South Koreas Strategy in Response to North Koreas Nuclear Weapon - Research Paper Example

South Korea’s Strategy in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapon: is possession a right choice? Abstract The recent military and political standoff between South Korea and North Korea has reiterated the debate in South Korea with regard to the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons as part of an overall deterrence policy geared towards North Korea. From a historical context, literature pertaining to the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear policy in international relations has been overwhelmingly shaped by the presumption of deterrence and mutual assurance. However, the literature review of the deterrence theory demonstrates that whilst the “First Nuclear Age” of the pre-Cold War era clearly supports a link between deterrence and nuclear weapons; the post cold war gradual proliferation of nuclear programmes in states such as North Korea; clearly point to a shifting justificatory rationale for nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it is submitted in this paper that a consideration of the psychology behind the development of nuclear weapons programmes in North Korea in the current “Second Nuclear Age” is vital to the evaluation of whether nuclear possession is the right choice for South Korea; particularly in light of the recent military attacks by North Korea on Yeonpyeong Island. It is further submitted that the determination of this question is inherently dependent on a true understanding of the motivational rationale for nuclear weapons development in contemporary world politics; particularly in light of non-state sector proliferation, the risk of nuclear terrorism and the concomitant effect of North Korea’s nuclear programme on international relations. Furthermore, it is submitted as a central proposition in this paper that the recent actions of North Korea have marked a significant shift in South Korean assumptions about the North Korean nuclear capabilities and intentions. Therefore, North Korea’s behaviour arguably necessitates South Korean nuclear possession going forward as a strategic move towards increased national protection and as a deterrent. 1. Introduction In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, international policymakers became increasingly preoccupied with the potential ramifications of nuclear warfare in creating an imbalance within the world political order. After the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin asserted that: “A single demand for you comrades… Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us” (In Sagan, 1996, p.58). Stalin’s comments highlight that whilst the effect of nuclear attack is clearly destabilising to the international world order; the procurement and development of a nuclear programme as part of a state’s foreign policy is clearly viewed by some states as a vital means towards achieving stability and balance. This further underlines the proposition of the nuclear myth and nuclear taboo dichotomy, which is an important factor in considering whether nuclear possession is the right choice for South Korea (Son, 2006, p.139). From a historical perspective, the Cold War phase following the Second World War led to what has been termed the “First Nuclear Age” (Walton & Gray, 2007). This phase highlights how nuclear weapons’ programmes were rooted in the need of both superpowers to assert power in the arms race. Moreover, Walton & Gray submit that the demise of this superpower rivalry has re-ignited the nuclear proliferation question in arms control measures within the world political framework. This in itself highlights that the stability of international relations and the political balance at international level is inherently dependent on the axis of nuclear control. Therefore, whilst the deterrence theory undoubtedly plays a central role in the relationship between nuclear war programmes and international relations, the inherent weakness of the theory is the failure to account for the changing global political climate, whereby nuclear strategy and proliferation is shaped by a correlation of complex, multifarious objectives. This is arguably exemplified by North Korea’s nuclear development and Son comments that “North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have been one of the greatest challenges to its global strategy of nuclear non-proliferation” (p.135). Moreover, in stark contrast to the “First Nuclear Age” under bipolar US/Soviet system, the current “Second Nuclear Age” has clearly shifted the dynamic and the role of nuclear weapons in international relations remains the subject of much debate with no international consensus as to whether they are stabilising or destabilising. Moreover, this is compounded by the critics of the deterrence theory, which is undermined as being an inappropriate justification for nuclear weapons in contemporary world politics as highlighted by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Indeed, it is submitted that North Korea’s nuclear ambitions