Fire Incident: Sofa Superstore Fire - Case Study Example

Fire Incident Sofa Superstore Fire The occurrence of a fire which has gained the dubbing of the Sofa Super Store fire, happened in Charleston, South Carolina, on 18 June 2007. The incident was a flashover ( of which there are at least four different types i.e., lean flashover, rich flashover, delayed flashover, and a hot rich flashover), the latter is what the firefighters were confronted with at this incident. The text book example of a flashover, is when there is a piece of furniture which ignites. At the super store fire, all of the ingredients for a rich flashover were present; the entire. 42,000 ft² (3,902 m²) single-story steel trussed showroom building with a 17,000 ft² (1,579 m²) warehouse, contained living room furniture. These pieces contained polyurethane.In so being, when the fire ignited it produced a layer of hot smoke, which settled across the ceiling of the room. In a domestic type fire, we would be talking of one, possibly up to four pieces of living room furniture. In this instance, there were thousands which caused the pyrolysis, and all of them were giving off flammable gases, which at this incident produced a very rapid ignition. The first call which the dispatcher received on this fire was at 7:08PM. The firefighters arrived at the incident at 7:11PM.( See Appendix “A”) The intensity of this fire was so great that by 7:30PM, the front part of the showroom building collapsed,1 and resulted in the death of nine Charleston firefighters.2 Here’s the rub; when firefighters arrived at 7:11PM, they began fighting a fire in the rear of the building, which was situated in a trash bin outside of the store, located between the warehouse and the showroom. There was no fire on arrival inside either of the two buildings.3 Four minutes into the firefighting, the fire enters the showroom through a door, when it was opened by an Incident Commander. Almost simultaneously, as the fire entered onto the showroom floor, one of the store’s employees make a 911 call, indicating he was trapped inside of the warehouse. The firefighters breached the wall of the warehouse, and rescued the employee. Sixteen firefighters enter the showroom, as the items in the showroom began to ignite.The flash was so rapid and so intense until it prompted firefighters in front of the showroom outside to break the large pane windows at the showroom front, to allow some of the sixteen firefighters who entered the building to escape. This maneuver saved two firefighters, but the intensity of the fire increased with the extra oxygen.4 Five retreated through the back door, and nine did not react in time, and succumbed to smoke inhalation. For one to assert that this incident progressed precariously and unexpectedly, would not be a misrepresentation of the events. At 7:11PM, the firefighters thought they were on scene to merely extinguish an outside fire, which was started by the careless non-extinguishing of perhaps a cigarette. Because of what the incident initially dictated, a number of things were not done. Which resulted in the fire fighters fighting a fire absent of direction; primarily, and most importantly, there was the absence of the formal establishment of Incident Command.5 The need for ICS grew out of a need to shore up response problems in the light of an emergency, and that most of the problems encountered by response teams not being both efficient and effective, were not borne out of a need for resources, but to a mounting communication and management defect. The Charleston firefighters were compelled to react to a rapidly progressing incident, which ultimately placed them in an information vacuum. Secondly, given the initial scope (trash fire outback) of the incident, the types of hoses and the proper provision of water, were not adequate to fight the blaze which eventually became the incident. Once the fire spread to the warehouse and the showroom, and the life of a citizen was at stake, the firefighters were placed in a defensive mode, but were lacking in information and resources. The building probably would not have collapsed as rapidly as it did, had a water sprinkling system been present. Reccommendations and Conclusion There appeared to be a no smoking policy on the showroom floor, consequently employees were relegated to taking their smoke breaks on the loading docks in back of the store. Management should provide receptacles which will be used by employees to distinguish and discard cigarette and cigar butts. Additionally, the designated smoking area should not be located near or adjacent to trash receptacles. Commercial and public buildings should be outfitted with automatic sprinkler systems, or the two buildings should have been divided by firewalls. If the firewalls been in place, the fire probably would not have spread to the showroom. All older buildings, such as the super store structure, should be retrofitted with automatic water sprinklers.The State Legislature must pass code legislation which requires the presence of automatic sprinkler systems, and firewalls to separate buildings. All firefighters on scene should have been trained in the dynamics of fires. This fire was not well managed, and it began with the Incident Commander who opened the back door of the showroom, which resulted in the spread of the fire from outside.6 The question here is of course, why was the incident commander involved in the direct action? Instead of opening back doors, the incident commander should have been receiving information on the status, and adequacy of resources. He did not follow the proper outlined procedure. The importance of following proper and proven procedure can not be stressed to strongly.Additionally, the firefighters who breached the large pane windows in front of the showroom, were obviously not aware of fire dynamics. This maneuver ostensibly saved two lives, but it gave the fire more oxygen, which assisted in the rise of the intensity of the fire, which caused the roof to collapse, and resulted in nine deaths. Throughout the entire term of the incident, there were calls for more water. The hoses which were being used had to be stretched across the parking lot, and hooked up