A Face of Battle Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israel War - Essay Example

Conduct a Face of Battle analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israel War using the "Advanced Face of Battle Analysis" model that is adapted from John Keegans Face of Battle Introduction: The main aspects regarding Sir John Keegan’s book deal with the actual carrying out of warfare by soldiers. John Keegan, a war historian at Sandhurst Military College, has written a thought-provoking the book called ‘Face of Battle’ which underlines the evolving dehumanizing effects of war over three centuries by discussing three major battles. The first, the Battle of Agincourt fought in 1415, second, the Battle of Waterloo during 1815 and finally, the first day of the 1916 Somme War during World War 1. These battles, although fought in different time zones, using different weaponry and with different combat strategies, have several common characteristics. For one thing, British forces were involved in all these wars, and secondly, more surprisingly, they were fought in more or less, neighbouring geographical territorial regions. Military speaking, the map below delineates the actual sites of war- Agincourt, Waterloo and Somme. The events during the Six day War are reminiscent of these wars in that they were fought and won by comparatively ill equipped and numerically lesser armies than their opponents. But they were commanded by legends, like Caesar, Duke of Wellington and General Sir Douglas Haig of the British army and fought by valiant men who needed a cause to die. All wars were based on territorial disputes and the Somme battle was part of WWI that lasted for long. Militarily speaking, the Arab- Israel conflict is yet deadlocked. Diagram 1.1. From John Keegan’s book: The face of battle – provided by customer As Keegam himself admits, he has been shorn of the actual experiences of witnessing, or participating in a war, and most of his experiences have been through his long career as a military historian preparing young cadets for war. Through his book, and keeping the Face of Battle analysis Model as a prototype it is now necessary to consider the Arab Israel conflict during 1967. Aim and objective of this study: Using the advanced Face of Battle (FOB) analysis model, this essay aims at analyzing the critical factors of the 1967 Arab-Israel war that led to Israel’s victory over its Arab league neighbours, primarily, of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Arab countries, like Palestine, Iraq to a smaller extent.1 Scope of this study: To achieve this aim, it is necessary to understand the events before, during and after the Six Day War during 1967 between Israel on the one hand, and its Arab neighbours on the other. It is also necessary now to consider the Six-Day War, in terms of the following aspects: 1. Planning for the battle 2. Preparations made 3. Weaponry 4. Tactics used 5. Centre of gravity 6. Point of decision 7.Moment of decision 8. Intervention made 9. Experience of being there. Planning for the battle This war was not an isolated one, but a result of events of attrition from both sides since inception of Israel during 1948. Moreover, the support and assurances received by Israel from the Arab League also emboldened it, in its demonstrated animosity towards Israel who nursed territorial designs in Israel country. The planning for battle began ever since Soviet Russia warned Israel, on May 14, 1967 of a potential Israeli attack on Syria. Nasser sought to hedge this threat by sending two armoured divisions to the Sinai desert to ward off a potential Israeli attack on Syria. Israel countered by sending a tank brigade to counteract Arab offensive.2 Already the Sinai area was a cauldron of hectic military installations and activities due to skirmishes and air attacks in Sinai, and no specific planning, as such was being envisaged. Militarily speaking, the inputs were all there. It was only a question of seeking reinforcement from the High command or perhaps change war strategies to suit current developments. The specific preparations which Egypt made were to vacate the 3500 strong United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai, and subsequently, occupy their own troops in the vacated areas. President Nasser knew that in order to provoke a war against Israel on the strengths of support from his Arab allies and the USA would need sufficient motive. He was also aware that blocking the Tiran could be a precipitating factor that may set off a war which he wanted. This was the major planning done by Israel in order to provoke the third conflict with Israel. “Specifically, the war stemmed from Egypts decision to expel United Nations troops from the Sinai peninsula and blockade Israels port of Eilat, under international law a casus belli, or act of war, in addition to belligerent Arab threats to destroy Israel.” 