More Intelligence Failures Are Caused By Failures of Analysis than By Intelligence Collection - Essay Example

More Intelligence Failures Are ‘Caused By Failures of Analysis than By Intelligence Collection’ Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Discussion 4 Critical Analysis 5 Intelligence Cycle 7 Planning and Direction 8 Collection 9 Processing 9 Production 10 Dissemination 10 Challenges Faced By the Intelligence Agencies 11 Scenario Planning 13 Political Driving Forces 14 Conclusion 15 References 17 Introduction Over the last century, intelligence failure has been a common phenomenon across the world. The repercussions of intelligence failure often range from minute political losses to huge economic and human life losses. Several instances of devastating losses have been witnessed under several scenarios at different parts of the world. Intelligence failure results in a huge blow not only in the political sphere, but also on the social life of the people. However, even after beholding several instances of intelligence failures the major reasons that lead to the occurrence of such failures are still not exposed. Several experts have been of the view that intelligence failure does not occur due to the failure of information collections, but because of wrong analysis of the collected data. On a larger note, the development of the analytical process could lead to the development of the system, leading to less situations of major information failure. In general the information security agencies define the term intelligence as information. Correspondingly, intelligence is defined as a process of information collection that can be converted into intelligence. The organization that collects raw data and then analyses the same to convert into information provides the political system a support to protect the nation from probable uncertain instances (Kruys, 2006; Gill & Phythian, 2006). A number of instances in the world depict the fact that failure of intelligence can have severe impact on the nation and can lead to a devastating situation leading to the immense loss of life. On a contrary, the political decision making of the nation creates psychological biases and influences the decision making for the nation at large. The strategic deception of bureaucratic politics creates the cognitive mind setting amid the analysts and even narrows down their skills which in turn influences the intelligence analysis. The influences of the political processes leads to several catastrophic instances inhibiting the proper analysis of collected information that leads to wrong analysis of the information and finally leads to intelligence failures. With this concern the essay analyses the failures of the intelligence analysis over the intelligence collections. By depicting several instances of consequences that lead to the strategic failure of information the essay well justifies the statement and provides support to the same. Discussion Intelligence is observed to be the fundamental element that ensures the security of a nation. Several instances of intelligence failure are evident in the history of the world which has a radical impact on the national persistence and even creates a huge backlog in the national development. The proper analysis of intelligence can be argued to provide the means to secure the nation and even safeguards the process of continuous development. Intelligence in the broader term provides relative security that bestows an advantage of the competitive pursuit. However, there are evidences that the national security was at stake not because of the failure of the collection of raw data, but for the wrong or biased analysis of the collected information. Several evidences support the fact that the unconscious psychological biases of the analysts have often created a severe effect on the proper development of an action plan. It can be firmly stated that the politicising has also been affecting the credibility of the intelligence. The pejorative presumption endured by the intelligence analysts by politicising can lead to instances of intelligence failure that might threaten the security of the nation. Moreover the prevalent conceptions that politicising distorts the collected information cannot be completely nullified (Heuer, 2005; Betts, 2002). For instance, during the Vietnamese war the analysts of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were demotivated continuously due to the politicising of the intelligence analysis and were even threatened that their career would be at stake. This abrupt attitude of the bureaucrats affected the nature of information sharing and even negatively influenced the moral courage of the information agencies (Adams, 1996). Conversely, it can be noted that in several instances that lead to devastating situations to mankind and instances of war the analysis of the raw data has played a pivotal part in developing such instances at large. The manipulation of the collected raw data leads to the failure of the synthesis of information leading to the warfare and development adverse situation, making the national security vulnerable to several risks (Bar-Joseph & Levy, 2009). Critical Analysis Intelligence failure is mostly considered to be the results of the improper analysis of the collected information. Accordingly, Matthias (2001) suggests that under several instances, it has been noted that the failure of the analytic agency led to the failure of the strategic analysis of the scenarios. It has been noted the influences of policy makers have influenced the proper synthesis of the raw information. Moreover, this flaw in the synthesis of the collected information has opened ways for enemies to achieve their total victory. It could be noted by the situational analysis that led to the devastating scenario of Pearl Harbour. Wohlstetter (1962) depicts the flaw in the judgement of the warning signals triggered at the time of the attack on pearl harbour. The misjudgement and the delayed decision making led to the colossal and the extraordinary blunder at pearl harbour, which eventually led to a devastating situation for the people. This made it evident that even when the information was available to the intelligence agency about the incidence of the attack, the improper analysis of the same led to such disastrous situation. With the unambiguous reports that indicated on the major abnormalities of the Japanese planning led to the failure of the intelligence agency to analyse the attack to a greater extent. It could be stated that a minute flaw in the assessment of the collected information may lead to several instances of discrepancies and put the nation under threat. Accordingly, it is the prime duty of intelligence analyst to conduct an objective specific intelligence survey (Zulficar, 2012). Similarly, in the case of the TET offensive attacks as