symbolise the increasing primacy of state interest in policy making, which is significantly reshaping the traditional order in the international framework. Furthermore, whilst South Korea’s strategic approach to national security always took account of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme; Son highlights the point that for South Koreans the protection of the US “nuclear umbrella” prevented any notion of undertaking pre-emptive strikes (Son, 2006, p.139). Furthermore, Son comments that the South Korean reliance on the US protection meant that the North Korean nuclear issue was “just another potential threat, since they ruled out possibility that the Pyongyang regime might use nuclear weapons against them” (Son, 2006, p.140). However, the recent military attacks on the South Korean island have served to reshape South Korean policy and assumptions regarding North Korea in terms of national security. For example, Borger (2010) reports that South Korean defence minister Kim Tae-young expressly asserted the distinct possibility that US nuclear weapons “could be deployed in his country for the first time in nearly 20 years, after it was revealed that Pyongyang had built an advanced uranium enrichment plant”. Accordingly, this paper evaluates South Korea’s position in response to the North Korea nuclear threat. To this end, it is submitted as a central proposition in this paper that the continued instability in North Korea and its changing objectives in developing nuclear capabilities, coupled with its increasing antagonism of South Korea has necessitated a significant shift in South Korean strategy. Furthermore, it is submitted that in the contemporary climate it is arguably necessary for South Korea to ensure nuclear possession as a protective measure in light of the increasing threat from North Korea. 2. Rationale for Nuclear Proliferation: Overview The reasons for embarking on nuclear programmes are multifarious and complex and Sagan highlights the obvious point of states intending to counter balance the perceived military power of other states (Sagan, 1997, p54). This is particularly evident with the weaker international states in alleviating political power imbalances as nuclear development programmes are often cheaper than conventional forces whilst simultaneously providing instant security (Epstein, 1977). A prime example of this is North Korea, whose nuclear ambitions are arguably directly correlated to the mistrust of the West and the United States’ support and protection of South Korea (Cha & Kang 2005, p.42). Directly correlated to this is the proposition of human’s innate need for power and influence in the international arena (Epstein, 1977, p.17). Indeed, states such as North Korea with ostensibly minimal clout on the international stage can become formidable (Cha & Kang, 2005). This clearly risks destabilising international relations, and if we consider the wider ramifications, the capacity of “inferior” states to develop nuclear programmes under the domino effect arguably escalates horizontal and vertical proliferation, and by extension can stimulate the domino effect, whereby states solely develop nuclear capability because of their neighbour’s nuclear capabilities (Wilkinson, 2010, p4-5). On the other hand, some commentators have propounded that in this way the domino effect is a stabilising factor in ensuring deterrence (Howard, 2001, p.14). This further highlights the fine line between the potentially stabilising and destabilising impact of nuclear weapons in international relations, which is further underpinned by the deterrence theory. This is exemplified by South Korea’s extrapolation of its willingness to deploy US nuclear weapons as a deterrence method in light of North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities. Indeed, North Korea’s rationale for nuclear weapons’ development has been clearly motivated by international prestige and trade-offs for compensation from South Korea (Son, 2006, p.139; Epstein, 1977, p17). This line of argument suggests that the prestige factor is provides influence, recognition and diplomatic clout, which is an important tool in any state’s operations (Son, 2006). Moreover, Waltz comments that the development of a sophisticated nuclear weapons’ programme is perceived as the optimum tool to display wealth in the international arena (Waltz, 1995, p.9). Again, this is exemplified by the relationship between North and South Korea in context of nuclear ambitions. In the 1970s, South Korea had wanted to develop nuclear weapons duet to the North Korea security threat, however continuous political negotiations with a concerned United States resulted in South Korea signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1975 (Son, 2006, p.141). However, whilst South Korea signed the Treaty in return for US umbrella protection on the nuclear issue; the development of North Korea’s nuclear programme has led to questions as to the continued efficacy of sole reliance on the US from South Korea’s perspective (Gupta, 2008, p.39). In turn this has reinforced the need