Suspicions of the Grand Alliance after World War II - Essay Example

Seeds of the Cold War: The Suspicions of the Grand Alliance When World War II ended, the Grand Alliance of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, andthe United States gave the people of the world a glimpse at a demilitarised future that offered a new spirit of peace and cooperation. However, by the end of 1947 the Alliance had been split with an irreconcilable wedge driven between the East and the West. The split was framed as a difference in the ideologies of capitalism and communism, but soon became characterised by an out of control arms race and a dangerous nuclear future. The change from wartime allies and victors that were dividing the spoils of war to bitter enemies threatening total mutual destruction was sudden and largely unexpected. The seeds of suspicion sown on both sides and the anxieties of a cooperative post-war worldview resulted in the exaggerated misinterpretation of the motivations of the adversarial ideologies. At the foundation of the split in the Grand Alliance was the mutual fear that each adversary had expansionist policies as its driving force behind their foreign policy. While the Soviets professed a desire for coexistence and cooperation, the West discounted these attitudes and instead focused on Soviet demands for influence in the Near East, Middle East, and Far East (Roberts 21). The United States held the position that the Soviets had a program designed and driven by their goal of world domination. With the post-war Soviet encroachment into Eastern Europe, Kennan's policy of containment had realigned British and American thinking to accept a more aggressive policy of rollback. By the end of 1946, Truman and Attlee were both in agreement that the Soviet Union " posed a direct threat to Western interests and were agreed on the pressing need to modify Soviet behaviour" (White 35). The United States and Britain discounted the ability to negotiate with the Soviets. Soviet statements and activities promoting themselves as an equal partner were interpreted as expansionist and aggressive. Stalin was also suspicious of the West's motivations and interpreted their foreign policy as being designed to dominate the world stage and the Soviet Union. At the foundation of this mistrust was the atomic bomb and the West's refusal to share nuclear technology. Stalin understood the implications of possessing the atomic bomb, and the fact that the Americans and British had kept it a secret prompted the Soviets to embark on an intense program to develop their own nuclear technology triggering the beginnings of a nuclear standoff (Zubok and Pleshakov 44-45). Stalin would not accept being anything less than an equal partner in the Grand Alliance and was willing to postpone any premature confrontations before getting the bomb. This put the Soviets into the position of retuning to the old Leninist model of igniting revolutions in Iran, Greece, and elsewhere aimed at increasing communist influence and providing the USSR with greater national security (Zubok and Pleshakov 45). Stalin's activities were a response to the unrealistic perception of the threat that the West posed to the Soviets. The mutual suspicions and reactionary fears on both sides began during the war and were a product of wartime necessity. At the heart of the situation was the division of Europe and the Soviet influence in the Eastern satellite countries. The political landscape in Europe was born out of the realities of providing security in Europe during the war. Wartime agreements among the Grand Alliance had given political control of Eastern Europe to the Red Army as a means of providing security for the region during the war and had been bolstered by the growing impact of the communist party in these countries during the post-war period (Roberts 18). By March, 1946 former Prime Minister Churchill was denouncing the growing Soviet influence and gave a speech in Fulton Missouri which coined the phrase 'iron curtain' (Roberts 14). While there was still a spirit of cooperation among the Alliance, the policy of mistrust was being echoed at the highest levels of government. Adding to the tensions between the East and the West was Stalin's sense of isolation after the death of Roosevelt and the replacement of Churchill in July 1945 by Clement Attlee. Stalin had built up a diplomatic trust in Roosevelt and Churchill which had been replaced by a deep suspicion in Truman and Attlee. The common threat of the war had passed and Stalin had lost his two closest partners and no longer felt as an equal member of the Grand Alliance. According to Zubok and Pleshakov, Stalin was " driven by his dark foreboding and suspicions, and picking the worst signals from his far-reaching intelligence networks, believed that a policy of partnership with the West had no future" (39). Stalin's loss of trust neutralized the more moderate thinking of Soviets, such as the diplomat Maxim Litvinov, who believed that Soviet intentions should be aimed at maintaining an atmosphere of trust and cooperation (Zubok and Pleshakov 39). Stalin's suspicion and self-imposed isolation prompted Litvinov to state in June 1946 that the Soviets had chosen the wrong path to post-war cooperation and peace and contended that expansionism was an outdated path to security and concluded that "I now feel that the best that can be hoped for is a prolonged armed truce" (qtd. in Zubok and Pleshakov 38). Stalin's suspicious perception of Truman and Attlee would overshadow any Soviet intentions of peace and prompt statements and actions that were interpreted by the West as threatening and aggressive. While Stalin was harbouring a mistrust of Western intentions in Europe, The United States was taking actions to validate Stalin's suspicion. The US has abandoned the Policy of Containment and their foreign policy was taking a more militant stance against the growing communist influence around the world. A US Navy programme known as "The Foundations of National Power" was teaching that the purpose of foreign policy was to provide security for the US and that they would " oppose, by force if necessary, the attempt of any Power to dominate Western Europe, or the area in Asia bordering on the Pacific Ocean north of the equator" (Bidwell 484). The United States also had a growing belief that the ideologies of capitalism and communism could not co-exist in the world and that the differences could only result in a long and bitter disagreement, which would lead to armed conflict. Noted foreign affairs expert Percy M. Bidwell concluded in 1946 that, " the only realistic conclusion which can be deduced from their premises, which is immediate preparation for a third world war" (485). The spirit of cooperation and peaceful coexistence exemplified by the United Nations was being undermined by the mutual mistrust and a sense of urgency to take a