Foreign Policy of North Korea - Essay Example

? North Korea (teacher)                   North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), is a country under the authoritarian rule of the military and the KWP, or the political party of Kim Jong-Il. The components of North Korea are as follows: Foreign Policy Objectives I, Human Rights Since the government and the military regulate every domestic institution in North Korea including the media and the schools, there is no known freedom of speech in the country. Moreover, according to the Amnesty International, North Koreans who are imprisoned or detained usually suffer from torture and other forms of cruelty and degrading treatment without due process of law. The prisoners are either beaten, forced to exercise, made to sit without moving for several hours, and publicly humiliated. Usually, because of these forms of cruelty as well as forced hard labor, lack of hygiene and inadequate food, prisoners usually fall ill and die some time during custody (“North Korea Human Rights,” 2011). As a response to the lack of respect for human rights in North Korea, the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, or NKHR, was established on May 4, 1996 in Seoul. The purpose is to defend the human rights and defend the lives of North Koreans. The founder and current chairperson, Reverend Benjamin H. Yoon, emphasizes that the goal of the NKHR is for the creation of a peaceful reunification of the North and the South and the formation of a democratic national community that is expected to result from such reunification (“John Diefenbaker,” 2011). The NKHR also seeks to assist North Koreans who have just settled in South Korea in the education of their youth and the protection of their rights. Moreover, the organization seeks to collect and publicize facts and information regarding the status of human rights in North Korea, especially those in political prison camps (“Citizens’ Alliance,” 2011). Nevertheless, the NKHR, since it is based in Seoul, cannot do much to help North Koreans in North Korea. Nevertheless, the institution of the NKHR is a crucial step and a beacon of hope for North Koreans whose rights are still being violated in their own country. II. Relations with Asian Countries ` North Korea’s relations with South Korea have been “difficult and acrimonious” since the Korean War and have been a sort of “mixed” policy since North Korea seeks to develop strong economic ties with South Korea but the former does not stop denouncing the latter’s relations with the United States (“Democratic People’s,” U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). After the Korean War, both countries actually affirmed their desires for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula but until 1971, there have been no possible way for the two Korean governments to officially communicate with each other (“Democratic People’s,” U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). The differing ideologies of the two Koreas, where the north assumes a rather communist and conservative role but the south a rather a democratic one, have been responsible for the delay of goals aimed at reunification. Moreover, the intervention of the United States and other member countries to the Six-Party talks and North Korea’s continual violation of international laws against nuclear missiles have also helped put aside and indefinitely postpone reunification. However, South Korea remains as one of the DPRK’s leading partner in trade (“Korea, North,” CIA.gov, 2011). Aside from South Korea, among the countries with which North Korea has had firmly established ties with was China. China is North Korea’s largest source of food, fuel and arms, and is its biggest trading partner. As to food, China is the leading producer and importer of 45% of North Korea’s food and 80% of the latter’s consumer goods. When it comes to energy resources, China provides North Korea with around 90% of the latter’s fuel. With North Korea’s current volume of imports from China, the economic dependence of the former on the latter is rather inevitable and rapidly increasing (Bajoria, 2010). Instruments of Foreign Policy Aside from North Korea’s relations with its Asian neighbors, it has also established strong ties with other countries, particularly the European Union, or the EU. The reason for a relatively more harmonious conflict between the DPRK and the EU is the fact that there was no incidence of any unpleasant past between the two, such as war or colonialism. Moreover, the East European country members of the EU lent significant support to the DPRK during and after the Korean War. East Germany, in particular, helped rebuild the destroyed provincial capital of Hamhung between 1955 and 1962. Other Europeans in history also rendered service to North Korea like the German Franz Eckert, who composed the first Korean national anthem in 1902 and another German Richard Wunsch, who was a physician of the Korean imperial court from 1901 to 1905 (Frank, 2002, p. 90). In matters of national aid and other assistance, North Korea has also received numerous benefits from the EU since 1995 when the latter provided humanitarian support to the DPRK during the floods and as a response to the constant appeal of North Korea for international aid. Food aid from the EU to North Korea also began in 1997. From 1997 to 2000, North Korea has received a total of 280 million Euro from the EU in various kinds of donor assistance. With the EU and with many of its Asian neighbors particular China and South Korea, North Korea’s instrument of foreign policy is trade. North Korea exports clothes, jewelry, electronic and electric products, plastic products, machinery and salt to the EU. As of 2000, the EU has imported $111.8M worth of products. Moreover, as of 2001, China, Japan and India rank as the top three countries that import North Korean products, while Germany and the rest of the EU occupy the 6th position. Among the EU members, it is therefore clear that Germany has the strongest economic ties with North Korea. Germany is followed by France, Spain and the UK (Frank, 2002, p. 93). Currently, however, the top two Asian trading partners of North Korea are China and South Korea, which respectively account for 61% and 24% of North Korean exports (“Korea, North,” CIA.gov, 2011). Another instrument of foreign policy used by the DPRK is military assistance to its allies. