Influence of Political Considerations on the Planning, Campaign, and Execution of War - Case Study Example

Name: Course Tutor’s name: Date: Politics and War: The Influence of Political Considerations on the Planning, Campaign and Execution of War Introduction According to Clausewitz, war is an extension of politics (Cowen and Gilbert 9). This means that success in war depends on an appropriate combination of two factors: political and military initiatives. Politics plays a key role in war: from the initial role of planning a military operation, campaigning for its implementation, operational management, down to the course of war, policy plays a central role in aligning the military objectives of a state with the geo-political situation in both the domestic and foreign environments. Theoretically, there should be a clear separation between military operations and policy formulation. A state should develop and maintain a clear decision making framework regarding its military and political processes. Such a framework should be well maintained prior to and during the course of an operation. Intelligence, the foundational ideology of any military operation, should remain pure and non-politicised. More so, prior to and during the course of a military operation, there should be adequate coordination between political and military authorities of a state involved in conflict. However, such a situation is idyllic. Contemporary wars are complex in nature. Apart from being highly unique in character, contemporary wars have drastically changed as a result of the effect of technological advances in telecommunications. This has had the effect of removing all barriers that existed between strategic and tactical levels of war. The resulting situation is that politicians, having developed policy objectives for the war, cannot merely sit back and watch, but are rather much involved in the actual conduct of military operations. Strategy – the rationally derived policy objectives which can be attained through military action; and tactics – the actual conduct of military operations – are therefore, in a constant and complex interaction. This paper examines the influence of politics on war. It explores the consequences of political considerations in the actual conduct of military operations in a number of different case studies in the recent past. The consequences of complex interactions between political leadership and the military institution in a state involved in war are examined, with an evaluation of how the interactions affected the final results in the military operations. Influence of Politics on War: An Overview Success in a military operation is a consequence of successful reconciliation of military options of a state and its political considerations, with respect to domestic and international relations. According to Brooks, more often that not, there is failure in attempting to reconcile the two important factors by the states involved in war (3). This failure of unity and agreement is the primary cause of failure in military operations. On the contrary, a successful alignment of military options and political considerations is a strong asset in the conduct of military operations. Such a seamless interaction between military and policy objectives of a state, however, depends on the relationship between the political leadership on one hand, and the military leadership on the other. The state of the relationship between the military leaders and politicians in a country determines the nature of institutions and processes which are charged with the responsibility of making strategic assessment in the course of a military operation (Cimbala 24). It is this relationship which ultimately determines how important decisions regarding military options, diplomatic consequences and political challenges are made by states engaged in military operations. It has already been stated how politicians interact with the military leadership during times of war. Such complex interactions provide an environment in which key decisions concerning the actual conduct of the war are carried out. The success or failure of an operation can largely be attributed to the success or failure of this relationship. In reality, there are always disagreements between the two institutions. Such conflicts arise from several factors including lack of a balance of power between the two levels of leadership, failure to understand the key role of the military as that of providing accurate assessment of the operation efficacy, an attempt by the political leadership to usurp the role of the military and clashes over security and other issues within the state (Stone 4). These factors vary in degree of intensity and frequency in terms of place and time. Their prevalence, however, is a strong determinant of the nature of a military operation and its actual outcome. Influence of Politics on War: Case Studies The world’s history is dotted with a number of interstate conflicts involving military operations. These operations vary not only in terms of nature, time and place but also in terms of the degree of complexity. Political disagreements are always the cause of wars between states. Conversely, it is politics that runs military operations. This view is examined in light of the selected cases of military operations in the recent history of the world. It is seen that the effect of politics on military operations is not confined to civil-military relationship in the course of a military operation; political influence on the military commences with shaping the domestic and international ideological stance of a state (Edstrom and Gyllensporre 200). This is then reflected in the strategic policy objectives developed by the leadership of the country with regard to the military capabilities. It is based on this assessment that decisions are made. This decision-making framework determines the conception and conduct of a military operation. War on Terrorism: Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Eagle Claw was a failed American military mission to rescue over 52 American hostages held by Iranian militants. Its inception, planning, execution and eventual