3 The precipitating cause of the war of 1967 was the blockade of Israeli ships by Egypt. The withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) under instructions from President Nasser and the build-up of troops along the Sinai border were also parts of the war planning by Egypt. On the part of Israel, historians believe that it did not want a war, but the blockage of Straits of Tiran had serious economic impacts, since ships carrying essential commodities for Israeli ports could not reach its destinations. Preparations made: President Nasser’s requirement to withdraw UN peacekeeping troops along the Sinai border was transmitted to the UN Secretary General, U-Thant. The SG tried to negotiate with Nasser, but the latter was adamant that UN forces need to withdraw from Gaza Strip. Finally, on May 12, 1967, the entire UNEF was withdrawn under instructions from the Secretary General of the UNO. Both US and Russia needed to protect their economic and political interests in the Middle East, and, by setting one neighbour against another, they had virtually turned it into a cauldron of America-Russian military rivalry with the participation of smaller countries like Palestine, Iraq, etc.4 Later historians or military strategists would ponder on whether the war was indeed between Israel and Egypt, or, on a larger canvas, between the obdurate Cold war adversaries- USA and USSR, given the kind of machinations they used during these, and subsequent wars. Israeli Military Chief of Staff (COS) - Yitzhak Rabin: Israel, on the other hand, had now appointed Moshe Dayan as defence minister. However, the main genius behind Israeli victory in Sinai, was their military Commander, Yitzhak Rabin. He engineered a three-faceted attack through use of armoured brigades, mechanized unit and infantry divisions. The adversary had five infantry, two armoured divisions with over 1,000 tanks. 5 The use of the air power to smother Egyptian advances and use of missiles and mortars to flush out and destroy deeply entrenched machine gunners has been amply seen in this war. Troops were placed along its borders and also, its hospitals were making provisions for according injured and wounded soldiers from the war front. Preparations were also made against possible injury caused to Israeli troops or civilians by Russian supplied conventional and chemical weapons. 6 Weaponry: The main weapons that were used during the Arab Israel war were modern weapons of destruction like aerial bombings, machine guns, hand grenades, howitzers and surface to surface missiles and rocket launchers. Besides, moving armoured vehicles and tanks were also used. Both countries have large units of fighting men with cache of arms and ammunition, but Israeli military leaders were able to rally their troops better and make better use of line formations and offensive and defensive techniques. Aircrafts provided strong cover for advancement of the infantry and barrages fires were used in forward areas to cover the onward sieges movements of troops. The war was truly Israel in that “From a nation that perceived itself as fighting for its own survival, Israel became an occupier. “ 7 Casualties: It is seen that Israel lost around 1000 death and around 4500 were wounded. However, the Arab casualties were around 10,000. 8 The casualties in the war against Syria were low at a mere 1000 for Israel as compared to 8000 soldiers lost by Syria. Tactics used: The strategies used by Israel could be said to be one of pre-emption. Being a small state besieged with belligerent and aggressive neighbours, it could hardly allow itself space to adopt defensive postures and wait until it was attacked. If this had happened, perhaps Israel would have been completely deciminated since its fighting units would have been heavily outnumbered by enemy forces. It attacked Egyptian air and ground targets simultaneously in several regions. The air attacks were conducted in the early mornings, the fighter planes flying low to avoid Egyptian radar control systems, and bombed stationary Egyptian aircrafts parked for maintenance and refuelling. It could also be said that Egyptian and Syrian forces did not expect this intensity and power in the enemy attacks. Unlike the kind of inspiring leadership that was provided by Caesar to his demoralised troops during the Battle of Agincourt during 1415 AD, Egyptian military think tanks and commanders could not inspire battle winning tactics during 1967 conflict. Although President Nasser had evacuated the UNPF and amassed several battalions in the Sinai borders with Israel, the Egyptians could not rise up to the occasion and destroy the enemy. In the words of John Keegan in his epoch making book, Face of Battle, “in our own decade we have seen the Arab armies adamant in their refusal to accept Israel’s lightning victories of 1967 as a fair trial of their relative worth, return to the struggle and insist on repeating the trial. 9 The Israelis used the techniques that were used by British soldiers in the Battle of Somme, a World War I battleground, involving “fire and movement tactics”, which has been described by John Keegan in his book, Face of battle. 10 This consisted of specialist movement and maneuver, with the air force and the ground forces working together. The aim was not to connect in more costly forward assaults, as in the break-in battles, but rather to so displace and perplex the opposing commanders that they would panic, causing their armies to break rank and disperse, allowing the advancing troops to gain ground and vanquish the enemy. 