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decision of China to take a neutral stance and to participate in the Six-Party Talks, no country has been identified as an ally of the DPRK. Nevertheless, reports of Myanmar, Syria and Iran being supplied by North Korea with weapons and missiles somehow lead one to think that North Korea is supporting countries that are against the United States and those that are planning to use weapons of mass destruction (Varner, 2010). Foreign Policy Resources According to a 2010 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, North Korea has been an exporter of weapons and missiles worth around $100 million each year. Moreover, North Korea has been suspected of supplying countries like Iran, Myanmar and Syria with these weapons and missiles (Varner, 2010). However, such exportation of armaments is unauthorized and clearly against the regulations set by the UN Security Council. North Korea has also been a huge exporter of minerals and metallurgical products, and a manufacturer of textiles as well as agricultural products and fish. The export partners of North Korea include South Korea, which accounts for 47% of its exports, and China with 40%. As of 2009, the value of North Korean exports amounted to $1.997 billion. On the other hand, when it comes to imports, North Korea imports mainly petroleum, coal, equipment and machinery as well as textile and grain, with China as its biggest importer accounting for 61% of all of the DPRK’s imports. South Korea only ranks second with a mere 24%. Total cost of imports into North Korea as of 2009 amounted to $3.096 billion, making the cost of its imports higher than that of its exports (“Korea, North,” CIA.gov, 2011). Based on the aforementioned data, one can see that North Korea may have shaky relations with both China and South Korea because of the sensitivity of the issue on nuclear missiles and the Six-Party Talks but the DPRK indeed has strong economic relations with these two countries. Instruments of Foreign Policy Used to Influence North Korea The United States has long been reluctant to develop strong political and economic ties with North Korea, not only because of the Korean War or differing ideologies in government and politics, but especially because of the DPRK’s nuclear weapon program, terrorist activities, and violation of human rights. The United States simply has a clear-cut policy regarding terrorism and that is to halt it, and at the same time prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology, and to promote regional stability and human dignity (Ogden & Anderson, 2008, p. 76). The DPRK, based on various news reports and those of the United Nations, has obviously violated many of these policies of the United States, especially because North Korea has “deliberately and secretively” pursued the development of nuclear weapons (p. 94). In fact, based on a 2007 report, the DPRK has in its possession significant programs on ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and between 600 to 800 ballistic missiles of short and medium range (Scobell & Sanford, 2007, p. vii-x). This is in addition to its military of around 13,000,000 soldiers (“Korea, North,” CIA.gov, 2011). Aside from the strong policies of the United States against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, another program of the country that has been repeatedly violated by the DPRK is the Six-Party Talks, of which the members include North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the United States. The aim of the Six-Party Talks is to end the DPRK’s nuclear program. Since 2003 when the talks started, it was interrupted many times by various standoffs particularly between the United States and North Korea, as well as several nuclear threats from North Korea directed against South Korea. With the interruptions and with varying national objectives for each member of the talks as well as many other obstacles, the Six-Party talks have been delayed for a number of years. Among the obstacles to the success of the talks include the unpredictable policies of North Korea, differing interests among the member countries, and the resistance of the United States to bilateral negotiations (Bajoria, 2009). International Strategies Despite the fact that North Korea has established strong economic ties with the EU and Asian countries especially China, the Chinese nation has somehow remained neutral in its previous stance on helping North Korea at all costs. Since North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in July 2006, the problem of North Korea with China is that the latter has somehow defected from the “treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” it had with North Korea and the former Soviet Union in 1961 (Pinkston, 2006, p. 4; Bajoria, 2010). A separate treaty between