failure represent a strong case in which politics influences the design, implementation and even outcome of a military operation. In November, 1976, the United States embassy in Iran was invaded by a group of fanatical supporters of the then Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. The invaders took over one hundred Americans hostage and staged a demonstration against the deposed Iranian leader and the United States. That the students were acting under the instructions of the Ayatollah and in agreement with the Iranian government policy came clear later. This was evident in January 1980 when, after six Americans escaped under the help of the CIA and with fake Canadian passports, the Iranian Foreign minister vowed to take action against the Canadian government (Trahair and Miller 44). According to Celmer, the seizure of the United States embassy presented a clear chance for the test of the American policy on counter terrorism. Under the Reagan administration, a strong stance against terrorism attack was adopted. This placed the Department of Defence in the limelight with the sole responsibility of dealing with international terrorism. The prerogative of the Department of Defence was to deal with special operations in response to international terrorism through a series of activities, the most important one being, to conduct special operations with, “specially trained and equipped and prepared forces” (Celmer 62). The operations were targeted to achieve military, political or economic objectives. This operation was a test of the United States' anti-terrorism policies which developed after the emergence of international terrorism as a new security concern for governments worldwide. Prior to this operation, there had been a series of policy changes on the mode of operations of national security apparatus. First, the policy objectives of the Department of Defence were completely distinguished from those of the Central Intelligence Agency (Kelly and Brennan 164). Such a distinction was a result of a series of failed operations, like the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Congressional pressure, coupled with a strong desire by the Kennedy administration to distinguish clandestine political or military activities from overt military operations, led to formulation of policies that made a clear distinction between the two forms of operation, as practised by both the CIA and the Department of Defence (Fishel 102). It was against this backdrop that the Operation Eagle Claw was developed. The official United States policy to fight counter-terrorism had shifted from retaliatory attacks to adopting the use of special operations to fight states that supported terrorist activities. Such a shift was necessitated by the failed attempt at the life of the then Libyan leader, Muammar Ghaddafi in the 1960s. After the failed attack, the policy objective of the United States shifted to developed strong capabilities of fighting terrorism, akin to those of Israel and other nations, which favoured commando-style raids aimed at destroying the regimes that support terrorist activities, as opposed to attempting to repress terrorist activities which only worked to promote the, “vicious cycle of strikes and counter strikes” (Celmer 67). Following the cue from such nations, the United States also developed a commando unit in 1979. Several reasons contributed to the disastrous abortion of the operation, with the loss of several soldiers and three military helicopters. It is argued that oversights from the military leadership and top policy makers were the main reason behind the failure of the operation. Such oversights created a breakdown in coordination between the vital civil-military balance of power, thereby creating an environment of high uncertainty for decision making by the military leadership charged with the responsibility of carrying out the operation. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw was replicated in the eventual prolongation and complexity of the Iraq War later in 2003. The United States, acting under the policy of attacking regimes that supported international terrorism, led a military operation to oust the Saddam regime in Iraq. Although it is difficult to judge the success of the whole operation in technical terms, the fact that the final outcome of the operation was out of the range of predictable outcomes in the initial plan gives credence to the general consensus that the whole military operation was flawed right from the conceptualisation stage. For instance, over-reliance on force as the only prerogative in fighting terrorism at the expense of the prevailing political and diplomatic environment on the part of the United States and her allies led to a prolonged war. Initial successes resulting from the use of superior weapons were wiped out in the following several months as growing insurgency and sectarian attacks ran out of control (Stone 4). Also, that the operation was a failure in political and economic terms underlies the observation that strategic assessment for the operation failed in two ways. The first one is that internal complexities of the civil-military balance in the United States allowed the operation to proceed regardless of the diplomatic and political environment in the international and regional scene. The second point is that poor coordination between the political leadership and the military leaders involved in the operation led to complete ambiguities in the internal authorisation process of the state. The result of these two factors was a protracted campaign that not only sucked resources and casualties longer than expected but also shaped the nature of the domestic political landscape (Brooks 13). Operation Barbarossa, Siege of Leningrad and Operation Nordlicht It has been argued that Operation Barbarossa, the failed invasion of USSR by the German-led Axis forces during the Second World War, together with the Siege of Leningrad and Operation Nordlicht, provide a classical case of how increased political interference can contribute to complete failure in a military operation. The prevailing social and political trends of the time