for South Korea to re-evaluate strategy vis-à-vis North Korea in terms of the nuclear issue particularly as the post Cold war international framework arguably implemented a new world order and the creation of a multi-tiered system in contrast to the US/Soviet bipolar system (Waltz, 1990). Waltz further argues that by the 1990 bipolarity was coming to an end and predicted the emergency of a multi-polar system (Waltz, 1990). This in line with Hobbes’ view of foreign policy that the international system is technically anarchical because there is no enforcement authority; which in turn creates a complex myriad of multi-polar institutions and interstate relations (Waltz, 1990). For example, in the “first nuclear phase”, Western Europe was given protection by the US, which became the subject of scrutiny as the Soviet Union built up nuclear capabilities to counter the growing power of the US. In response and in line with the domino effect theory, France and Britain began developing their own nuclear programme to enable counter action if necessary and as a deterrent against Soviet attack (Barnaby, 2003). Similarly, in Asia, the aftermath of the Korean War left China fearing a US attack and by 1964, China had a fully developed nuclear warhead system in place for self preservation purposes, whereas South Korea sought protection from the US (Wilkinson, 2010, p.149). However, whilst these five traditionally nuclear states may have been a direct result of the aftershock of the Second World War and rooted in deterrence, the dynamic has clearly shifted post cold war. Indeed, the second nuclear period has resulted in countries such as India, Pakistan and North Korea developing nuclear programmes, where the state motives clearly appear to go beyond mere deterrence. If we consider this specifically in context of South Korea’s nuclear strategy; the North Korean nuclear threat clearly undermines the pre-existing US umbrella protection model and necessitates a pro-active nuclear policy geared towards containing the North Korean threat, which has significant ramifications not only for South Korea but key states in the region (Wilkinson, 2010, p.101). 3. Rogue States, the North Korean Threat As highlighted above, in the second nuclear age post cold war, the United States became the sole superpower and therefore led to increased focus on so called backlash states and nuclear proliferation (Potemski, 2007). Moreover the global risk of such states developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorism has impacted the international order. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major concern as even with the NPT in place, leaders of rogue states are developing nuclear weapons with increased concerns regarding the supply of nuclear weapons to terrorists (Potemski, 2007). The United States and its allies are particularly concerned that small actors are possessing nuclear weapons, which in turn restricts ability to maintain the international security order (Walton & Gray, 2007). Indeed a central aim of Bush’s administration was the prevention of nuclear proliferation. However, it has proved particularly difficult to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program due to its express unwillingness to co-operate and admissions that it has sold missiles abroad with the US suspecting them of selling missile technology to Iran and Syria (Potemski, 2007). The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a treaty with the overriding objective of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and opened for signature on 1 July 1968. However, North Korea having initially acceded to the treaty has flouted the NPT provisions by openly testing nuclear weapons and subsequently withdrew from the NPT (Hughes, 2007). The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles and whilst there is no express “pillars” concept as such, it is evident that the NPT has been interpreted as extrapolating three central “pillars” namely, non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use technology (Hughes, 2007). North Korea ratified the treaty on December 12, 1985 but gave notice of withdrawal from the treaty on January 10 2003 following US allegations that it had commenced an illegal enriched uranium weapons program (Hughes, 2007). To increases pressure the US further ceased fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework, which addressed plutonium weapons issues in 1994 (Hughes, 2007). The withdrawal marked North Korea as the first state ever to withdraw from the Treaty, sending shockwaves through the international community and ringing alarm bells to South Korea in terms of security strategy (Cha, 2003). This blow to international security was further cemented in 2005, when North Korea made a bold declaration of nuclear weapon possession and pulled out of the six party talks in China and the Foreign Minister made the following points regarding North Korea’s stance to suspend participation in the talks: “We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured nuclear arms for self defence to cope with the Bush