China and North Korea, the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, states that China must defend North Korea from any unprovoked aggression. It was also in 2006 that China decided to sign the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. This resolution imposes sanctions on North Korea especially on the matter of its missile tests. Since the signing off of this resolution, China has changed its sentiments and policies on North Korea from those of alliance and diplomacy to those of punishment. The reason is that, for China, the top priorities are stability and the avoidance of war, and the Chinese nation simply considers North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as a means to war and destruction. Another reason for this change in China’s attitude towards North Korea is the fact that, since the post-Cold War era, China has concentrated more on national interest. Nevertheless, China remains ambiguous on this change in political stance, and may still strongly deter other countries like the United States from taking military action against North Korea (Bajoria, 2010). When it comes to national strategy, North Korea’s national strategy centers upon its ideologies. One of these ideologies is the Juche – a term founded by the late North Korean President Kim Il-Sung and one which literally means “self-reliance.” Introduced in 1955, Juche became the state ideology of North Korea and was only reinforced by his son Kim Jong-Il in 1998. The Juche idea revolves around the ideologies of tradition and communism. In fact, North Korea under Kim Il-Sung did not seem like a revolutionary socialist state but rather more like a Choson Dynasty, which was one of Korea’s historical dynasties that dominated the country from 1392 to 1910 (Pinkston, 2006, p. 1). The Juche idea of Kim Il-Sung has extended to its foreign policies even after the death of the President. Based on Article 17 of North Korea’s 1998 Socialist Constitution, “independence, peace, and solidarity are the basic ideals of the foreign policy and the principles of external activities of the DPRK” (Pinkston, 2006, p. 2). Moreover, North Korea emphasizes in its Constitution that “the state shall establish diplomatic as well as political, economic, and cultural relations with all friendly countries” and that these must be based on the principles of “complete equality, independence, mutual respect, noninterference in each other’s affairs, and mutual benefit” (Pinkston, 2006, p. 2). In fact, if one were to take a closer look into the ideals emphasized by the North Korean Constitution in matters of foreign relations, one would realize that the country wants to deal with others peacefully on the condition of “complete equality,” which is a communist principle. Moreover, the Constitution also stresses out the idea of “noninterference in each other’s affairs,” which is a principle of tradition under the Juche idea. The idea of “complete equality” may be akin to the democratic principle of justice, but the idea of noninterference has been the subject of controversies between North Korea and the other countries that questioned some of its policies, especially on the subject of nuclear missiles. The foreign policies of North Korea are in fact very conservative in that it does not allow any country with which it has established political and economic ties to interfere with its national affairs, even those concerning nuclear missiles. The regulation of foreign policies is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but with both the economic and military ministries also playing active roles in policymaking. With the United States in particular, it is the Foreign Ministry’s American Department, which is mainly responsible for how North Korea should conduct itself vis-a-vis United States policies that are against or in favor of its ideologies. However, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is guarded by the military ministry, the Korean Worker’s Party, or KWP – which is the sole political party in the country and whose General-Secretary is Kim Jong-Il – exerts full control over any foreign policy formulated by the ministries. In short, it is still Kim Jong-Il who is the final arbiter when it comes to foreign policies towards any country including the United States. Furthermore, it is still Kim that has the power to veto any policy which he believes is not good for the North Korea, no matter how seemingly beneficial it is in terms of foreign relations and national interests (Pinkston, 2006, p. 2). In fact, Kim Jong-Il is not only General-Secretary of KWP but also the chairman of the country’s National Defense Commission, or NDC, and with his political power, he has influenced North Korea’s local and foreign policies. With his superior position and influential role in the KWP and NDC, Kim has implemented two novel state ideologies in addition to his late father’s Juche idea: the son’gun chongch’i or military first politics, and the kangsongdaeguk or the “strong and prosperous country” ideology. The first of these two ideologies – the son’gun chongchi’i – simply means the empowering of national security against external threats and the assurance to the military that the government will always support them. The first goal of the son’gun chongch’i is somehow a strategy of Kim’s government to give assurance to the people and to prevent them from a possible revolution, while the second purpose is to prevent the military from disbanding. The second ideology on the other hand – the kangsongdaeguk – aims to make North Korea strong, prosperous, prominent and successful in all aspects of