The Causes of the Buncefield Fire Incident - Case Study Example

Report on the Buncefield Fire Incident Course: Name: University: Date: Contents Contents 2 Summary 3 Site conditions and constraints 6 Impact 6 Environmental impacts 7 Structural Impact 8 Health impact 9 Recommendations 10 Summary This report summarizes the incidents of the Buncefield oil terminal fire incident and tries to look at the various impacts; structural, environmental, health and also economical impacts, it had on the surrounding. It also tries to further look at the cause of the explosions and the technicalities that were involved in it. In addition, this report also tries to draw conclusions and recommendations on the probable most efficient ways/methods in which the oil terminal operators could have used and can use to reduce such incidences in future. More to that it looks into the various recommendations that were suggested and implemented by some of the key players in the oil industry and safety authorities to ensure that safety measures near and within the oil terminals is implemented and maintained. Introduction The Buncefield fire that occurred in December of 2005 was reported to have originated at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal which is located northwest of London in Hemel Hempstead town. The oil terminal was opened in 1968 and was known to be the fifth largest oil-products storage depot in the United Kingdom holding a capacity of about 60,000,000 imperial gallons of fuel (Health Protection Agency, 2006). This fire despite the great efforts to contain it had an effect that could be experienced up to about heard up to 125 miles away. These fire events were characterized by big infernos that had resulted from a series of explosions. These explosions were reported to first occur in the early hours of the morning and sequentially progressed leading to a great inferno (Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service, 2006). Investigation reports indicated that the phenomenon occurred due to an overflow that had occurred due to failure of the safeguards on one of the tanks that fuel was being pumped in. This failure caused the fuel to overflow from the tank unnoticed until it was late (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). Terminal engineers indicated that the safety mechanisms were supposed to detect the overflow and trigger a system shutdown to cut the flow but they did not and the fuel then overflowed through the vents of the tanks (Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service, 2006). According to fire fighting experts, the explosions were reported to have been caused by an unusually high strength fuel-air explosion. MIIB (2007) in their reports indicated that, if a gas cloud is ignited within a confined volume, it can cause an explosion since it increases pressure resulting from the limitation to expand. With Buncefield explosions however, the phenomenon was not the same since the vapor was not confined within the tanks and therefore was presumed to be caused by unconfined mechanisms of combustion. For this two probable mechanism; the deflagration whereby the flame accelerates to high speed, requiring a mechanism for generating the flame acceleration which is provided by turbulence caused explosion due to congestion in the pipes. The other mechanism is the detonation which is presumed to be more damaging than and could be triggered by shock-waves. However the conditions necessary to provide the shock waves/detonations were not present around the site (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). Other reports on this event categorized this fire also as a un- usual occurrence and the biggest fire phenomenon experienced since World War II. For instance, surveys by the British Geological Survey which monitored the event, reported as high as 2.4 reading on the Richter scale. This measure of force prompted the police to evacuate the people from various premises due to fear of structural damage and instability site (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). Site conditions and constraints The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal was opened in 1968 and was intended to link two link two Shell refineries in Stanlow in the North West of England. The pipeline transported white oil products and was opened along with other Buncefield pipeline feeding installations. Despite the improvement in efficiency of oil product transport, Buncefield terminal was found to be the hardest to manage. The input that was required to ensure the smooth running of the terminal was overwhelming the available work force (MIIB, 2007). It known that it is the responsibility of the board of directors in any company to ensure that they improvise or put n place a risk management plan. However, the terminal was faced with difficulties in ensuring that the surroundings were safe enough since there were residential structures and businesses build very close to the perimeter. These structures were also not build in the required standards that could enable them withstand great impacts from fire incidences (MIIB, 2007). Impact Despite the magnitude of a fire event that made history in the city, the effects of this fire event were maintained at a minimum with least of effect experienced in health related issues. Reports by the Emergency Planning Team, Hertfordshire County Council indicate that about 2,000 people had to be evacuated from the vicinity during the rescue mission in order to minimize the probable casualties (Emergency Planning Team, 2006). Businesses were not spared either where about 92 businesses were involuntarily forced to close down business for about a week while others relocated permanently and over 1000 workers from the adjacent industries unable to access their workplaces until the conditions in the area were stabilized. The county and also the local businesses experienced great economical blow from this incident for instance, relocation expenses and also losses from this catastrophe were estimated to be as high as £70 million. Other losses were experienced in businesses and transport sector. Legal suits were also filed by the local in claim for compensation for the damages in property that attracted up to a total of a billion pounds in remunerations (Crime and disorder review panel, 2007). For instance, the terminal supplied 30% of the fuel required by Heathrow airport and thus oil shortages led to grounding of some flights (Emergency Planning Team, 2006). Environmental impacts Environmental impacts especially on ground and water pollution were also not very high as was presumed