administration’s evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK” (available at www.atomicarchive.com) . Nevertheless, by September 2005, North Korea announced that it would agree to a preliminary accord, under which it would scrap all existing nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities, rejoin the NPT and readmit IAEA inspectors into the country (Hughes, 2007). However, the period of instability continued as by 2006, North Korea again indicated its intention to conduct nuclear tests in the future, although it did not indicate when this would be (Hughes, 2007). However North Korea’s first nuclear test on October 9th 2006 sent security shockwaves around Northeast Asia and Hughes comments that the international community has been struggling to cope with the lack of ability to reign in North Korea’s nuclear program, even with trading and international sanctions (Hughes, 2007). Indeed Hughes comments that: “At the forefront of regional policymakers’ minds is the concern that any potential window of opportunity to either roll back or at least stop further North Korean nuclear proliferation may be closing” (Hughes, 2007, p.77). Moreover, Pyongyang’s ability to flout bilateral talks and withdraw from and openly violate the NPT treaty reinforces the assumption that the US led efforts whether in engagement containment or military threats to dissuade North Korean proliferation have failed (Hughes, 2007). It further undermines the contemporary relevance of deterrence in the second nuclear age, which was the context within which the NPT was born and reinforces the proposition in this paper that South Korea needs to consider nuclear possession as part of it strategy to deal with North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities. The consequence of this clearly has wider ramifications at regional level in Northeast Asia and Hughes poses the question as to whether the threshold states such as Japan will be provoked to embark on a nuclear weapons programme under the domino effect (Hughes, 2007). Indeed, as a result of the 2006 tests, this prompted the Japanese policy research council to consider the debate regarding the use of nuclear weapons in Japanese strategy (Hughes, 2005). This in turn attracted China and South Korea’s interest in the program, highlighting a domino effect rooted in considerations of self defence as opposed to an overriding motivation of deterrence (Lobe, 2006; Hughes, 2007). Bush acknowledged the political ramifications of this in the region by highlighting the fact that Japan’s re-evaluation of a nuclear stance would cause China anxiety and that North Korea’s nuclear stance might produce an undesirable arms race in Northeast Asia thereby further threatening international security (Lobe, 2006; Hughes, 2007). Alternatively, Lobe refers to the fact that: “in the United States there is a willingness to exploit again the so called Japan card of encouraging talking of Japan’s breaching of its non-nuclear stance as a means to punish China for its failure to pressure North Korea on its nuclear programme” (Lobe, 2006). Hughes argues that national security is a primary driver for nuclear proliferation and that states faced with enhanced security dilemmas resulting from the changing nature of warfare and threats whether in the form of new capabilities or conventional capabilities create strategic uncertainty, which will intrinsically result in an attempt to address the imbalance in power (Hughes, 2007). Moreover, the variances in conventional and nuclear threats through the acquisition of new conventional capabilities, defensive/denial deterrent capabilities such as missile defence can prove insufficient and therefore the “acquisition of nuclear weapons is the ultimate cheap equaliser” to prevent submission to superior powers (Hughes, 2007). 4. Analysis & Conclusion The above analysis highlights the fact that national security dilemmas pose the potential drivers of nuclear proliferation and are heavily influenced by related alliance dilemmas and the presence or absence of security guarantees from more powerful states whether conventional or nuclear, as highlighted by the increased vulnerability of South Korea (Lee, 2006). In practice, in the first nuclear age, this meant dependency on US superpower security guarantees with states fearing alliance dilemmas of abandonment if the ally deviated from the nuclear security guarantees (Lee, 2006). Alternatively, some states may bear what has been termed the “entrapment dilemma” of forced state alliance as an ally deploys new forms of conventional and nuclear strategy, which is self serving in supporting the ally’s strategy and related offensive and defensive weaponry, which increase the protected state’s vulnerability (Morgenthau, 1993; Potemski, 2007). In this these cases, some states have felt the need to relinquish the “entrapment” alliances and control their own security through acquisition of nuclear weapons outright or launching of nuclear weapons that enable them to attract the attention and re-extract security guarantees from an ally (Potemski, 