The Strategic Causes of Conflict - What caused the 1973 Arab-Israeli War - Essay Example

? Strategic Causes of Israeli-Arab War, 1973 & year Historical documents conclude that The Yom Kippur, or Ramadan war of 6-25 October 1973 led to the loss of 2,687 Israeli lives and an additional estimated 16,000 Arab lives.1 This war also disrupted the US-Soviet detente and spurred Arab oil producers to impose an Oil embargo against the West during the mid October 1973, far being a contributor of a global recession, and additionally opening up rifts between the United States and its NATO allies. This war largely was attributed to the failure to resolve international disputes arising from an earlier war between the two nations in 1967. Irrespective of the United Nations resolutions number 242, which called Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories in June 1967, there seems to be little progress that was achieved towards its implementation. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat instead opted to resolve the issues through diplomacy, and resorted to withdrawing the Mitla and Gidi. Additionally, President Anwar suggested starting the diplomatic relations with the US and signing a peace pact with Israel, however, Israel also decided to withdraw to the armistice borders that were earlier established before June 5, 1967. There have been various schools of thought with regards to the implications and genesis of this war, on one side, the West European political elites placed blame on the United States for provoking the war through the assistance it provided to Israel. On the other side of the divide, Edward Heath, the then British Prime Minister did not welcome the United State’s response towards the war by its unanimous decision to uplift nuclear forces to Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON3) without giving the British government timely warning.2 Scholars have provided various perspectives of the October 1973 war, with a major focus on the military dimension, its societal implications between Arab, Israel and its neighbors, and its crisis in the Cold War. Given its huge crisis and implications, various researchers have only compared this war to the Suez War in 1956, the Bosnian civil war of 1992-3, and the latest Iraq war of 2003. 3This paper examines the strategic causes of this and the involvement of countries that fueled the war. An attempt is also made to provide an in depth analysis of the Western influence into this war with a focus on Britain and US. At the end of this paper and an attempt will be made to look into the negotiation process and peace building strategies that were put in place in a bid to resolve this war. Background to the Israel-Arab War When the Israel-Arab War broke out in the year 1973, Israel found itself in a defenseless position and not ready for the War for the first time – scholars have argued that this was a very big mistake for a nation that possessed very little information on its territorial boundaries and its enemies. However, with the progress of the war, Israel over time gained military superiority, but all in all, it was Egypt that emerged victors in the war through be achieving its main goal. In the end, the stalemate that had been at the heart of the Israeli-occupied Sinai was resolved, leading to the Camp David Accords and the Egypt’s reacquisition of the Peninsula. Other scholars have conceded that the War was in equal measure the success of President Anwar Sadat, and it never have been possible without the element of surprise tactics achieved through a carefully planned strategic deception approaches. While there were various elements to that deception campaign, an interesting one that was employed relevant to this particular case was the one of Ashraf Marwan, who was a high ranking-ranking Egyptian official and Israeli spy who by that time married to the daughter of Ganal Abdel Nasser. In his endeavor in making diplomatic approaches to the conflict, President Anwar was already in the process of preparing for war. In this process, President Anwar contacted his Syrian counterpart, President Hafiz al-Asad to plan double front attack on Israel. Egypt, however, was not well prepared for this war and instead depended on the Soviet Union for the supply of modern equipments that were to be used in the war. Resulting from Soviet Union’s failure to address his demands for a constant supply, Sadat in July 1972 surprised the international community by sending away 21,000 Soviet militant advisors and officers that were stationed in Egypt. Although keen observers and critics saw this as an attempt to delay advancement towards the war, the Soviet Union re-affirmed their commitment to the war by assuring more deliveries to both the Egyptian and Syrian military to have Sadat’s favor. On the other side in Israel, the then governing Labor Party held to the principle of “territorial exchange in return for peace,” but it openly was against return of all the geographical lands they had occupied, arguing that security would be compromised in such an event and that Israel would then have to continue occupying large fractions of the land. It can be seen that Sadat’s inability to follow to the letter after his proclamations concerning the ‘year of decision’ in 1971 and 1972 led to a general feeling among the Israeli’s staff to reason that the country was not to be attacked in any near future and that the Bar-Lev line in the Suez Canal to be impenetrable. At the end, the Israeli army had a general reluctance towards any forthcoming war and was subsequently unprepared for the October attacks from either Egypt or Syria. Their intelligence further misinterpreted Egypt’s military exercises along the canal. The war started on a two-front platform on October the 6th in 1973 which was also the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), thus the name Yom Kippur War. At the same time, this month also coincided with the Muslim Month of fasting, the Ramadhan; therefore the war was commonly referred to as the Ramadhan war by the