development, particularly “ideology, politics, the military and the economy” as well as the country’s nuclear missile technology (Pinkston, 2006, p. 3). These national strategies of North Korea affect their foreign relations in such a way that other countries may think that having to deal with North Korea means that they are tolerating its threats of nuclear missile attacks. Moreover, North Korea wants to expand its economic and cultural influence to other countries, but they remain defensive and would not want any country to comment on their national affairs. Indeed, “the security and economic policies [of North Korea] are irreconcilable” (Pinkston, 2006, p. 4). North Korea’s national strategies are often regarded as a “variety of authoritarian ‘tools’ to protect itself both from popular revolt and from internal coup” (Byman & Lind, 2010, p. 45). Among these tools are certain ideas and nationalism, social policies, and the deliberate use of force to prevent any revolution. Other tools include manipulation of foreign governments in order to obtain foreign aid, elite co-optation, and controlling domestic institutions so as to avoid any incidence of a coup (p. 46). There is a theory that a typical authoritarian regime, like the DPRK, is threatened by popular revolution and should therefore preserve the government in every way possible even if it has to use a nuclear program to scare would-be coup plotters (p. 47). From the point of view of national survival and preservation of government authority, the nuclear program of the DPRK therefore serves a twofold purpose: to prevent the people from revolting and to impose upon them and the rest of the world an image of strength and invincibility (p. 47; Pinkston, 2006, p. 3). Broad Foreign Policy Objectives The main goal of North Korean foreign policy toward the United States is to deter the latter from intervening in Korea further and to split its alliance with South Korea as well as to withdraw all U.S. forces from the said country (Pinkston, 2006, p. 4). Nevertheless, this clearly goes against United States policies of ensuring the peace and safety not only of South Korea but of the whole Far East including North Korea. Since North Korea has perceived relentlessness in United States policies directed against DPRK, North Korea has no choice but to “strengthen its military capabilities” in order to deter the United States. North Korea’s goal to deter the United States has actually gradually worsened since the 1950s when North Korea perceived nuclear threat from the United States itself (Kim, 2010, p. 52). One result of this is the DPRK’s nuclear program. Another result is that the foreign policy formulated by North Korea somehow alienates Washington in the process and decreases the possibility of DPRK forging good economic ties with the United States. The reason for this is mainly due to the rather irreconcilable security and economic policies of North Korea towards the United States and even other countries as well (Pinkston, 2006, p. 4). One of the foreign policies of the United States directed against North Korea is the National Security Strategy of the United States, which states that “military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country [the United States] and allies or to preserve broader peace and security” (“National Security Strategy,” 2010, p. 22). This is rather a warning directed against those who do not abide by the conditions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which clearly states, “countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament…and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy” (p. 23). Furthermore, the United States is very specific with its intentions on North Korea and its nuclear arsenal: “The United States will pursue the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” and that “if North Korea eliminates its nuclear weapons program…[it] will be able to proceed on a path to greater political and economic integration with the international community” (p. 23-24). The conditions set by the United States on North Korea are therefore clear – the DPRK has to give up its nuclear missile program in exchange for political and economic benefits from other countries including the United States. Now, while political and economic development do not violate the principle of the kangsongdaeguk, or “strong and prosperous country,” ideology of Kim Jong-Il, the shutting down of its nuclear weapons facility will definitely go against the son’gun chongch’i ideology, or military first policy. Thus, the two ideologies are truly irreconcilable (Pinkston, 2006, p. 4). Furthermore, the United States should acknowledge the idea that North Korea’s nuclear program is largely a tool for maintaining internal stability of the country (Byman & Lind, 2010, pp. 45-46). Moreover, on April 5, 2009 in Prague, U.S. President Obama himself addressed the issue of nuclear threat to the international community and pledged to work with the partners of the United States for the purpose of achieving the denuclearization of North Korea, and that this should be carried out through the Six-Party process (“Foreign Policy,” WhiteHouse.gov, 2011). What North Korea wanted in 2006 was for the United States to remove Pyongyang from the list of states that are known to sponsor international terrorism and to have all sanctions by the United States removed so that DPRK can advance itself economically in the international community (Pinkston, 2006, p. 5). Nevertheless, the wishes of North Korea were not granted for the United States simply somehow recognized the DPRK’s using its economy’s poor performance