11 Centre of gravity: On May 13, Soviet intelligence warned Egypt that Israel was moving troops and armaments along its line of Sinai, apparently to launch a full scale offensive against Syria. This however proved untrue. 12 Militarily speaking, the command of Israeli attack against Syria vested with Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff (COS) of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Upon hearing that Egyptian troops were moving eastward towards the Suez Canal, Rabin immediately instructed his Southern Command to step up reconnaissance along the borders with Israel and also refrain from unwanted troop build up which would be interpreted wrongly by Egyptian intelligence as offensive tactics. 13 Militarily speaking, Egyptian commander Gen. Abd el Mohsen Mortagui had five infantry and two armoured divisions with more than 1, 000 tanks at his disposal. 14 “Israel reunified the city, extending Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to the parts previously occupied by Jordan.” 15 The cause for Israeli occupation of old Jerusalem is not surprising. Although the Arab fighting forces were quantitatively larger than that of the Israelites, the latter were well trained, disciplined and organised during battle. 16 Point of decision: The decision came after Egypt took the drastic step of blocking the Straits of Tiran in order to obstruct the passage of Israeli cargo carrying essential commodities and the President eventually ordered around 3500 soldiers of the United Nations Emergency Force to leave the place. 17 Speaking in military terms, Nasser ploy to get rid of UNEF and to block international waters of Tiran was sufficient causus belli. But, after the overwhelming defeat, Egyptian Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer orders a general retreat, telling his army to dump its heavy weapons and retreat to the Suez Canal. The move leads to the death or capture of thousands of its soldiers who were unarmed and could not fight back. 18 1. Israeli air attacks precede ground artillery warfare 19 2. Ground force position on 10 June, 1967 20 3. Land occupied by victorious Israelis after the Six day war. 21 Moment of decision: The decision of the Israeli government to attack Egypt on June 05, 2009 was a momentous one, since entreaties from countries like USA and UK were not heeded by Egypt and its allies. Israel was forced into a war that it did not really desire, since they believed in peace. In the words of John Keegan in the Face of Battle, soldiers “come from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable.” (John Keegan in Face of Battle: P. 66 : provided by customer) Militarily speaking, the moment of decision was taken when Egyptian lost possession on the three fronts, The Sinai front, the Jordanian front (Nasser had signed a pact with Jordan just before the war) and the Bolan heights in Syria. (Refer diagram 3. above) The loss of the war also forced President Nasser to resign as head of the Egyptian country. Intervention means: The main impacts of the Third Arab-Israel Conflict 1967, commonly referred to as the Six-Day war began on June 5, 1967 and were over by June 10, 1967. This war witnessed the complete routing of the Egyptian and Syrian air force and the capture of Arab Sina Peninsula, including Gaza strip, West Bank, Old city of Jerusalem from Jordan and the strategic Golan Height from Syria. The peace brokering was at the instance of Great Britain, US and other larger countries who wanted to end twenty years of war and bloodshed in the Middle East. The United Nations, through its UN Resolution 242, required that Israel return all militarily captured territories during the war of 1967 forthwith and sign peace accords with her neighbours. 22 However, the Arab league was in no mood for reconciliation and rejected the deal, tooth and nail. However, military speaking, the Arab league met under the aegis of the Khartoum resolution and vehemently harboured that” the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.” 23 Experience of being there: Militarily it is believed that battles are not won by soldiers but by their abiding spirits. This has been more than relevant in the pluck and tenacity shown by the Israeli by comprehensively defeating their arch foes in not one, but three theatres of battle- Sinai, in Jordan, and again, in the high altitude hillock of Golan. More than a moral victory, this has also been a victory of a smaller but well knit army against a larger but ill-organised and badly directed adversary. The war perhaps was won on the first day itself when Israel’s air power was reduced to cinders and when Israeli offensive were almost within shaking hands distance of Damascus, the Syrian capital. The morale and fighting spirit, against all odds, under the astute leadership of veteran Yiyzhak Rabin speaks volumes of the soaring confidence and indomitable spirit of the Israeli fighting units, which perhaps had contribute, in no small measure to their ultimate victory. Conclusions: The Third Arab-Israel conflict, also referred to as the Six day war was significant in many ways. For one thing, it changed the geo-political map of the Middle-East completely, providing Israel with the much needed territorial increments, and also simultaneously destroyed the supposed invincibility of the Arab League. For another, Arab nations, particularly Egypt, began to realise that international waters cannot be held ransom for gaining land, especially with the world community not inclined to fully support their endeavours. The Third consecutive Israeli military victory (after 1948 and 1956) unprecedented in its speed and decisiveness, confirmed the IDF’s advantage over its opponents. 