notwithstanding, the series of military operations by the German army illustrate how strategic assessment fails in an environment of usurpation of the role of military leadership by the political leadership of the time under a totalitarian regime. To begin with, there were sharp disagreements between the actual courses of the operation. According to Brooks, substantive disagreements between the military leadership and the political establishment of a state differ significantly in terms of place and time (3). Such a conflict can have a strong negative effect upon the maintenance of a strong bargaining power of the military in the ruling regime. When these conflicts become severe and prolonged, the effect is that civil-military relations degenerate, much to the detriment of success in military operations. For the case of Operation Barbarossa, sharp disagreements over the real ideology of the war were widespread and extended. There were contradictory analyses to the question of viability and desirability of the operation in the first place. The whole planning team was split between two rival camps: on one side was the group of military leaders who were in favour of the operation. Led by Hitler, they believed that attacking the USSR was an appropriate objective given the geopolitical conditions of the time. On the other side was a group of military officials who felt the carrying out an attack of such a scale was way too far from the capacity of the resources at hand. Prior to the operations, the socio-political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were characterised by suspicion and hostility. This was inherent in the two countries’ competing ideologies, interests and intentions. For Germany, motivation for these operations was born in the Generalplan Ost, a document outlining a nationalist-socialist radical ideology as earlier espoused in Hitler’s Mein Kampf. However, the role of international politics played a key role in precipitating the conflict prior to the actual operations (Wiest and Barbier 34). Germany signed a non-aggressive treaty with the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) in 1939. Apart from surprising the world, this deal was important in that it contained a secret pact that dictated the terms of dividing border countries like Latvia and Poland in the event of a possible invasion of the territory. Also, this pact contradicted with the then prevailing trends in international politics and relations. After Germany signed the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, plans were underway to incorporate the Soviet Union into the plan. Forczyk observes that this still underscored the secret German intention of invading and occupying the whole of the eastern front, as indicated in the original Hitler plan (54). Trade relations between the Soviet Union and Germany increased such that the companies entered into a trade pact in 1940, whose main intention was to help Germany avoid a British blockade by getting raw materials such oil and wheat in exchange for German military and industrial equipment. In November, 1940, Germany presented to the Soviet Union a proposal for joining the Axis Pact. Later, the Soviet Union offered a counterproposal to which Germany failed to respond. This stance increased tensions between the two countries and exposed the reality of a possible confrontation between them and the leading actors on the arena of international politics at the time (Kay 40). It has been argued that domestic politics in Germany also played a key role in precipitating the final invasion of the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1940, Germany faced a serious shortage in raw materials. This was accentuated by a conflict between the two countries over territories in the Balkans. To Hitler, this presented a complete opportunity to invade and occupy the Soviet Union (Megargee 30). This position of invading the Soviet Union was proposed by Hitler and won the support of leading military commanders and political leaders like Albert Speer, minister for armaments and war production, who viewed the invasion as having the potential to bring several benefits to the German state and the Axis forces in general. First, the German policymakers believed that invading the Soviet Union would help relieve the acute labour shortage in German industries. Labour shortage was one of the consequences of earlier invasions which had caused German industries to operate way below capacity. To counter this situation, it was believed that large populations from large scale demobilisations of captured Soviet Union soldiers would provide the much needed labour force. Second, a successful occupation of the Soviet Union would provide oil through control of the Baku oil fields. This was considered a primary motive for the invasion since oil was badly needed for the success of the German war machinery. Third, the political leadership in Germany believed that an invasion of the Soviet Union would enable the Axis forces to occupy Ukraine. This would not only provide a reliable source of agricultural products but also improve Germany’s geo-strategic position by isolating the allies, in particular the United Kingdom (Wiest and Barbier 69). Since the leading political leaders of the time had a strong influence over the general direction and decision making in the formulation of war strategies and actual implementation of military operations, assumptions, oversights and errors were most likely to be committed by the military planners. Additionally, the voice of dissent, which opposed the military operation, was totally ignored, not basing on any factual reasoning but rather on ideological and political reasoning of the time. Strategic planning for the operation was characterised by many fundamental oversights and mistakes which proved costly in the long run. For instance, the German military high command did not have accurate information about the military capacity of the Soviet Union. Their planning and anticipation for a quick victory was based on the illusion that the Soviet Union was completely inferior and totally unprepared to handle an aggression of such magnitude. Also, the military