Arabs. During the war, Egypt’s forces crossed the Suez Canal and quickly overran the Bar-Lev line while in the North; Syria took over the Golan Heights. Given their unpreparedness for this war, Israel was quickly outweighed almost to a mere ration of twelve Egyptian soldiers against one Israeli at the time of the start of the war. In a quick response, Israel marshaled massive military reserves to redress the situation. Contemporary studies have concluded that the Israeli-Arab war in 1973 was the heaviest fighting experienced globally since 1948, characterized by massive loss of material and human deaths. Similarly, the number of warplanes, oil tanks, and artillery assortments used in this war was the largest to be seen the world over since the World War II. Each of the fighting sides was being rearmed and supported amidst the fighting period, with Egypt and Syria relying on the Soviet Union for replenishment and the United States playing a big role in aiding the Israelis.4 Britain and Diplomatic involvements in the Israeli-Arab War British role and involvement in the Israeli-Arab War and by an extension influence on Middle East can be best understood upon a detailed analysis and account of Britain’s loss of dominance in the Middle East during the first quarter of World War II. Emerging from its problems as a result of the World War problems and economic difficulties, Britain was unable to maintain its military and imperialism control over the rich oil producing continent. Further, Arab’s clear refusal of Britain’s rule and authoritarianism practiced through monarchial rule was further worsened by the end of the Palestinian command and the subsequent establishment of Israel in 1948. The main challenge to British’s presence and dominance in the Middle East came about as a result of the political overthrow of King Farouk in Egypt in July 1952 by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. At the time of his ascent to power Nasser vowed to expel all the British dominance in the Middle East. His popularity among the Arab nations promoted pro-Arabic cultures with the development of Egypt-Soviet relationship provoked further hostility to the British. Many scholars to this day contend that British involvement in the war was promoted by their desire to preserve and promote British economic and political interest in the region and to some extent the Cold War objective of maintaining Communism, thus prompting Anthony Eden’s attempts to influence British efforts in overthrowing Nasser, leading to an ill-conceived conspiracy with France and Israel to control Suez Canal in October 1956. This debacle led to huge political and diplomatic relations in the Anglo-American corridors as President Dwight of Britain used his diplomatic influence and financial muscles to stop the Anglo-French-Israeli attempted assault on Egypt. These attempts further led to more damage on the British as Nasser emerged from the war as the main preferred voice of the Arabs, thus making him more powerful and against UK’s regional interests in the region. As one commentary openly stated, ‘that the period between 1956 to 1967 was one of the most difficult moments to British in Middle East, compounded by Egypt’s constant opposing to the UK’s foreign policy in the region.”5 Other analysts argue that Britain’s and US’s ultimate with regard to the affairs of the middle East did not differ much. On their part, British administration was worried of a possible overthrow of those regimes that appeared to have a soft spot for Western policies by the use of insurgents or radical political parties and to some extent the influence of Soviet Union in the Middle East countries including Egypt, Iraq, and Syria among others. The intense rise of Arab nations and Arab nationalism bore huge implications to the Western nations as was evidence by Libya’s and Iraq’s approach in Oil production in 1970 and 19726, and as such the only best way to safeguard British’s interest and role in the region, according to Whitehall was via carefully planned rapprochement with the Arab nations and distancing of UK from Israel. Even though Britain had long foreseen that their involvement in the war could serious economic consequences to the West, it did not prevent their participation before and after the war. Despite continued frictions and reluctance, Britain offered indirect aid to Kissinger’s diplomatic undertakings, especially in drafting the peace and disengagement deal between Israel and Egypt. Additionally, UK under the leadership of Heath allowed the US to use their British airbase facility for overseeing the ceasefire in the Sonai. Equally important is the role of the British government in endorsing Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy efforts and generally agreed to the conditions that for peace to prevail then Israel had to surrender land in the Suez Canal. However, the diverging opinions between U.S and Britain policies during the war period of 1973 was sharply shaped by UK’s reliance on Middle East in matters of oil supplies but again by two main political factors: Britain’s skepticism concerning U.S policy and Britain’s interest in stopping fallout between Arab nations and the European countries that would benefit the USSR. Above all, Britain’s involvement in Middle East peace did not was not for greater reasons but for two sole purposes – to support Kissinger’s engagement in diplomacy efforts and to curtail Soviet’s perceived influence in the Arab nations which was mostly seen as a cold war strategy. United States Military Support to Israel during the War During the period of 1973 war, the United States sent over 12,000 tons of military equipments to Israel, and giving modern weaponry to the Israeli military to outdo its opponents. Kissinger and Nixon had earlier planned on regulation of supply arms to Israel with intentions to control the war strategy during the fighting period and to widen its dominance in post war period. It has been suggested with huge and heavy reliance on military equipment transfers to Israel, United was largely