Historical Reference to U.S. Counter-terrorism Practices - Coursework Example

The US Counterterrorism Case History A historical reference to U.S. counter terrorism practices, and how these practices have been developed. · An overview of terrorism prevention, focused on countering suicide bombings and similar acts of terror. · Demonstrate your view of US counter-terrorism policy today, supported by references from the reading material. Abstract This paper reviews the development of US counterterrorist policies and practices, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the bipolar world. Surveying the changing nature of terrorism worldwide from 1996 up to the present, including major incidents, terrorist groups, rogue states, etc., the paper expounds on the US efforts to deter and respond to terrorist attacks against US citizens and facilities, both on American territory and abroad. Two sections, besides the introductory one, deal with key issues in crafting the US counterterrorism strategies, while the third section lays a particular emphasis on the current approach to countering acts of terror and terrorist networks. Thus, the final section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the present-day US counterterrorism policy and draws a conclusion about its effectiveness. Introduction As a general rule, terrorism is unsusceptible to exact definition insofar as certain interpretations could justify violence, especially actions conducted under the banner of politics, which is otherwise unacceptable (White, 2012). Thus, as White (2012) states, terrorism denotes different things to different people, being called either revolutionary war or crime in one or another period of history. On the other hand, according to White (2012), terrorism itself, along with the counter-terrorist responses, are practices that have always been in transition; while Ambassador Michael Sheehan (retd) points out that terrorism is both provoked and sustained by technological progress, development and, perhaps most notably, globalization (Alexander & Kraft, 2008). In that regard, the smaller the world has become, the more capable terrorists would appear – whether in terms of communication, travel, funding, or weaponry (Alexander & Kraft, 2008). The advent of global-oriented terrorism in the 1990s, being represented first and foremost by Islamic Jihad- and al-Qaeda-led activities worldwide, appears a powerful argument in favor of that statement (Anderson and Sloan, 2009). In his foreword to Evolution of US Counterterrorism Policy, Ambassador Sheehan (retd) concluded that the US counterterrorism policies generally present a perspective on the evolution of terrorism itself (Alexander & Kraft, 2008). Being largely preoccupied with traditional interstate conflict and counterinsurgency, the US national security establishment first recognized the terrorist threat in the early 1970s; while the increasing frequency, considerably extended reach and magnified lethality of terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s up to the post 9/11 era, firmly shifted the focus of attention on terrorism in order to become US national security policy’s top priority (Sheehan in Alexander & Kraft, 2008). Correspondingly, the US counter-terrorist responses and tactics reflected the growing complexity of terrorist threat worldwide, including weapons of mass destruction, cyber-terrorism, etc. (Lia, 2003). The Times of Blissful Ignorance There have been numerous acts of terrorism across the world in modern times, but the United States became a prime terrorist target as late as the 1980s; until then, the term terrorism had been applied to various groups, including revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists and violent left-wing activists, who mainly targeted European citizens and governments (White, 2012). As the meaning of terrorism fluctuated over time, the forms of terrorist activity also fluctuated between group violence, rioting and guerilla warfare (White, 2012). In turn, the tactics employed by terrorist organizations varied from kidnapping to assassinations and bombings, including suicide ones. The attack on the American Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 (Anderson and Sloan, 2009), by Iranian university students, which actually denotes the first significant peacetime terrorist act against the United States in the twentieth century, came as quite a shock for the American intelligence and security establishment; not surprisingly, the attempted rescue, dubbed operation ‘Eagle Claw’, ended in disaster (Tristam, n.d). The failure, however, is thought to have produced some unexpected effects, besides the United States’ humiliation to the rest of the world and evidence of incoherent American policy in the Middle East: namely it signaled to the Americans that terrorism is not an abstract notion or a problem inherent mainly in Europe, as well as exposed the unpreparedness of the American security machinery to rise to the challenge. The early 1980s witnessed new, much more serious causes of worry – the US embassy in West Beirut was partially destroyed by Islamic Jihad suicide bomber and 49 people were killed in the explosion; on October 23, 1983, the US Marines’ barracks at Beirut were destroyed by Islamic Jihad suicide truck bomber, killing 241 US Marines; and to add insult to injury, in 1984, Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later on murdered the CIA station chief in Beirut, William Buckley (Anderson and Sloan, 2009). All in all, the US responses to the surge in religiously inspired terrorism during the period between 1968 and 1988, besides the retaliatory raid on Libya in 1986, could be reduced to the introduction of metal detectors in airports – in 1973 – security fortification measures taken on US