Moral Problem - Research Paper Example

?Moral Problem Introduction First in Tunisia and then in Egypt, peaceful popular uprisings have unseated long-time dictators and established more democratic regimes. Encouraged by these successes, the people of Libya have made their own bid to claim their right to a free and democratic state. Unlike deposed Tunisian president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (ruler since 1987) and former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak (ruler since 1981), Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has defiantly remained entrenched in his position four months after the revolt began (Burns, 2011). Gaddafi has no official government function, and prefers to be called “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution” (Elgood, 2011). Furthermore, he has unflinchingly ordered the violent repression of dissident citizens, prompting the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution allowing member states to intervene on behalf of the Libyan people. In this paper I shall examine the decision Gaddafi has so far pursued but may still revise, regarding his response to his people’s clamor for democracy. I shall examine the moral dilemma, and arrive at a moral solution pursuant to the decision procedures of Utilitarianism and Kantianism. However, I shall first relate the background of Gaddafi, the type of leader he is, his decisions and actions, so that these may be made the basis for discerning his motivations. Factual details In 1969, 27-year-old Col. Muammar Gaddafi successfully led a bloodless coup against King Idris to take over the reins of power in oil-rich Libya. Gaddafi was born to nomadic parents, the son of a Bedouin herdsman, and dropped out of college to join the army; despite his humble beginnings, he had been able to maintain absolute dictatorship over his country for the past four decades (Al Jazeera, 2011; Elgood of Reuters, 2011). Gaddafi’s rule was and continues to be oppressive towards the Libyan people, having imprisoned countless dissidents and putting thousands to death, as reported by Human Rights Watch. During the 1970s, he publicly hung student demonstrators who marched and demonstrated for the restoration of their human rights. In another incident, Gaddafi ordered the execution of 1,200 unarmed prisoners in the span of three hours (Al Jazeera, 2011). The media remains under tight government control, as does all large businesses. Gaddafi has been openly anti-US and anti-Israel, and he is strongly associated with terrorism due to his role in the 1988 bombing of the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland which was perpetrated by Libyan intelligence agents. However, in 2003, in a seeming act of reconciliation he accepted responsibility for this act and indemnified the families of those who died, although his admission remained guarded. He also relinquished his complete inventory of weapons of mass destruction (MacLeod & Radwan of Time, 2005). Due to these acts, Libya assumed normalized relations with the West, allowing the oil industry to flourish and the economy to grow. In 2009, however, Gaddafi spoke at the UN General Assembly, at which he tore a copy of the UN Charter in protest, accused the United Nations and the US of being a terrorist group like the Al Qaeda, and demanded $7.7 trillion in compensation from past colonial rulers. Nor was his contempt directed solely at the US. In a two-day visit to Italy in 2010 to strengthen Rome-Italy ties, Gaddafi unabashedly invited thousands of women to convert to Islam as he was accompanied by a dozen female bodyguards (Al Jazeera, 2011; Elgood, 2011). In the recent spate of civil unrest that has spread throughout the Arab states, Gaddafi showed he has not changed his militaristic dictatorship. Human rights protesters have been gunned down in the hundreds within the span of a few days, and even those attending funerals were not spared the carnage (Elgood, 2011). Libya has never held free elections under Gaddafi, and his sentiments on the matter became clear during a Time interview in 2005: “Elections? What for? We have surpassed that stage you are presently in. All the people are in power now. Do you want them to regress and elect somebody to replace them?” (MacLeod & Radwan, 2005). Presently, Gaddafi’s supporters are slowly eroding. By March, many of Gaddafi’s ministers had already abandoned their posts (“Another jumps Gaddafi’s sinking ship,” International Business Times, 2011). On May 30, eight Libyan generals and 100 soldiers defected from the Libyan army and fled to Italy (International Business Times, 2011). Many of those fighting on the government’s side are actually Yemenis, Egyptians and Algerians, “in effect mercenaries” (Burns, 2011). An insight into Gaddafi’s motivations may be gained from a comment by him during an interview: “Libyans are in paradise. [Even] [i]f you put them in paradise, they will still complain.” (MacLeod & Radwan, 2005). Utilitarian analysis The decision shall now be evaluated using the decision procedure from the utilitarian standpoint. For this purpose, it is important to consider the following information: UN sanctions are imposed on Gaddafi, nine members of his family and six other members of his inner circle, in the form of travel bans; additionally, assets belonging to Gaddafi, his eldest son Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, and four other family members are to be frozen (Reuters, 2011). The estimated strength for each side as of March 24 is 17,000 rebels (BBC, 2011), against some 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers (Al Jazeera, 2011, Mar 3) on the side of the government. From news reports there are