The Taliban and Current Homeland Security Policies Towards Terrorism - Essay Example

The Taliban and Current Homeland Security Policies Toward Terrorism The Taliban and Current Homeland Security Policies Towards Terrorism There is the current increase of incidents involving terrorist organizations globally during the past years. Even the United States of America, perceived to be one of the strongest nation worldwide has experienced the debacle of 9/11 involving attacks perpetuated by the Taliban and Al Qaida. There is a current trend worldwide of trying to dissect terrorist organizations to learn their structure, resources and tactics in order to develop ways of combating them. Social scientists and organizations are conducting studies in order to develop “more concrete data…that lead some people to terrorism –and use those insights to develop ways to thwart it” (Tori DeAngelis, 2009). The Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu aptly puts it: “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every vic­tory gained you will also suffer a defeat (The Art of War, 6 BC).” The Taliban The Taliban emerged in the 1990s as a predominantly Pashtun movement in northern Pakistan. The group became prominent in 1994 in Afghanistan and was then recognized by the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It gained notoriety after the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America in 2001 and was soon removed from power in Afghanistan by a US-led coalition. The group advocated a hard line enforcement of Islamic Law (BBC News Asia, 3 January 2012). Taliban ideology is based on Salafism which follows the egalitarian model, and Pashtunwali, which “arose from the madrassas during the Afghan-Soviet war.” The group “represented nobody but themselves and recognized no Islam except their own. (Afsar, Major Shahid, Samples, Major Chris and Wood, Major Thomas, 2008). Their religious ideology firmly enforces zealous compliance to their rule including banning all forms of entertainment, and banning of women’s education, including their seclusion. Harsh punishment for offenses like chopping of hands and public executions are their common methods of dispensing justice for perceived crime (EASO, 2012). The group has a hierarchical and layered structure with autonomous units under the control of the central leadership. It is headed by the Mullah Mohammad Omar who also controls the Shura (Leadership Council) with several organizing directors controlling provincial level activities under him. The next level of hierarchy is the Provincial Chief with their respective Provincial Commision members, followed by the District level chief with District Deputies. On the fighter level, are the squad leaders with their respective Mujahiddens (EASO, 2012). Decision making is left to the top leaders who utilize authoritarian decision-making. The lower levels of the hierarchy on the other hand rely on consensus decision-making to maintain support from the populace (Afsar et. al, 2012). According to Jeffrey Dressler and Carl Forsberg, in their article Backgrounder The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operation and Shadow Governance (December 31, 2009) Large fighting units range in size from groups of twelve to thirty-plus fighters. They typically carry out…coordinated, multi-directional ambushes or raids in Taliban-controlled territory. Suicide bombers are…foreign…(as) their deaths will not be mourned by local families, potentially eroding public support for…Suicide attackers are trained in Pakistan and sent into the south, to report to a specific commander to receive instructions. At the district level and below are resourced by local indigenous fighters. Low-level commanders and small-unit leaders (no less than five personnel) operate with a higher degree of autonomy. Smaller units are typically comprised of between eight and twelve men, responsible for planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), conducting small-scale ambushes of coalition and Afghan patrols and checkpoints and collecting intelligence. In order to carry out its operations, the Taliban relies on religious allies for money, personnel, military supplies (i.e. explosives and communication gear as well as firearms and ammunition), and training (Afsar et al, 2008). It also sources its finances from taxation in controlled areas and alleged opium and heroin trafficking (Dressler and Forsberg, 2009). They also have a vast resource in the human terrain, particularly the Pashtuns who have mistrust on the Afghan authority to protect them from “abuses perpetuated by insurgents and warlords wince the fall of the Taliban.” These act as a great resource for recruits, support personnel and a vast intelligence network for the Taliban (Asfar et al, 2008). Ben Brandt (2011) describes the “current intelligence gathering structure as being one where local Taliban units collect intelligence and share it with neighboring units and the Taliban’s ‘higher hierarchy,’ which provides top-down intelligence support.” He goes on that “the Taliban possess dedicated intelligence officers…deployed to the regional and provincial levels, and run informant networks…village and neighborhood level intelligence networks continue to provide a large quantity of information on U.S. and ISAF movements and potential spies or government collaborators, as well as…fear of the spies, a major factor in many Afghans’ decision to obey the Taliban’s edicts and avoid assisting counterinsurgency efforts. Taliban intelligence focus on Afghan government employees (such as police) and Afghans working for foreign militaries (such as interpreters), monitored while entering or departing foreign military bases, and later targeted for intimidation or murder…the Taliban derive actionable intelligence from informants in military bases, prisons, and Afghan security forces…used to identify informants, provide intelligence on military movements and facilities of interest to the Taliban, and intimidate or coerce other Afghan personnel. (It has) also (been) reported  that the Taliban appear to have attempted to gather information via Twitter, noting that the group’s account was following the Twitter feeds of several U.S. military personnel as of early 2011. In addition to social media, the Taliban monitor the foreign news media and NGO publications. Its strategy of insurgency as Afsar et al (2008) puts it is “one of patience.” He further goes on that the Taliban is conducting a “war of the flea – causing enemy to suffer from too much