The Transformation from the Grand Alliance of World War II to the Development of the Cold War - Coursework Example

Explain the transformation from the ‘Grand Alliance’ of World War II to the development of the ‘Cold War.’ Why was it impossible to maintain the former? Introduction The Grand Alliance which consisted of the three primary allies during the Second World War was formed to improve the chances of triumph over Nazi Germany and its allies. Ironically, it was the consequences of the success of the Grand Alliance that divided the three allies and transformed the coalition into the Cold War. The discussion that follows examines how this transformation developed by exploring the dynamics of the Grand Alliance as well as the Cold War and the circumstances that gave way to the transformation. The Grand Alliance Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December of 1941 the United States had assumed a largely isolationist stance with respect to the Second World War. (Nordlinger, 5) With the US entering the Second World War following the attack on Pearl Harbour, the three world powers, the US, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were forced to come together to develop strategies to hold back and defeat the axis.(Greenfield, 3-23) At least as far as UK-US relations this strategy was a far easier task for the two nations. Despite the US’s isolationist position in the earlier stages of the war, it remained supportive of the UK. (Greenfield, 3-23) Essentially the Grand Alliance involved a series of common goals and understandings between the US, the UK and the Soviet Union. Following the attack on Pearl Harbour the three countries would both formally and informally negotiate and agree at wartime conferences, government meetings and summits on strategies to defeat Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy. (Stone, 20) The Soviet’s association with the Grand Alliance grew out of necessity following Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, in June of 1941. (Stone, 15)Following which both British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt pledged their countries’ support. Once the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour the Grand Alliance became a reality. In other words, the UK, the US and the Soviet Union faced a common threat and while the Grand Alliance was primarily focused on war time cooperation, the three nations recognized a common goal to ensure post war security on a global level by ascertaining that Germany and Japan would not remain a threat to world peace following the war. (Lewis, 178-241) The Transformation From the Grand Alliance into the Cold War On 4 February, 1945, the Soviet’s Joseph Stalin, US President Theodore Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill convened in Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula for what was one of three major war time conferences. The primary purpose of the meeting was to not only strategize the manner in which to defeat the Axis, but to map out a plan for the regulation and reconstruction of a post war Europe. (Byrnes, 21-45) In principle it was agreed that the unconditional surrender of the Germans was a primary aim of the three leaders. Moreover, the three parties agreed that following the surrender of Germany, the three powers together with France would govern Germany until such time as it could be unified. Poland was a matter of concern because it was governed by the Red Army and was under communist rule. Roosevelt and Churchill were determined to set up democratic elections in Poland and Stalin sounded sincere when he replied: “For the Russian people, the question of Poland is not only a question of honor but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Twice in the last thirty years our enemies, the Germans, have passed through this corridor. It is in Russia’s interest that Poland should be strong and powerful, in a position to shut the door to his corridor by her own force. It is necessary that Poland should be free, independent in power. Therefore, it is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state.” (Byrnes, 21-45) The dialogue between the three countries with regard to Poland is significant because it demonstrates the division between them that eventually led to the break down of the Grand Alliance and its transformation into the Cold War. Implicit in the exchanges over Poland is the vastly different priorities of the three countries. The Soviet’s idea of peace was controlling its borders and the US and the UK’s idea of peace was the establishment of democratic governments. A cloud of suspicion was also looming over the three countries comprising the Grand Alliance. For much of the Second World War, the Soviets suspected that the UK and the US had taken a position which largely left the Soviets with the greater cost of the War and were poised to take charge of the peace accords and take control of Europe. (Gaddis, 151) The US and the UK were equally suspicious of the Soviet’s intentions for a post war Europe. (Gaddis, 156) Despite the lack of consensus between the UK, the US and the Soviet Union, once the Second World War ended in May of 1945, with the defeat of Germany, the Soviet Union occupied the greater part of East Europe while the US took control of most of West Europe. (Kolb, 19) As stated previously all three nations together with France zoned off Germany and shared control of that nation. By the time the three countries convened at the Potsdam Conference in July of 1945 tensions were elevated, most especially between the US and the Soviet Union, the former