Intelligence Failures and Success of Pearl Harbor Attack - Research Paper Example

 Intelligence Failures and Success of Pearl Harbor Attack THESIS STATEMENT This paper will be representing the incident of Pearl Harbor, USA. “Pearl Harbor is a harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, west of Honolulu. It is the headquarters of US pacific Fleet. On December 7, 1941 the empire of Japan began an attack on US. This attack also made United States to enter into the World War 2” (Daws). HYPOTHESIS Pearl Harbor was considered as the most well built and highly raised military base of America. Japan attacked this base to force US to pull itself out of the area, leaving it free for the Japanese to continue its expansion in the Far East. Both the countries had their own set of advantages that made Japan to attack the base and America to calmly accept the surprise attack. Japan wanted to expand her invasion where as America wanted to step into the war with the permission from Congress as America at that time was following the policy of not participating in international affairs of other countries. PURPOSE STATEMENT The purpose of this paper is to describe the role of intelligence in this attack whether the intelligence failed or succeeded, areas where the intelligence failed and the reasons of its failure or if it succeeded what factors made it successful. Further the paper will be describing and highlighting the areas where improvement could have been done for better results. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The problem that is going to be discussed, mainly, is that intelligence’s role in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The solution that is presented in the paper is feasible because it will be discussing the incident from the scratch hence providing the reader with the background of the attack, the reasons why this particular region was attacked, the significance of this attack, the intention of the assailants and the role of the defenders. This will help reader in knowing the history as well as the results of the attack. The analysis will illustrate whether the intelligence failed or succeeded and then explaining the areas where improvement could be done and lastly a conclusion will be presented. The president of America Roosevelt said that “December 7, 1941 will always be an unforgettable date for the people of America and the date will live in infamy”(Pearl Harbor, 2000). The lose America faced was greater when compared to Japan’s lose. After the attack, America was brought into the World War 2 and she with Russia and Britain won the war and hence tagged itself as the new super power of the world. BACKGROUND “Early on the morning of December 7, 1941 death rained from the skies over the island of Hawaii where the US naval base was located. The island was in the Pacific Ocean which made it very important for US as the naval base was located there and all the trading to China and Far East was done through this particular port. Japanese planes bombed US military base for an hour” (Daws). The US planes and battleships were destroyed. All the main and significant battleships were destroyed, personnel were killed and major submarines were damaged. “This surprise attack opened ways for America to enter into the World War 2, a war that started from Europe in 1939 and later expanded to Asia and Africa” (Parillo, 2006). By 1941, millions of people already died because of the on going horrible and terrorized war but the surprise attack not only killed thousands of more people but also brought US to take part in the war. The strategy that was behind the surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor was to weaken America’s fleet. The action was taken in order to keep US fleet from influencing the war that the empire of Japan was intending in Southeast Asia against the Britain and its alliances. “The objective of this attack was to carve its path as to easily move to the Far East and Asia and taking control of that area. The lack of any formal warning by Japan specifically when the peace negotiations were still under process led President F.D. Roosevelt proclaiming December 7 as a date that will live in infamy”(Goff & Uschan, 2005). It all started when both the United States and Japan were having long standing possibility of having war in the Pacific which was constantly raising tension between both countries. “This tension suddenly and immensely increased in 1930s when Japan expanded into the mainland China. Japan wanted to advance itself into the Malaya and the Dutch East Indies where it can have complete access to the natural resources like oil and rubber” (Parillo, 2006). “In early 1940s, President Roosevelt ordered his nation to halt trading with Japan following its invasion of French Indochina. The trade particularly included war supplies like steel, airplanes, airplanes gas and machine tools. This was implied as an unfriendly act by the Japanese government. Later in July 1941, US stopped oil trading as well. In October 1941, the newly elected prime minister of Japan decided to attack the US base and destroy the entire Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor so that the invasion of Philippines and Attack on the British colonies becomes easy for them”(Pearl Harbor, 2000). Further the transfer of the U.S. Pacific fleet from its previous base to new base in Pearl Harbor was seen by the Japanese government as a signal for the preparation of the