international military forces involved on the side of the rebels, and a number of foreign mercenaries on the side of the government forces; furthermore, several Libyan military officers and soldiers have defected, but the total of all these numbers are not specified in the reports. For the purposes of calculating the pleasure to pain ratios therefore, all foreign participants are not included; after all, they participate at their own volition. Those who shall be considered are Libyans, whether members of the Gaddafi family and loyalists, the combatants and the non-combatants. Total population of Libya estimated as of 2010 is 6,420,000 (World Bank, 2009). There are two alternative choices: for Gaddafi to step down, or for him to cling to power by not stepping down. For the first groups (Gaddafi, family and allies), pleasure is rated only at 5 if he does not step down because he still holds to power though that power has dwindled. If he steps down, he loses that power but there is pleasure in not being any longer in danger of one’s life. This pleasure is estimated at 5 because any of them may entertain the sentiment that life under detention is the same as fear of one’s life in relative liberty. Pain would pertain to the loss of freedom to travel (travel ban) and the freezing of assets. While even with Gaddafi still in power he may be precluded from travelling outside Libya’s borders, he might do so covertly as he is still at liberty (pain = 4). Once he steps down the ban is absolute. There is relatively greater pain, however living in fear of one’s life (already, Gaddafi’s youngest son and three grandchildren have been killed in the NATO bombings), thus the pain is greater for the 16 family and friends while Gaddafi has not yet stepped down. As for the frozen assets, obviously the foreign assets of the six persons mentioned are already now frozen, but not their local assets which they may still enjoy. Therefore the pain is less if Gaddafi does not step down (6) than if he had (9). Following is the decision table used for a clearer presentation of the foregoing discussion. Decision Gaddafi & immediate allies Combatants Civilian non-combatants Total pleasure to pain ratio Step down Pleasure = 16 x 5 Pain = 16 x 4 + 6 x 9 Pleasure = 17,000 x 10 + 20,000 x 8 Pain = 20,000 x 2 Pleasure = 6.42 M x 9 Pain = 6.42M x 1 58,110,080 6,460,134 Don’t step down Pleasure = 16 x 5 Pain = 16 x 8 + 6 x 6 Pleasure = 20,000 x 5 + 17,000 x 0 Pain = 17,000 x 8 + 20,000 x 5 Pleasure = 6.42 M x 1 Pain = 6.42 M x 9 6,520,080 58,016,182 As for the combatants (20,000 Libyan army and 17,000 rebels), there would be a more absolute reaction for the rebels who fight for conviction, rather than the army that fights out of duty but may not have full conviction. This is evident from the number of defectors from the forces. The rebels would have full pleasure (10) and no pain if Gaddafi steps down, and would have no pleasure if he does not step down, although pain would be only 8 because they would still nurture the hope of the struggle. The troops, on the other hand, would experience greater pleasure than pain if Gaddafi steps down because there would be no need for the struggle though there may be a slight pain at not accomplishing the mission. On the other hand, if Gaddafi does not step down, pain would merely equal pleasure as status quo would be maintained. For civilian non-combatants, there would be a direct inverse relationship between pain and pleasure. Greater pleasure would attend a step down because life would normalize and the country would not be subject again to an embargo and to military attacks. This is not even to consider the democratization process, which is still not assured by Gaddafi’s stepping down but would depend upon the successor. The situation has so polarized itself that it is beyond compromise. Because of the huge benefit to the population, there is a great pleasure to pain ratio if he steps down, and a very small one if he does not step down. He therefore should choose the first alternative, to abandon his position of power. The Kantian imperative The decision procedure following Kantian’s categorical imperative is to “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. This is the universalizability test. First, we shall propose a maxim by which an action shall be taken. From the factual information earlier given I shall construct what I perceive Muammar Gaddafi’s maxims are from his viewpoint: First, as my country’s leader I act in the interest of my people, and therefore can use force to neutralize dissidents who seek to impede my actions. Second, eliminating dissidents in my country who impede my official actions is an internal affair other countries may not interfere with. The next step in the decision procedure is to generalize these maxims: (1) Any country’s leader can use force to neutralize anybody who opposes him. (2) No third party nation may interfere in the internal affairs of any country the leader of which uses force to eliminate those who oppose it. The first generalized maxim, that any leader may eliminate his opposition by force, cannot be made into universal law. The reason is that as an imperative, if leaders are truly acting in the interest of their people, then they must be receptive of both favourable and unfavourable feedback from this same people, otherwise he could not be certain if he truly provides what his people need. The violent action contradicts the presumption that a leader knows and does what is good for his people. The maxim could therefore not be made universal law, and therefore fails the test of universalizability. The action (to eliminate dissidents) should not be taken. The second generalized maxim, that