The Failure of the UN in Providing International Peace and Security after the Cold-War Period - Essay Example

Introduction The United Nations undertake a central role in safeguarding peace internationally. Two critical decisions that the body faces are to evaluate whether there exists a threat to international security and secondly, whether or not to use force in maintaining peace. It is, however, unfortunate that the UN failed to perform its duties of maintaining peace and security (Morris & Wheeler 2007).Statistics shows that the budgetary amount allocated to peacekeeping missions in the years 1989-1996 was $ 1,756.6. The UN later became more active in peacekeeping keeping missions during the post-cold war period (Yesildag 2010 ). There has been a transformation of the duties and responsibilities of the UN. The organ oversees police training and election monitoring in some member countries. The mind-boggling question is whether such UN peacekeeping missions are fruitful or not. The UN’s efforts in peacekeeping missions have not always been a success. The failure in maintaining peace may be attributable to the selection bias of the UN. In some instances, the UN sits on the fence when there is involvement of a third party in conflict resolution (Yesildag 2010 ). The fall of state institutions like Somalia, the Haiti coup, and civil wars in worldwide countries have at times attracted little international response. Efforts by international bodies in mitigating conflict resolution have been mixed at best. Member states of the United Nations redefined the organs’ agenda to create a relation between the sovereignty of the state and legitimate international intervention at the close of the cold war. In 1993, there was a striking interpretation made by the UNs Security Council in the provision of security and peace. The use of force in peacekeeping missions led to war rather than peace in some states for example Somalia (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). There is great value in ending civil wars. Wars have erupted within the borders of armed sovereign states since the Cold war era. For example, the recurrence of civil wars in Angola and Rwanda was a result of failed peace agreements. The UN failed miserably in the case of Rwanda because it failed to attempt peace enforcement. The severe consequence that ensued was the loss of lives a result approximately 700’000 Hutus, and Tutsis died in the 1994 genocide (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Analysis of UN failures as a peacekeeping body in honoring its mandate in enforcing peace in the 1994 Rwanda genocide is the papers objective. Realism The concept of realism is worrying in light of international politics. The international community perception as a cruel ring and states are opportunists exploring ways in which to take advantage of each other. Nations consequently do not trust each other. According to this concept, nation’s battle for supremacy each state endeavors to be the most powerful in the international scene. International relations are not a continuous state of war rather it is a ceaseless competition in terms of security. Absolute peace where countries do not fight for power is impossible according to the theory of realism (Mearsheimer 1994). The enactment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) had the sole aim of ending war in Rwanda. The task of UNAMIR included the installation of a transitional government, a representative government of both Hutu’s and Tutsi’s. The Rwandese government was sluggish in its efforts leading to an irritable situation among the Security Council. The US affirmed its position that it would terminate the UN operation unless the government established the transitional government. The high involvement of the UN in third world security issues made Rwanda an avenue to explore such security matters (Mearsheimer 1994). Bureaucratization Barnett, an expert in political science, was deployed to Rwanda by the US during the genocide period. As an expert, he had to comprehend and possess skills such as correct framing of conversations, knowing who said what, the importance of utterances and distinguishing insiders from outsiders. The counterparts of Barnett at the field communicated using acronyms and slang unknown to him. The implication was that Barnett was unable to make out what events had transpired through the day. Continual questioning of what went on only made him a laughing stock to his colleagues (Mearsheimer 1994). One of the bureaucratic processes in Barnett’s role was writing reporting cables. A reporting cable entails reports of meetings, events and other related developments that may be related to the foreign bureaucratic policy or the US policy. Cable writing involves knowing whom to include in the distribution list and its related formal organization. Cable reports in the real essence are political documents. Cable reports thus being political documents; they had to reflect the position of