The Outbreak of World War I - Essay Example

The Outbreak of World War I 2008 The Outbreak of World War I Introduction Almost a century since the end of World War I, the causes and origins of this overwhelming conflict continue to produce massive disagreements and intensive discussions in the scholarly community. The debate on the origins of World War I was launched almost immediately after its outbreak in August 1914 with both sides publishing solid collections of diplomatic materials in order to demonstrate that the other side bears the guilt for the conflict. In the aftermath of World War I, Germany was held responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. Particularly, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles held Germany liable for the damages done during the war: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of a war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies" (The Versailles Treaty 1919, Art. 231). The German guilt stance was subsequently supported by the absolute majority of non-German historians. During the 1920s, a special department of the German Foreign Office - the War Guilt Section - published full compilation (39 volumes) of Germany's foreign policy documents. The compilation was supposed to demonstrate that Germany was not guilty of the outbreak of hostilities. Other European states also published the same collections of pre-war documents. These documents provided historians with massive data that suggested a revision of the view of solely German responsibility for the war, but did not lead to any major change of views among the historians. Furthermore, the Second World War only reinforced the traditional point of view. As a result, European and American historiography overwhelmingly supports the Germany guilt stance. Thus, Luigi Albertini (1952) believes that although part of the blame for the outbreak of World War I rests with the failure of diplomacy and miscommunication aggressiveness of Germany was the key ingredient for conflict. Albertini's views rely on the solid foundation of pre-war documents and largely support the idea of Taylor that the primary responsibility for the war must be inflicted on Germany's mobilisation plan. In a similar vein, Steiner (1977) argues the German drive for power threatened British interests and British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey had no choice but respond defensively to an inevitable German aggression. However, this point of view is not in line with that of David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister who seemed to accept the blame in his War Memoirs (1934) saying that "We muddled into war" (Price, 1981, p.27). Lieven (1983) also claims that Germany's inability to control its militarism was the major factor that the blame for war must "unequivocally rest with the German government" (p.85). And even, Taylor (1969) who is widely known for his famous argument which puts events beyond the control of diplomacies believes that the breakdown of the balance of power due to a self-aggrandizing Germany was the key factor for the First World War. Although remoteness of the event, coupled with the alleged desire of many participants to hide at least part of the truth makes it too difficult to find out what country or who was primarily responsible for the outbreak of hostilities the German guilt still seems to be the most reasonable. International and domestic policy conducted by the Germany leaders convincingly demonstrates that taking the responsibility for the war off her shoulder would be a highly imprudent and unjustified step. Main Discussion The major causes of World War I are often referred to as 'MAIN': Militarism, Alliances, Imperialism, and Nationalism. The German build-up of its naval forces was the main reason for deterioration of Anglo-German relations. During only four years after Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire formed the alliance known as the Triple Entente in 1907, Germany managed to build 9 battleships, a step that immediately drew adequate response from the rivals and particularly Britain who build 18 similar ships. Other members of the Triple Entente also significantly reinforced their military potential during that period and by 1914 the European states were fully ready for a full scale military conflict (Fairbanks, 1985). Historians commonly agree that the Arms Race played arguably the key role in the outbreak of hostilities. Thus, David Stevenson (2005) claims that armament of European powers was one of the necessary preconditions for the war; similarly, David Herrmann argues that the arms race precipitated the conflict: "If Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, there might have been no World War I" (Ferguson, 1999, p 82). This opinion is in line with the traditional viewpoint that Germany bears the guilt: it was Germany that launched the arms race by building up its military potential and other Europeans states barely had any other choice by to respond adequately. Despite the seeming reasonability of such claims it is still open to questions, namely whether the role of armament was really as essential as Ferguson (1999) and Stevenson (2005) argue. The example of the arms race launched after World War II suggests that the importance of its role might be seriously exaggerated. Any comparison drawn between that race and the race that had occurred in Europe prior to the First World War would easily demonstrate that by the year of the Cuban Crisis military potential of the world powers was incomparably higher than that of European states by 1914 (Frankel, 2004). And the fact that such accumulation of destructive weapons has not resulted in the Third World War does undermine the validity of armament alone as the key reason for World War I. Probably, the seeds of the conflict had been sawn several decades before the First World War actually occurred. After a decade of using the military power to unify Germany and establish the second Reich in 1871, Otto von Bismarck applied his energies to win time needed for the country to recover. The Bismarckian System of alliances established by the Chancellor was meant to achieve this major goal. However, Bismarck's policy was cautious enough to prevent the