United States Post 9/11 Policies in Relation to South Asia - Essay Example

? xxxxx No. 12345 (History and Political Science) HOW 9/11 CHANGED US FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO INDIA, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN Professor: ABC Xxxxx xxxx College Department of XXXX XXXX 19 March, 2013 United States Post 9/11 Policies in Relation to South Asia US Post 9/11 Policy towards India The post 9/11 US-led war on terrorism has reshaped the entire South Asian region, with a reinvigorated Indo-American relationship. “We have reshaped that whole region -- a reinvigorated US-India relationship, a new US-Pakistan relationship, a new Interim Authority in Kabul, the Taliban gone, and the terrorists’ dead, in jail or on the run," Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The recent warm Indo-US relations didn’t establish overnight. There are three major developments which took place in last 15 to 20 years that forced both the countries to come close to each other for their national interests. The foremost development was the end of Cold War era which remained focal point of US foreign relations. India had nonalignment policy during that period. Therefore, end of Cold War created a room for both countries to change their foreign policy in terms of new scenario. Second, India set up excellent financial reforms at the start of 90s. It was the first time when Indian government opened its borders for international trade. Huge population of India was a huge market for US multinational private sector companies. Lastly, the world has seen a tectonic shift at the start of 21st century, and of course India has come as one of the emerging countries. (America's Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership Author(s): R. Nicholas Burns). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 offered New Delhi a golden opportunity to deepen its security links with Washington. New Delhi promptly endorsed President Bush’s declaration of “war on terrorism” and promised full cooperation. US think tanks ritualistically incant that India, the largest democratic country of the world, must be a natural partner of United States. No doubt, what the features India possesses, amongst all, its entire democratic feature is most prominent. Looking after of a population consisting of 1.1 billion people who belong to various religions, speak lots of different languages, and having different priorities. In the presence of such diversities, India per capita GDP is $1122 which is definitely a mark of its greatest democracy. Traditionally United States is a great supporter of enhancing the democracy on the globe and in this context it always has appreciated the Indian contribution for establishing the democracy in a third world country. However India, despite of being an incredible polity and having remarkable democratic value, still seems short of preserving US interests with respect to political system. India is not promoting the democracy to flourish in other countries. Actually, the effects of colonialism are still evident on Indian culture and that’s why the country is still hesitant, however, its own contribution to set the largest democracy is the feature which forces the Washington to keep Indian governments to create political reforms across the world (Toward Realistic U.S.–India Relations). Both India and the US share the common view of China as a potential and major future threat; and, have common interests in circumscribing the rise of China. In the long term, there is the possibility of establishing strategic relations with each other to contain China by using the other as a core element for balancing Beijing, especially at a time when each has trouble with China (Nicholas Burns, 2007, p.139). The likelihood of India becoming a military counter to China or its attractiveness as an alternative market, however, is questionable and certainly not immediate. A big concept of relationship is highlighted by many self-proclaimed realists in America and India that the US-Indian cooperation shouldn't be conceptualized as a way to set competition against China. Washington must value the India’s innate significance. Therefore, in order to create equilibrium in the region and to convince the Indian government, US instrumentalizes it. However, India pretends that it’s not simply a tool for anyone. Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney has states that “the Bush agenda was predicated on the idea of helping a rising India become a democratic bulwark against authoritarian China. Chellaney and American critics argue that “Obama sees things through a different prism. The bigger strategic questions are whether China will ineluctably challenge the post-World War II international system of economics and security developed largely by the United States and, if so, whether the best way to prevent or mitigate China’s exertions is to counter them with military power. If military balancing is the foremost strategic imperative, then the next question is whether India is willing and able to be an effective U.S. partner in pursuit of this end”. (Toward Realistic U.S.–India Relations) US Post 9/11 Policy towards Afghanistan After 9/11, the moment Taliban government repudiated the final US proposal to extradite Bin Laden, the once Bush government chose to militarily put an end to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. President Bush articulated an aggressive strategy that against those terrorists who harbor terrorists United States, and evaluated that the warm and friendly regime within Kabul is exclusively mandatory to make it possible for US forces to look for Al-Qaeda and its reserves. (Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy book). Not even close to accomplishing the target which was set in 2001, the US driven coalition hardly spurred the primary command of Taliban and their associated roots in Pakistan. Even till now, US are short of making an obvious strategy to merge its political and tactical objectives progressively in Afghanistan and South Asia. The Bush government couldn’t successfully offer and convince the Taliban fighters who didn't prefer to protect Al-Qaeda with a method to resume Afghanistan in harmony. Rather, the unlawful detentions at Guantanamo Bay and at Bagram Air Base, crafted sanctuary toward Pakistan. This policy has given some more options to Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders to make their roots more strengthening in Pakistan (Saving Afghanistan: Barnett R. Rubin). On 19th September, 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf addressed that nation that he will have to cooperate with Washington to be able to "save Afghanistan and Taliban from being harmed". Consequently, US government was quite happy as all its instructions were fully followed by Pakistan to paralyze the main focused target Al-Qaeda and its network in Afghanistan. Taliban were not the prime target till then, however, by mid of 2006, during the western military operations intelligence reports disclosed that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was involved to continuously support the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. It was also claimed that Taliban leadership is based in Quetta, the capital city