to defend” with too little and fast an enemy to capture and in the long run, tiring the enemy to stop the Taliban. Relying mainly on guerilla tactics, small groups and ability to merge with the population due to its local support, Brandt (2011) claims the Taliban operates on three levels of insurgency. Classified as Tiers or levels, Tier 1 are “full-time fighters recruited in Pakistan or Afghanistan (with) foreign fighters, very mobile and operate four to six months in a region not of their origin or birth, in a valley or village and stay with the local population. The units can be smaller than a dozen fighters, but can merge into larger groups of several hundred fighters. If military pressure forces rises, they have the ability to split into the small units and take refuge in the mountains. There, they can reorganize and restart activities from propaganda to intimidation and execution of perceived enemies, mobile jurisdiction and dispute settlement, tax collection, and attacks on police and military targets. Tier2 are local fighters who operate in their own valley and gather when a Tier 1 unit arrives in the region and operate together with this unit, rarely independently. After an operation, they simply return home. They act as the Taliban’s guides, informants, local guards and fighters. Tier 3 is ‘The village underground’ or the local movement of village people supporting the other layers. They collect information and report on enemy troop movements. They intimidate and target neighbors cooperating with the government by way of night letters, visits and killings (and) keep and guard materials such as explosives” (EASO, 2012). In Afsar et al’s study (2008), the Taliban is seeking to re-establish its status through four phases. First, is to mobilize the Afghan and Pakistani religious public; secondly, rally the Pashtun tribes by agitating the Pashtuni’s that the government of Kabul is predominantly non-Pashtuns; third, build organizational confidence through attacks on coalition and government forces; and, lastly, seize control of eastern and southern Afghanistan and “push for influence in Western Pakistan and establish their version of an Islamic State. In the achievement of their goal, the Taliban is continuously conducting harassment and intimidation activities against US-led coalition troops and Afghan officials and citizens. Aside from the infamous 9/11 attacks, the Taliban have conducted dramatic assassination attacks designed to intimidate the local population and government officials. In Kandahar in 2008, the deputy National Directorate of Security chief was assassinated and attempted failed attacks on NDS Headquarters in August and September of 2009. Again in 2009, two sons of an official of Afghanistan’s NDS were killed by explosives. In 2008, Taliban assassinated a district police chief in Helmand and conducted a double suicide bombing at the Kandahar City Police Office. Gunmen also frequently attacked police officials in Kandahar 2008 and 2009. A roadside bomb struck the car of Dad Mohammad, a former mujahedeen commander, NDS official, and a respected member of the Afghanistan Parliament. Attacks have been conducted against governors of Helmand and Kandahar by nearly shooting down the Helmand governor’s helicopter in 2008, and an IED attack against the Governor of Kandahar in 2009. The brother of President Karzai faced multiple well-coordinated assassination attempts in 2008 and 2009 (Asfar et al, 2008). The Taliban also claimed responsibility in the shooting down of a US transport helicopter killing 22 Navy SEALS in August 2011 (Christina Capecchi and Timothy Williams, 11 August 2011). The US Response to 9/11: Homeland Security Policy Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States of America realized that it was not immune to terrorist attacks. The government’s response was swift with announcements of policy-shift from that of deterrence to preemption. “Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Administration decision makers felt that the United States could not afford to sit back, wait for attacks to occur, and then respond”. The month following 9/11, the USA Patriot Act (PL 107-56) was enacted on October of 2001. The act increased law enforcement authority “to investigate suspected terrorists, including surveillance procedures such as roving wiretaps; provided for strengthened controls on international money laundering and financing of terrorism; improved measures for strengthening of defenses along the U.S. northern border; and authorized disclosure of foreign intelligence information obtained in criminal investigations to intelligence and national security officials” (Raphael F. Perl, 2007). The following year in November of 2002, two Acts were passed by Congress: PL 107-292, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Perl, 2007), and PL 107-306 or the Creation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States or more commonly referred to as the “9/11 Commission” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The Homeland Security Act established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and charged with coordinating the defense and response of the nation against terror attacks in the country. It effectively consolidated 22 federal agencies, offices and research agencies including the activation of the National Counter-Terrorism Center in May of 2003. The DHS lists five goals to achieve its mandate. First is protecting the nation against dangerous individuals through the effective control of its borders through air and ground surveillance, enforcement of immigration monitoring and laws, transport security plans and passenger pre-screening. Second is to protect the country from the entry and use of dangerous material like nuclear, biological, chemical and explosives through intelligence and aviation/shipping security. Third is the protection of critical infrastructure through ensuring government communication and continuity of operations, improved cyber-security and protection of the transport sector. The agency will ensure this through assessment of critical infrastructure and readiness, tracking and disruption of terrorist financing. Fourth is to strengthen emergency preparedness and response capabilities of both government and public sectors for all man-made, natural disasters and severe pandemic through training of more emergency first responders and continued planning and joint exercises by government and the public sector. Lastly, is the strengthening of agency operations and