transformation of numerous defensive (at least on paper) alliances into offensive structures (Pflanze, 1990). The retirement of the Chancellor changed the situation dramatically. Expansion of German colonial possessions, increase of the country's naval presence and German support of the Austria's expansion in the Balkan Peninsula replaced the Bismarckian policy of peace (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). Such turn in the foreign policy, coupled with the questionable diplomatic gift of William II suggests the Bismarckian system would seriously change soon. Great Britain who did not make any formal alliance but remained friendly toward Germany due to absence of colonial conflicts during the Bismarckian era immediately changed its attitude to more cautious and even hostile: the naval construction plans openly promoted by William II threatened the traditional British supremacy on the sea (Fairbanks, 1985). Such steps of the Kaiser seriously deteriorated the existing status quo in Europe and contributed heavily to the pre-war escalation of tension. Another step in the same direction was the German support of Austria's expansion in the Balkans. In response, the Russian Empire that historically had strong interests in the peninsula suggested an alliance between France and Russia. Therefore, while the alliance between Germany and Austria supported by Italia grew stronger the period from 1890 to 1907 was also marked by gradual alienation of Great Britain, the Russian Empire, and France from Germany, which formed the foundation of the future rival bloc of anti-German alliance subsequently known as the Allied Powers (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). The history and sequence of emergence of these two blocs suggests that the policy of Great Britain, the Russian Empire, and France represented the reaction of these states to unfriendly actions of Germany. In case of Germany, the peaceful nature of its international policy was only a screen created to disguise the apparently military foundation of the alliances system. Sooner or later that screen would inevitably fall despite any efforts because peace was impossible to establish on a war-footing. The policy conducted by Wilhelm II did little to avoid that fall: the Kaiser practically excluded the civilians from the process of decision making. Wilhelm believed that the civilian decision-makers lacked courage to make serious decisions and, therefore, their role was not essential. This principle brightly manifested during the renowned war council held on the 8th of December 1912 to address the Balkan Wars. Wilhelm did not invite any civilians to the council (Rohl, 1966). The exclusion of civilian persons from this important meeting could not but affect the overall tone of decisions made during the council. By contrast, the role of the militaries in making those decisions was overwhelming as was their influence on Wilhelm II. As a result, the series of decisions made and determined during the meeting were openly aggressive including preparation of naval plans for war against Britain, approval of the 1913 Army Bill, and stockpiling of gold and fodder (Rohl, 1966). Moreover, Helmuth von Moltke, Germany's Chief of the General Staff between 1906 and 1914, promoted 'the sooner the better' point of view: during the council he claimed that Germany should launch war straight away (Mombauer 2001). And the fact that Moltke's opinion failed to prevail was not because Wilhelm and other participants stood on anti-war positions but because Alfred von Tirpitz, German Admiral, Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, insisted the war had to be planned for 1914 when the Kiel Canal would be ready (Rohl, 1966, p.167). Further developments convincingly demonstrated that even if the Kaiser had any doubts regarding the necessity of war those doubts failed to materialise into any actions: the course for war set during the war council of 1913 was implemented steadily. Ultimately, it was Wilhelm II who sanctioned a decision to go to war in August 1914, and it was also the Kaiser's tactless international policy that prepared the ground for hostilities among the European states. The openly aggressive nature of the decisions made in December 1913 was absolutely apparent, and despite the attempts to justify her major steps as defensive Germany almost always failed to live up to the meaning of 'defensive'. The Schlieffen plan allegedly designed to counter against the powers like France, Russia and Britain was openly hostile toward the neighbors: in fact, German mobilization was equivalent to war (Taylor, 1969; Steiner, 1977). However, while the importance of the Schlieffen plan as a contributing factor can hardly be questioned, it also seems unreasonable to claim, as some historians do, that 'final, definite responsibility for the outbreak of the war lies with the German plan of mobilization' (Albertini 1952, p. 18). It was only one, though an essential one, of the steps made by Germany toward the major conflict. Germany's decision to grant Austria Hungary the so-called 'blank cheque' was another highly unfriendly step. In fact, issuance of the "blank cheque" meant that Germany had finished all the preparations and was ready to follow its decision to exploit the next suitable major European crisis to unleash a major war. The major purpose of the cheque was to create such crisis to be exploited (Fischer 1975). As Michael G. Fry, Erik Goldstein, and Richard Langhorne reasonably put it, "the German blank cheque to Austria Hungary of 5 July has been regarded as an important and crucial, factor in the escalating crises that led to war" (Morrow, 2003, p. 34). Germany simply used the international situation to provoke the crisis. Although the complexity and scale of political developments in the pre-war Europe suggests that each state pursued its own goals entering the hostilities, neither of these goals were as aggressive as those pursued by Germany and Austria (McKay, Hill & Buckler, 2005). The ways other European states entered the war were different but even the cursory analysis of those ways suggests they entered hostilities in response to the Germany aggression. The Russian Empire, allied by treaty to Serbia, announced mobilisation to