the US in terms of personal and bureaucratic positions. Prior to submission of a cable report one had to clear issues with the parties in the report to ensure that their representation was favorable. A “good report” was not only one that was clear and succinct, but one that was conforming to the bureaucratic and personal interests of the immediate supervisor (Mearsheimer 1994). Barnett, in his discourse, had to portray the U.S ambassadors as alert, sharp and probing. Re-writing cable reports became frequent because former reports were not favorable to the supervisors. The bureaucratic interests and the international view of the US mission, general and political to the UN had to be captured in the cable report. There was an immense need to re-define the term US interest that was in line with supporting UN peacekeeping(Mearsheimer 1994). The high level of bureaucratization in the UN led to the loss of many lives. Bureaucratization contributed mostly by negligence and indifference of the peacekeeping mission thus people suffered in the watch of the very people who had the mandate to assist. There is a strong correlation between production of indifference in bureaucratic peacekeeping and acting in the best interests of the international community. Going by the traditional view of international scholars, countries seek their own interests. According to the theory, it is immaterial how states were grieved by the Rwanda’s genocide and, therefore, reluctant support the peacekeeping mission with money or work force simply because there were no interests (Mearsheimer 1994). The traditional view provides some of the answers yet it does not give a bigger picture why the UN did not end the Rwandan genocide. According to Hertzfield, the UN’s neglect was more of a moral calculus .Hertzfield asks the disturbing question: “why do political institutions that promote the rights of individuals and minority groups become selectively biased in application of such rights?” The answer lies in five observations on the relationship between indifference and peacekeeping (Mearsheimer 1994). State bureaucracies are both domination instruments and symbolic markers. The bureaucracies as symbolic markers create a line of demarcation between citizens and non-citizens, apostates and believers and members and non-members of the community. The above is an example of the criteria used to explain who belongs and who does not (Mearsheimer 1994). Primarily, indifference leads to the abandonment of the different. Bureaucratically, identity can be used to facilitate the production of difference and indifference. In short, bureaucracy represents an emotional mechanism that determines who receives attention and who does not. The commonest form of identity bureaucracies for countries is national citizenship. Bureaucracies can further be advanced to members of the same society. Members of the same society still may not receive the same treatment. Certain people are highly esteemed than others. People will receive treatment based on religion race and gender (Mearsheimer 1994). Selective application by bureaucrats may not be solely on the basis of citizenship but also with bureaucracy. Boundary lines are drawn to distinguish the society from bureaucracy. Priority in this context will be advance to members of a set bureaucracy rather than the societies they represent. Personal agenda is the last reason for a bureaucratic divide. Individuals may manipulate the culture of bureaucracy in a way to achieve personal gain. Bureaucratic manipulation is such that their actions of bureaucrats will seem to be in accordance to bureaucratic interests yet in the realest sense they are not (Mearsheimer 1994). In the UN, impartiality is not a new thing. Impartiality exists almost in all types of conflicts. The level of support varies from one party as opposed to another even more help in one than another. Economic sanctions are set in some instances against a particular party or state. Key to note also is that the UN has a set of values, interests and tasks, which are unique in some respects from other assignments. Re-definition of impartiality has it meaning reluctance to make and implement Security Council decisions (Roberts 1994). Constructivism Constructivism differs from realism in the sense that it dies not center on the nations’ interests but explains creation of such identities and interests. The constructivism approach lays aside norms and material interests as the components of the nation’s identity (Ramuhala 2010).Constructivism affirms that sovereign states can as a result of new norms change their behavior and even act contrary to their material interests. South Africa provides a good example where international states developed sanctions against Apartheid due to the widespread racial inequality at the time. The move by the states was against any material interests by the countries. It is, therefore, in order to infer that in the emergence of norms in humanitarian intervention could