Analysis and Observation of Sofa Super Store - Research Paper Example

Strategies and Tactics of Charleston SC Super Sofa Fire (June18, 2007) Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 2.0 Analysis and observation 5 3.0 Conclusion 9 References 12 1.0 Introduction Sofa Super Store prides itself in offering excellent customer service in furniture retail. Prior to the fire incident its Charleston branch comprised of 42,000 ft² a steel structured single-story showroom building annexed to a 17,000 ft² warehouse building located. The location of the store is strategic owing to the fact that it is located at 1807 Savannah Highway. The evening of June 18, 2007, marked the most disastrous moment of the store both in loss of property and life owing to fire which completely razed down the store and killed nine Charleston firefighters. It was reported as the greatest single loss of firefighters since the bombing incident of the World Trade Center in September 11, 2001 (Newman, 2010). 1.1 The incident It is believed that the fire started shortly before 7pm, well within the working hours of the store. This is also a time when there is significant traffic outside the store. The staff of the store believed that the fire started in the trash outside the loading dock and quickly spread inside loading dock, then to the retail showroom and the annexed warehouse are thereafter. The first call reporting the fire was made to Charleston Fire Department at around 7:08 pm and units were dispatched a minute later. It took the approximately three minutes to arrive at the scene, an admirable response time. Another battalion from the St. Andrews Public Service District arrived at the scene a minute later to reinforce the initial team. On arrival they observed that there was a trash and debris fire against the docking area wall. A team entered the showroom but they didn’t observe any obvious fire other than smoke and light at the ceiling tiles where the fire was burning form outside. It has been noted that the Incident Commander opened the door from the dock area leading the showroom prompting an inrush of oxygen which aggravated the fire to enter the showroom. It is thought that the fire’s fury made it impossible for the commander to close the door to prevent the fire from engulfing the showroom. It is also suggested that the fire was slowly burning due to lack of oxygen in the dock area but the sudden influx of oxygen made it possible for the fire to migrate to the mail retail showroom (Newman, 2010). Approximately forty five minutes later the fire is still razing and a flashover occurs. The interior of the showroom erupts into a fireball and collapse sending ashes and debris all over the area. The fire is brought under control four hour later but in those four hours six firefighters from the Charleston had lost their lives. Apparently they were trapped in the main showroom and several efforts to rescue them were futile. The rescue operation was also marred with water shortages compounded by blockages of the pipes as the ensuing traffic drove over the water supply lines (Routley, 2008). 1.2 Unusual circumstances  There are several unique circumstances that made the fire incident different from other fires. Firstly, the fire occurred at 7pm a time when traffic is high thus navigating through the traffic would have been a problem for the firefighters. However the firefighters did exceptionally well considering they took three minutes to access the scene. Secondly, it was observed that the store had not installed fire sprinkler system; this was not a requirement at the time of construction. This would have saved both the property and lives lost in the incident. Thirdly, the store did not seem to have a disaster management system and if was available the staff had not been trained on. This is so because it was observed that some staff was going on with their duties at the time of the fire. One staff was strapped in the inferno forty five minutes after the call to the fire station, suggesting there was no proper evacuation procedure as this could have identified the missing staff (Stech, 2007). Fourthly, over twenty minutes into the fire rescuing operation, the nearby traffic had not been stopped or diverted further more there were many onlookers around the scene. This situation endangered more lives. Fifthly, it was also observed that the ongoing traffic was also blocking the supply of water. In as much as the traffic on Savannah Highway was finally stopped, the fire had done a lot of damage. In as far as the Charleston fire department scored very well in terms of response time, it was clear that the challenge they faced at the store was either a peculiar one or there must have been professional negligence in their part. There were two fire fighting departments but it was not clear who was in command. It is not clear whether pre incident survey was conducted judging from the misfortunes that occurred. Expert opinion from NIST team of investigators concede that the factors which contributed to the fire complications included: flammable materials in the store; lack of sprinkler system; open layout of the store; hidden combustible smoke; lack of fire walls; breach of the widows allowing oxygen into the showroom, among others (Stech, 2007). 2.0 Analysis and observation 2.1 Strategic considerations  Strategic considerations for Charleston SC Super Sofa Fire can be clustered into two tiers i.e. national and institutional. The national considerations include those approaches aimed at improving fire safety across the country and are usually aimed at the long run. Such include the reinforcement and enforcement of the fire code, disaster management code, building code etc.; training on public fire safety training and continuous research on fire prevention and containment techniques. The institutional approaches are those concerns implemented at the various organizations across the country (Polchin, 2009). They involve the people, systems and procedures within an organization. In this case the U.S. Commerce Departments National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), called for national safety improvements after investigating the Charleston SC Super Sofa fire. In their report they recommended that all state and local jurisdictions adopt building and fire codes based on revises model codes, aggressively implement the codes, employ NFPA professionally qualified fire inspectors, the model codes to demand and enforce sprinkler systems in retails regardless of the size, use of comprehensive risk management plans in their undertaking, development and training on ventilation guides during fire incidences and conduct research on upholstered furniture flame and on improving fire barriers. In another investigation, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health investigators also recommended the development, implementation and enforcement of: Occupational Health and Safety guidelines based on NFPA 1500, develop, Incident Management System to guide firefighter in all incident operations, guidelines that establishes training standards and requirements for its members (Newman, 2010). 2.2 Tactical considerations  Tactical considerations are those measures done frequently or on a daily basis to avert fire disasters most of which are institutional than the national. The national level tactics will involve daily, weekly or annual activities like, inspections, audits and training (Polchin, 2009). Institutional tactics will involve maintenance of fire equipment, fire drills, staff training on occupational safety and health etc. In the case of Charleston SC Super Sofa, indications are that they did not have an occupational safety and health policy, and if they had it dint have fire prevention, firefighting and evacuation procedures. At the same time they did not have a sprinkler system in the store, owing to ignorance of its importance or laxity on the part of the local jurisdiction as frequent inspections and follow ups could have remedied the situation. At the same time, the Charleston public had not been sensitized on fire disastrous (Frazer, 2007). At the same time it was evident that the Charleston SC Super Sofa fire presented a unique situation for the fire department which inadvertently stretched their knowledge and resources in fire fighting. Training in this case is a viable tactic in fire prevention initiatives. Tactical recommendations made by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health investigators