embassies, as well as a backup for a number of UN resolutions dealing with terrorism, namely against aerial hijacking (1969-1970), the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents in 1977, and United Nations resolutions against General Assembly and Security Council hostage taking in 1985 (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). Another effect of the1980s’ woes might appear the changed meaning of terrorism (White, 2012) since the United States Department of State had defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f[d] cited in Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). Al-Qaeda International – the Enemy We Created Following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the US policy-makers and intelligence coryphaei were apparently by far more concerned with the possibility of draining the Soviet Union of its resources rather than the far-reaching implications of the US support for the Islamic insurgency. The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the enticing prospect of undisputed Western (American) dominance in the world affairs somehow blurred the lessons of Beirut bombings and the threat of well-armed-and-trained radical Islamists on the loose. Moreover, the founding of the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Crusaders and Jews, an umbrella organization led by al-Qaeda, had been definitely underestimated (Lia, 2003). Nevertheless, the Islamic terrorism soon got the world attention – the 1998 bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which, taken together, killed over 200 people and injured more than 4000, along with the 1999 rocket attacks on US and UN offices in Pakistan and the 2000 attack on USS Cole, revealed the bitter reality of the situation (Anderson and Sloan, 2009). The suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, which resulted in nearly 3000 deaths and an immense scale of devastation (Anderson and Sloan, 2009), not only marked the peak of terrorists’ ability to strike wherever they want, but also a radical change in the US counter-terrorism approach. The latter gained worldwide currency as ‘the War on Terror’. Here should be mentioned that the hitherto US policy on counterterrorism, as outlined in Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39 (1995), has laid great emphasis on reducing the US vulnerabilities as well as degrading the terrorist capabilities whether by means of diplomatic activity, sharing intelligence information, or via both preemptive and punitive actions. In turn, the Bush administration’s counter-terrorist policies and practices appeared prima facie much more determined to get the job done – according to President George W. Bush own words “we’re talking to them in a way they can understand” (cited in Geltzer, 2010). The bigger emphasis on preemptive strikes, or more aggressive tactics that moved the war into enemy’s territory, resulted in many al-Qaeda operatives being either killed – including Qaed al-Harethi who is believed to have masterminded the attack on USS Cole – injured or captured, as well as the Taliban being ousted from power in Afghanistan (Geltzer, 2010). On the other hand, as Geltzer (2010) points out, there had been, to some degree, rhetoric which, along with the communicative aspect of the American counter-terrorist actions, was intended to convey certain perceptions of America (Geltzer, 2010). Although the intelligence reports suggested a “shock for al-Qaeda… and owe among leaders of key Arab nations” (Suskind, 2006, p.182, cited in Geltzer, 2010), the overall assessment of the counter-terrorist policies generated by Bush administration is that they were generally counter-productive in regard to Washington’s goal of undermining al-Qaeda’s strategic narrative (Geltzer, 2010). The rhetorical declaration of ‘war on terrorism’ is thought to have had some important consequences. First, it justified the 2003 invasion in Iraq and, more generally, eased the projection of US military power in the face of any possible terrorist organization or rogue regime threatening the United States (White, 2012). Thus, the US policy toward the Middle East and Central Asia acquired more character, even though not the best one. Second, the war on terror made terrorism a very dangerous occupation – not only in terms of possible criminal prosecution – since many suspected terrorists paid the ultimate price; and finally, it played a significant part in unifying the nation in the face of the new deadly enemy who hate America more than they love life (Friedman, 2004, cited in White, 2012). Not surprisingly therefore, Friedman (2004, cited in White, 2012) pointed out that the fighting after 9/11 appeared democracy’s third great struggle against totalitarianism in the past century, and Bush administration declared their intention to create a global balance of power that favors human liberty (Rice, 2005, cited in Alexander & Kraft, 2008). The critics of the Bush administration, however, indicate that these policies and practices brought about further radicalization of the radical Islam, and thus failed to deal with the strategic roots of terrorist decision-making and behavior, i.e. to eliminate the social, emotional and political sources of terrorism (Geltzer, 2010). The waves of deadly attacks against the US-led coalition forces in Iraq, after the fall of Saddam Hussein (Anderson and Sloan, 2009), as well as in Afghanistan following the Taliban insurgency, might appear strong evidence in favor of these assertions. On the one hand, most terrorism experts have argued for over fifty years over the pre-eminent role of law enforcement in preventing terrorism, especially by means of stopping criminal activity within international networks that wage modern conflict (White, 