In what ways did US officials act to build a global order under US leadership - Essay Example

In what ways did US officials act to build a global order under US leadership, during and after World War Two, and what were the essential features of that order? 1/ demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the evolution, formation and implementation of US foreign policy; 2/ debate and discuss US foreign policy as it relates to a range of significant contemporary international issues; 3/ apply the major theoretical approaches to international relations to contemporary US foreign policy; 4/ understand the role of the American state in the construction of the liberal international system; 5/ critically analyse US foreign policy in a case study, contrasting different theoretical perspectives and utilising detailed empirical material Introduction According to Hudson (2008), foreign policy is “the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities” (p. 12). Kaufman (2010), in turn, writes that the formulation of foreign policy denotes a process of reassessing certain policies – either previous or existing ones – as a result of changing circumstances. In general, the process of foreign policy decision making not only involves various domestic actors aiming for certain outcomes, most notably the national government, but is also highly dependent upon regional and global developments, factors, and forces, which constitute the particular international context. While most of the foreign policy decisions, whether being concerned with international trade, economic and diplomatic relations, immigration policies, etc., could be considered relatively routine, there are extraordinary ones where the stakes appear to be extremely high (Kaufman, 2010), like the formation of strategic alliances, decisions on whether to go to war or make peace, etc. On the other hand, even those foreign policy decisions, which are generally considered routine, inevitably attract more attention in election years, or when an extraordinary event or development occurs (Kaufman, 2010). Thus, as noted by Kaufman (2010), foreign policy is not only of concern to diplomats or bureaucrats but can affect everyone. This paper is aimed to examine the evolution of US foreign policy, as manifested in the twin processes of formation and implementation, in order to demonstrate the role of the United States in the construction of the new global order that followed the outbreak of World War Two. Three more sections, besides the introductory one, deal with the different aspects of US foreign policy over time, which led to the establishment of a global order under US leadership, as well as the essential features of that order; viewing US foreign policy in relation to significant contemporary issues and applying the major theoretical traditions in International Relations to contemporary US foreign policy. The fourth section is in the form of a case study which analyses US foreign policy in the Middle East (Iraq) from different theoretical perspectives. Finally, the paper draws a conclusion on the current US foreign policy. Historical Background Two conceptions of what the American type of government should consists in had been put forward at the very dawn of the United States – that of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton (Kaufman, 2010). While Jefferson didn’t conceal his animosity towards “a very energetic government” (US Department of State, n.d.; Peterson, 1993) but advocated “the ‘new diplomacy’ of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on fairness, peace, and openness in international affairs“(Peterson, 1993, p.19), Alexander Hamilton, in turn, argued in favour of a strong relationship between the national government and big business, order, efficiency, as well as for the necessity of integrating the country – under favourable terms however – into the international system, especially the economic one (Kaufman, 2010). Even though these views seem diametrically opposite, there are historians who aptly point out that Hamilton and Jefferson “often arrived at the same practical conclusion” (Harper, 2004, p.104); which had particularly been observed in the line of foreign policy. Not surprisingly therefore, the principles of economic development and non-interference in the European conflicts remained “a matter of consensus”, and the pillars of American foreign policy until the early twentieth century (Harper, 2004, p.104). Nevertheless, the purchase of Louisiana from France during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson and the War of 1812 signalled more or less a considerable shift in US foreign policy behaviour. Both developments not only appeared demonstrative of the way the United States were going to expand within their immediate international environment in the years to come, but also provided the US government and policy-makers with the necessary corrections that inter alia made the nineteenth-century expansion possible. Thus, the success of the purchase of Louisiana could be deemed to have set the precedent for buying the strip of land along the American–Mexican border in 1853 – named after the American general and diplomat James Gadsden, aka the Treaty of La Mesilla (Ibarra, 2004; Yale Law School, n.d.) – as well as Alaska from the Russian empire in 1867. The War of 1812, on the other hand, produced two far-reaching implications for the course of US foreign policy. First, it proved the American state militarily week and unprepared, in terms of regular army and navy, to match the then global powers, Britain in