across the highway, during the height of rush hour. This was done inspite of the fact that the area was not cordoned off. The heavy traffic was in contact with the water hoses, which were not of sufficient diameter to provide the necessary water flow. Ozone Disco Club On March 17, 1996, , the Ozone Disco in Quezon City, Philippines, was packed to capacity with high school and college students, who were celebrating graduation, then a short time after midnight, tragedy struck, when the disco ignited in flames. At the time of the fire, the club was occupied by at least 350 patrons and 40 staff employees. This was a structure which was only approved to accommodate 35 persons. The cause of the fire was bad electrical wiring, at the onset of the fire; some of the survivors, (of which there were not many, 176 people died),7 say they saw sparks inside the disc jockey booth, but dismissed the possibility of danger, because they thought it was part of the entertainment. Within minutes of the observation of sparks, the entire building was engulfed in flames, and within minutes the club’s mezzanine collapsed. Individuals began to scramble towards the exits, only to find out they were locked. The emergency fire exit was said to be locked because the construction of an adjacent building, which was constructed too close, and the emergency fire exit was hung to open outward. There were several other violations of the fire code; the fire extinguishers were defective and inoperable, and the building did not contain an automatic sprinkler system.8 Additionally, after the fire commenced, the main exit was locked from the outside by the club security guards, because the security guards upon hearing the screaming and pandemonium inside, ‘thought’ that a riot had transpired. 162 people died and 95 were injured.9At the time, this was the worst nightclub fire in history. These persons were locked inside of an inferno, with no possibility of escape. Reccommendations and Conclusion It immediately becomes obvious that there were a number of officials who were remiss in efficiently carrying out their responsibilities which enabled this tragedy to occur. The fire could have been avoided if the fire inspectors been vigilant in making sure that the building wiring system was in adequate accord to accommodate the load which the disc jockey equipment placed on the electrical wiring. City inspectors should not benignly ignore the wattage capacity versus the anticipated usage. Inspectors must be comprehensive in their interviews of applicants for permits, and they should return to the premises during operating hours to assure that the proprietors are operating within the legal limits. It must be stressed by municipalities and local government units that inspectors make field visits to establishments which apply for permits to operate commercial enterprises, where members of the general public will frequent. Had city inspectors taken the time from their busy schedules and visited the establishment for a fire hazard inspection, they would have discovered that the emergency fire exit open outward, instead of inward. They would have also discovered there was insufficient easement between the establishment (disco), and the property which had been constructed next door. Additionally, there should have been a firewall constructed between the two buildings On site inspection would have revealed that the establishment’s fire extinguishers were inoperative and needed to be replaced. Of course, this should have been dealt with by the owners of the disco, as well as overseen by the fire inspectors. There is thread of gross negligence, which weaves its way through this entire incident. Also, a site visit would have revealed that the wood frame structure, did not possess an automatic sprinkler system. This code violation enabled the inferno to rage unabated until the arrival of the firefighters. The government must enact legislation which makes it imperative for fire inspectors and city license and permit issuers to do an onsite evaluation of buildings, prior to issuing documents of approval to operate. Additionally, these inspections should be periodically updated to assure that there is no slippage in code adherence.These inspections should be random, with no advance notice to occupants or owners. On the matter of occupant capacity, this establishment was grossly violating the law. The proposed legislation could possibly seek the monitoring and legal muscle of the police department, to assure that no business establishment ever again goes as far as these people did on exceeding the maximum allowable capacity. This tragedy was exacerbated by the blind ignorance of the security guards stationed outside.It is no doubt a criminal offence to incarcerate anyone, without due process. These people were, due to ignorance, locked inside an inferno. The proposed legislation, could also carry a section which makes it illegal to lock a door from the outside, when there are occupants in a public or commercial building. Thai toy factory fire On May 10, 1993, the worst industrial factory fire in history occurred in Thailand, at the Kader toy factory. The incident killed 188 persons and seriously injured over 500 young girls from rural families.The factory was a manufacturer of stuffed toys, most of which are exported to the United State sand into the showrooms of Mattel and Disney. The problem started with the design and construction of the building. The design plans clearly illustrated the placement of emergency fire exits, however, none were ever put into the actual building. Additionally, the construction of the building was a text book case for disaster, as the steel girders which were placed, were not insulated. Once the fire heated up, the structure weakened rapidly and it resulted in the collapse of the building. At approximately four PM, someone discovered a small fire in the area where finished products had been stored on the first floor of the E-shaped building. Albeit, the workers were informed of the occurrence, they were instructed to continue to work, because the management decision was that the fire could be contained. As a consequence, no general fire alarm was sounded. Unfortunately, the