cause countries or organizations to discriminately apply the norm rather than focus on the nations’ economic interests (Dowell 2009). Constructivists believe that an international system is a set of well-fashioned ideas, structured thoughts and norms. Certain people in a given region determine the system of thoughts, ideas and norms. Social reality is a creation of human beings and its incorporation thereof in daily routine practices. Constructivism thus perceives the international system as the result of social construction (Karacasulu & Uzgören 2007) Constructivism argues that nation or states cannot exist in isolation from the environment. A nation thus develops interests from the environment in which it carries out its operations. A social in the context of this argument would imply ideas, thoughts, beliefs, languages and perhaps symbols and signals. According to constructivists, the social environment defines people’s identities. Constructivism also centers on the differences that exist among people and how relations form because of such differences (Karacasulu & Uzgören 2007). Constructivists emphasis is on normative, ideational and material structures to define an individual’s or one’s identity. Constructivism argues that people interpret the material world. For instance, the international system of security constitutes; weapons, populations and physical assets. However, the principal factor ids the organization of these material resources for purposes of international security (Karacasulu & Uzgören 2007). Norms and common beliefs are the elements that constitute an actor’s identities and interests. Constructivism majors on the social interests and identities of states. Social interests and identities are variable, relational and not fixed. Social identities of actors are the basis of interests. Constructivism explains the need for redefinitions of roles rules and, identities departing from the usual rational choice of conceptualizations (Karacasulu & Uzgören 2007). UN Peace-keeping Mission in Rwanda The fundamental involvement aspects of the UN in Rwanda was peacekeeping mission of UNAMIR I and II. The signing of a1993 peace agreement in Arusha intended to end the three-year war looming in Rwanda. A transitional government was to take charge for a transitional period of twenty-two months and the ultimate elections be in 1995.To aid in monitoring elections and security maintenance in the transitional period, the United Nations Assistance Mission was established in June 1993(Howard & Suhrke 1999). The responsibilities of UNAMIR included a monitor a weapon-free zone within the city, assess the security situation in the transition period and ensure compliance to the peace agreement in Arusha. The perception initially was that UNAMIR would be an easy “success story” unfortunately that never happened. Differences first set in when evaluating the appropriate forces size to dispatch to Rwanda. The final decision was because of political and economic considerations rather than military reasons. The initial ranges of the forces were 4500 on the higher side and 2600 as the threshold level. Romeo Dallaire, a general, made amendments to the original range reducing the size of the force to 2538-1935.The act in itself was a compromise and unusual to UN peacekeeping mission. The earlier report emphasized the need for large troops to discharge the duties in a timely manner. The UN failed in this respect and led to the loss of many lives when war broke out (Howard & Suhrke 1999). Inadequacy of machine equipment was another major challenge in the peacekeeping mission by UNAMIR. The geographical terrain in Rwanda favored use of helicopter units and armored personnel carriers in the operations. Nations donated helicopter units and personnel carriers, which, the UN later reimbursed the states. Failure of the equipment donations, the UN had no reserves to use as an alternative. In the case of Rwanda, only Belgium donated personnel carriers. The UNs efforts in obtaining equipment were a success because it obtained 8 personnel carriers from Mozambique. The carriers were Russian vehicles whose manuals were in Russian language, therefore; it was difficult to operate the cars efficiently. Maintenance of the vehicles was almost impossible because no spare parts were available once the Russian vehicles broke down. The UN failed in mobilizing contributing countries to honor their pledged donations of equipment thus when war eventually erupted, almost all peacekeeping operations were crippled due to lack of proper equipment and financing(Howard & Suhrke 1999). Lack of proper communication flow and cooperation was between the UN, and UNAMIR was detrimental to the operation. In the first few months of 1994, UNAMIR expressed the worsening security situation in the country. The assassination of two political leaders during the first few months shows how grave the situation was. One informant from militia leaked information to UNAMIR there was the importation of