Letter to the Committee Saying Why Brain Rejuvenation Should Not Be Allowed - Essay Example

Dear members, While there exists a general consensus of the benefits of medical transplant towards saving lives and giving persons a second chance in life, it becomes very necessary that advancements in the medical field towards replacement of body organs be examined keenly with a view to determine the issues surrounding such a process. Within the context of brain transplant, a person is only identical to the later person if the later person has the entire body as the earlier person, subsequently, brain rejuvenation results to memory duplication whereby a person’s memory can be used by several other persons. Prior to the suggested “brain rejuvenation” procedure on Nick, Dr. Mathews performed a “brain transplant” operation on Julia North and subsequently the members of the committee agreed that Julia North’s life was saved. Perhaps we may need to understand a few basics and events that led to this case. Before this operation, Julia North was a young woman run over by a car in efforts to save the life of a child who wandered onto the tracks. Mary Frances who was the child’s mother had stroke while watching the events unfold. The two victims were brought to this facility where Dr. Mathews performed his ‘Brain transplant’ operation which the committee approved and agreed that saved Julia’s life. It is also important to note that at the time of accident, the survivor, Julia North’s body was dying and the brain was okay and Dr. Mathews transferred her brain into another body. The committee further agreed that it was Julia’s life that was saved since the survivor had memories of Julia based on the being Julia. While arriving at this conclusion, this committee must have been guided by the sophisticated memory account that provides that when a person is numerically identical to a later person if and only if the person has memories of being earlier person that is so caused in the right way. My objection for this matter rests with Cohen’s views on this matter. Julia North had one up until the time of accident, and another body after the operation. This implies that one person had two bodies. Therefore a person cannot be simply identified with a human body and therefore something must be wrong with the view that the committee had adopted on this case as it implies that if a similar operation were to be carried out on brain transplant, then afterwards this person would be a person with new body since the person with that body has a memory of having a similar case as Julia if caused in the ‘right way.’ Right in this scenario has a particular meaning of interest, and must satisfy three conditions; if a subject experiences some event, this experience leaves a trace in the brain of the event and this trace that has been left is later responsible for content of a memory, then in this way we can say that the memory is caused in the right way. Dear members, we are faced with another problem of a new technique called ‘Brain rejuvenation’ yet to be performed on Nick. While adopting earlier propositions to defend approving Julia’s case we are also suggesting that the same logic as earlier proposed would be applicable and as such the committee is justified in saying that Nick would be the survivor of the operation , and I quote, “Nick would be the survivor of the brain rejuvenation procedure because the survivor would have the memories of being Nick and there would be more than one person of being Nick.” But dear members, Nick cannot be more than one person and this do not seems right. Using the same procedure as advanced in this new ‘brain rejuvenation’ process, the committee has argued that saving Nick’s life will be accomplished by replacing his brain with a duplicated brain from someone else and as such his survival are justified on the premise that the same bodies would be of this new person, say Alex and that Nick would then have Alex’s memories and they remember them in the right way. Premised on the duplication theory, when someone physically dies, God creates a person in heaven that is a mental duplicate of that person’s body. It implies therefore that this mental duplicate created will have the same memories of being that person before that person died and these memories will then have to be caused in the right way by God to be the exact person before that person died. It implies in simple essence therefore that when this happens the newly person created in heaven actually remembers being the latter person and we quantitatively conclude that the new person is numerically identical to the latter person. Several concerns arise from this process, notably, if it is possible that God can create such a person in heaven and by designing that new person after the latter person and make that latter person to be the new person, then why could he not then make two such identical bodies and equally transfer information into both of them? If such occurs then duplication theory as proposed by Dr. Mathews cannot be justified. In order to avert the personality duplication problem associated with such body transplant operation it becomes quite necessary that ways to amend the problem of personality identity is utilized so that I does not result to duplication problem. In this regard it becomes necessary that earlier arguments adopted regarding same personality being perpetuated in the new person whom operation has been done on is abandoned and instead more practical and objective reasoning sought. In line with it can be said that the later person is the same as the earlier person if and only if the latter has memories of being an earlier person and the later person has the same brain as an earlier person. With this it can sufficiently be argued out why this person would not face duplication problem within this view of personality identity. While we also want to justifiably admit that the revised view of personality identity would solve the problem of personality duplication, it becomes apparent to also note that this view would result to another problem. While we agree that Julia was the survivor of the body transplant our foregoing discussion forbids us from adopting the same view of suggesting that Nick would also the survivor of brain rejuvenation given the magnitude of the reasons I have presented against the brain rejuvenation process. And therefore both arguments cannot hold for both. At this point, a new problem also emerges, the committee cannot justifiably also claim that Julia is the true survivor of the transplant and that Nick is the survivor of the brain rejuvenation because of the new account of personality identity that I have developed above that demands that the brain ,must have same memory account that provides that when a person is numerically identical to a later person if and only if the person has memories of being earlier person that is so caused in the right way. One would ask, what if Dr. Mathews makes two, three, four or so many duplicates of Nick, would we not be allowing unethical act where Nick’s brain which were duplicated during the process put into other bodies and as such with more than one person having memories of being Nick yet we are aware that there can only be one Nick at a time. In as much as the committee has allowed earlier brain transplants we have also so far enumerated reasons for objecting brain rejuvenation which dispels earlier logics that were founded on this matter within a wider paradigm of personal identity and brain duplication. Read More