The Arab-Israeli War: Did it Achieve the Political Objectives for Egypt - Essay Example

?The Arab-Israeli War: Did it Achieve the Political Objectives for Egypt? Introduction                 The Arab-Israeli war, which began in 1973, wasjust one of several conflicts that were waged during a period of years. The most important things to remember was that this was a period where there was intense conflict between the Israeli state and the Arabs who more or less wanted the demise of Israel. Israel had become a state in 1948, and had to live without a peaceful accord with the Arabs who were already on the land. What preceded this particular conflict was a war in 1967 that emboldened the Israelis. This war resulted in a rout from the Israelis, and also resulted in the Israelis taking land that they previously didn’t have, effectively expanding the Jewish state in Israel by threefold. This, in the eyes of the Arabs, emboldened Israel to the point where Israel felt that she was invincible. The Arabs saw Israel as being a true bully-  like a bully in a neighborhood, Israel felt that she was operating from a position of power, and, therefore, Israel would feel that whatever she wanted, she could get. Therefore, Israel was intractable and would not be amenable to any kind of negotiated settlement with the Arab states. This mentality had to change, and Egyptian Anwar Sadat felt that he would be the one who could change it. And the war did change this, so, in this way, the political objectives were met.                 This essay will examine the conflict, briefly touching upon the military strategy that the Egyptians utilized to surprise Israel in the conflict, and how this affected the Israelis. Then the essay will examine the roots of the conflict, and how the conflict helped the Arabs achieve their political goals. The Arab Israeli Conflict                 To understand how and why the Arab-Israeli war was waged in 1973, one must understand that he conflict began not in 1973, but, rather, in 1967. 1967 was the year that there was another Arab-Israel war, one that was decisively won by the Israelis. This war was in June, and, as Weinland (1978) noted, the Arabs immediately started to prepare for their next war after the 1967 war had ended. They were assisted by the Soviet Union in this endeavor. The stages to prepare for the 1973 conflict consisted of three stages – rebuilding the Arab military capabilities, negating the Israeli offensive advantage, and making ready for the ensuing attack.1 The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 lasted for three weeks of intense combat.2 This war began with a surprise attack, with the Israelis receiving only a last-minute strategic warning prior to the outbreak of the war, and there were more surprises to come. There were surprises in the technological, operational and tactical areas of the war. The war was led by Egypt, which crossed the Suez Canal into Israel far quicker than they could have ever anticipated. The Arabs stood and fought, and did not retreat as they had before in the six day war of 1967. The United States, an ally of Israel, was soon involved, however, and the United States was able to make up for the Israeli losses in tanks and aircrafts, while furnishing countermeasures to help out the Israelis in this war.3                  The Arab Israel 1973 war might have been short, but it was also bloody. There were heavy casualities on both sides, and there was vast quantities of military material which was lost during this short, but bloody, conflict.4  At first, the Egyptian military strike was successful – Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, had secured diplomacy with other countries to help in the fight, while choking off oil to Israel. Furthermore, Sadat had provoked Israel twice to mobilize troops, only to back off, thus giving Israel a false sense of security.  When the October attack came, Israel did not mobilized her resources, having been tricked twice before by Sadat. Cooper (1997)5 notes that, in the beginning, Israel had actually feared for its survival, and this fact was extremely important in the end, because, as noted below, Sadat’s main tactical objective was to put fear into the hearts of Israelis, which would make them more likely to negotiate. However, as noted above, the United States had gotten involved, giving equipment to Israel, while the Soviets threatened to intervene on behalf of the Arab states. This moved the two superpowers, USSR and the United States dangerously close to a confrontation with one another.6 The UN Security Council then got involved and implemented a shaky cease fire in the conflict.7 Roots of the Conflict                 According to Cochran (1998), there was a stalemate between Egypt and Israel, in that Egypt had a national policy of “no peace no war, and Egypt also wanted to create favorable political conditions for the conduct of negotiations, leading up to a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. The roots of the conflict dates back two millennia and were exacerbated by the statehood of Israel, which was established in 1948. There were several other conflicts and military contests that occurred before the 1973 war. These military contests occurred in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1969-1970. These conflicts were marked by Israeli success and expansion into more territory, but these conflicts did not address the underlying political situation between the two sides.8 The 1967 conflict was perhaps the most devastating to the Arab cause, as this conflict resulted in a decisive Israeli victory and the seizure by Israel of territories that made the state of Israel triple its original size. Among the lands acquired by Israel in the 1967 conflict were Syrian