particular; many historians, however, would argue in favour of the opposite but the fact remains that the British more or less achieved all their objectives, most notably preventing a loss of Canadian territories (Benn, 2002; Latimer, 2007; 2009) and British troops and warships moved unchallenged in American territory and coastal waters at the end of the war, even after the Treaty of Ghent had been signed (Heidler and Heidler, 2002; Latimer, 2007). Second, the border agreement between the US and Canada (the British Empire), along with the practice to settle any boundary dispute via joint commission, introduced long-lasting peace, hence considerably improved the situation in the north (Heidler and Heidler, 2002); which, in turn, had given the Americans a free hand to look at the South and westward – something they did shortly thereafter. The territorial expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century, besides the purchase of Louisiana, continued with the benevolent connivance of Britain, while Spain, France and Russia appeared rather incapable of opposing it, even if they wanted to. The decay of Spanish Imperial rule in South America between 1810 and 1825 (Bakewell and Holler, 2010) is believed to have provided a fresh impetus to the cause of US expansion. In 1822 the Monroe administration recognised – arguably under powerful public pressure – the newly independent states of former Spanish America, including the ex-Portuguese colony of Brazil (US Department of State, n.d.). At the same time, Russia, Austria, Prussia founded the Holly Alliance, which, although being considered of little importance (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2013) in Europe, stirred up certain anxiety in the United States, insofar as the Alliance treaty’s Article I hinted the vague possibility of concerted action towards the spread of revolution into South America (The Napoleon Series, 2000; US Department of State, n.d.). Being convinced by the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, the president Monroe declined the proposal put forward by London concerning extended Anglo-American guarantees to Latin America; subsequently, in December 1823, he pronounced what would later become known as the Monroe Doctrine, namely the refusal to tolerate a further extension of European power and political system into the American continents (US Department of State, n.d.). Several important observations should be made here: on the one hand, having expressed prima facie solidarity with the newly independent states of South America, the Monroe Doctrine clearly defined the US interests, hence foreign policy behaviour in America’s immediate international environment. The doctrine more or less directly challenged the European pretensions and commercial system, and more importantly poised the United States to take control of North America (Herring, 2008); to powerful Britain, however, it wisely conceded the right to “keep what is yours and leave the rest of the continent to us” (Bemis, 1949, pp.491-92, also cited in Herring, 2008, p.134). On the other hand, the stipulation that the United States would not interfere when the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power were concerned (US Department of State, n.d.) is deemed to have referred to the “policy of aloofness” and non-interference in the European conflicts from the times of Washington, Thomas Jefferson (see Harper, 2004; Kaufman, 2010); although the US foreign policy in the 1820s had become much more assertive (Herring, 2008). And finally, the knowledge that the Royal Navy would defend South America in the case of invasion by the Holly Alliance (US Department of State, n.d.), along with the British tacit approval for this US foreign policy objective, undeniably added weight to the doctrine (Lawson, 1922; Herring, 2008). An intriguing aspect of US foreign policy by that time is the relationship with the former mother country – the British Empire. Against the background of two wars fought in less than 50 years, the American nervousness about certain British menace – whether justifiable or not – and the apparently defiant American stance on the issue of British influence over the Americas (see Bemis, 1949), the relations between Britain and the United States appeared rather harmonious (Lawson, 1922). While the fast-growing British industry eager for American raw materials, the British commercial interests and the vulnerability of Canada (Herring, 2008) taken together may present a plausible explanation from the British perspective, the US point of view proved a bit more complex. It might have included the common heritage, language, the aversion to other European nations and the European absolutism as a whole, the common border with Canada, and, most notably, the lack of credible army and navy that would protect the hemisphere, along with the US, from outside intervention (Lawson, 1922; Herring, 2008). Since the Royal Navy’ supremacy was enough to guarantee the latter, thus providing ‘free’ security for the American state and minimising its necessity to enter alliances and/or maintain large military forces, the United States enjoyed a rare opportunity to develop without major external threats (Herring, 2008). Following the 1820s, the increasingly assertive US foreign policy expressed itself in ‘Manifest Destiny’ – a phrase coined by John L. O’Sullivan in an editorial on the Texas issue in 1845 (Merk and Faragher, 1995b). The term was meant to denote nothing but territorial expansion – whether over the North American continent or over the hemisphere – and became not only part of the language but also the focal concept in US foreign policy orientation (Merk and Faragher, 1995b). Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed US trade and diplomatic expansion in Middle East, East Asia and the Pacific during the Jackson administration (Herring, 2008), the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), which ended with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the seizure of control over Texas, San Francisco, and San Diego, along with the control over California, and the desert Southwest (Lind, 2006); as well as the Spanish-American war of 1898, which, being a clear expression of US foreign policy of unilateralism, marked the beginning of the US rise to a great power (Schmidt, 2005; Kaufman, 2010). The Birth of a Superpower Whether being an “irony of fate” or not – as Woodrow Wilson himself had once declared (Link, 1972 cited in Herring, 2008, p.378) – but the tumultuous international environment during the years of his presidency made foreign policy the administration’s top priority (Herring, 2008). The revolutions in Mexico, China and Russia, and most notably the Great War, eventually put an end to hitherto US foreign policy of unilateralism (Herring, 2008). Traditionally, as Hunt (1987) points out, the US sympathised with revolutions – at least in principle – insofar as their interests were not threatened by outbursts of violence or radicalism. Not surprisingly therefore, the Wilson administration sympathised with the revolutionary forces in Mexico and China and even took bold steps to interfere in China (Herring, 2008). The limits of then US helpfulness, or capabilities, as the case might have been, were exposed by both the outbreak of the war in Europe and the Japanese interference in China’ s affairs in 1915 (Herring, 2008). The US involvement in the Mexican revolution, on the other hand, brought about major difficulties for Wilson (Herring, 2008) and once again drew the limits of American power – in terms of diplomacy and military capabilities – to effect meaningful changes in the international arena by then. Nevertheless, this period of US military interventionism, which, besides the abovementioned involvements in China’s and Mexican revolutions, included one intervention in Cuba, two in Panama, five in Honduras, along with interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, clearly spoke of Wilson’s intention to spread US values and influence a bit further from home (Herring, 2008). In fact, the guiding principles of then US foreign policy were summarised by the dictum credited to Captain Mahan as follows: “In the Far East, cooperation; in Europe, abstention; in Latin America, dominance” (Ferrell, 1987 cited in Buchanan, 1999). Thus, the so-called ‘progressive imperialism’ became America’s fifth great foreign policy tradition associated with McKinley and most notably Theodore Roosevelt (Buchanan, 1999). The course of the war in Europe had given the opportunity while the sinking of the pride of the British Cunard Steamship, the ocean liner Lusitania, provided – arguably or not – the casus belli (Preston, 2002; Schmidt, 2005), this principles to undergo certain change. The American policy of “strict neutrality” declared in 1914 appeared more or less a public pose, which, however, lasted only for a brief period and was by no means a consideration for the large American banks (Schmidt, 2005). The US financial and commercial interests, along with the American lives lost on either American or British and French ships, could be generally considered the main driving forces behind the US involvement in the Great War, which appeared the actual turning point in the US foreign policy. The opposition to this involvement was personified by the Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan (Buchanan, 1999; Schmidt, 2005). The final stage of the World War I saw nearly two million men in American army uniforms, yet poorly trained and inadequately equipped for combat (Schmidt, 2005), as well as the “official” admission of the US status of a great power – to the degree that Wilson was confident enough to pronounce his famous fourteen-points vision of the post-Great War world (Schmidt, 2005). The End of Isolationism and Rise to Global Dominance According to the historians, the United Stated embraced a policy of isolationism during the interwar period, namely between the 1920s and 1940s; which is actually deemed to have reflected the domestic political priorities of that time (Kaufman, 2010). Among those should be mentioned the commitment to economic development and the desire to keep the country out of another European conflict (Kaufman, 2010). Additionally, the Great Depression years that followed the “black Tuesday” – 29 October 1929 – required the government to put the greatest emphasis on domestic economic recovery, rather than international engagement (Kaufman, 2010). Herring (2008), however, prefers another explanation of the US isolationist policy during this period – lack of an overarching theme and a dominant political figure, like Wilson or Theodore Roosevelt. Having become the world’s top economic power beyond any doubt, the United States still lacked commensurable military power (Herring, 2008), despite their participation and role within the previous war. The absence of any serious threat to US security, with Europe being exhausted from the war, Soviet Russia preoccupied with problems of its own and Japan willing to co-operate, the United States were merely content to maintain a small regular army of about 140 000 men (Herring, 2008). Since the traditional