information sharing through the integration of plans and coordination of operations among federal, local and private agencies involved in the security of the nation (DHS, 2011). On 22 July 2004, the 9/11 Commission finally released its report to the public. In BBC’s report (23 July 2004), the Commission “warns against complacency” against the threat of terrorism and enumerated several recommendations to Create a national counter-terrorism center unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against Islamist terrorists across the foreign and the domestic divide; Appoint a new Senate-confirmed national intelligence director to unify the intelligence community; Create a "network-based information sharing system that transcends traditional governmental boundaries"; Set up a specialized and integrated national security unit within the FBI; Strengthen Congressional oversight; Strengthen the FBI and Homeland defenders; Develop (a) global strategy of diplomacy and public relations to dismantle Osama Bin Ladens al-Qaeda terror network and defeat its militant Islamic ideology; and Establish a better dialogue between the West and the Islamic world In December of 2004, Congress passed PL 108-458, or the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) that broadly affected laws against terrorism in the country. This Act established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and covers several subjects namely: the Federal Bureau of Investigation; security clearances; transportation security; border protection, immigration and visa matters; and terrorism prevention (US Congress, 2004). The Director of National Intelligence was subject only to the control, authority and direction of the President and served as his principal advisor and advisor to the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council and interim head of the sixteen-member Intelligence Community composed of civilian and military intelligence agencies. These are the following: Central Intelligence Agency; the eight intelligence arms of the Department of Defense; Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; two intelligence divisions within the Department of Homeland Security; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (ODNI. n.d.). The government conducts additional interagency coordination and programs like the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program that capacitates other nations’ antiterrorism capabilities (Perl, 2007). Events after September 11, 2001 led to the US leading an international coalition of forces whose aim was to destroy Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network and oust the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in October of 2001. It succeeded in removing the Taliban from power and forced its forces, including bin Laden to flee and wage an insurgency war from neighboring Pakistan. On May 2, 2011, bin Laden was finally tracked down and killed in Pakistan. The war against the Taliban however, still continues even while US-forces in Afghanistan starting its gradual phase-down and troop withdrawals which is expected to be completed by 2014 (911 Attacks, 2012). President Barack Obama, in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism Report (June 2011) stated As we approach the 10th anniversary of… September 11, 2001, it is a time to mark the progress we have made in our war and to rededicate ourselves to the challenges that remain…(and) have significantly strengthened our defenses and built a steadfast international coalition. Despite our successes, we continue to face a significant terrorist threat (and) defeating them requires a strategy that is even more agile and adaptive…And yet today, we can say with growing confidence – that we have put Al Qaeda on the path to defeat. With an unrelenting focus on the task at hand…we will not rest until that job is done. References Afsar, Major Shahid, Samples, Major Chris and Wood, Major Thomas. (2008). The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis. Military Review May to June 2008. Retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Understanding_Taliban_Organization_Mil_Review%28May-Jun08%29.pdf . BBC News. (23 July 2004). 9/11 Report: Key Findings. BBC News. Retrieved from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3917703.stm. BBC News. (3 January 2012). Who Are the Taliban? BBC News Asia. Retrieved from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11451718. Brandt, Ben. (1 June 2011). The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. US Military Academy: Combating Terrorism Center. Retrieved from http://www.ctc.usma. edu/posts/the-taliban%E2%80%99s-conduct-of-intelligence-and-counterintelligence Capecchi, Christina and Williams, Timothy. (11 August 2011). Helicopter Crash Victims Named. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com /011/08/12/us/12victims.html. DeAngelis, Tori. (November 2009). Understanding Terrorism. Monitor on Psychology Vol 40 No 10. American Psychological Association. Retrieved from www.apa.org /monitor/2009/11/terrorism.aspx. Dressler, Jeffrey and Forsberg, Carl. (31 December 2009). Backgrounder The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operation and Shadow Governance. Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved from www.understandingwar.org. EASO. (2012). EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Taliban Strategies – Recruitment. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Print. Obama, Barack. (June 2011). National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Washington, DC: Office of the President. Print. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Retrieved from www.odni.gov. Perl, Raphael F. (3 January 2007). International Terrorism: Threat, Policy and Response. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ terror/RL33600.pdf. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Trans. Thomas Cleary. 1991. Boston: Shambhala. Print. US Congress. (17 December 2004). PL 108-458 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Retrieved from www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf. US Department of Homeland Security. (2011). Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations – Progress report 2011. Print. 9/11 Attacks. (2012). The History Channel website. Retrieved from www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks. 911 Commission. (22 July 2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved from govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. Read More