during the fire incident. Despite the high quantities of vapor and fine particles released by the fuel tanks that caused the high combustion, environmental experts discovered that they had little or un-significant effect on the surrounding ground (Health Protection Agency, 2006). Runoffs of the oil into the surrounding water bodies that could have caused aggravated effects to the eco-balance of the area were contained. In their assessment reports, the Health Protection Agency (2006) indicated that instead of the thick cloud of fuel vapor condensing and settling on the ground, it tended towards the air tearing the wintertime boundary layer and into the free troposphere at higher altitudes. Based on reports by Jon et al., (2006) UK National atmospheric emission inventory, the fine particle emissions (PM10) from this fire were recorded to be about 6% of the countries’ total annual pollutant emissions. Other reports also summarized the measured emissions in their respective estimated quantities compared to total annual emissions; PM10 and PM2.5 emissions were estimated to be between 4 to 8.5%, while B[a]P emissions were reported to be about 5 and 10%. Other pollutants emitted like NO2 and dioxins read a value 0.003% and 0.6%, respectively. Some of the emissions that were measured most form these explosions were; nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, dioxins and furans. The minimal effect of the plumage was due to the weather that discouraged the plume from mixing with the environment properly. Apart from the minimal effects that were experienced to the surrounding environments, some of other changes that were experienced in the surrounding structures were accumulation of soot on the roof tops which was relatively harmless, carbon dust accumulation which was presumed to have irritant effects and dust which had spread even into the crop fields (Health Protection Agency, 2006). Structural Impact The fire was reported to have been catastrophic and its effects could be felt by many in different ways both near and far. For instance, some of the reports indicate that witnesses who were as far as 70miles away could see the great pillars of smoke and flames as the explosions carried on. Houses and buildings in the surrounding area were also shaken, glasses broken from the windows, walls collapsed and even doors torn. An example is the Holy Trinity church and Leverstock Green School, that were shaken to the brink of being brought down. Vehicles within the location also experienced the great force of this inferno to a point of some going up in flames (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). On the site of the oil terminal, the fuel vapor large quantities of vapor were seen emanating from a bund on the North-West corner of the Buncefield site. This loss was presumably in consistency with rate at which the tanks and pipe works were losing their consignment. After a prolonged loss, a great explosion then followed with other small explosions. 21 tanks in the site were engulfed in the flames that spread all over within minutes (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). This explosion spread its effects that were within a radius of about 2km from the terminal however some of these structures suffered minimal structural damages. Health impact Despite the efforts of firefighters and other law enforcement groups, the number of feared casualties was reported to be about 43. Health Protection Agency reports reported that the fire resulted in high numbers of people attending Accident & Emergency Departments for medical assistance. However, 75% of the people who attended these departments were emergency workers but most of them had no serious symptoms. Reports by the Health Protection Agency (2006), the Dacorum and Watford and Three Rivers Primary Care Trusts study released in 2006 indicated that exposure to the plume had no signs of a lasting public health risk. Some of the commonest health issues that were reported included; shortness of breath, coughing, asthma and lacerations or strains that were attributable to the explosion and fire. After the aftermath of the fire event experienced in Buncenfield, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration stepped up the requirements and standards that the new businesses had to adhere to ensure that safety was at its maximum. However just to ensure safety of the surrounding environment, took a precaution to close down some of the abstraction boreholes that were used to provide drinking water (Pat, 2006). Recommendations Due to the largely presumed extent of hazard that could have been caused by the explosion at the terminal, it was recommended that it is important that all the safety concerned arms of the government step up the standards required by oil terminal operators. Oil terminal operators also on the other hand also thought it wise to improve the basic safety standards of operation and risk management. In line with this, the Health Protection Agency and other Major Key players involved in the Incident Investigation Board, concluded and recommended stringent measures to prevent incidents of such great magnitude in future (Health Protection Agency, 2006). With this they advised that it is paramount for terminal operators that safety measures be put in place to avert fuel leakages from the storage tanks (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2007). In addition to that, it was also deemed important that extra safety measures be put in place to help counter any leakages that may be experienced from the storage tanks. Among this safety measures, should include an important measure to mainly help in preventing the formation of any flammable vapor and also environmental poisoning and contamination by pollutants (Major Incident Investigation Board Buncefield 2007). New regulations were hence drawn involving major partners in the oil production industries providing these services with this region. In this, it was concluded that impacts of this magnitude costs great losses to the companies especially if it affects the surrounding areas. With this fact in mind, it was then seen that it is important to subject the structures surroundings of any terminal or pipeline to standards that are going to ensure safety is improved. According to the safety standards required for any person operating a business or even putting up a business premises near a pipeline of an oil terminal, it is important that they adhere to the most recent safety standards (Emergency Planning Team, 2006). In line with this, most of the companies have therefore come up with regulations and