test of a great power was the “strength for war”, the United States during the interwar period were characterised as “soft power”, deriving its global influence from its economic might, technological superiority and cultural sway (Nye Jr, 2002, pp.5-12; also cited in Herring, 2008). It was not a surprise in that regard, as Herring (2008) aptly points out, that the approach adopted by the American political establishment was “involvement without commitment” (p.436); which denoted the US relations with the world during the interwar period (Herring, 2008). Although this approach could be credited with remarkable short-term successes, in the long run it could be blamed for a number of foreign policy failures (Herring, 2008). The presidential election of 1932 led to the Democrats’ victory and Franklin D. Roosevelt became the 32nd President of the United States (Kaufman, 2010). Following his inauguration, Roosevelt openly admitted – arguably for the first time in the interwar period – that the United States would probably have to face a crisis – whether in Europe or in the Pacific – if national interests were threatened (Kaufman, 2010). The outbreak of the hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia in 1935 prompted a response from the US Congress in the form of a series of laws which prohibited the supply of arms or money to the belligerent countries (Kaufman, 2010). Another war broke out in 1937, between China and Japan, which was condemned by the US; in turn, Japan refused to comply with any existing agreements, including the Open Door policy and the Washington Conference (Kaufman, 2010). In 1939, the Congress passed another neutrality act, which was thus amended to allow the belligerent states to purchase munitions and other war materials from the US (Kaufman, 2010). Having won the presidential election of 1940, Roosevelt began to prepare the US for the possibility of war (Kaufman, 2010). Actually, almost one year before, namely in July 1940, he had sent a naval mission in the Great Britain formally to “carry on talks” but actually to establish whether Britain is capable and resolved to withstand (Churchill, 1950). Meanwhile, the massive purchases of American arms, munitions and other military equipment, and investments in war-related facilities, along with the massive loss of tonnage due to the German submarines in the Atlantic, had nearly drained Britain of its resources (Churchill, 1949). In order to secure Britain’s ability to continue the war, hence to prevent the war from reaching the US coasts, the Congress passed the Lend-Leased Act in March 1941 (Kaufman, 2010). The United States’ official entry into the whirlpool of World War II, however, occurred after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941; on December 8, President Roosevelt asked for a declaration of war against Japan (Kaufman, 2010). During the course of the war, the United States and Britain achieved an unprecedented level of co-operation, sharing intelligence, resources, and even vital information on top-secret military projects; moreover the US and Great Britain embarked on the Manhattan project, bringing together probably some of the greatest atomic scientists of that time (Kaufman, 2010). Nevertheless, the two allies were suspicious of each other, and most likely with good reason, given their contradictions on a variety of issues, including the future of the British Empire (Kaufman, 2010). In 1945, the newly-created weapon – the atomic bomb – was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, and three days later – on the city of Nagasaki, which led to the capitulation of Japan (Kaufman, 2010). With the war in the Pacific and Europe over, the United States emerged as the richest and most powerful country in the post- Second-World-War world; thus the balance of power, or the seat of the world power to be precise, irreversibly shifted to the New World (Herring, 2008; Kaufman, 2010). As Herring (2008) points out only the US and the Soviet Union were capable of wielding considerable influence beyond their boundaries. As a result of the decolonisation process, nationalist movements flourished worldwide and hundreds of new nations had been created; in turn, the instability – sometimes generously cherished by the new world’s heavyweights – shook the foundations of the fragile international system and, quite ironically indeed, provided the fertile ground for the ongoing Soviet-American rivalry (Herring, 2008). The direct result of this new type of conflict – the Cold War – in its turn became not only the reason for unprecedented armament and technological race, but also caused numerous ‘hot’ conflicts around the world. The Clifford-Elsey report of 1946 dealt with the US’ necessity to rearm and contain the Soviets, posing Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to US interests across the world; in order to do so, the US were to maintain high military readiness, with overseas military bases, expanding nuclear arsenal, etc. (Herring, 2008). On the other hand, the Marshall Plan furnished thirteen billion dollars in economic assistance for the devastated economies of the Western European countries (Herring, 2008). The aid from the US not only stabilised the European currencies and helped liberalise trade, but most importantly started a process of integration that later on led to the creation of the European Union (Herring, 2008). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, in turn, being rested on the US military power, provided the common security for the Western Europe, Greece and Turkey. In a nutshell the US immense military power, technological advancement and liberal ideology brought about the US position of a leader of the so-called free world, as a counterweight of the Soviet empire. The numerous conflicts – the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the conflicts and coup d’états in Latin America, Africa and Asia – gradually drained the Eastern bloc of its resources, and combined with its economic inefficiency, eventually led to the spectacular collapse in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In result, the US remained the only superpower and world hegemon, with hitherto unmatched capabilities and a range of sway. Case Study – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Having attempted to render simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, etc., classical realists such like Morgenthau, Thucydides and Niebuhr, presented politics as a struggle for power and unilateral advantage (Lebow, 2007). Additionally from classical realists’ perspective, international affairs solely denoted a struggle for power among self-interested states; where leaders rationally calculate the costs and benefits of war in terms of their state’s power and security (Lebow, 2007; Walt 1). A rather nuanced understanding of the relationship between interest and power is being developed by Morgenthau, according to which, the successful exercise of power necessitates a sophisticated knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of both allies and adversaries, as well as third parties (Lebow, 2007). In turn, this view presents a plausible explanation of why Iraq had become a country of choice for the 2003 invasion, rather than Iran, Libya or North Korea, which presumably had had the potential to threaten the US interests and those of their allies (Lieberfeld, 2005). In turn, neorealism, most notably Kenneth Waltz, focuses on the effects of the international system and regards international relations as the domain where each state is an autonomous and formally equal unit, which strives to realize its interest, counting solely on its own resources (Waltz 89-99, cited in Donnelly, 2000); hence the stronger the state, the less vulnerable it would appear in the international arena (Aliyev). In this train of thought, the 2003 U.S. invasion in Iraq could be considered a prima facie case of neorealist theory of international relations put into practice (Kennedy-Pipe, 2008). According to neorealism, Iraq has been targeted due to its geostrategic location and oil reserves, along with the possibility of projection of the U.S. power further into the Middle East and East Asia and demonstration of US power to both friends and adversaries (Lieberfeld, 2005). In other words, the US decision to wage war on Iraq has been made on the basis of cost-benefit calculations and the assumption of rationality (see above). Liberalism, in turn, namely the actor-centred rationalist approach, provides an explanation for why the US decided to invade Iraq with the presence of a powerful pro-war domestic coalition composed of the conservatives in the Republican Party, backed by the military-industrial complex and other business interests, most notably oil companies, etc. (Panke and Risse, 2007). The basic theoretical premise of such an approach is the influence exerted by domestic actors upon the way states define their foreign-policy interests and the way they behave in the international arena (Putnam, 1988; Panke and Risse, 2007). The process is explained in two steps – the American nation and elites ‘agreed on the change of regime in Baghdad as the only way to deal with the problem – whether due to the shock from 9/11 or the vain decade-long attempts at imposing the Security Council resolutions – which in theory denotes the formation of state’s interest by “win sets of domestic actors (Panke and Risse, 2007). The second – international level – according to theorists, is the one where state negotiators face external constraints due to the fact that other states are likely to pursue rather different interests (Panke and Risse, 2007). In the case of 2003 Iraqi war, the German opposition, along with the likely veto by France, Russia, or China, produced lack of consensus in the UN Security Council; which, in turn, influenced the US means-ends calculations and they went to war without international – consider UN – sanction (Gordon and Shapiro, 2004). Conclusion While the foreign policy of the Bush Jr administration, formed mainly under the pressure of 9/11 and bringing some allusions to Pearl Harbour, could be considered more or less in compliance with the realist tradition, i.e. concerned with the effects of the international system and cost-benefit calculations, the current US foreign policy, as conducted by the Obama administration, might be broadly characterised as dominated by domestic factors and win sets, whose top priority appears the economic development, especially in the light of the current economic woes. This is by no means meant to say that the US foreign policy is heading towards new isolationism era, at least because of the globalisation phenomenon, and due to the more or less significant threats to the US global interests posed by the Islamic and other terrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the obscure Chinese power and foreign policy objectives. On the other hand, there is a tangible US withdrawal from the world affairs insofar as the latest conflicts in the Middle East – the conflict in Syria for example – raged without meaningful international sanction. 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