seen as a platform that forced United States to depart from the conventional policy of arms transfer that would ensure that Israel remained dependent on United States as a client State. Both President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and their national security and intelligence organs sought to control the flow of arms to the recipient country during 1973 and by an extension controlling its military moves. With this strategy, United States sought to leave Israel with a manageable level of armament that would in the long run make Israel dependent on Washington even after the War. During the 20 days of fighting, Nixon government transferred arms to the recipient country as a very high pace and with a high level of sophisticated weapons than it had previously given to Israel while at the same time promising Israel to provide a sustained supply of weapons that would in later years to come ease Israel’s reservations on issues of post-war diplomacy. However, it emerged that most of Nixon’s administration was characterized with a bureaucratic contest while trying to determine whether the final say to delay airlift rested with Kissinger of the Washington’s Department of Defense. In some cases, it was reported that Kissinger had almost an overall control of the crisis even before its eruption on the “Saturday Night of Massacre” of October 20 in 1973, further deepening the loose level of the President’s control in managing the war and leaving the whole scene this secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger. Even before 1973, the Nixon administration had long planned to sell Israel military equipments in the spirit of keeping with the U.S understanding of its client’s military high handedness and on an agreement that Washington decided exclusively. It was based on the fact that, were Soviet allowed to sole handed allowed to supply Egypt without any support to the Israelis then, it would mean a fatal loss to the Israelis, thus making it impossible to champion U.S postwar economic and political interests in the Middle East, thus getting into unintended effects of Israel’s military engagement. The administration further made no attempt no adhere to the schedule of equipment transfers that they had signed before 1973 war, and military contracts that were less than one year after the end of the war far much exceeded the limits that the United States had intended to adhere to before the eruption of the war. In the same line of thought, in September 1974, Yitzhak Rabin, who had replaced Meir as the Prime Minister of Israel went to Washington and obtained an additional agreement to supply extra 200 M-600AI tanks, Phantom jets, 1,000 TOW missile launchers and more new equipments that interestingly United States had refused to supply in 1973 during the war.7 Consistent research has alluded that the Soviet Union’s military equipment transfers to the Arabs propelled Nixon’s urge to outdo the supply operation. The principal challenge to the United States concerned airlift, an operation that has been suggested that the United States had initiated days earlier than the Soviet’s operation, and at a much further distance from its client, and with no logistical assistance given to them by no country except Portugal. Thus, the airlift to Israel was a determination on the part of United States to provide aid to a threatened client, an operation that to some greater degree impressed Sadat, who viewed Israel’s victory as United States’ win over the Soviet Union.8 Attempts by Soviet Union had all along been seen as an act that violated the agreements of detente with regard to crisis management, and thus United States intervention was a response to that violation. However, United State’s deliberate exclusion from post-diplomacy engagements leaves room for more questions into their actual intentions. Implications of the War and Peace Negotiations There is a general agreement that Israel had expressed fear to the Arabs during the early days of the war, especially with Syria forces pushing towards the north. This led to a general feeling among the Israelis that the Arabs would finally penetrate through the pre-June 1967 borders. Within a week however, Israel was able to counter the Arab forces turning the tide to their favor. Syria was sent back from the Golan Heights, and Israel’s forces began to push towards the Suez Canal into Cairo. The war ignited and international predicament when Soviet Union joined the fighting to supply Egypt with military equipment. The war continued despite the UN Security Council orders to cease-fire, with Israeli troops continuing with the attack. The situation was only salvaged by the United State’s worldwide call for military alert. With the combats finally agreeing to cease-fire on 22 October, Israeli military had already gained control of Sinai and had crossed to the Western side of the Suez Canal. Most of the Galon region was regained back. Both the two nations emerged victors. For Egypt, it was because it sent Israel forces back into the Sinai border and for Israel for defeating the Arabs. However, many lives and property were damaged during this confrontation with over 3,000 Israeli soldiers lost and an additional 8,500 Arab soldiers killed. At the same time, the number of wounded officers numbered almost 8,800 and 20,000 for Israelis and Arabs respectively. Israel lost 840 tanks while Arabs could not account for 2,250 tanks. The cost of the war when quantified was approximate to a year’s Gross National Product for each combatant. In the end, Israel became more reliant on Washington for military and economic assistance while the Arabs went knocking at the Soviet’s to restore their lost arsenals. On the economic front, the war led to the doubling of oil prices by the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and Arabs insisting on using the oil sale proceeds to further support and champion its fight against Israel. Saudi Arabia also stopped shipments to the United States in response to the United States role in supplying weapons to the