Golan Heights, the Jordanian Old City of Jerusalem and West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. This hardened the Arabs against Israel, as these lands became occupied by Israelis, and the Arabs made repeated demands for this occupation to end.9 However, the decisiveness of this victory made the Israelis content to sit behind their defenses, and refused to negotiate, as they were in the position of strength in the conflict from that point on. Therefore, they continued to hold on to the captured territory.10 A month after the cease fire was negotiated, the President of Egypt,  Abdel Nasser, died, and Anwar Sadat subsequently became the new President of Egypt. Sadat came into the Presidency looking for a diplomatic solution for the Israeli impasse, knowing that the Soviet’s support for Egypt was shaky, and the Arabs were not unified. However, Sadat’s attempts at diplomacy with Israel had failed. Israel was inflexible to negotiations, and the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, Israel’s ally, meant that the Soviets would be hesitant to take action that would destroy this detente, and backing the Arabs in a war against Israel would certainly qualify as destroying the detente. Yet, Sadat could not just accept that Israel had taken territories to occupy – to accept the permanence of these settlements would mean that Sadat was recognizing the legitimacy of these occupations (Cochran, 1998). Meanwhile, Sadat was seeing the time for a peaceful negotiation slip away – Egypt ‘s military burden was becoming too much for the country to bear, there was the distinct possibility that Sadat would be deposed, and the morale of the Arabs was becoming lower by the day. The country could not survive much more of the humiliation of seeing the Arab annexes. Therefore, Sadat decided that he had to go to war.11 Sadat’s calculation that the time to strike was soon was emboldened by the fact that Sadat was seen as a weak leader, and that he would be merely an interim President.12 According to Kalb (1992),13 the stalemate between the Arabs and Israel that existed at this time could continue indefinitely, and this would block any progress towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. There was captured land that would not be returned by Israel, as this land was an important part of the Israeli overall strategy in the area. Meanwhile, the Arab states saw the occupied territories as being a matter of national survival. Sadat also understood that there could not be a negotiated settlement, as the Arab pride had been too hurt in the 1967 conflict. Kalb (1992) further stated that Sadat had calculated that the United States would be hesitant to get involved with the conflict, as they were still stung by Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal, which was still ongoing at this point of time.  The United States and Soviet Union detente further led Sadat to calculate that the USSR would not help Egypt in the conflict. Sadat saw the Egypt was the only country in the Middle East that would have the power and might to intervene in the conflict and try to break the stalemate. Further, Sadat saw non-aligned and third-world countries as likely to side with the Arabs in the war, and used oil as a powerful political weapon. Sadat saw a window of opportunity to act, knowing that detente would eventually constrain the military options for Egypt, and that, the more Israel built settlements in occupied lands, the harder it  would be for Israel to make concessions. All of these calculations led Sadat to conclude that Egypt must attack, and must attack soon.14                 Sadat’s political objective, according to Kalb (1992), was simply to make a negotiated settlement more likely. He though that Israel was complacent, and this led Israel to have a false sense of security. If Israel were not threatened, thought Sadat, then Israel would not be willing to negotiate. Therefore, Sadat wanted to attack Israel, to let the country know that she was not as secure as she thought, and this would make Israel more willing to negotiate a return of the occupied territory. Sadat’s strategy began by cutting off oil from the Arab lands to Israel and Israel’s supporters. Simultaneously, Sadat arranged for the domestic production to be shifted to wartime production, and planned diplomacy to entice other countries to join Egypt in the war effort, targeting the non-aligned and third-world countries for this. Surprise was the part of the strategy, as the element of surprise would put Israel on notice that she was not secure.15 Political Objectives Achieved Through the Conflict                 The strategy worked, in that there was a cease fire that was instituted by the UN Security Council, and Israel no longer saw herself as being invincible, while seeing Arabs as being impotent.  There was a profound psychological shift as a result of this war – the enemy’s morale, thinking and aggressive tendencies were affected by this war, according to Gawrych (1997).16 Sadat felt that Israel was like a neighborhood bully who uses his might to try to make all the neighborhood kids bend to his wishes. He is able to continue his reign of terror because he knows that no other kid will stand up to him. He has a position of strength, and this position of strength makes him bold and unwilling to compromise. What is necessary to change the bully’s perspective is simply bloodying his nose – it is not necessary to defeat him. His respect is gained through fighting him, as well as changing his behavior and attitude. The child who finally stood up to him gains the bully’s respect, and the bully is willing to treat that child differently.17 Thus, by standing up to Israel, just like the child who is willing to stand up to the bully, Egypt