planners in the German military forces failed to consider the possible impact of political and economic factors in the course of the operation. They failed to consider the industrial capacity of Germany to produce enough equipment to sustain an operation of such magnitude in the event of an extension (Forczyk 70). Prior to the invasion, German industries were operating far below capacity. Such concerns had been raised by a group of high ranking German officials who developed a comprehensive memorandum that proved an entry into the Soviet Union would be a net economic loss to Germany as a result of minor states such as Latvia and the problem of having to maintain a large local population after the invasion. Many of the operations carried out by the German military under the political leadership of Hitler failed as a result of continued interference by the political leadership in military operations (Lemay 30). Sustained disagreements and overriding authority of political leadership created an environment of poor coordination between the political leadership and the German military high command. On several occasions, Hitler assumed sweeping powers that allowed him to disregard contradictory opinion to his plans, which were mostly based on ideological ambitions of dominating the largest part of continental Europe. This was exemplified in a number of circumstances as discussed next. The first one was Hitler’s continued interference in the leadership of the German military during the operation. His insistence on the generals not to retreat but rather to stand and fight made the Axis armies to be trapped in the USSR in the face of growing Soviet counterattacks. Lemay notes that at the peak of the ensuing conflict, Hitler issued the “stop and fight” directive to the Axis soldiers who were evidently besieged by the strong Soviet counteroffensive, as a way of stopping a massive withdrawal in the face of the repulsion (218). On December 5th 1941, the Germans believed that the Soviet counteroffensive had reached a critical point. This forced the Axis armies to take a defensive position, forcing many generals to order retreats. The retreats were carried out so recklessly and hastily that there was total abandonment of tanks and other vital military equipment by the retreating forces (Forczyk 21). The second instance happened immediately after Operation Barbarossa, prior to the Siege of Leningrad and Operation Nordlicht. Immediately after the crisis, Hitler dismissed more than 35 generals for the slightest hint at retreating. Later, he accepted the resignation of the Field Marshal Brauchitsch, assuming the command of the military himself. This meant that Hitler assumed the role of the head of state, supreme commander of the army as well as the commander-in-chief of the army. This interference by Hitler compromised the operational efficiency of the army in the battlefield because the whole army structure was directly subordinate to Hitler. Even the chief of the Supreme High Command of the German Army (OKH) staff generals found themselves sidelined in the combat operations in the theatres of war. This conflict of interest further caused divisions between the OKH and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), thus weakening the general performance of the Axis armies in the operations. Conclusion The relationship between the political leadership of a state and its military leadership is key to the formulation of policy objectives, their implementation in a military campaign and the actual outcome of such a campaign, if it is carried out. That war is an extension of politics and that politicians need to be involved in the actual conduct of military operations is a fact which cannot be disputed in the conduct of modern military operations. However, lack of clear separation between these two distinct levels of a military operation can have severe consequences on the military operations of a country, including its failure. This is because of the fact that increased ideological differences between political leaders and the military of a state causes disruptions in the delicate civil-military balance of power. The consequences of such a disruption are many: from poor coordination between the two entities to a complete power struggle, disruptions in the civil-military balance of power create an environment that encourages poor strategic assessment due to a breakdown in the decision making framework. This has been illustrated in a number of military operations: their eventual failure or success has been dependent on the strength of the strategic assessment of the states involved. Works Cited Brooks, Risa A. Shaping Strategy: The Civil- Military Politics of Strategic Assessment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Celmer, Marc A. Terrorism, U. S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987. Cimbala, Stephen J. The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Cowen, Deborah and Gilbert, Emily. War, Citizenship, Territory. London: Routledge, 2008. Edstrom, Harkan & Gyllensporre, Dennis. Political Aspirations and Perils of Security: Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMilan, 2013. Fishel, John T. Civil Military Operations in the Civil World, Westport: Greenwood Publishing Press, 1997. Forczyk, Robert. Moscow 1941: Hitler’s First Defeat. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2006. Kay, Alex J. Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder: Political and Economic Planning for German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941. Berghahn Books. Kelly, Justin and Mike, Brennan. Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009. Lemay, Benoit. Erich von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist, London: Casemate Publishers, 2010. Megargee, Geoffrey P. War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Stone, John. Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011. Trahair, Richard C. S. and Miller, Robert L. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations. Enigma Books, 2009. Wiest, Andrew, A and Barbier. M., K., Infantry Warfare: Strategy and Tactics. Osceola: MBI Publishing, 2002. Read More

