Philosophy of Mind: Knowing How and Knowing That - Essay Example

G. Ryle necessitates distinguishing one from the other based on some prospects of which, a part is to yield relief from the misconception that the mere capacity to attain knowledge of truths ought to be the defining property of the mind. As another prospect, the distinction is intended to illustrate how humans are quite disposed to pay attention to competencies and deficiencies in the process of acquiring truths instead of the truths or propositions themselves and the nature thereof. It is Ryle’s aim as well to present the similarities and dissimilarities between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ to substantiate further his findings upon the claim that the ‘intellectualist legend’ is false.

In general, Ryle points out herein that “efficient practice precedes the theory” or that ‘knowing how’ comes before ‘knowing that’. According to Ryle, theorists have often acknowledged the so-called ‘intellectualist legend’ which relies on the basic assumption that intelligent behavior is a function of what cognition has intellectually established. In other words, if such legend holds, then one is brought to conceive that any kind of performance is a product of intelligence that works within the inner faculties being its ever-prior source.

To Ryle’s analysis, however, the course of performing tasks for the sake of comprehension as an individual engages in practice to grasp the rule or operating principle can be relatively intelligent. Rather than looking into the depths of theories under the consideration that they should govern behavior as higher in level or first in order, those who depend on this convention must equivalently account for a thorough examination of the meaningful significance of knowing how a particular undertaking is desalted within several aspects toward a more confident resolution.

Through this perspective, Ryle proceeds to concretize his position by exemplifying that “A person’s performance is described as careful or skillful, if in his operations he is ready to detect and correct lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes, to profit from the examples of others and so forth.” This alludes to ‘knowing that’ may validly succeed ‘knowing how’ when empirical over theoretical approach is rendered efficient by a constant attitude of passion to practice until optimum ends are achieved.

In that manner, the ‘intellectualist legend’ becomes defeated for it would then be absurd to support a claim in which a fixed theory manages to surpass a dynamic practice as the cause of the latter especially when performances are repetitively worked out that they could, to an extent, deservingly be identified as the wisdom of origin altogether. Moreover, since the world or at least a common society in it widely believes in the reasonability of judging people based on unique skills and possessed capabilities of learning and coping with the truth, it tends to neglect the opportunity of exploring the quality of truths or propositions.

Because people appear to express more concern about how intelligence is exhibited through manual executions, it seems less difficult for them to measure ignorance and assign its degree in proportion to individual potential. For instance, a person may be fluent in speaking a language while another is assessed with below-average proficiency in using the same medium.