then under the leadership of President Harry Truman. It was at this conference the US informed the Soviets that it was in possession of the Atomic bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki a week after the Potsdam Conference. The greatest bone of intention came when Truman who was distrustful of Stalin indicated that the Soviet’s involvement in post war Japan would be limited. (LaFeber, 28) Even before the Japan question arose Stalin and Truman had clashed over the politics of Poland. It appeared that Stalin had no intention of establishing a Western type democracy in Poland and contrary to the Yalta agreements elections were not held expeditiously. A vastly similar trend was reflected with respect to Rumania and Bulgaria. The Grand Alliance convened a number of conferences in the latter part of 1945 and despite dissension amongst the three nations a political framework was plotted out for the resettlement of Bulgaria and Romania.(Mastny, 217) Once again the US and UK’s plans for democratic self-government was thwarted by the Soviet’s plan for a less democratic governance. As a result of the dissension between the Soviets and the UK and the US over much of Eastern Europe, the Grand Alliance began to look more and more one sided with the US and the UK essentially aligned against the Soviet Union. (Mastny, 218) The acrimony and struggle for power in the reorganization within Europe following the Second World War created mistrust on the parts of both the U.S and the Soviet Union. While the US began to reconsider its new found friendship with the US, the Soviet’s were equally suspicious of the US. Comments made by Maxim Litvinov, Stalin’s Deputy Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, highlight the extent of the Soviet’s mistrust. Litivnov commented to a US journalist in June 1945: “Why did you Americans wait till now to begin opposing us in the Balkans and Eastern Europe?...You should have done this three years ago. Now it’s too late and your complaints only arouse suspicion, now.” (Mastny, 218) Acrimonies also developed over the funding of Germany and at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet’s were adamant that US$20 be allotted for the Grand Alliance’s claim on Germany. The US on the other hand did not agree, fearing the cost to its own tax payers and proposed that the funds come from each country’s German zones. While this position was agreed it only drove further division between the three powers. (Cox, 17-82) Once the US dropped the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Truman had hoped that such display of military power would gain for the US a decided advantage over the Soviet Union during the post war negotiations. (Aplerovitz, 10-23) It has been submitted by historians that Truman who was in the midst of the Potsdam Conference on Romania and Bulgaria when he received the news that Atomic bomb had been successfully tested and such news fortified his resolve not to give in to the Soviet’s position with respect to the two Eastern European regions. Be that as it may, Truman’s plans failed since according to historian John Gaddis, Stalin “became increasingly rigid after August 1945”. (Gaddis, 2000, 246) In fact Gaddis argues that it was perhaps at this point that the Soviet Union resolved to invest more resources in the development of its own nuclear weapons programs. (Gaddis, 2000) The Atomic bomb would become the catalyst for the ultimate breakdown of the Grand Alliance and its reconstruction as the Cold War which was essentially an arms race fuelled by a desire to prevent the spread of one Super Power’s regime into the rest of the world. (Haas, 442-477) The Baruch Plan, introduced by the United States and held in the summer of 1946 was designed to control the development of nuclear arms.(Rumble, 8-9) Once again the United States and the Soviet Union could not come to terms on the establishment of an arms control organization, both advocating vastly different means of control and inspections. (Rumble, 8-9) By the end of 1946 any semblance of the Grand Alliance was essentially evaporated with the result that the US and Soviet Union were all but sworn enemies. Any efforts to at least meet each other halfway as during the war was now replaced by complete opposition. The 1946 crisis in Iran had at least illustrated the extent of the deadlock between the two super powers. (Lenczowski, 29-45) From the US standpoint the Soviet’s were far too hesitant to remove its Second World War troops from the region. These troops had been place there together with the British to protect Iranian oilfield from Nazi occupation. The Soviet’s hesitation only garnered an angry reaction from the Americans. Rather than permit the Soviets and the Iranians to continue to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet Troops the US placed the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations. (Lenczowski, 29-45) By 1946 it was apparant that the Grand Alliance had broken down and that it had reached a point of no return. Murmurs of the internal disparage over Truman’s seeminly soft approach to the problem of East Europe began to be expressed far more articulately. Secretary of State James Byrnes who had negotiated most of the Eastern European agreements on behalf of the United States freely admitted that it was time to take a tougher stance with the Soviets. Brynes statement was made in Feburary of 1946 and one month later, Winston Churchill was referring to Eastern Europe as an “Iron Curtain”. (Siracusa, 195) Further complicating matters, Stalin in an electoral speech denounced capatilism and