Sofa Superstore Fire in Charleston SC - Case Study Example

 Sofa Superstore Fire in Charleston SC In June 18, 2007, the Charleston Sofa fire incident occurred, in Charleston, South Carolina, USA ending up in the death of nine of the firefighters. The event happened at the Sofa Super Store, comprising of 42,000 ft2 single-story steel trussed showroom building with 17,000 ft2 warehouse building situated behind the retail space, located at 1807 Charleston savannah Highway. There were no fire sprinkler systems at the building. The fire started exactly at 7:00 PM. in a loading dock area that is covered between the warehouse and the showroom building which was attached to both buildings. The business, at the time, was still open, and the employees were present. Within an approximately three minutes of the alarm the Charleston firefighters had already arrived at the scene, followed closely by the St. Andrews Public Service District firefighters. The primary attack mainly focused on putting out the fire at the loading dock region, with a second effort to evacuate and search for people trapped inside, and prevent the fire from spreading to the warehouse and showroom. It was reported by the teams entering the showroom that they initially encountered clear visibility with only very light Smokey puffs observable near the back of the showroom ceiling. Shortly after that, an outside door was opened in proximity to the raging fire. Attempts to close the door failed, permitting the fire to breach into the showroom. There was an order for the firefighters to extend two hose lines into the showroom to mitigate the spreading fire; unfortunately, the initially connected line was not enough. It needed some firefighters to leave the building again in order to increase the sections of the hose, and to hold off the growing fire they had to leave only one small hand line. Fire dispatchers about this time notified the crews on the ground that they had got a distress call from an employee still trapped in the warehouse, which forced some of the firefighters to re-direct their attention towards the rescue. To eventually save the trapped employee, the firefighters had to breach an exterior wall to reach the victim (Routely, et al., 2007). Despite efforts to extinguish and confine the fire, it persisted and spread into the building structure and kindled the showroom furniture, developing much faster than the original operational hose lines could handle. Meanwhile attempts to begin operating additional hose lines and stretch their range extended. The showroom area of the store at 7:41 p.m. with at least sixteen firefighters still working inside experienced a flashover. The flashover added to the already rapid deterioration of the building's integral structure leading to an almost complete rooftop collapse a few minutes after. Most of the firefighters caught in the event could not escape and thus were trapped under the weakened shelving and collapsed roof affected by the rapidly spreading fire. The trapped firefighters made several calls for help and rescue efforts were initiated. They however were unsuccessful. Nine of the Charleston firefighters by the time the fire was brought under control had already been killed. The Sofa Super Store site was on the main commuter and business artery feeding the shopping center and suburbs of Charleston. For long car traffic continued unabated in the initial stages of the incident, driving over the water supply lines and adding to serious water shortage problems. At last the Savannah Highway automobile traffic was stopped so that there would be a consistent water pressure, the diversions for the traffic caused the surrounding area to fill with stranded onlookers and commuters. As the fire receded and seemed controlled, nearing 11; 00 PM, the nearby area began to disperse, and spectators went home, most unaware of the death caused by the fire. Analysis shows that the firefighters died mainly from the combination of burns and smoke inhalation, but not from injuries got from the collapse itself (Cote, 2006). The following long list of challenges illustrates what went wrong in the Charleston store, both before and during the fire response. It was noted that since 1998 the store had not been inspected for code enforcement purposes, and the city had reviewed its system to eliminate the mandate for yearly fire inspections in mercantile occupations in 2001, according to the report. Two workshops and a wooden loading dock were added on the property without requesting, or permits being issued. The fire separation efforts were compromised by these additions that provided the permitted structure to be constructed without any automated sprinklers being installed and in addition removal of at least one of the main building initial doors. Several exits, after the fires, were found to be padlocked or blocked. If effective fire walls had been provided or if the building had effective equipped sprinklers, the fire might have been contained and not spread beyond the loading dock. The likely cause of the tragic fire at the store can be traced to the smoking materials that burnt the materials stored outside the loading dock and the discarded furniture, according to the report. The aggressive approach to firefighting according to the department entailed interior attack with small hose lines, which was thoroughly insufficient to regulator the very high fire of the Super Stores contents inside large structure adjacent buildings, including narrow aisles of the furniture-packed showrooms in display. The report states that firefighters begun to run out of air once they entered the building, but their radio calls for assistance were never heard. The department continually used offensive tactics after the point where risk management guidelines demanded a defensive strategy (Stech, 2007). The incident at the Sofa Super Stores clearly demonstrates the importance of an efficient (IMS) Incident Management System to provide control, command and efficient coordination of emergency services. It also highlights the fact that the essential risk management concepts have to be implemented after being well understood at all levels within the Charleston Fire Department. The level of acceptance must be justified and weighed by the practical benefits that can be achieved. The appropriate strategies decision either defensive or offensive is the central element that controls the safety of the firefighters. An appropriate strategy decision must be based on a realistic evaluation of the capabilities and resources that are available to carry out the operations and the risk management applications of risk management principles. It also points out that there can only be effective offensive strategy when the fire department can conduct an exterior attack that delivers an adequate amount of dousing agents by firefighters to put out the fire. If an offensive attack cannot be attained effectively and safely with the available resources, it should not be tried. Such decisions have to be solely left to the Incident commander. The radio system at Charleston appears to have the functionality, capacity, and reliability to support effective tactical communications. The system should be analyzed to guarantee that it is designed to offer all operating members in IDLH areas with the ability to maintain communication with a designated individual outside the IDLH area or the Command Post. Lastly, all the fire department members at Charleston must be trained properly and qualified to perform their assigned duties, including their given tasks, including short-term jobs. People who are permitted temporarily to work in higher level assignments must be evaluated and trained in performing those tasks. A periodic reevaluation of all members must be done to ensure that they are capable of carrying out their defined roles more efficiently and safely if these changes are carried out (Menchaca, & Smith, 2008). References Cote, A. E. (2006). Fire protection handbook (18thed.).Quincy, MA: NFPA. Menchaca, R. & Smith, G. (2008). Review, changes costly in Charleston. The Post & Courier/Firehouse.com Routely, J. G., et.al. (2007). City of Charleston post incident assessment and review team: Phase1report. City of Charleston, SC. Stech, K. (2007). Super Sofa Store building had long history. The Post and Courier (Charleston). Read More