Israel. During post-war periods, Gasoline shortages in the United States were largely attributed to the trade embargo placed on it by Saudi Arabia, leading to global inflation and a further recession in the year 1974 and 75. Conclusion Efforts to find an amicable solution to the peace process began with the convening and declaration of UN Security Council Resolution No. 338, which was passed at the same time as when cease-fire order was given on the October 22 1973. This resolution called for an immediate stop of all military activity, and implementation of the Resolution No. 242 and the beginning of negotiations that were aimed at “establishing a just and fair peace.” In its applicability and interpretation, Resolution 338 became a guiding provision for Resolution 242 as a basis for implementing the peace agreement. Middle East Peace Conference would then follow in Geneva under the Co-Chairmanship of Soviet’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, the UN Secretary General and the United States. Except for Syria, other nations participated in the Conference including Jordan, Egypt and Israel. However, this meeting failed to reconvene after two days of disagreement regarding the procedure that was to be adopted to guide their discussions. The collapse of this meeting provided an opportunity for Henry Kissinger with an avenue to eliminate the Soviet Union and United Nations thus creating a deal for settlement. In this new deal, the first undertaking was to cease-fire allowing for Egypt to return to the lines of 22 October. Historically, this was the first accord signed between Israel and Egypt since 1949 resolution. Again in January 1974 Kissinger started another set of shuttle diplomacy in an effort to engage Egypt and Israel to commit to a disengagement agreement that provided for Israel to withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal. However, many authors concede that this much more a harder task especially having a disengagement deal between Syria and Israel, although after numerous trips to and from Damascus and Jerusalem, Israel conceded with Kissinger to withdraw its forces from the territory they had taken from Syria during October 1973 and from Quneitra town of Golan. A buffer zone then had to be set up between the soldiers of Israel and Syria in the Golan region, and Syrian President finally agreed to stop Palestinian insurgents from using Syria as a preferred base to launch attacks against Israel. These disengagement agreements that displayed a diplomatic height of the 1973 war were historically the achievements between Israel and Egypt and their relations for the next many years.9 Egypt’s accomplishments opened new channels for openness to Kissinger’s diplomatic methodologies and were a prelude to Sadat’s peace process in the year 1977. At the same time, this war provided Israel with an opportunity to break from psychological barriers to having territorial concessions that sought to define Israel’s protection against any Arab forces. Equally, the war uplifted Arab’s self confidence in protecting and regaining their territorial boundaries. On another level, for Israel, this was perhaps one of the greatest losses it experienced in decades with its total number of causalities exceeding those that it had in the previous wars, and its intelligence agencies discredited for not having provided accurate, timely and adequate warming to ensure accurate preparations for the war. In order to elude and fill the gaps in the war, the Agranat Commission blamed Israel’s loose evaluation of Egypt’s abilities to marshal such a war, and as such called for the removal of Israel’s Chief of Staff and other supporting high ranking officers within the government. Later, the report formed the major yardstick for a series of changes that then followed within the Labor government, including the ultimate resignation of Gola Mier, the Israeli Prime Minister and subsequent formation of a new cabinet in June 1974 led by Yitzhak Rabin.10 It has largely been seen that the Agranaat report were among the contributing factors leading up to the Labor Party’s defeat four years later. Bibliography Ahron Bregman’s Israeli’s Wars, 1947-93 (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.23, 92; Bregman, Israel’s Wars, pp. 66-94; Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace inthe Middle East (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982) Walter Laquer, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (London: Sphere, 1974) Abraham Rabinvich, The Yom Kippur War (New York: Schocken Books, 2004) Coral Bell, “The October Middle East War: A Case Study in Crisis Management during Detente,” International Affairs, Vol. 50 (4) (October 1974) pp. 539-540; Walter J. Boyne, The Two O’clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift That Saved Israel (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), pp.87-88, 165; Laquer, Confrontation, pp.181-187. Robert Mc Namara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East 1952-1967 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p.1 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003) Oles M. Smolansky and Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham, DC: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 15-33 Golan, M. The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East. (New York, Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 134-5 Boyne, W. J. The Two O’ Clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflict and the Airlift that Saved Israel. (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 2002), pp.87-90 Gawrych, George W. The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between Egypt and Israel in the 1967 and 1973 Arab - Israeli Wars. (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000) El-Badri, Hazzan, Taha El-Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia El-Din Zhody. The Ramadan War: The Egyptian View. (Dunn Loring, VA: Dupuy Institute, 1978). Michael B. Oren’s, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 304 Read More