On the contrary, a successful alignment of military options and political considerations is a strong asset in the conduct of military operations. Such a seamless interaction between military and policy objectives of a state, however, depends on the relationship between the political leadership on one hand, and the military leadership on the other. The state of the relationship between the military leaders and politicians in a country determines the nature of institutions and processes which are charged with the responsibility of making strategic assessment in the course of a military operation (Cimbala 24).

It is this relationship which ultimately determines how important decisions regarding military options, diplomatic consequences and political challenges are made by states engaged in military operations. It has already been stated how politicians interact with the military leadership during times of war. Such complex interactions provide an environment in which key decisions concerning the actual conduct of the war are carried out. The success or failure of an operation can largely be attributed to the success or failure of this relationship.

In reality, there are always disagreements between the two institutions. Such conflicts arise from several factors including lack of a balance of power between the two levels of leadership, failure to understand the key role of the military as that of providing accurate assessment of the operation efficacy, an attempt by the political leadership to usurp the role of the military and clashes over security and other issues within the state (Stone 4). These factors vary in degree of intensity and frequency in terms of place and time.

Their prevalence, however, is a strong determinant of the nature of a military operation and its actual outcome. Influence of Politics on War: Case Studies The world’s history is dotted with a number of interstate conflicts involving military operations. These operations vary not only in terms of nature, time and place but also in terms of the degree of complexity. Political disagreements are always the cause of wars between states. Conversely, it is politics that runs military operations.

This view is examined in light of the selected cases of military operations in the recent history of the world. It is seen that the effect of politics on military operations is not confined to civil-military relationship in the course of a military operation; political influence on the military commences with shaping the domestic and international ideological stance of a state (Edstrom and Gyllensporre 200). This is then reflected in the strategic policy objectives developed by the leadership of the country with regard to the military capabilities.

It is based on this assessment that decisions are made. This decision-making framework determines the conception and conduct of a military operation. War on Terrorism: Operation Eagle Claw and Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Eagle Claw was a failed American military mission to rescue over 52 American hostages held by Iranian militants. Its inception, planning, execution and eventual failure represent a strong case in which politics influences the design, implementation and even outcome of a military operation.

In November, 1976, the United States embassy in Iran was invaded by a group of fanatical supporters of the then Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. The invaders took over one hundred Americans hostage and staged a demonstration against the deposed Iranian leader and the United States. That the students were acting under the instructions of the Ayatollah and in agreement with the Iranian government policy came clear later. This was evident in January 1980 when, after six Americans escaped under the help of the CIA and with fake Canadian passports, the Iranian Foreign minister vowed to take action against the Canadian government (Trahair and Miller 44).

According to Celmer, the seizure of the United States embassy presented a clear chance for the test of the American policy on counter terrorism.

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