as a mere scapegoat for advancing its nuclear ambitions (p. 5). At present, after several violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea has agreed to resume the Six-Party Talks and to return to the negotiation tables (Eberstadt, 2011). However, political experts say that North Korea will simply use the Six-Party Talks this time to make the United States and the other members of the talks to ratify DPRK’s status as an official nuclear weapons state, and thus to further its own goals (Eberstadt, 2011). In fact, it is China that wants to resume the talks but since North Korea has not done anything about the recommendations of the previous Six-Party talks, both the United States and South Korea are reluctant to push through with the talks (Johnson, 2011). This inactivity and lack of cooperation on the part of North Korea somehow encourages the United States to rethink its position on providing more food aid to the DPRK (Johnson, 2011). Specific Foreign Policy of North Korea Which May Affect the United States Since the bombing of the Korean Airlines flight 858 in 1987, North Korea has been known to be sponsoring terrorist acts. Moreover, Pyongyang is known to provide support to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction, or JRA, which was mainly responsible for the 1970 hijacking of the Japan Airlines flight to North Korea. Nevertheless, despite the accusations, the DPRK has made several statements of condemnation against terrorism since then. It has also signed in October 2000 a joint statement with the United States on terrorism. Moreover, the DPRK became one of the signatories to the Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism in 2005. Because of the aforementioned reasons, the United States began making an effort in 2007 to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and to lift the Trading with the Enemy Act directed towards DPRK (“Democratic People’s,” U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). However, in May 2010, using Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act as basis, the United States has declared North Korea as “not cooperating fully” with the efforts of the United States against terrorism. The consequence of this act is the banning of the exportation to North Korea of defense articles and services from 2009 to 2010 (“Democratic People’s,” U.S. Dept. of State, 2011). Despite the act, North Korea is still reported to export $100 million worth of weapons and missiles each year, thus violating the Arms Export and Control Act. Among the countries rumored to have imported armaments from North Korea include Syria and Iran. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a 75-page report in 2010 stating that North Korea is involved in the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile activities in Iran, Syria and Myanmar. In fact, in order to conduct such activities secretly, North Korea uses various forms of concealment from false description and labeling of containers as well as falsification of information that covers the shipment. These methods also involve cash couriers and financial institutions (Varner, 2010). North Korea was also involved in the abduction of some foreign citizens. In fact, Kim Jong-Il himself acknowledged the truth in the statement of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002 that North Korea was involved in the abduction of Japanese citizens for seven years from 1977 to 1983. So far, 12 cases remain unsolved until now. Moreover, South Korea made similar accusations while stating that around 480 South Korean civilians have been kidnapped by North Korean officials and around 560 soldiers and prisoners of war possibly detained by the DPRK. North Korea also acknowledged the truth of these accusations in October 2005. However, until now, nothing much was done on the part of the DPRK and the United States has continued pressing North Korea to address the concerns of Japan and South Korea regarding the abductions (“Democratic People’s,” US Dept. of State, 2011). Since many of these cases remain unresolved to date and with the obvious reluctance on the part of North Korea to conduct investigations, such a negative attitude has somehow kept the United States unwilling to establish stronger economic and political ties with the DPRK. Sources Bajoria, J. (2009, July 1). The Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved Sept. 24, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593 Bajoria, J. (2010, October 7). The China-North Korea Relationship. Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved Sept. 23, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097 Byman, D. & Lind, J. (2010). Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea. Massachusetts: Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 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North Korea’s Foreign Policy Towards the United States. California: Center for Contemporary Conflict . Retrieved Sept. 22, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://cns.miis.edu/other/pinkston_strategic_insights_sep06.pdf Scobell, A. & Sanford, J. M. (2007, April). North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles. Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved Sept. 19, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf Varner, B. (2010, November 11). North Korea Exports $100 Million of Arms Each Year in Breach of Sanctions. New York: Bloomberg. Retrieved Sept. 23, 2011 from the World Wide Web: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-10/north-korea-exports-100-million-of-arms-each-year-in-breach-of-sanctions.html Read More