included: clear identification of one Incident Commander with responsibility to coordinate all activities at an incident; ensure integrity is sustained in the crew, ensure that there is enough personnel and equipment to respond immediately to incidents, pre-incident planning inspections of buildings, establishing and maintaining adequate water supply, refresher training for fire fighters and line officers in accordance to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021 (Sypen, 2010) To avert similar fire catastrophe the following strategic and tactical recommendations were made by the NIOSH investigators to fire departments across the US. There is need to develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500; develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations; develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles; ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident; ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior firefighting operations (Routley, 2008); train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates; ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fire ground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts; ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System; ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive; ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fire ground; ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire; ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations; ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents (Sypen, 2010); ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents; ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations ; conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fire ground strategies and tactics; consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps; develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments (Routley, 2008); ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present; ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained; consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit; ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander ; train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure; ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021; implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments; ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus; protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control (Polchin, 2009); ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities (Sypen, 2010); ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA); develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use; use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire; develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction; establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities; and ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation; provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments. Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations were advised to: consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards (Stech, 2007). 3.0 Conclusion It is evident that there was failure in both Charleston fire department and the Charleston SC Super Sofa. Charleston fire department and local authorities was at fault because they failed in their duty enforce the national fire code in their jurisdiction, they did not have SOPs on dealing with such fires and managing such incidences, they did not have in place mechanisms to continuously train and update its staff on modern fire fighting skills, they did not seem to be in full control of the incident, lack of planning in approaching fire incidences etc. In summary the fire code was not institutionalized in the department. The Charleston SC Super Sofa store was at fault for not implementing the occupational safety and health code in their organization (Routley, 2008). Nationally, there should be an overall framework that guides occupational safety and health and disaster management. Such a framework should guide and integrate the activities of the regional, local, institutional and community levels. There should also be a mechanism that encourages feedback from the community all the way up to the national level. There should be adequate personnel, systems and processes to support such a framework. Such a framework should be overseen by a state agency enforced by a state law. At each region, the agency should have sub agencies to enforce the policies. The regional agencies should also be well equipped to ensure development, implementation and enforcement of the said policies in all the institutions within its jurisdiction. The institutions must also do everything to institutionalize the policies within their organization. Initiatives like developing SOPs on Occupational Safety and Health, staff training, provision of firefighting equipment should be encouraged. Lastly, the community should also ensure that the laws are implemented within their environment as this will be for their own benefit. Such initiatives include citizen monitoring (Routley, 2008). For urban planning, the development, implementation and continuous improvement of Fire Management Plans are very important. The approach for developing such plans should bring together a range of agencies and organisations within the locality to discuss, plan and manage fire in the community. Typically these organizations involved are those that are responsible for fire prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and the community at large. Such an approach will ensure a more strategic and integrated practice to planning for fire management, thus cutting on effect of fire within the given locality. Extensive community involvement should be encouraged during the planning and implementation stage. Such plans should guide the community in compliance with appropriate building site location, building design and construction, provision of adequate water supplies, appropriate clearing and landscaping, provision of fire/maintenance mechanisms, advice to existing and new residents, appropriate vehicle access, appropriate layout and land use etc. Such a plan will define and institutionalize fire prevention, preparedness and fighting in the community (Frazer, 2007). It is evident that the US fire fighting regime benefited greatly for the investigations of the Charleston SC Super Sofa fire as some if the recommendations have greatly informed the current policy on fire management both at the national and institutional level. It is also clear that the success of such systems require deliberate planning and subsequent involvement of all the stakeholders during the implementation process. In the case of Charleston SC Super Sofa fire, the national code on fire had either not been updated or enforced to the letter by its custodian. For instance the requirement of a fire wall between the docking area and the showroom was complied with however due to malfunction it did not prevent the fire from crossing to other areas. Such requirements seem to be trivial to an ignorant mind yet a very vital aspect in fire prevention (Routley, 2008). Frequent facility inspections and audits by the local jurisdiction could have identified and corrected anomalies in the facility. At the same time the owners of the stores should have in place mechanisms to implement the prescribed codes. In conclusion, there is need for an integrated approach in dealing disaster, where all the stakeholders are involved in planning, implementing and monitoring of a disaster management framework. References Frazer E. (2007)."Fire agency faces criticism," The State Newman M E. (2010). NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements. Retrieved on 22nd November 2011, from: http://www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm Polchin J. (2009). The High Price of Neglecting Rolling Fire Door Testing and Maintenance. Life Safety Digest Routley J.G (2008). Lessons Learned from the Charleston South Carolina Super Store Fire Embassy Suites, Beachwood, Ohio Stech K (2007). Super Sofa Store building had long history. The Post and Courier. Retrieved on 22nd November 2011, from: http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2007/jun/23/super_sofa_store_building_had_long_history/ Sypen D. (2010). The Charleston Sofa Super Store Tragedy: The Importance of Enforcing Building & Fire Safety Codes. University of Cincinnati Open Learning Fire Science Program Read More