area was also the storage for raw materials, and the fire began to rage quickly. Individuals who sought to leave the building as the fire intensity began to build, discovered that the emergency exits had been locked, and the intensity of the fire resulted in an early collapse of the stairwell. Persons on the second and third floors were forced into panic mode and they jumped from second and third story windows, which resulted in the death of some and serious injury to many. Firefighters arrived at the scene after the fire had been raging for more than 40 minutes, just about the time when the origin of the fire in building one began to collapse.In building #2 and #3, the fire alarms were sounded and all of the workers in these two buildings were able to scamper to safety. This fire and its tragic outcome was the result of inadequate enforcement of fire safety regulations. Reccommendations and Conclusion Employers should be compelled to conduct fire safety inspections. These inspections would identify all areas which are at high risk and hazardous. Also, these fire safety inspections would identify all areas and equipment are suitable for egress in the event of a fire emergency, and it would also identify defective or non-existent apparatus which is essential in extinguishing or preventing the spread of a fire. None of the literature reviewed made any mention of the existence of fire extinguishers, or any type of fire apparatus i.e., water hoses, or automatic sprinkler systems. The presence and operability of these pieces would have enabled either an abatement or a slowing down of the spread of the fire. The mere size of the factory and the number of employees, should have dictated that the management have been actively involved in providing emergency procedure training to its work force. This training would have made it clear to everyone concerned which were the safe routes they could use to egress the building, in the event of an emergency. Moreover, with the training, the fact that the fire exit doors were permanently locked would have surfaced. This information alone would have saved many lives. On the same note, the government fire inspectors are shown to have been extremely neglectful in carrying out inspections of the facility. While the origin of this fire was known, the cause is still unknown. This is due in large part to the absence of industry standard scientific investigative techniques.The government must institute and enforce code standards, and not turn a blind eye, merely because the establishment generates revenue. The Royal Marsden In January 2, 2008, a fire ripped through the world renowned Royal Marsden cancer hospital, causing the evacuation of hundreds of staff and cancer patients.The fire attacked the roof and the upper floors of the building, at the peak of the incident, the cadre involved more than 125 firefighters, 16 ambulance crews, and dozens of other agencies.10 There were several operations in progress at the time and they had to be stopped, and 79 in-patients had to be transferred to other hospitals. There were no injuries, and no fatalities. The London fire brigade and all of the other agencies which participated in this incident performed admirably. In that there were multiple agencies involved in this incident, and things moved in an orderly fashion, indicates that manpower and resources were properly coordinated through the effective and efficient use of Incident Command. The brigade's handling of the fire drew praise from the president of the Chief Fire Officers' Association, Steve McGuirk. "The evacuation of complex premises is a challenge for any organisation. "Safely evacuating a large number of sick and highly dependent patients, such as those in operating theatres and recovery wards, is an even greater challenge." 11 Moreover, firefighters were successful in preventing the fire from spreading to any of the other floors. The London fire brigade is quite professional in its approach to incidents; they invite feedback from firefighters on the dynamics involved in each incident, the debriefing usually takes place within 28 days. It does not matter whether it is positive or negative feedback, and the input could involve situations equipment or resources.All of this information is customarily feed into a data base, and always acted upon.12. Reccommendations and Conclusion Since I have not been able to locate any of the fire investigation reports or any news accounts of what started the fire, I am unable to make any recommendations of how future incidents could be avoided. However, in light of the manner in which the fire brigade followed all of the proper procedures and protocols, they are to be commended on their excellent execution of a sound text book plan. Bibliography Coroner: Charleston firefighters died of smoke inhalation, burns, The State, June 20, 2007, Retrieved on line on October 16, 2008, from www.thestate.com Collapse in 30 Minutes, The post and Courier, June 19, 2007, Retrieved on line on October 16, 2008, from www.charleston.net Fire started in loading dock, ATF confirms, The Post and Courier, Retrieved on line October 16, 2008, from www.charleston.net It Looked Like Hell Was Burning, Newsweek, June 23, 2007, Retrieved on line on October 16, 2008, from www.newsweek.org Menchaca, R. Fire Experts: Charleston Fire Department must change, The Post and Courier, August 18, 2007, Retrieved on line on October 18, 2008, from www.charleston.net Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, CDC – National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, June 21, 2007 Disco in Manila, for 35 People, Held 400, Associated Press, New York Times, 1996, 03,20, Retrieved on line on October 18, 2008, from www.new yorktimes Vanzi, S. J. Light Sentence for Ozone Disco Owners, Newsflash, Philippine Headline News, retrieved on line on October 18, 2006, from www.philippineheadlinenews.org At Least 160 killed in Disco Fire in Manila,Associated press, New York times on line, Retrieved on line on October 19, 2008, from www.nytimes.org Thompson C., The Complex challenge of hospital blaze, BBC News, January 4, 2008, Retrieved on line on October 18, 2008, from www.bbcnews.com Appendix “A” Read More