conflict. “Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor began in early 1941. Over the next few months the preparations were done which included the training of the pilots and elite force, arrangement and testing of equipments and intelligence collection .At this point the Japanese spies on the base played an important role” (Walter, 1962). With their reporting it became easier for the Japanese military in knowing the positions of the battleships and the way operations were carried out by the U.S. fleet. This facilitated them in designing the plot and planning the attack. On the other side, due to the cold war between the two countries since halting of the trade, U.S. officials doubted that Japan can attack U.S. base and that Pearl Harbor might be its first target. Considering this doubt the pacific base was placed on the alert at many occasions. There were several objectives behind the attack. “Firstly it was intended to destroy all the major and significant American fleet units as to prevent the fleets from interfering with Japanese in their conquest against the Southern Resource Areas. Secondly it was hoped by Japan to consolidate its positions and increase its naval strength. Finally it was to give American morale a severe blow and discourage them from interfering in the war (Gordon, Goldstein & Dillon, 1981)”. Japanese intention was to destroy as many battleships as can so that America had nothing left with which it can counter attack on them as at that time battleships were the main assets of any country. It was decided that the attack should take place in three terms. “The first wave was the major one as it consisted of huge number of airplanes and submarines. The first wave was given the responsibility to destroy as many fleets as it can. The second and third one was sent to accomplish the remaining goal i.e. if any fleet survived the attack, it should be destroyed in the second or third wave (Gordon, Goldstein & Dillon, 1981)”. The bombardment ended after 2 hours but it caused mass destruction. Destroying almost all the battleships, hundreds of aircraft, thousands were killed and numerous injured. The U.S. officials observed the attack as a surprise attack without granting any warnings but the Japanese officials sent the 14 page notification in which it was explained that they are ending the peace agreement between the two countries and hence attacking America. The commander in chief wanted to warn 30 minutes before the first torpedo was fired. “On the morning of 7 December, the Japanese ambassador in Washington was ordered to deliver the notification to the white house and inform them about the attack but the encryption and translation of the notification took time and the ambassador reached the destination late then it was intended by the Japanese officials”(Hixson & Walter, 2003). Before he could formally declare about the war, the news of attack already reached the white house and the attack was initiated on the other end. This not only stunned the world but also helped America in gathering all the sympathies and brought her in the World War 2 to support the allies (Britain, Netherlands etc). ANALYSIS “Pearl Harbor provides a dramatic and well documented example of an attack presaged by mass and variety of signals which nonetheless achieved complete and overwhelming surprise (Kam, 1988)”. Before the analysis could be done, few points should be discussed in order to conclude whether it was an intelligence failure or success. The role of intelligence is to be discussed. Few questions that can clear things are that how was the US- Japanese relations before the Pearl Harbor attack. If they were having a friendly relation it must be unaccepted for US to expect Japan’s aggression. It’s already discussed in the background section that the relationship was exacerbated after the 1930s. If the relationship was on the point of collapse and America portrayed Japan as a threat it would be easier for them to anticipate for a war. If we review the history of the political relations of both the countries till the attack, “it was heading towards the collapse soon after Japanese victory over Russia in 1905. Japan came forward as a new power in East Asia. From that time the immigrants in America were facing racism, economic anxiety and psychological fear. In July 1941, the intensified relation set the stage for Pearl Harbor attack (Marshall, 1995)”. “The negotiations started between both the countries as trying to avoid the war. In reality, however, the attempt was just to show the world about the reconciliation. The armies and navies prepared for war (Heuer, 1999)”. At this point U.S. was playing the dual game by preparing for the war on one side and negotiating on the other side. Despite series of negotiations U.S. distrusted Japanese by calling them unreliable and treacherous. The policymakers of U.S. knew that end of negotiations would likely cause an armed collision with Japan. This was the intelligence report and it was informed that Japan was ending the negotiations. “The message was decoded from the Japan embassy in Washington (Kobayashi, 2005)”. The intelligence even predicted how the war would begin. The U.S. administration was intended to enter the war and this was the right option. “The intelligence even reported that Japan was to end the agreement and might attack America (Kobayashi, 2005)”. While on the other hand, US were in the state of isolationism. America itself wanted to enter the war against Japan and Germany. “For