weapons into the state, plans to exterminate Tutsi minority and a plot to murder Belgian peacekeepers. Dallaire sent numerous requests to the UN headquarters seeking for permission to carry out a search for the weapons as informed by the militia. It is unfortunate that Dallaire’s superiors denied him the permission to carry out a search. The superiors’ justification was that the search would go against the mandate of UNAMIR’s mission outlined in chapter VI. The indecisiveness of UN whether to withdraw their presence from Rwanda or extend their stay was also detrimental in the peacekeeping mission (Howard & Suhrke 1999). The UN’s genocide preventive actions could have involved dealing with both the potters and resisters. Good structures ought to have been setup to capture data and analyze it quickly. It was of paramount importance to identify who the killers were, unravel their plans and determine the hidden location of weapons. In the UN’s strategies, it was unfortunate that it did not provide intelligence capacities for UNAMIR to conduct, the peacekeeping exercise. It was a serious mistake for the UN representatives to march to the president in early January and pour out information before determining the connection between the plotters and the president. It would have been prudent to evaluate information about the extermination plot and the level of support the plotters had (Dorn & Matloff 2000). Effective engagement by UN peacekeepers in preventive diplomacy would require careful study of the myriad characteristics of the plotters. The characteristics include the plotter’s power base, the likely opposition, their political; parties, ties to foreign states and the relationship to the president. Supposing the UN had such a wealth of information, devising a strategy would be easy. Potential sources of information were human rights groups and political leaders. The UN, however, sidelined Jeanne Pierre, a reliable informer at a very early stage (Dorn & Matloff 2000). Based on concrete evidence, the UN ought to have applied appropriate pressure to institutions preventing genocide such as the presidential guard, Network Zero and Radio Miles. The genocide preventive organizations often obtain funding from foreign states. Had the UN insisted on proper accounting of the disbursements received, deviations and diversion of funds could be traceable. Broadcasting radio stations required a close supervision to enhance peace and security in the country. Upon the transmission of hate speech by broadcasting stations, the UN was to temporarily shut the station or close off the radio station temporarily (Dorn & Matloff 2000). UNAMIR lost its credibility when it failed to act upon the information about dangerous weapons spotted in the country. A negative response was the result from the UN leadership upon requesting to carry out a weapon search by UNAMIR. The weapon search would have been fundamental in both psychological and practical sense. Consequently, UNAMIR lost a great deal of the community’s confidence. Had the search for weapons taken place, the accessibility of the weapons would have been difficult when the genocide began (Dorn & Matloff 2000) The Arusha agreement demanded installation of a neutral installation force to coordinate the implementation of the accord. Deployment of troops was to take place within 37days after signing of the agreements. The neutral organ would ensure a safe transitional government before the major elections in 1995.The agreement, stipulated crucial matters that went beyond chapter VI of the UN operations regarding the confiscation of firearms and maintaining security at a general level. The UN from the beginning was aware that it was incapable of discharging the requirements of the accord yet it insisted on its ability to honor the agreement. The UN further made threats such as withholding monetary and equipment support if not given the responsibility. In the end, what the UN provided fell far below the mark and there was little resemblance to the Arusha’s agreement (Alexandra 2003). Since the inception of the mission, UN made light of the current situation present in Rwanda. The report presented by the reconnaissance team was highly optimistic and failed to picture the true picture of the suffering and pain that the war in Rwanda caused. Recommendations postulated by the reconnaissance team initially were scaled down by the secretary general followed by Security Council. The re-drafting and scaling down the reconnaissance’s’ report revealed the bias and bureaucracy present in the UN and thus did not reflect the actual situation in Rwanda (Alexandra 2003). The response time with which the UN responded to the situation in Rwanda is questionable. The secretary general to the UN received a letter in 1993 from Rwanda that asked the body to provide a neutral international force, as well as a reconnaissance team immediately. Three whole months after the signing of the agreement is the precise amount of time that took