more militant stand in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. These fears and apprehensions were being validated in the satellite countries as early as January 1945 when armed conflict between the communists and Western interests struggled for control of the newspapers and labour unions. Winterton, writing in January 1946 described the communist takeover in Rumania and argued that, "Using its power as a conqueror, Russia has swept aside the authority of political parties" and that "Roumania has been turned once more into a police State, dancing to the Russian tune under a one-party system" (26). As early as the spring of 1945 Stalin was driving a wedge between East and West with ideology being the central issue. The United Nations had provided a forum for diplomatic conflict rather than providing the intended role of a peaceful mediator in world affairs. By the beginning of 1947, Stalin's mistrust of Western intentions, armed and bitter conflicts in Europe, and the clash of ideologies had resulted in swaying public opinion in the US and UK towards a nationalistic feeling of Anglo destiny to rule the world. The foundation for the Anglo-American alliance was laid by Winston Churchill in his address to the US Congress in December 1941 when he stated, "British and American peoples will for their own safety and the good of all walk together side by side in majesty, in justice, and in peace" (qtd. in Danchev 739). This alliance between the UK and the US made the security of Europe one of the primary concerns of US foreign policy. By the end of the war the US no longer required a direct threat on their own soil to be considered a national security concern. The isolationist policies of the past were no longer valid in the politics of the new worldview. By 1947 a harder line was drawn. In January 1947, foreign affairs expert Arnold Wolfers described the new policies as, " throwing American power, military power at times, into the scales of world politics ; it meant more specifically that the United States would have to contain the mighty Soviet Union within limits compatible with American security and the peace of the world" (23). By the beginning of 1947 the irreconcilable differences in ideologies had pushed American Foreign Policy into a more activist role in Europe. The role that the US would play in the future of Europe, and elsewhere, was lined out by a speech given by Truman to the US Congress in March 1947. In this speech, Truman laid out the policy that would become to be known as the Truman Doctrine. This speech clarified the departure from Kennan's Policy of Containment and into a more activist role in European politics. Speaking of the Soviet threat Truman contended, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" (Truman). Any future US action in Europe would be viewed through the framework of the Truman Doctrine. The thinly veiled suspicions of the Soviet Union in regards to American intentions for Europe had been brought out into the public eye. This would serve to fortify the growing belief that, " the Soviet Union is threatened by an encirclement of decadent and corrupt capitalist states, hence their constant suspicion about the outer world, no matter how other representatives behave" (Kertesz 12). Truman had laid to rest any optimism about a peaceful coexistence among the competing ideologies. In the face of dwindling hope for any long term peaceful coexistence, Truman took pre-emptive action to wrestle control of Europe from the Soviets through the implementation of the Marshall Plan. When Truman's ambitious plan, known as the European Recovery Programme (ERP), was announced in June 1947, Molotov was viewed it as a means of establishing an anti-Soviet bloc in Western Europe (Roberts 24). While the economic aid was targeted for Western Europe, the plan did not exclude Eastern bloc countries. Both Molotov and Stalin interpreted the ERP as being invasive and an attempt to interfere in Soviet affairs in Eastern Europe (Roberts 24). The pivotal Paris Peace Talks of 1947 were brought to an abrupt end when Molotov announced that the Soviets viewed the ERP as " an attempt to undermine the sovereignty and independence of European states and as the harbinger of a divided Europe" (Roberts 24). Any ideas of peaceful cooperation, whether economic or security, were drowned out by the fear that the clash of ideologies had already cast the future for Europe. In conclusion, the Grand Alliance was a vehicle for cooperation born out of the necessity of World War II. At best it was a tenuous cooperation that provided temporary security for the mutual partners. However, the clash of ideologies provoked the underlying suspicions of expansionist policies on both sides. This mistrust was exaggerated by the loss of Roosevelt and the failure to re-elect Churchill as Stalin lost the only two Westerners he felt he could trust. Driven to pursue old line communist tactics, the Soviets continued to inflame Eastern Europe during the post-war period. In response, the Americans accepted the role of the Anglo-American destiny for Europe under one world power. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were viewed as overt aggressions against the struggling communist parties in the Soviet sphere of influence. Because many of Stalin's unreasonable fears were based on the US possession of the atomic bomb and a fear of US intentions, it prompted the Soviets to pursue a program for the rapid development and deployment of their own nuclear arsenal. Tensions in Europe, clashing ideologies, and old suspicions precipitated in the division of Europe and a cold war that would consume the world for the next 40 years. Works Cited Bidwell, Percy W. "Ideals in American Foreign Policy." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 22.4 (1946): 479-87. JSTOR. 28 Mar. 2008. Danchev, Alex. "On Specialness." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72.4 (1996): 737-50. JSTOR. 28 Mar. 2008. Kertesz, Stephen. "Reflections on Soviet and American Negotiating Behavior." The Review of Politics 19.1 (1957): 3-36. JSTOR. 28 Mar. 2008. Roberts, Geoffrey K. Soviet Union in World Politics : Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold War, 1945-1991. New York: Routledge, 1998. Truman, Harry. "President Harry S Truman's Address Before a Joint Session of Congress March 12, 1947" US Congress, Washington, DC. 12 Mar. 1947. 28 Mar. 2008 . White, Brian. Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations . New York: Routledge, 1992. Winterton, Paul. "The Aims of the U.S.S.R. in Europe." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 22.1 (1946): 14-27. JSTOR. 28 Mar. 2008. Wolfers, Arnold. "The United States in Search of a Peace Policy." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 23.1 (1947): 20-29. JSTOR. 28 Mar. 2008. Zubok, Vladislav, and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996. Read More