gaining the control of the situation the officials demanded Japan to give in all its gain since 1931. This demand not only ended the negotiations but also resulted in Japan’s aggression. The administration planned this and it got the accurate result what they were foreseeing (Wohlstetter, 1962)”. As soon as the negotiations ended between both the countries, the U.S. intelligence started collection of the secret communication between the ambassador at Washington and the Japanese administration. The intelligence gathered information from different sources. “Both army and navy had special section o decode Japanese communication. It gave the officials advantage of seeing the most private communication between Japanese officials and the ambassador in different countries. Thus U.S. intelligence enjoyed extraordinary advantage in breaking the Japanese communication codes before Pearl Harbor (Heuer, 1999)”. Second source was the navy intelligence at the base. “It had a radio traffic unit that could analyze and detect the location of the Japanese ships. This could only detect the location and could not read the messages (Walter, 1994)”. Third source was the American embassy in Japan. The ambassador usually reported the high officials about the insight of the attitudes and intentions of the Japan’s administration. The information that the intelligence got was often ignored. “Before the attack, the ambassador sent a message that Japan is planning an attack on the Pearl Harbor. Intelligence investigated which late turned out to be a rumor from a Japanese cook. He was the ambassador’s cook and the ambassador used this channel so that the Japanese administration could not find out who leaked this information. But the intelligence discarded the information due to unauthentic source. If we review this information from a qualitative point of view, the information was accurate. Another warning was given by the British intelligence. The agent was sent by Germany but he was loyal to Britain. Due to the dual status of the agent the intelligence once again ignored the information (Heuer, 1999)”. “The immaturity of the intelligence resulted in not gaining impressive results and outcomes (Kobayashi, 2005)”. This resulted in not perceiving the enemy’s intention. Ambiguity about the Japanese target was a critical absence for protecting the base. Most of the information that the intelligence gathered was from unreliable source and unclear. “Inspite of verifying the authenticity of information, intelligence ignored information that was from obsolete sources. In whole operation the role of intelligence was not only weird but also questionable. The poor collection was the main reason of failure (Marshall, 1995)”. Indeed if the US intelligence had gathered more accurate and reliable information the surprise attack might have been avoided. Intelligence not only failed in collecting the information but also in analyzing them. “Collection of information was not the only reason for the failure in defending Pearl Harbor. Proper analysis rather than additional information often contributes to an accurate judgment. Analysis failures usually cause major intelligence failure (Kam, 1988)”. Hence if the United States had appropriately analyzed the information it might have prevented or at least reduced the damages at the base. The other area where the US intelligence failed was that the intelligence mispercepted the enemy’s intentions and thinking. “Intelligence assumed that the attack on US soil will be risky for Japan. The proposal that demanded Japan to surrender all its expansion in Asia encouraged Japan to fight against America (Marshall, 1995)”. Even before the war, Japan leaders knew that Japan could not defeat US as she only had one tenth of the power that America possessed. Japanese were avoiding the war not until the proposal by US officials was presented. America knew that if Japan started off with the war, Japan will have to face the consequences also. “The underestimation and overconfidence of US intelligence was also a factor that caused their failure. The lack of imagination of American analyst prevented them from predicting the attack (Kobayashi, 2005)”. Few assumptions by the officials took too lightly the possibility of Japan’s attack. “The US navy assumed that the battleships in shallow water could not be sunk by torpedo from the air. This was predetermined by the theory that minimum depth of about sixty feet was feasible to aircraft to validate the torpedo whereas the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was only 30 to 40 feet (Kam, 1988)”. To handle this difficult Japanese navy trained their pilot accordingly. Overall the underestimation of the Japan navy inferred the state of overconfidence in Americans. They thought that they were better than the Japanese from all aspects for instance they considered themselves better pilots, the inefficiency of Japanese in finding directions and also that they had better war weapons. “US overestimated its capability in defending the base. The overconfidence of US that they have come to know about the secret communication of the opponent also caused them to misjudge the intentions of enemy (Walter, 1994)”. “A submarine was detected hours before the attack still the army and navy were not on high alert (Marshall, 1995)”. Further the army and navy commanders at Pearl Harbor received several warnings of Japan’s hostility and possibility of an assault but still military didn’t take defensive