2012). Thus, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001, cited in White, 2012), five factors identify sensible nodes where such network could be disrupted – technology, social support, narrative – as a myth, story or raison d’etre – organizational structure and tactical doctrine. On the other hand, law enforcement has had three main responsibilities prior to 9/11, namely maintaining public safety, collecting criminal intelligence and sharing information in a legal manner (White, 2012). Since police departments should not become military or secret intelligence organizations (White, 2012), it’s obvious that a counter-terrorism strategy aimed at disruption of terrorist networks should involve the military as well. Such combination, between the law enforcement and military forces is rather characteristic of the current US counter-terrorism policy and practices. The Current Approach The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, adopted in 2011, not only renders an account of the successes in eliminating key al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks’ leaders, including Osama bin Laden himself, but also admits the United States continue to face a significant terrorist threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents (The White House, 2011). The Strategy builds on previous approaches to countering terrorism, namely the use of military force and the word ‘war’ to describe the campaign against al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks, and at the same time claims to have harnessed “a multidepartmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military and law enforcement functions” (The White House, 2011). First and foremost, the Strategy defines the range of terrorist organizations that pose threat to the United States and the core principles that guide the US counterterrorism efforts. The latter include adhering to US core values, building security partnerships, applying counter-terrorism tools and capabilities appropriately and building a culture of resilience (The White House, 2011). The respect for human rights, along with the respect for privacy, civil rights and liberties, as well as the right balance between security and transparency, are among the core values that are considered to play a critical role in the US counterterrorist practices (The White House, 2011). Additionally, the Strategy recognized the necessity of building security partnerships, insofar as admits the United States’ inability to eliminate all terrorist networks alone; and contemplates the balanced exercise of American power against terrorist in order to avoid both probable risks of inaction and costs of certain actions (The White House, 2011). The overarching goals of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism are defined as follows: protection of the American people, homeland and American interests, disruption and defeat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, preventing the terrorist acquisition and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, eliminating terrorist safe heavens, and countering terrorists (al-Qaeda) ideology and its resonance for the Islamic world (The White House, 2011). Conclusion Thus constructed, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism appears much more comprehensive than any previous US government’s attempt to combat terrorism. On the other hand, there are some points within it, which seem controversial and therefore may prove ineffective in the future. Among those are the right balance between civil rights and liberties observance, and the necessity of isolating or eliminating terrorists; as well as the use of military force in pre-emptive strikes (assassinations of terrorist leaders, like that of Osama bin Laden, etc.) and the stated vision of building security partnerships, for example, with Pakistan. Insofar as the world has changed significantly – since the so-called Arab spring arguably opened the doors to radical Islamists in many countries previously considered safe in that regard and the increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East and Central Asia – the strategy would need the ultimate test of time, which will determine whether or not it has achieved the stated goals. References Alexander, Y. & Kraft, M.B. (Eds.). (2008). Evolution of the U.S. Counterterrorism Policy (Vol. 2). Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Anderson, S.K. & Sloan, S. (2009). Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (3rd ed.). Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press Inc. Geltzer, J.A. (2010). US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and al-Qaeda: Signalling and the Terrorist World-View. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge Lia, B. (2003). Contemporary Terrorism from A to Z. Security Dialogue 34(4): 499-501. Retrieved from http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/34/4/499 Lum, C., Kennedy, L.W. & Sherley, A.J. (January 2006). The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review. Retrieved from http://www.rutgerscps.org/publications/Lum_Terrorism_Review.pdf Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39. (June 21, 1995). US Policy on Counterterrorism. Washington: The White House. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf The White House. (June 2011). National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Washington: The White House. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf Tristam, P. (n.d.) The Failed Rescue of American Hostages in Iran on April 24, 1980. About.com. Middle East Issues. Retrieved from http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/a/me090413b.htm White, J.R. (2012). Terrorism and Homeland Security (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning Read More