and Syria were able to gain some respect from Israel, and was able to change the psychological sense that Israel had that it was invincible.18                 After the 1973 war, this had changed. Israel no longer felt that it was invincible. Indeed, it suffered many different casualties in this war. One was that there were many capable people who were killed in the conflict.19 Another was that there were a number of battle shock casualties that was much higher than in earlier conflicts. As Belenky (1983) noted, other issues that arose for the Israelis in the 1973 war was that that IDF was subjected to intense scrutiny, and there was a systematic lack of record-keeping which meant that valuable information was lost. There was a great deal of psychiatric problems that occurred with the individual Israelis as well. As Belenky (1983) states, there were individuals who broke down upon receiving their first telephone call from home, and battle shock, in general, proved to be a problem for these men. The battle shocks were numerous during the first hours and days of the 1973 war, and the battle shocks were highest during the crossing of the Suez Canal, because this was when indirect fire was the most intense. The Israelis were fatigued by lack of sleep as well – the Israelis were only sleeping around 3-4 hours for ever 24. Belenky (1983) stated that the 1973 war was the first war that the Israelis suffered these types of battle shocks and psychiatric casualties in numbers that were significant. Moreover, the Israelis were ill-equipped to treat these psychiatric injuries. Israel’s shift in the psychological perspective would mean that the negotiation path was opened, due to the fact that Israel no longer felt invincible, thus vindicating Sadat’s initial strategy going into the conflict.20 As Cochran (1998) noted, the conflict was good for the entire Arab region. The Arab people, after the 1967 war, felt a lack of self-respect, dignity and prestige. They also felt a great deal of shame. The 1973 war allowed the Arab people to regain their dignity, which gave the entire region a positive political effect, even though Israel eventually won, militarily, against Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, as Weinland (1978) noted, the conflict united the Arab world, so that the radical and conservative Arab states, coalescing behind the Soviet Union, got together to mount this attack, and was able to stay together while the war was launched, and was integral in supporting the Arabs afterwards. Furthermore, the stalemate of “no peace, no war,” was ended by this conflict. Moreover, because of this war, Israel was in a state of virtual diplomatic isolation – the Communists and the Muslims uniformly supported the Arabs in this conflict, as did virtually the entire Third World. European support for Israel started to wane after this conflict as well. Since Israel had reduced her standing in the world because of this conflict, and there was also changes that the American ally went through during this period of time, Israel decided that it should come back to the bargaining stable. This resulted in the final Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979.21                 The war achieved, overall, the Arab goal of emboldening the Arab race while uniting Arab countries as well. Cooper (1997) notes that wars may be worth it, politically, even if military success might not be achieved, if the war helps the losing side regain some pride and prestige. Before the 1973 war, the Arab world was disunified and diverse. After the conflict, there was more unity and there was effective leadership that emerged after this conflict. Further, as Cooper (1997) notes, Sadat’s objective in starting the war was to change the political reality, not necessarily to threaten the existence of Israel as a state. This meant that this objective was achieved.22                 So, in a sense, the war did achieve the political objectives which were sought by the Arabs in this conflict. By making Israel feel vulnerable, and Egypt feel emboldened, there was more room for peaceful negotiation regarding the return of the settlements. This limited objective was achieved. Another achievement, according to Gawrych (1996) was that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was tarnished by the public inquiry that followed the 1973 war, and there was a number of senior officers whose careers were ended. The ruling party was eventually forced from power, which heralded a new era of Israeli politics which resulted in a peace treaty with Egypt that included the return of Sinai to the Arabs.  What wasn’t achieved, however, was the deeper objective of destruction of the “Third Temple.”23                 What else was accomplished, at least from the perspective of the Arabs, was the fact that there was fear instilled in Israel as a result of the 1973 conflict. Bar-Tal (2001) notes that there is collective fear in Israel that has been the result of the conflicts that are on-going with the Arab state. The Israeli Jews feel a constant threat to their existence, as individuals and as a society. This fear is ever present in Israeli life – it is shown in its literature, in its schoolbooks, in its press, and in its collective emotion.24 This is a far cry from the bully mentality that was earlier attributed to the Israeli mentality. No longer did Israel feel that they could do whatever they wanted without reproach. The Arabs showed that they could fight and, though they couldn’t necessarily win, they could extract damages from the Israelis. This fear is essential if there ever is to be some kind of peace accord, because if Israel loses the fear of its neighbors, then Israel would never be willing to negotiate regarding its borders.                 