. Nuclear deterrence may not be effective when the deterrence message is not credible. Deterrence message must be credible, to some extent (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). That is, both nations must believe that the threatening nation will perform the promised action without fail, if it is required to do so. When one party or both parties believe that the threatening nation may be incapable of performing the promised action, then nuclear deterrence may be ineffective. Effective nuclear deterrence requires sufficient military instruments to threaten opponent in such a way that it will not think of attacking (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2013). Therefore, nations with insufficient military weapons cannot effectively impose a nuclear deterrence. It should also be noted that nuclear deterrence may not be effective when policymakers believe wrongly that security can be maintained by having many nuclear weapons. Global security threats cannot be addressed with the use of, or threat of use of nuclear weapons (Drell & Goodby, 2012). This is because nuclear weapons have little or no effect in coercing states, rebellious groups or terrorists. Therefore, they cannot prevent such groups from taking actions that threaten international peace and security. For instance, the main objective of terrorists is to threaten international security. Therefore, imposing a nuclear deterrence on terrorist will be ineffective because it will not change their decision to use nuclear weapons. An excellent example is that of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States’ nuclear weapons were meant to prevent a land invasion by the Soviet Union on NATO Europe, as well as, prevent nuclear weapons’ use by the Soviet Union against United States’ allies (Drell & Goodby, 2012). Unfortunately, nuclear deterrence did not prevent the Soviets from engaging in unacceptable actions. This is because two wars involving the United States broke out in Asia, despite the deterrence. The deterrence did not affect a number of Governments’ decisions to acquire or attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, given that there was an intense desire of successive United States’ administrations to prevent such actions from happening (Drell & Goodby, 2012). Nuclear deterrence promotes the creation of nuclear weapons because there are accurate delivery systems such as submarines, bombers and missiles, as well as, penetration aids and multiple warheads. If nuclear weapons found their way into the hands of terrorists or rogue states, then international security with be at an extremely high risk. It has been argued that deterrence is useless against terrorists, and less useful against rogue states such because such groups can use nuclear weapons to achieve their unacceptable objectives (Harvey, 2012). Nuclear deterrence is not effective because a nation is only required apply nuclear weapon use in very necessary scenarios. A country can only use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence. The use of these weapons should not be contrary to international law (GOV.UK, 2012). Nuclear deterrence theory is put under doubt by factors such as the characteristics of nuclear deterrence. For instance, the characteristic of nuclear deterrence attack proposed such as city attack is not effective in military terms and may not be rationally decisive (Wilson, 2008, p, 421). Secondly, psychology of terror that should work in nuclear deterrence’s favour creates circumstances of unremitting resistance (Wilson, 2008, p, 421). There is no evidence that nuclear deterrence works, while attacks on cities have little impact on the course of wars (Wilson, 2008, p, 421). Failure to communicate nuclear deterrence efficiently makes it ineffective. This is because nuclear deterrence depends on how well the participants in a crisis communicate their ultimate concern, intentions and interests so as to make their allies and opponents to understand (Ziemke, 2001, p, 4). In addition, perfect protection against effects of nuclear power does not exist. Owning nuclear plants is dangerous because nuclear war can result from accidents or a series of technical errors, which might lead to explosions, and eventually, massive damage. It was made clear in the Cuban missile crisis that so long as countries have nuclear weapons, they still face the risk of their use (Coleman & Siracusa, 2006, p, 70). Exercising nuclear deterrence per se is not enough to prevent conflict because deterrence has to be proportional to what is at risk in a given conflict (Coleman & Siracusa, 2006, p, 70). Nuclear deterrence requires a strategy. According to Gray (1999, p, 17), a strategy is the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy. Further, war is associated with psychology (Gray, 1999, p, 392). Therefore, nuclear deterrence must be capable of affecting psychology of the opponent so as to be effective. This requires the use of information and intelligence to deceive (Gray, 1999, p, 35). The use of information and intelligence also requires penetration of the culture veil to comprehend an enemy’s world view so as to achieve own expectations. People normally tend to believe what they want to believe, and this requires an understanding with their enemies’ expectations (Gray, 1999, p, 35). Nuclear deterrence is ineffective because peace is still at stake in Europe even after the demise of the Soviet Union (Waltz, 1994, p, 26). Therefore, it is not only nuclear deterrence that and promote peace. With nuclear deterrence, nuclear wars cannot be won because neither side can escape the devastation by another (Waltz, 1994, p 26). Further, each country has to cope with another country in a power war, and does not have to require approval from other countries to engage in nuclear deterrence (Waltz, 1994, p, 92). It should be noted that the world might become more dangerous with the spread of nuclear weapons, as a result of nuclear deterrence. Also, nuclear deterrence is supported by countries theoretically, but in practice, other interests are more pressing, leading to the spread of nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1994). It is also imperative to note that nuclear weapons are made of fissile materials. These materials are extremely dangerous. They need to be effectively controlled and managed so as to preserve international security and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war (Albright & O’Neill, 1999, p, 1). As mentioned, nuclear deterrence can lead to nuclear war. Rational countries can lead to destruction of their societies if nuclear deterrence was embraced, and none of the involved parties obliged (Blight & Lang, 2005, p, 59). Jackson (2009, p, 1157) asserts that having nuclear energy is associated with security risks, while Braut-Hegghammer (2011, P, 101) states that preventive attacks can increase the long term proliferation risk that is posed by the targeted nation. A country that seeks to impose nuclear deterrence has to be ready for war by improving its air defence and shielding society and economy, through a massive civil defence infrastructure to be successful (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005, p, 210). This is because deterrence works in the enemy’s mind and not the enemy’s body. Deterrence is psychological, and may not be effective it does not inflict psychological effects on adversaries. In conclusion, it should be noted that the risks associated with nuclear deterrence are numerous and that the instances where nuclear deterrence has been effective are minimal. As much as it may be hard to measure the efficacy of nuclear deterrence because its effects are almost invisible, a more hopeful nuclear future and nuclear disarmament depend on the attitude of the state parties towards a nuclear peace treaty. In turn, this depends on their decision if they can trust in the treaty and the bargain it entails (Wheeler & Ruzicka, 2010, p 70). Therefore, nuclear deterrence is not an effective tool of policy formulation and conflict resolution. References Albright, D., & O’Neill, K., 1999. The Challenges of Fissile Material Control. Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security Press. Blight, J. G., & Lang, J. M., 2005. The Fog of War. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Press. Braut-Hegghammer, M., 2011. 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