maintained that “our Soviet social system has won.” (Siracusa, 180) Truman precieved these sentiments as expressed by Stalin as a declaration of cold war, according to some historians. (Siracusa, 180) The extent to which the Grand Alliance had transformed into the Cold War is manifested by Truman’s response to remarks made by Secretary of Commerce, Henry Wallace in September of 1946. Wallace publically stated: “The real peace treaty we now need is between the US and Russia...we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the US”. (Siracusa, 210) This kind of patience and understanding for the Soviet Union was not going to be tolerated and as a result Wallace was forced to resign his post. (Siracusa, 211) The enemy lines had obviously been drawn where previously a coaltion had once been the primary goal. It also indicated that Harry Truman was not minded to tolerate liberal thinking with respect to the Soviets within his won adminsitration. The Americans under Truman were beginning to align the situation with the USSR as no different than that of the situation with Germany. They had become a part of the Grand Alliance with one vision and that was to free Europe from Nazi oppression. In the end they had, by virtue of the Grand Alliance subjected Eastern European to an equally oppressive government in the Communist Soviets. (Marks, 313-336) With Wallace’s reginatin a decidedly new tone took over American politics and it was obvious that a Cold War was in effect. From 1946 on, what followed in American politics was a string of leaders who had apparently learned lessons from the appeasement approach that had characterized the Grand Alliance. (Marks, 313-336) Moreover, the Soviet atomic spy-ring in 1946 that was uncovered in Canada only heightened US sentiments against the Soviets. (Marks, 313-336) A fear of the spread of communism under Soviet influence would destroy any semblance of the Grand Alliance. (Marks, 313-336) In the mean time a similar approach was taking shape in the Soviet Union. Just as the United States was fueled by a fear of the spread of communism the Soviets were fueled by a fear of the spread of Western democray. Stalin was likewise ridding his administration of any show of sympathy toward Westernization. (Deutscher, 555-565) Conclusion The Grand Alliance transformed from a drive to defeat a common enemy and evolved into the creation of new enemies. Ironically the new enemies were the members of the Grand Alliance. The only coalition that remained was the bond between the UK and the US, who were equally committed to averting the spread of communism. What followed from the Grand Alliance was a policy of mutual assured destruction on both fronts. Each country was committed to equally coercing the other to bend to its will. Out of this state of affairs a cold war grew and as realist Hans Morgenthau puts it a situation unfolded in which “power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.” (Morgenthau, 183) The power between the US and the Soviet Union became measured in terms of politics, military, resources and economics. The seeds for this concept grew out of the Grand Alliance and are ironically the cornerstone of the Cold War. The balance of powers manifested via the Grand Alliance gave way to practice that developed into an arms’ race that would characterize much of the cold war in which the Soviet Union and the United States raced to see who could develop and prefect the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Works Cited Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima, Potsdam. The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the Confrontation with the Soviet Union. New York: Penguin. Byrnes, James, F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. Cox, Michael. “The Cold War and Stalinism in the Age of Capitalist Decline.” Critique, Vol. 17, pp 17-82 Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin: A Political Biography. New York: Vintage, 1960 Gaddis, John, Lewis. Russia, The Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretative History. McGraw-Hill, 1990 Gaddis, John, Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. Columbia University Press, 2000 Greenfield, Roberts, Kent. American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration. Krieger Publishing Company, 1982 Haas, Ernst, B. “The Balance of Power: Prescrtiption, Concept, or Propaganda.” World Politics, 1953 Vol. 5, No. 4 pp 442-477 Kolb, Richard, K. Cold War Clashes: Confronting Communism, 1945-1991. Veterans of Foreign War, 2004 LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992. McGraw-Hill, 1993 Lenczowski, George. “The Communist Movement in Iran”. Middle East Journal, 1947, Vol. 1, pp 29-45 Lewis, Julian. Changing Directions: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947. London: Frank Cass, 2003 Mastny, Vojtech. Russia’s Road to the Cold War. Columbia University Press, 1979 Marks, Eduard. “American Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War: An Alternative Interpretation.” Journal of American History, 1981-82 Vol. 68 pp 313-336 Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knofp, 1967 Nordlinger, Eric. Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy For a New Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995 Rumble, Greville. The Politics of Nuclear Defence – A Comprehensive Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985 Siracusa, Joseph. The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976. Stone, David. War Summits: The Meetings That Shaped World War II and the Postwar World. Washington, D.C. Potomac Books, 2005. Read More