standards necessary for the construction of these structures to minimize the impact in cases of a fire incident or explosion. For instance, the Special requirements for safe working in close proximity to high pressure pipeline (2006) Guidelines for any work near Pipelines drafted by oil owners like; BP, BPA, ConocoPhillips, E-On, Esso, GPSS, Huntsman, Mainline, Manchester Jet-line Limited, Shell and Total. These regulations were designed to provide guidelines to the people building structures near the pipelines to ensure safe working. According to these pipeline operators, these safe working requirements are not exhaustive but can ensure minimal effects that can be felt. These safety regulations dictate that a new builder/developer has to undergo some procedures in order to attain consent to establish a premises near an oil terminal or pipeline, he/she has to provide; a brief description of the proposed works, a plan with a National Grid reference, a proposed time scale for the works. These have to be vetted and approved by the pipeline operators under the parliament act and deeds of grant. i.e. Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1948, the Land Powers (Defence) Act 1958, shell-Mex and BP (London Airport Pipeline) Act 1959, Esso Petroleum Company Act 1961, Pipelines Act 1962, Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996. Some of the basic safety regulations drafted by these organizations that a builder has to adhere to while working near these sites include; All builders prior to commencement of all Works should submit a written task risk assessment and method statement will be. Also a legal agreement should be provided for any work to e carried in the area of the way leave. A written consent from the pipeline operator should also be acquired in order for one to carry out any ground adjustments i.e. raising or lowering of the ground. The pipeline that is at permanent road crossings and parking areas, including temporary construction areas must be covered using concrete slab for protection. However, the developer will be required to expose the pipeline under the supervision of a pipeline operator representative to provide chance for the inspection of the pipe protective wrapping repair and approval by the pipeline operator or the operators’ agent. It is also required that the easement be pegged out and fenced off prior to commencement of any work. Agreed points of crossing across the easement for construction machines should be protected using tied timber material or temporary concrete slab or hardcore. Service crossings (i.e. drains, cables, pipes, etc.), must be grouped together at a common point to prevent indiscriminate crossings along the pipeline. Pipeline marker posts must be installed at the Promoter's expense each side of all road crossings and elsewhere as necessary, to mark the pipeline route. These pipeline markers however must be provided by the pipeline operators at least a forty night in advance. The pipeline easement should not be occupied by any buildings, structures or caravans. The pipeline easement is also supposed to be located in an open area since easement/pipeline access is required at all times thus will help reduce disruptions of other activities taking place in the easement. Since the pipeline is cathodically protected, it is the responsibility of the promoter to protect against the construction against it. This should be paramount activity of the promoter so as to reduce any anticipated risks. Tree planting also around the easement should be restricted since the roots might have adverse effects on the pipeline infrastructure. The proprietors should ensure according to the safety standards that no explosives are used within 400 meters of the pipeline without consent from the Pipeline Operator or the operators’ agent. There should be no pile driving within 30 metres/100 ft of the pipelines unless there is a prior agreement with the Pipeline Operator or his Agent. The developer should ensure that there should not be any 3D seismic survey using the Vibrosis method within 30 meters (100ft) of the pipeline without prior agreement. Alternative method of crossing the pipelines such as directional drilling, thrust boring or other trenchless techniques should be considered in certain conditions. Special consideration should be given to High voltage electric cable crossing the pipelines to ensure that paramount cover and safety is maintained. Conclusion The Buncefield incident was an incident that could have been averted from the start if the oil plants operators had put in place stringent measures to ensure the leakages and some of the technical faults could be contained. On the other hand this incident was seen to set off the trigger in many of the key players responsible in assuring safety standards within and around the oil terminals. It is none the less a good lesson learnt and luck that the environmental impact was not as great as was expected and the fire fighting services were well prepared. Good and advance preparedness in petrochemical fire prevention and containment was one of the major factors that could be attributed to the efficient response. However, despite the many drafts and safety standards reports from the various organizations that have been put in place to minimize such occurrences in future, state regulations under Section 16 of The Land Powers (Defence) Act 1958 deter establishment of most works in the vicinity of these establishments without advance approval from the Secretary of State. References Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. (2007) Explosion Mechanism; Advisory Group report crown publishers. Crime and disorder review panel. (2007) The Buncefield incident. Background publishers. Emergency Planning Team. (2006) Hertfordshire County Council emergency.planning@hertscc.gov.uk Health Protection Agency. (2006) Key Findings from the Health Surveillance and Monitoring Post Buncefield Oil Depot Fire. Health Protection agency. London. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service. (2006) Review of the Buncefield incident fire response. The Stationery Office. Great Britain. Jon B., Jaume T. (2006) National monitoring, emissions and data activities. Buncefield. Major Incident Investigation Board Buncefield. (2007) Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites". http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk. Pat .T. (2006) The Public Health Impact of the Buncefield Oil Depot Fire. Health Protection Agency. London. Special requirements for safe working inclose proximity to high pressure pipeline. (2006) www.linewatch.co.uk Read More