depicted by the Wirtz (1994), the intelligence failure led to severe political turmoil within Vietnam, leading to the failure of the country to avert the situation of war. Furthermore, it has often been evident that the psychological biases created by the political policy makers have been influencing the decision making of the intelligence team. Several other instances in the world history make it evident that the intelligence failure can lead to the instances of intelligence of failure and war. As depicted by Erikson & Dilks (1994), the failure of the intelligence agencies in the Operation Barbarossa led to the Second World War. In several instances, it has been noted that even with the availability of substantial information, there has been intelligence failure. This could probably be because of the malfunctioning of the other systems involved with the intelligence agencies. Several instances of intelligence failures, the dilemma of the policy makers was observed to be lingering their decision making even when the intelligence agencies has been adequately informed about the calamity. The strategic decision that was to be taken by the policy makers at the time of the crisis has been largely influenced by the different political delicacies at the various levels of the bureaucracy. The major causes of such failures were the prolonged system of the decision making that led to failures of prompt decision making (Bruneau & Dombroski, n.d.). Furthermore, the continuous revolution in the system of information sharing has been making the system vulnerable to the risks of mass devastation. It has been observed in several situations that the lack of proper assessment of the information leads to the ambiguity of decision making affecting the clarity as well as the acceptability of decision making (Turner, 2014). It can be stated that by the development of a better system of information sharing the analysis of data should be clearly segregated from the influence of politicising. Moreover, the democratic consolidations that is to be taken into consideration when conducting the analyses of the data is observed to creating a huge backlog for the development of comprehensive intelligence. These ethical dilemmas created due to the practices of the complex bureaucratic system of decision making have been affecting the intelligence system at large and leading to instances of intelligence failure. At the occurrence of situation of war or sudden terrorist attack, it has been noted that the synthesis of information has been duly conducted. However, the situation could not be altered due to the dilemma of political decision making. Instances have made it evident that the continued delay in decision making has also been one of the major reasons giving rise to such adverse situations. Evidently, in the case of the Iran war in the recent years the continuous aversion of the prompt decision making at the US bureaucrat led to the adverse situation of intelligence failure leading to massive devastation. Similar instances were also evident at the time of the cold war when the delayed decision making gave rise to the situation of turmoil (Turner, 2014; Kam & Kam, 2009; Murphy, 2005; Sick, 198). Intelligence Cycle Intelligence cycle has been an integral part of the intelligence system at large. The intelligence cycle provides the complete procedure of the information analysis a guide to enhance the system of intelligence analysis. The intelligence cycle provides the contemporary intelligence system a proper flow that would ensure the timely and accurate information sharing. This would also ensure that the timely information is available to the policy makers so that they can correctly assess the comprehensive information and decide accordingly. The intelligence cycle usually follows a particular chain (Phythian, 2013). This could be depicted through the following illustration: Figure 1: Intelligence Cycle (Source: Turner, 2014; Department of the Navy, n.d.) The importance of the different phases of the decision making has been elaborated through the following points: Planning and Direction The cycle starts with the development of the planning and directing stage where the policymakers request for the collection of information about a particular issue. Moreover, the planning for developing a sequence of action that is needed to be followed to enhance the system of decision making is required to be conducted in this initial phase. There has been a majority of the strategic planners of the military department supporting that planning and decision making is the most decisive phase of the intelligence cycle. Depending on the high strategic decision making, it is needless to say that the effectiveness of the decision making is majorly dependent on the planning phase. This phase even provides the complete system with a direction in which the information is to be collected and synthesised to achieve the objective of the analysis (Turner, 2014; Phythian, 2013; Negulescu, 2011). Collection The most important segment of the intelligence cycle is the collection phase. The collection phase is involved with the assessment of the raw information. This phase is considered to be of utmost importance as the complete system of the analysis phase is dependent on the collection phase. This phase involves interception of a sequence of information like the signal intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) as well the imagery intelligence (IMINT). This backed up by the several other intelligence systems enhance the quality of the collected data. However, the system of the collection process keeps on changing with the changing needs of the changing times. Moreover, the collection methods are also evolving with the development of new technology. This has been enhancing the quality of the data and developing a better acceptance of the collected data to make proper decisions in the long run (Phythian, 2013; Negulescu, 2011). Processing The processing phase of the intelligence cycle is considered to be the analytical phase. This is the phase where the raw information is transformed into the intelligence phase. This stage of the intelligence cycle is involved with the decryption of the collected information and converting the same into intelligence that would help in proper decision making. This phase even deals with the nullification of the unimportant data and helps in achieving the generalisation of the data. This enhances the process of decision making, keeping it aligned with the objective and helps in achieving success. This is an effective technical stage; failing to fulfil the needs of the proper analysis of the collected information can lead to the failure of the complete intelligence cycle (Phythian, 2013; Department of the Navy, n.d.). Production The production stage of the intelligence cycle is majorly concerned with the