defend Serbian from Austro-Hungary: the latter declared war on Serbia on the 28th of July 1914. Germany, bound by treaty to Austria-Hungary, perceived the announced mobilisation as an open act of war against the ally and proceeded with the declaration of war on Russia on 1 August, 1914. France entered the war against Germany (and Austria-Hungary, bound by treaty to Germany) following a German declaration made on 3 August, 1914. Britain followed the provisions of her alliance with France and declared war against Germany the next day after Germany invaded Belgium to reach Paris via the shortest possible route (Strachan, 2001). Seemingly, these three states can barely be blamed for the outbreak of war though their policy might play a role in the growth of tension during the pre-war decade. Yet, again the above discussion demonstrates to what extent the actions and policies of France, Russian and Britain were influenced by the unfriendly policies of Germany during the pre-war years. The most illustrative example of this influence was the four Fleet Acts issued by Germany from 1898 to 1912 (Fairbanks, 1985) in response to which Britain entered the alliances with France and Russia. As far as responsibility of Austro-Hungary is concerned, her role seems to be secondary and rather supportive than decisive though the country shared the blame imposed by the Treaty of Versailles commonly with Germany. The guilt clause, coupled with the fact that it was Austro-Hungary that formally launched the war should not be misleading because without absolute support of her powerful ally, Germany, Austria would have probably not dared to engage in the conflict with Serbia supported by the Russian Empire. This standpoint is perfectly worded by John C. G. Rhl in the following phrase: "If Germany had not opted for war in 1914, there would have been no war, because Austria Hungary would certainly not have dared risk a war without Germany's support, and the triple Entente would not have attacked the Central Powers then nor three years later" (Rhl, 1998, p. 6). In other words, Germany used Austria as a shield to cover its aggressive intentions, and the fact that Austria shared the responsibility for hostilities demonstrated that this intention had had success. At the same time, Austria's policy in the Balkans and the refusal of self-determination to minority groups did play a role in the outbreak of the First World War which means application of the guilt clause to Austria was justified. Conclusion Evidently, the war was a desperate attempt to cut the Gordian knot of extremely serious collisions that had been accumulating in Europe since the middle of the 18th century and repeatedly manifested in local territorial conflicts between the nations, clashes over the colonies, trade wars and struggle for military supremacy. However, the complexity of those mutually interlaced factors, causes and relations can barely hinder the fact that Germany bears the lion's share of responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. Although the increasing thirst for power, imperialism, and expansionist tendencies could be observed in almost every European states prior to the War in Germany this thirst became too compelling. The German guilt stance does reflect the actual state of affairs by correctly identifying the side that was responsible for the absolute majority of developments that eventually led to the Great War. As Fritz Fischer smartly puts it, "There is no doubt that the war which the German politicians started in July 1914 was not a preventive war fought out of fear and despair. It was an attempt to defeat the enemy powers before they became too strong, and to realize Germany's political ambitions which may be summed up as German hegemony over Europe" (Fischer, 1975, p. 470). This statement is almost impossible to question given the policy of armament conducted by Germany during the 1900s, the deterioration of the existing systems of alliances and relations in Europe, the Schlieffen plan, and the blank cheque. It seems almost impossible that such steps, coupled with the strengthening of Germany were absolutely peaceful and defensive. On the contrary, they evidently pursued the goal to establish Germany as the leading European power which was possible to achieve only through a major war and that was exactly what Germany tried. However, despite the huge burden of evidence there is a group of historians who argue that Germany was almost free of any blame for the war. A bright representative of this stance is Harry Elmer Barnes whom believes that "The Franco-Russian Alliance concluded by 1894 was transformed into an offensive organization following 1912 through the cooperation of Izvolski and Poincar. Both recognized that the chief objects of Russian and French foreign policy, the seizure of the Straits and the return of Alsace-Lorraine, could be realized only through a general European war. . . . In estimating the order of guilt of the various countries we may safely say that the only direct and immediate responsibility for the World War falls upon Serbia, France and Russia, with the guilt about equally distributed" (Rhl 1998, p.xv). Despite attractiveness of such position for those whom want to 'whiten' Germany, it adopts a very selective approach in treating the pre-war developments. Particularly, territorial claims of France, Serbia and Russia are presented as the major - and almost only - contributing factor. Such approach is openly biased because it ignores the fact that these states entered the war in response to Germany's actions and presents more than a decade of Germany's efforts to boost its military potential as a solely defensive behaviour. Thousands of documents some of which have been referred to in the above discussion and hundreds of witnesses directly involved in the pre-war diplomatic relationships convincingly demonstrate that no other European power contributed as heavily to the outbreak of World War I as heavily as Germany did. Therefore, the traditional point of view expressed in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles holding Germany and Austria liable for the damages done during the war does seem to be absolutely objective. 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