positions. “Moreover in early December fleet intelligence received two reports in which it was indicated that Japan carriers have left the home port and is moving south (Kobayashi, 2005)”. This report made it clear that Japan has prepared to attack the base even then officials didn’t acted upon the report. “There were several signs that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor but because of the perceptional obstacle, the officers at the base didn’t pick them up as a threat (Wohlstetter, 1962)”. Once the intelligence had formed their minds, they only tend to see what they wanted to see and what was seemingly consistent. These were the analysis misperception that led to all the above mentioned actions. Nonetheless if the intelligence agency gathered and analyzed the information properly, the effort would be useless if the information is not used that is the management of information. There were several organizational obstacles in the Pearl Harbor case that resulted in the mismanagement. “The existence of sectionalism within the US intelligence community brought about unprecedented catastrophe upon US. Each nit was reluctant to do what was thought to be another’s job (Kam, 1988)”. The navy at the base was appointed to repot if any unusual act happens on the base but it was more interested in arranging the ships and carriers. “Secondly the coordination and communication between the authorized departments and organization also effected the management of information (Kam, 1988)”. For instance before the attack, in response to the war warning the army commander relied fully on the navy and the navy depended on the army. Both were assuming that the other one is dealing with the defensive operations. “Further the people with different backgrounds were also negligent. They took a particular message differently even if they were of the same department (Walter, 1994)”. Finally conflicts over interest among communities made organizations do unnecessary things or prevent them from doing obligatory things. Further failures of US intelligence included the securing of information among the US officials. This became a hurdle in preventing the Pearl Harbor attack. “The intercepted messages of Japanese government were limited to few officials only. The officers at the base complained that they were not well informed about the important clues of the war (Hixson & Walter, 2003)”. A mutual misunderstanding tend to build a wrong assumption that someone else knew what is happening and he will handle the situation in case of emergency. One reason of the intelligence failure was the organization routine work. Even in the normal days the officers were ordered to report anything unusual. However in the wartime, they were required to do much more and gradually became insensitive to what hey saw as an emergency in peacetime. “This insensitivity of officers also caused the intelligence to fail (Kobayashi, 2005)”. According to the analysis, these were the areas where intelligence failed and was left unsupportive in handling the situation and attack. The intelligence agency setup was not advantageous for the officials and the States. In short, intelligence failed to prevent the surprise attack even though it had the information of the attack. After the event it is relatively easy to point out what were the flaws that resulted in the failure and what should be done. Learning lesson from the experience can prevent another disaster. The improvements that could be done are firstly the diversification of intelligence sources. Not to rely on a single source instead gather information from different sources to make better decisions and to take accurate actions. The significance of human intelligence should be understood by the intelligence. It was the human intelligence that reported about the possibility of attack on the Pearl Harbor but the intelligence ignored it. The decoding message is also a useful tool but it was confided to the diplomatic communication only without providing the strategic information. If these messages were assisted by the human intelligence it would be more helpful and meaningful. The human intelligence can provide necessary clues to interpret the raw data. So the intelligence agency should have recognized the importance of diverse intelligence sources and materialize the concept in order to collect more qualified information. Second improvement could be made by not only understanding the foreign leader’s assumption but also gaining the knowledge of their misunderstanding. Role playing helps in this situation. It is used to break constraint of one’s limited way of thinking by actually imitating others position. This can help in leading to more accurate and clear conclusions. The lack of imagination can also be eradicated by questioning the assumptions and conduct an open minded meeting. This can help in dealing with the facts that one can merely think of. Further intelligence could have found some clues from the history through which it can predict about the attack style and solve the raising issues. Thirdly and lastly the intelligence should have objectively estimated the capability of opponent. The underestimation of Japan power and overestimation of itself was also a major set back. Estimation of enemy’s capability is extremely difficult. One way to evaluate abilities is to access the quantitative elements such as number of armed men, potential of mobilization, quantity and types of weapon and there performance. But