integration of the other phases, namely the collection phase, processing and analysis phase, as well as the evaluation phase. This phase helps in disseminating the collected information with the set objective for conducting the intelligence survey. This phase deals with the conversion of the basic data into final intelligence and by following a series of evaluation and analysis. The phase deals with the development of reliability, validity as well as the relevance of the data. Moreover, the proper analysis conducted in this phase of the intelligence cycle provides the policymakers the proper support to develop a justified decision that would enhance the system of intelligence at large (Phythian, 2013; Department of the Navy, n.d.). Dissemination This is the last segment of the intelligence cycle. However, depending on the dynamic behaviour of the cycle the process does not end with dissemination. Rather the process continues with the further researches and planning, unless the processed intelligence is in its actual form to be used effectively. Moreover, this stage is further followed by the justification of the judgement at the end of the decision makers. This stage additionally helps in developing the corrective measures that could be developed to meet the effectiveness of the decision making. The process should also include the reformation and reanalysis of the tactical decision making for ensuring a better support for decision making. The final stage of the cycle involves the effective distribution of the comprehensive intelligence to the respective personnel as and when required (Phythian, 2013; Department of the Navy, n.d.). Challenges Faced By the Intelligence Agencies There have been several instances of intelligence failures in the history of the world that has been leading to mass casualties and loss of properties for nations. The devastating effect that has been caused by the intelligence failures is evident at several scenarios. This phenomenon has even made the world evident of several wars that has involved several casualties and has developed a domain of threat for the common citizens of the nation. On a larger concern the failure of the intelligence agencies needs to be analysed that would help in enhancing the process of attaining a better approach to the decision making for the policy makers. There has been a series of challenges faced by the intelligence agencies, while collecting and analysing the data. The challenges could be broadly classified under a series of events that involves from the collection of information to the synthesis of the data to support the effectiveness of decision making. The involvement of the different sectors at the bureaucratic and political level makes the system of the information sharing quiet complex. This complexity leads to miscommunication and intelligence failure creating adverse situation in the nation (Erwin, 2013). The challenges like the politicising of the events affect the intelligence decision making largely. The influences of the various political decision making and the psychological biases of the investors are observed to be affecting precision of decision making. Another, major challenge could be identified to be the availability of the agile information that affects the decision making at large. Moreover, this decision making strategies terribly affects the decision making by creating ambiguous approaches towards decision making. Similar instances of the politicised decision making at the end of the intelligence agencies were evident in the case of the pearl harbour attack. The other major dilemmas are observed to be the challenges of democratic consolidation. Owing to the vast procedural dilemmas in the operation of the system leads to the later synthesis of the data leading to intelligence failure (Wohlstetter, 1962; Bruneau & Dombroski, n.d.). According to Turner (2014), the failures of the intelligence agencies are an outcome of a series of events. This even involves the transformation of the series of events into accurate and meaningful information that can easily provide an insight into the future series of events. Moreover, the utility of information is based on the process and synthesis of the events and the generated information. Correspondingly, the analysts of the information have to manage a balance between the bureaucratic imperatives and the political requirements. This phenomenon blocks the proper synthesis of the generated raw information and creates a psychological bias that leads to the unscrupulous interpretation of the data leading to the event of intelligence failure. Furthermore, the bureaucratic system of the decision making can be observed to be affecting the efficacy of the decision making. Correspondingly, at the several instances the prolonged system of decision making also affects the procedure of information analysis (Turner, 2014). Correspondingly, the changing scenario of the threats has made the requirement of the intelligence assessments quiet eminent. Moreover, the recent ambush attacks on the different parts of the world points towards the increased level of consciousness among the intelligence providers. The terror predicting abilities of the system need to be developed and enhanced in order to enhance the decision making strategies for the development of a secured system. On the long run the dilemmas of the policy makers to take the effective decision as and when required even creates a huge challenge for the intelligence agencies to operate successfully. Another major challenge that creates a severe backlog for the effective intelligence assessment is the influences of the various sectors that create a huge backlog in the effective analysis of the available information. The ideological myopias of the policy makers were quite evident in the case of the Iran where due their lack of promptness of decision making created a situation of distress within the country. This made it apparent that even after channelizing the information into meaningful stimulus of intelligence; the lack of the decision making at the political backdrop creates a diverse situation (Kam & Kam, 2009; Sick, 1985). Scenario Planning One of the major needs of the intelligence agencies is the preparedness. Preparedness of whatever may come would help the nations and their intelligence agencies to be equipped for any adverse situations. This analysis would help the nations as well as their intelligence agencies to analyse all the options that may arise and can be predicted through the available information. Scenario planning helps in developing the alternative futures that help organisation to plan the alternate solutions for a given scenario. These scenarios, even acts as change agents that help in developing the structured outcomes that would assist in attending the needs of such scenarios as and when it occurs. This even