24 Although this conflict was just one of the many conflicts that marred Arab-Israel relations, Israel emerged as a strong and capable nation, efficient in fighting battles alone, unlike the Arab league which depended largely on support from Soviet Russia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and others, and yet were not able to displace the will and tenacity of the Israelites. Militarily, Egypt’s strength was significantly depleted since its air force was almost annihilated and most of the ground force were killed, wounded or taken as prisoners of war by the victorious Israeli army. Arab casualties in all the three theatres of battle- Syria, Jordan and Sinai were substantial compared to the light casualties of the enemy. Israel acted in self defence: This study seeks to establish the fact of battle at military strategy level. One of the main reasons for the war to end the way it did was perhaps to the fact that the Israelis were able to pre-empt every move made by Egyptians and yet not be the sponsor of causus belli, or the cause of war. Finally it were the Egyptians whom history views as having been the causus belli in this war, having blocked the straits of Turin and send back the UNEF, and also initiated a military treaty with Jordan. All these events precipitated into a situation whereby Israel, as a smaller country, had no option but to go for war in sheer self-defence. Bibliography “Arab- Israeli Wars.” 2009. Answers.com. http://www.answers.com/topic/arab-israeli-wars (accessed July 11, 2009). Beinin, Joel, and Hajjar, Lisa. “Palestine, Israel and the Arab – Israeli Conflict a Premier.” MBP: Middle East Research & Information Project. http://merip.org/palestine-israel_primer/Palestine-Israel_Primer_MERIP.pdf (accessed July 11, 2009). Ben-Yehuda, Oemda, and Sandler, Shmuel. 2002. “The Arab Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crisis.” SUNY Press. 107. http://books.google.com/books?id=uqxDS4_r9-4C&pg=PA107&dq=Third+arab+israel+conflict+june+1967 (accessed July 11, 2009). Bordeaux Parker, Richard. 1996. “The Six- Day War: a Retrospective.” University Press of Florida. 6. http://books.google.co.in/books?id=K6VoEY8xs3MC&dq=The+Six+day+war&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=45D6oASr36&sig=SzKl6n6gBy-gjyDjOFRHBqMV5oY&hl=en&ei=kbZSSsrMK47e6AO5t83TBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&re (accessed July 11, 2009). Cohen, Anver. 2009. “Crossing the Threshold: The Untold Nuclear Dimensions of the 1967 Arab- Israeli war and it Contemporary Lessons.” Arms Control Association. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/Cohen (accessed July 11, 2009). Flynn, Matthew J. 2008. “First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History.” Routledge. 199. http://books.google.com/books?id=7k86YMUTotYC&pg=PA199&dq=Bowen,+J.+Six+days:+How+the+1967+War+Shaped+the+Middle+East (accessed July 11, 2009). “Jerusalem.” 2007. The Six- Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.org/jerusalem.asp (accessed July 11, 2009). Keegan, John. “Face of Battle.” 306. (Provided by customer). “Lexicon: The State of Israel.” 2007. Ynet News. com. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3284752,00.html (accessed July 11, 2009). “Players.” 2007. The Six- Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.org/players.asp (accessed July 11, 2009). “Precursors to War.” 2007. The Six- Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.org/precursors.asp (accessed July 11, 2009). Rabinovich, Itamar, and Reinharz, Jehuda. 2008. “Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, pre- 1948 to the present.” UPNE. 2nd edition. 212. http://books.google.co.in/books?id=iVJR9UZnTVAC&pg=PA212&lpg=PA212&dq=Yitzhak+Rabin+military+role+in+1967+war+with+egypt&source=bl&ots=5D7_rqg0jf&sig=Hw8K1n1azGZO27Pn1NcKWCJpw_g&hl=en&ei=FlFYSorLL47q6AOR9ZSWCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2 (accessed July 11, 2009). “Six Day War.” 1967. Encyclopaedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/850855/Six-Day-War (accessed July 11, 2009). “The Six- Day War Causes and Consequences.” 2007. The Six- Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/introduction.asp (accessed July 11, 2009). Tristam, Pierre. 2009. “UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967): Israel to Withdraw from occupied Territories, Palestinians to Recognize Israel.” About. com: Middle East Issues. http://middleeast.about.com/od/documents/qt/me081115b.htm (accessed July 11, 2009). “The Khartoum Resolutions September 1, 1967: Text.” 2008. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/The%20Khartoum%20Resolutions (accessed July 11, 2009). “War Egyptian front.” 2007. The Six-Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/southernfront.asp (accessed July 11, 2009). “1967 Middle East War.” Mahesh KO Blog: to Hamro FAMILY Blog. http://mamahesh.wordpress.com/imported-articles/war-around-the-world/1967-middle-east-war/ (accessed July 11, 2009). Read More