the quantitative aspects are not enough to estimate the capability of opponents. The capability is difficult to assess because it changes with the change in plan and are complicated to assess. These are the three main areas where improvements could be done for better and less destructive results. CONCLUSION “The reasons for the failures seem to originate in the nature of human beings. Once people establish a hypothesis, it is troublesome to reexamine it when the majority regards it as true. Challenging this kind of assumption is hard for an officer because it requires strong evidence to turn over the widely granted view while intelligence per se is not clear enough to disprove the other one in the first place (Kobayashi, 2005)”. Analysts tend to pick up the information which is consistent with the hypothesis and ignore the information which does not fit their assumption. Reconsidering the assumption, especially when it was built by serving great amount of time and money, requires intelligence to start over and rethink about their previous efforts and analysis. Therefore, naturally they are comfortable with sticking to the first assumption. “The organizational problems also revealed typical human behavior. People are usually happy with close friends or colleagues, and are reluctant to cooperate with outsiders, particularly if they are competitors. They are not willing to share their fruits, on which they have spent resources, with unfamiliar people (Kobayashi, 2005)”. Therefore the intelligence failure of the surprise attack stems from the human nature. “The U.S. officials seemed to follow the more comfortable choices in dealing with Japanese aggression (Kam, 1988)”. Generally, unless people feel an obligation or a necessity, they are reluctant to do things according to their will. It is not until they experience a shocking incident such as a surprise attack that they change their strong beliefs. Therefore, not having experienced a surprise attack before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. intelligence was not expected to do something to change the situation. Especially, “reforming people as an aggregation is quite hard because reshaping a few people’s minds is not enough to change an entire organization. Not until the majority of people, specifically senior officers, review their prejudice does an organization modify itself to a considerable state (Kam, 1988)”. “On the eve of Pearl Harbor, Washington expected the Japanese surprise attack. However, the American leaders could not detect the target (and method). The failure stems mainly from a lack of qualified information and secondly from mistakes in analyses and management of intelligence (Kobayashi, 2005)”. The Pearl Harbor attack was almost impossible to prevent and was extremely difficult to limit the damage. However, the lessons from Pearl Harbor would help avoid or reduce a surprise-attack casualty in the future. In conclusion, continuous study is necessary for intelligence, but at the same time what intelligence officers have to bear in mind is that historical lessons cannot necessarily prevent any attacks. Learning from Pearl Harbor is important, but still not enough to avoid a future attack. “This notion remains uncertain and uncomfortable to intelligence analysts, however coping with uncertainty and discomfort is attributed to better intelligence. Once people feel comfortable with established assumption, they tend to avoid painstaking efforts to change it (Heuer, 1999)”. Hence, continuous efforts, opposite to human nature, are absolutely required to collect, analyze, and manage intelligence. In the end it can be concluded that the U.S. intelligence totally failed although they were having some related information and they were very much obsessed and fanatical in their own assumptions. The blame of failure goes to the intelligence and higher officials of the government. If they would have acted rightly and passionately, the causalities and losses would have been less. Although America herself wanted to enter into the war against Germany and Japan but the path they paved was not the right one. Apart from losses of aircraft and battleships, thousands of military officials and civilians died in the Pearl Harbor attack. REFERENECES Daws, G. Shoal of Time, University Of Hawaii Press (pg.78) Goff, Elizabeth H, & Uschan, Michael V., The Bombing of Pearl Harbor, World Almanac Library, (2005). Gordon Prange, Donald Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, At Dawn We Slept (New York: McGraw-Hill 1981), p.31-35 Hixson, Walter L., The American Experience in World War II: The United States and the road to war in Europe, Taylor & Francis, (2003) Heuer, Richards J. Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study ofIntelligence 1999) Kam, Ephraim, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1988). Kobayashi, M., U.S. Failures in the Pearl Harbor Attack, Tufts University, (May 2005). LaFeber, Walter, THE AMERICAN AGE: The United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1994). Marshall, Jonathan, To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and the Origins of the Pacific War (Berkeley: University of California Press 1995). Parillo, Mark, "The United States in the Pacific", The University Press of Kentucky, (2006) Pearl Harbor: (2000) http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/pearl_harbour.htm Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (California: Stanford University Press 1962). Read More