develops a greater insight on the possible effects that could be caused if a certain situation arises. The analysis of these alternatives leads to the readiness of the intelligence agencies to face all the outcomes that may arise from a particular situation. The planning for a scenario helps in nullifying the chances of the ambiguity in decision making (Chermack, 2004). Similarly, as depicted by Murphy (2005), the failure of the scenario analysis by the policy makers led to the devastation of the Soviet Union in 1941. Scenarios provide effective techniques for the future studies that lead to the development of an authentic approach to the government planners. Different categories are prepared for the analysis of the scenarios that helps in annulling the chances of the scenarios that may possibly give rise to the scenarios of war or terrorist attacks. The great value of the scenarios helps in analysing the complex scenarios that may arise out of the different circumstances. Moreover, the proper analysis of the various scenarios helps in developing a comprehensive and coherent plan that would help in understanding the conflict scenarios. Through the proper analysis of the scenario planning the instances of success were evident in the cases of the oil conflicts of 1973 (Mietzner & Reger, 2005). Political Driving Forces Once the analyst team draws out the scenario planning, it can act as a driving force at all levels of the intelligence system. Scenario planning done by the government participation also increases a better understanding between the intelligence agencies and the policy makers. It has been noted in the case of the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, the political preparedness of the scenario could easily eradicate the negative impact of the conflict. Moreover, with the insight of the complete scenarios that could be predicted by scenario planning helped in developing a better approach towards the system of intelligence planning. The political decision makers should be well equipped with the planning system that would help them to develop a better approach and tactical analysis of the information analysis. On a larger note, the development of the forecast of the possible scenario before the arousal of the actual instances would lead to the development of a better approach of the system (Bruneau & Dombroski, n.d.). This phenomenon would also help in developing a tactical approach to the scenarios of decision making on the availability of the information. This would also help in developing a scenario that would provide the system with a better support for the effective decision making. The rigorous analysis of the scenarios would help the policy makers gain the complete insight of the situation. Correspondingly, this would also help the policy planners to develop a proper planning that enhances the approaches towards intelligence. Political driving forces could only be attained by the development of a better understanding of the scenarios and their effect in the long run. This developed method of analysis of the available scenarios would enhance the approach of the system of decision making. Moreover, the political driving forces would also enhance the transparency of the political system and would develop a better approach to the system. If the political driving forces act in alignment with the intelligence agencies, the safety of the nation could be easily assured. Additionally, the alignment of the bureaucratic goals and the goals defined by information agencies would ensure security of the nation. This would even enhance security and would develop a better approach towards prompt decision making (Erwin, 2013). Conclusion The security system of the nation is mostly dependent on the different agencies that collect different information about the vulnerabilities and possible threats that are imposed on the security of the nation at large. However, the information collectors are not solely responsible for the intelligence failures that lead to the massive situations of devastation for the nation. This has been highly evident that the analysts of the security system are the ones that collects the raw data and develops it into valuable information that could assist the decision making of the nation towards a threat. This has also been observed at the several instances that the development of proper valuable information at the end of the analysts has led to the failure of the system. Moreover, the psychological biases that are created at the end of the analysts through the influences of politicising of facts are observed to be affecting the security of the nation. It has been observed that at several instances the different information that are available to the intelligence agencies needs to be analysed properly so that the reliable information are available to prevent the nation from facing any adverse situation. On a larger note, the intelligence agencies must be segregated from the political departments so that the intelligence agencies do not have to balance between the bureaucratic decision making and information analysis. Additionally, it has also been observed that even after the proper synthesis of the data into valuable intelligence the delay in decision making at the end of the policy makers had made the nation face such insecurity. It can also be argued that the raw information collectors of the intelligence agencies collect all the information that they consider to be valuable for the particular phase. It is the duty of the analysts and intelligence agencies to nullify the information that they consider irrelevant. It is at the part of the analyst to synthesize the available information and duly convert them into logical data that would help them support the policy makers in a better way. Moreover, the intelligence department should be acting adequately so that they can support the policy makers with the relevant decision making and help them understand the emergence of the situation. This would develop a better approach towards the process of decision making and would develop an efficient system that would prevent the nation from the vulnerabilities. Correspondingly, the system should be updated and developed in order to ensure that information collected is authentic and aligned with the objective of providing national security. References Adams, S., 1996. A War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. Library of Congress. Bar-Joseph, U. & Levy, J. S., 2009. Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure. Political Science Quarterly Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 461-488. Betts, R. K., 2002. Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits. Christopher H. Browne Centre for International Politics, pp.1-29. Bruneau, T. C. & Dombroski, K. R., No Date. 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