third parties may not interfere when a country’s leader uses force against his own people, likewise cannot be made into universal law. It implies that a moral person may observe a basic wrong and refrains from averting the wrong even if it is within his power to do so. This premise contradicts the nature of morality, which is to do what is right and avoid or avert what is wrong. Seeing a wrong and not acting to stop it is a moral wrong by omission. The use of force and violence to subdue legitimate exercise of a human right is a fundamental wrong, since human rights are not created by statute but are inherent in humans by nature. Therefore, if a third party nation observes that a country’s leader systematically inflicts violence against his people in the legitimate exercise of their human rights (such as the right to express disagreement with him), then such third party should have not only the right but the moral duty to intervene, to avert further injury to the populace. The second general maxim could therefore not be universalized, and the maxim fails. From the two maxims representing Gaddafi’s motivations as construed from his official acts, it is evident that Gaddafi’s moral justification to lead Libya has been eroded. He no longer acts in the interest of his people, constrains the exercise of their basic rights and inflicts violence upon them when they assert their human rights. He should therefore step down. Utilitarianism versus Kantianism The two decision procedures yielded the same resultant decision; as basis, however, I believe Kantianism provides a more defensible alternative because it examines the morality of the motivation behind the act, not merely what would create the greatest consequent pleasure. The shortcoming of utilitarianism is that it is anchored on the greater pleasure vis-a-vis the pain it inflicts; however, pleasure may be contextual, arbitrary, and variable with time and circumstance. Furthermore, it creates poor precedents because it is individualized to the parties then involved. Kantianism, anchored as it is on principle of right or wrong, provides a more solid foundation for the creation of precedents for consistency in application. One may say that while Kantianism provides good basis for universal law, utilitarianism may point out mitigating and aggravating circumstances that may be considered in judging the action. Two possible objections and their One likely objection to the foregoing discussion is that it advocates an escalation of force that may exacerbate the violent condition it seeks to resolve. This presents a problem, unless one recognizes that it is not unconditional peace that is priority, but the creation of a just peace, founded on observance and respect for human rights. In the enforcement of rights in a society, there is need for the lawful “police” force that should oppose the criminal forces in order to restore balance and order. Similarly, there is need for an international “peacekeeping” force with the power to compel submission by tyrannical forces, by military means if necessary, where Inasmuch as the use of reasonable force to avert a greater evil is not repugnant to the human experience, then the use of reasonable military means to protect the greater population does not present an important obstacle to the decision arrived at. A second objection pertains to the intervention of foreign powers (the UN, NATO, etc.) which may well force Gaddafi out of power. Many are quick to point out that such interference violates the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter (Kreijen, 2002, p. 527). This issue has been settled in the resolution by the UN General Assembly recognizing the “Responsibility to Protect,” where it has become the responsibility of each state to protect its people in the exercise of their human rights. Failing to discharge the responsibility would invite external diplomatic, civil, even military, intervention until the country’s leaders provide sufficient protection for human rights (Silverbug, 2011, p. 46). References Al Jazeera 2011 “Profile: Muammar Gaddafi” Al Jazeera. 24 Feb 2011. Accessed 9 June 2011 from http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/2011/02/201122117565923629.html Al Jazeera 2011 “Gaddafi’s military capabilities,” Al Jazeera 3 March 2011. Accessed 9 June 2011 from http://english.aljazeera.net/video/africa/2011/03/2011331522685587.html BBC 2011 “Libya: France Jet Destroys Pro-Gaddafi Plane,” BBC News, 24 March 2011. Accessed 10 June 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12850975 Burns, J F 2011 “Libyan Leaders Defiant as Battle Rages at Oil City,” The New York Times, 12 June 2011. Accessed 12 June 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/africa/13libya.html?_r=1 Elgood, G “Gaddafi-Profile.” Reuters in the Middle East Reporter (Weekly Edition), 2/26/2011, Vol. 138 Issue 1239, p16-17 International Business Times 2011 “Another jumps Gaddafi’s sinking ship,” International Business Times, 31 Mar 2011, EBSCO International Business Times 2011 “Libyan Generals Desert Gaddafi, Defect to Italy” International Business Times. 30 May 2011, EBSCO Kreijen, G 2002 State, Sovereignty & International Governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford MacLeod, S & Radwan, A 2005 “10 Questions for Muammar Gaddafi,” Time, 2/7/2005, Vol. 165 Issue 6, p8 Reuters 2011 “Gaddafi, family members to face travel ban”, Alertnet, 27 Feb 2011. Accessed 10 June 2011 from http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gaddafi-family-members-to-face-travel-ban-un-draft Silverbug, S R 2011 International Law: Contemporary Issues and Future Developments. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado . Read More