2007). Moreover, Hughes highlights the point that the fragility of state alliances in the contemporary world order further undermine the relevance of deterrence in the second nuclear age as “these proliferation dynamics are compounded both by the perceived slippage of the NPT and other non-proliferation regimes and by the sense of a lack of collective measures to prevent or punish nuclear proliferation” (Hughes, 2007). To this end, Hughes posits that the nuclear choices of states can be governed by domestic economic pressures and as a useful bargaining chip to extract economic security guarantees from other states or allies. State policymakers might also see utility in nuclear programmes as a means to boost domestic technologies and nuclear energy industries (Hughes, 2007). Indeed, it would appear that nuclear proliferation in the second nuclear age has been driven by a correlation of trade offs between primary and secondary drivers (Haider, 2000; Walton & Gray, 2007). Arguably, North Korea’s stance on nuclear proliferation is a prime example of this and indicates how the economic trade offs, state alliances, and security guarantees provide breeding ground for nuclear proliferation. On the one hand it is arguable that the Clinton administration saw North Korea’s nuclear policy driven by an intention to secure negative security from the US (Potemski, 2007). This approach clearly shifted dynamic in the Bush administration with the North Korean policy being motivated by an attempt to achieve a security equaliser against the United States (Hughes, 2007; Potemski, 2007). This in turn has fuelled speculation regarding the concomitant ramifications for South Korea’s nuclear intentions and whether it will follow Japan’s approach (Lobe, 2006). Under the Japanese constitution, Japan retains the right to possess nuclear weapons for the exclusive purpose of self defence (Lobe, 2006). In practice, though Japan has imposed constraints on its nuclear policy with a prime example being the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1953, which limits nuclear research and development solely for peaceful purposes (www.us-japan.org). Another example is Japan’s compliance with the NPT and the adoption of the three non-nuclear programs. Moreover, the 1995 official Japanese Government report “A Report Considering the problems of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” set against the background of the first North Korean nuclear crisis still resulted in the conclusion that a nuclear proliferation programme was not necessary due to the state alliance protection under the US umbrella (Hughes, 2007). However the second North Korea crisis in 2006 raised the issue of a reformulated Japanese policy again. Overall, the Japan Policy Report demonstrated that an immediate nuclear domino is not likely to manifest in Northeast Asia. Hughes argues that part of the reason may be the fact that the principal drivers of nuclear proliferation observe the general theory from a historical perspective that these states have interrelated nuclear security dilemmas which are currently compounded by the U.S. alliance dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment (Hughes, 2007). As such, neither of the central “threshold states” in the region is sufficiently independent to make a bid for nuclear weapons, due to the reliance on US security guarantees (Hughes, 2007). Similarly, Hughes suggests that whilst the deterrence theory may not be the overriding factor in international nuclear security policy, the desire to ensure compliance with the NPT and observation of international norms, will also heavily influence states such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Hughes, 2007). Indeed, this is evidenced by the fact that whilst South Korea’s conventional stance has been anti-nuclear proliferation on political grounds, the continued instability of North Korea’s intentions towards South Korea, coupled with the reality of its growing nuclear capabilities poses a threat to South Korea and stability within the region. Therefore, it is submitted that whilst the international legal status of a preventative nuclear attack remains ambiguous; in terms of strategy South Korea’s move towards nuclear possession and express acknowledgement of this is arguably necessary in light of the North Korea threat. Bibliography Borger, J, (2010) “South Korea considers the return of US tactical nuclear weapons”, Monday 22 November 2010, The Guardian. Available at www.theguardian.co.uk accessed December 2010. Cha, V & Kang, D. (2005). Nuclear North Korea: a debate on engagement strategies Cha, V. (2003). Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defence and Stability: A Case for Sober Optimism in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed: Muthiah Alagappa Stanford University Press: 464 Cooper. M (2004). Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism: Can rogue states and terrorists acquire nuclear weapons? CQ Researcher. Epstein, W. (1977). Why States Go – And Don’t Go – Nuclear. 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