How Operational Art Was Applied in the Planning of OIF - Essay Example

How Operational Art was applied in the planning of OIF (Question 1) In the context of Cobra II, the Operation Iraqi freedom significantly applied the use of Operation art based on the consideration of the operational goals, available means and risks involved during the execution of the operation. Generally the primary goal of OIF was to change the regime of Saddam Hussein as well as destroy his ability to employ the use of Weapons of mass destruction (MMD). The operation art applied however failed to effectively plan for the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad such as how to deal with counter insurgency campaigns (Gordon and Trainor, 28).With regard to achieving the main objective of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a number of risks such as the fear a long protracted war with heavy casualties were taken into consideration. Consequently the planning of the OIF was designed to achieve operational theater strategic objectives by a Quick Decisive military victory (QDV) with minimal casualties on the occupation forces. This strategy however compelled the planners to define their objectives more clearly as well as set objectives that are attainable within a given time frame. CENTCOM included a number of governmental agencies related to national security such as the CIA, the National Security Council in its plans to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein from power. Some of the operation art plans incorporated how to address and mitigate some of the potential risks and challenges that were likely to face the occupation forces in the Iraqi deserts. To achieve these ends while at the same time minimizing risks, the planning of the OIF also took advantage of the massive technological advancements as part of the occupational strategy. This paper uses Cobra II as the context to analyze the application of Operation art in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom with regard to the objectives, means and risks involved as well as military art and science. From the conception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the American central command planners primarily focused on the goal of changing the regime of Saddam Hussein in their operation art. In this regard, it is evident that little attention was given to the strategies of realizing a post war stable Iraqi state such as counterinsurgency measures. The military planners of OIF were also obsessed with the size of the invading force that was required to achieve the military objective of regime change in Iraq. For example the then defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, wanted smaller occupation force to be used although this would have made it difficult to deal with the problem of counterinsurgency after the fall of the regime. The main assumption of the war planners was that some of the Iraqi military units will not only surrender but also change sides to support the defeat of Saddam Hussein. The application of the Operation art was particularly influenced by the military operation lessons previously learnt from the Vietnam War. Consequently in order to minimize casualties and costs of the operation OIF, the planners adopted the operation art strategy of Quick Decisive Victory(QDV) where by the occupation forces were to employ any mean available to defeat the forces loyal to Saddam Hussein within a the shortest time possible. With regard to the art and science of combat operations, operation art applied in the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom includes the use of factors such as force, space and time to achieve the strategic and operational objective of the coalition forces. For example the planning indicated a strong to gain the knowledge of the battle theater as quickly as possible to reduce the number of casualties on the part of the occupation forces while at the same time limiting the amount of time needed to achieve particular operational objectives. With regard to combat space such as airspace, land and sea, the planners assumed the coalition forces will use the airspace and command infrastructure of the neighboring states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to launch their campaigns against the Iraqi forces. The operation art in the OIF also sought to minimize the length of time needed to achieve a decisive victory. This was to be achieved through speed and lethality. Finally in terms of force, the planning of the Operation Iraqi Freedom emphasized on the use of advanced military weapons and tactics rather than in the number of troops. This kind of art was particularly used to minimize the potential casualties and operation costs on the part of the coalition forces. To successfully employ this strategy, the planners clearly defined their overall goal which was to change the regime and destroy its ability to use its stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. According to this operation art, the next important strategy was to deploy an overwhelming military force particularly with regard to its lethality and speed to defeat the loyalist forces and achieve the defined objectives. The planning of the Operation Iraqi Freedom particularly focused on the use of advanced military training and technology to enable efficiency and reduce the number of personnel required to accomplish the strategic and operational objectives. For example there was particular emphasis on reducing the costs of the operation by using small lethal strikes carried out by a small number of highly trained combat forces (25). As part of the operation art strategy, OIF planning also focused on the defensive capabilities of the occupation forces in the event of retaliatory attacks from the Iraqi forces. Some of the preparations that were included in the operation plan included building and improving the theater infrastructure, developing effective command control for the ground forces, training of the combat soldiers and staff, provision of new advanced combat equipments and mobilizing the US reserve forces. Generally there were a number of pitfalls and challenges in the operation art that was used in planning and executing the Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example some of the assumptions like the belief that the coalition forces will receive a friendly reception in Iraq as liberators did not materialize as planned (222). Although the objective oriented operation art used in the OIF was an outstanding success, it failed to plan for the potential insurgency that was likely to be faced by the advancing occupation forces. This was particularly evident in the fact that CENTCOM planning only focused on the threats posed by the Iraqi army units and the fear that they would use biological or chemical weapons. This was a major failure of the operation art applied in the OIF. A better operation art would have focused more on the political social and economic factors and combated insurgency to achieve a safe post war Iraq. CENTCOM also planned to engage the support of both the NATO and EUCOM in its strategies to deploy an overwhelming force against the forces loyal to Saddam Hussein and achieve a regime change. The assumption in such plans was that the coalition partners would help in the development of communications infrastructure, provide security in the Mediterranean and other sea routes and other related services. Another challenge that faced the planners at the central command was the looming risks of urban combat after the fall of Baghdad and other cities loyal to the regime. This was particularly because most of the Iraqi cities were different from the Western cities in that they were sprawling and lacked tall skyscrapers. This presented the risk of some Iraqi soldiers being positioned on the roof tops. Additionally urban combat is often highly destructive and deadly as the combat forces are often more vulnerable to enemy and friendly casualties. Finally battling in the cities was not only going to result in civilian and combat casualties but many buildings and infrastructural facilities were going to be destroyed. Consequently the OIF planners emphasized on training the army and marine corps on various tactical operations in build and urban environments. The planning of the operation Iraqi freedom also included measures to avoid the destruction of infrastructure and turning urban centers into ruins when faced with the challenge In conclusion, Cobra II effectively highlights both the success and the failures that resulted from the use of operation Art in the planning and execution of the Operation Iraqi Freedom. While OIF planning has been hailed as an outstanding success, the operation art used also resulted in a number of failures such as misleading assumptions, overreliance on military technology as well as failure to focus on how to ensure the stability of post war Iraq. Works Cited Gordon, R., Michael, and Trainor, E., Bernard. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon, 2006.Print. Read More