That said, there is substantial evidence that any gains that the Arabs made through making their stand in the 1973 war were not long-lasting. Perhaps the most crucial piece of evidence that this is true is the fact that the Palestinians, who are Arabs living in Israel, still do not have many rights and they are still oppressed. They are considered to be second-class citizens in the land, and their settlements in the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into Israel. Additionally, they are denied civil and political rights.25 Therefore, over the course of time, it seemed that the Israelis retained the powers that they had after the 1967 conflict, and they haven’t yet given up the land that they gained in that conflict.26 Because of this, it seems that the long-term objectives of forcing Israel to negotiate a return of the lands that were annexed in 1967 did not bear fruit. Conclusion                 What was the objectives of the Arabs in the war of 1976? There was the fact that the Arabs were despondent after the 1967 war. They felt disunity and discouraged, and felt that they were humiliated and down-trodden. Their land was taken by the Israelis in 1967, and this made them feel ever more despondent. Meanwhile, the Israelis felt strong and emboldened. They felt that the Arabs were weak, therefore they were strong, and the strong generally do not negotiate. This, in a nutshell, was the problem – a super strong country that undervalues her opponent is a country that does not see a need to give even one inch to the countries that would have threatened it. This mentality had to be changed.                 This, in effect, was the reason why Anwar Sadat knew that he had to try to fight. Sadat came into power because the prior President died in office, and the country was in an economic slump that compounded its overall feeling of humiliation and malaise. There was a way for the Israelis to come to the negotiation table, and the way was to show Israel that she was not invincible and that the Arabs were not as weak as she had originally thought. Sadat also thought that he could get other countries to take up the Arab cause, which might have an impact upon the international stage. There were many countries that were not aligned to either the Arab or the Israeli cause, and there were other third-world countries that had no allegiances. Therefore, it was important to get these countries to become sympathetic to the Arab cause. If the international community could take up the Arab cause, and put pressure on Israel, then this would further encourage Israel to come to the negotiation table.                 The political objectives of the Arabs were, for the most part, attained. The Arabs were able to bring the Israelis to their knees, if only for a brief period of time. The surprise attack meant that the Israelis were put on the defensive immediately, and Israel suffered many casualties in the war. More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that Israel was isolated politically after the conflict. The IDF was put under scrutiny on the world stage, and much of the world took up the Arab cause. This meant that Israel was willing to negotiate. There was an important peace accord that occurred, that probably would not have occurred if Israel did not feel threatened and did not feel isolated. That said, there is ample evidence that the gains were short-lived. Perhaps Israel was more willing to bargain directly after the conflict, but Israel still has all the power in that country. The Palestinians, whom are Arabs, have no power. The short-term gains might have been many, but the long-term gains, for the Arabs, were precious few. The Israelis still have all the power in the country, and this situation does not seem to be changing anytime soon.   Sources Used Bar-Tai,D.  “Why Does Fear Override Hope In Societies Engulfed By Intractable Conflict, As It Does In The Israeli Society?” Political Psychology, vol. 22, no. 3 (2001): 601-622. Baxter, S.  “Arab-Israeli War October 1973: Lessons Learned,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, (1994): 1-18. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA279557 Belenky, G., F. Tyner and F. Sodetz, F.  “Israeli Battle Shock Casualties: 1973 and 1982.” Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Institute of Research,(1983): 1-50. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA133359 Belgard, L. “The Arab-Isaeli War of 1973 and the Inevitability of Surprise The Arab-Isaeli War of 1973 and the Inevitability of Surprise.” National Defense University, (1997): 1-24. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA442632 Cochran, E. “The Egyptian Staff Solution: Operational Art And Planning For The 1973 Arab-Israeli War.” Naval War College, Newport, RI (1998):1-20. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA348901 Cooper, G.  “Operational art in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.” Naval War College, Newport, RI (1997): 1- 25. http://www.stormingmedia.us/87/8718/A871823.html Gawrych, G. “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory.” Leavenworth Papers, No. 21 (1996): 1-23. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai? verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA323718 Kalb, J. “Anwar Sadat’s Statecraft and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.” National Defense University (1992): 1-36. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA440541 Smooha, S. “Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 13, no. 1 (1990): 389-413. Weinland, R. “Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War.” Professional Paper No. 221, Center for Naval Analyses (1978): 1-35. http://mycredituneup.net/sites/default/files/research/5500022100.pdf   Read More