the UN to deploy the troops. The UN was also negligent in the conduct of its operations in the sense that it failed to do prior planning in terms of the mission’s logistics and mandates. The reconnaissance team, on the other hand, was two weeks late. Upon submission of the reconnaissance of the report, it was until September that the Secretary General issued the report. The adoption of the report was in October and deployment of the chief commander and troops at the end of the month (Alexandra 2003). Policy makers in Washington and at UN strongly believed that UNAMIR lacked the capacity to stop the looming war in Rwanda. Thus, no there were no additional troops dispatched to Rwanda. The policy makers did not deem changing the original mandate of UNAMIR necessary. They argued that UNAMIR’s purpose was not a stop genocide operation but a peacekeeping operation. The failure of the UN’s Security Council mainly was due to the indifference expressed by the US and UK. Consequently, the council believed that no action by the council would salvage the situation in Rwanda. It is striking that during the first week of the genocide; the council ordered a reduction in the number of UNAMIR troops. This was the response when general Dallaire requested a change in the mandate of the body in order to stop the genocide. More than 500,000 Tutsis lost their lives while the UN assumed a “Pontius Pilate state”(Stanton 2012). Conclusion Many questions concerning the genocide in Rwanda remain unanswered. Why were the western countries reluctant to act despite receiving information in advance? During the initial first few days, there was a continual denial of facts refusing to term, the situation in Rwanda as a genocide until it was late .The denial of the facts was a failure on the side of the Security council signifying the unwillingness to act(William 2006, p.15). The UN was impartial in discharging its role in maintaining and safeguarding peace in Rwanda. The failure of the UN is attributable to the reluctance of the western countries s for reserved reasons. There was the lack of cooperation, and the result was the loss of many lives, an incident that would not happen were proper procedures implemented. The international community shares in the failure in marinating order and peace in Rwanda. Nations such as France and Belgium having learnt of the planned massive killings, they did not take any precautionary steps to prevent a disaster. The international policy makers turned a blind eye to the events happening in Rwanda for several weeks during the genocide killings. The US in particular shunned the word genocide fearing it would call for interventions (UNHRC n.d.). The UN willingly accepted its failure in the Rwandan genocide and apologized. The withdrawal of more than 2500 UN peacekeepers adversely affected the rescue operation. Lloyd, a Canadian minister, says that none can look back without being remorseful of neglecting Rwandans in time need. The members of the council have learnt lessons from the incident and pledged never again to repeat a grave mistake in the future (BBC 2000). References Dowell, A.M.Y., 2009. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INTERVENTION IN CASES OF GENOCIDE. Polis student journal, 1(1). Doyle, M.W. & Sambanis, N., 2006. Introduction: War-Making, Peacebuilding, and the United Nations. In pp. 1–27. Howard, A. & Suhrke, A., 1999. The Rwanda Crisis From Uganda To Zaire:The path of a Genocide, NewBrunswick,NewJersey: TransactionPublishers. Mearsheimer, J., 1994. The False Promise Of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), pp.1–45. Morris, J. & Wheeler, N.J., 2007. The Security Council’s Crisis of Legitimacy and the Use of Force. International Politics, 44(2/3), pp.214–231. Available at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/doifinder/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800185 [Accessed May 4, 2014]. Ramuhala, M.G., 2010. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA AFTER The Cold War. Stellenbosch. Roberts, A., 1994. The crisis in UN peacekeeping R. Tamne, ed., Oslo: nstitutt for forsvarsstudier (IFS) Tollbugt. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396339408442752. Yesildag, M., 2010. THE UNITED NATIONS Peacekeeping Operations. New York University. Alexandra, H., 2003. The Rwandan Genocides : The “ Could Haves , Would Haves , Should Haves ” of UN Prevention : Conflict Prevention, BBC, 2000. BBC News | AFRICA | UN admits Rwanda genocide failure. Dorn, W. & Matloff, J., 2000. Preventing the Bloodbath: Could the UN have Predicted and Prevented the Rwandan Genocide? | Dorn | Journal of Conflict Studies. Stanton, G.H., 2012. The Rwandan Genocide : Why Early Warning Failed. Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies, 1(2), pp.1–21. UNHRC, Genocide in Rwanda | United Human Rights Council. William, S., 2006. Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations, Alexandra, H., 2003. 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