of Province Baluchistan. As an outcome, the cross-border riot successfully demoralized the weak Karzai’s government and Afghanistan's indigent community. (Saving Afghanistan Author(s): Barnett R. Rubin Reviewed). However, despite the carpet bombing, physical control and lucrative monitory reward offers, Allied forces remained failed to achieve the prime objective of capturing Osama till May, 2010 when the most wanted target was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The declaration of exit of US troops from Afghanistan does not seem to be a practical strategy as Obama’s National Security Advisor, Gen L. Jones, acknowledged that “We have strategic interests in South Asia that should not be measured in terms of finite times. We are going to be in the region for a long time”. Prior to one year of his re-election campaign, President Obama highlighted three priorities of United States in relation to Afghanistan. Firstly, to defeat Taliban by surging fresh military troops in Afghanistan, secondly to establish local civilian set up to look after the Afghan issues under the directions of Washington, and third one to enhance its coalition with Pakistan (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/01/). Although Obama‘s desired goals are made around army provisions in order to refute the secure destination to change the Taliban’s impetus and fortifying the Kabul government’s protection forces, however, practically nothing have been said regarding bigger objectives such as establishing democracy in true letter and spirit, conserving human liberties, education, peace, or even encouraging the women’s participation in national regime (Kenneth, 2013). Obama has played his last survival card in Afghanistan. He has tied up the policy with new surge of troops along with their expected withdrawal up till 2014. It appeared to be part of his re-election campaign as well but still there is nothing different within Afghan policy which might carry any significance. It is really a big question mark on US policy toward Afghanistan that how a war could be finished successfully by these 30,000 troops which couldn’t’t’t be won in the span of last 12 years. The United States is seriously searching for an instant and uncomplicated sort out for a respectable exit from Afghanistan.          US Post 9/11 Policy towards Pakistan Even prior to the aftermaths of 9/11 settled down, U S think tanks were adequately conscious that Pakistan was at the middle of the world's most detrimental Islamist terrorist systems. United States immediately finished a sanction on Islamabad to convince it being a crucial associate in the global war upon terror. However, after a time span of six years, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell proclaimed that “Washington and Islamabad stood at the start of a strengthened relationship". The Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders continue to be en-trenched along Pak-Afghan border areas and finding out safe shelters inside Pakistan. Militancy and terrorists attacks from these Taliban and other groups are also continuing with increasing frequency and lethal intensity. (A False Choice in Pakistan Author(s): Daniel Markey) US immediately contacted to Musharraf and a hasty dialogue concluded in the modified Pakistan's conduct although not in its interests. Assisting the Taliban was so vital for Pakistan that Musharraf also deemed to battle with United States instead of giving up his allies in Afghanistan. Alternatively, he tried out to convince Washington to permit him to settle a "moderate Taliban" based federal government in Kabul or at a minimum to avoid the Northern Alliance from stepping into Kabul as well as developing a federal government because Pakistan knew that this group had interests with India. (Saving Afghanistan Author(s): Barnett R. Rubi) The light of apparently long-lasting connections between Islamists and the Pakistani army guides the US foreign policy makers towards two strategies. Primarily, they claim that Washington must overcome its squeamishness regarding pressing Pakistan and its army to do more in the name of war on terrorism. Earlier, they made Musharraf like a master of handling the essential things to assure the tactical needs and prioritizing the interests of United States which were promptly changed after 9/11. Pakistan army is under extreme stress and in this situation just an uncompromising stance from United States will be enough to discourage it. Second, the US think tanks assert that Washington must support a well-balanced democracy in Pakistan which will strengthen its aggressiveness against the war on terrorism. The Pakistani army has indicated itself that it had keen relations to Islamists to dominate the domestic politics and project regional impact at the international level. As far civilian politics is concerned, few political parties particularly Bhutto's Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), is said to become self-interested and ideologically determined in its resistance against Islamist militancy. A government consisting of Pakistani moderates can definitely deal with the different exploitations and deficiencies that in the long run trigger extremism. (A False Choice in Pakistan: Author(s): Daniel Marke). Pakistan also has some interests behind its U turn policy against Taliban. On 19th September, 2001 Musharraf, the Pakistan’s President, disclosed the national interests associated with this new policy. These interests included the security measures for the nation, to meet up the financial obstacles, the growing demand of protecting tactical and defense assets of Pakistan and lastly to carry on with the Kashmir cause (Kronstadt, K. Alan, and 2008: 51). As a result, Pakistan evolved into an essential partner of the US and NATO forces in the anti-terrorism campaign against Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan as a consequence of its U turn policy in relation to Afghanistan after 9/11, withdrew its assistance belonging to the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. In response, President Bush waived off the sanctions imposed on Pakistan by Clinton government after the 1998 nuclear tests and the military coup of October 1999. So on this occasion, Pakistan once again became a successor of substantial volumes of US support and aid. In post 9/11 scenario, US aid to Pakistan even exceeded by $10 billion dollars (Daniel Markey, 2007, p. 88). In 2005, United States declared Pakistan a main Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) due to its initiatives against terrorism. Bush administration respected the Pakistani dictator as it really supported the US interests in South Asia especially against Al Qaeda and Taliban. Numbers of heads who ware demanded by America were captured and handed over to the United States (Daniel Markey, 2007, p. 89). The 9/11 Commission Report described that “Government of President Pervez Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of enlightened moderation” (Akram, 2002:118). It was simply impossible for United States to successfully launch its global war on terrorism without logistic support of Pakistan. Its long term stability was highly dependent on whole hearted cooperation of Islamabad. According to Zahid Hussein (2010) “Pakistan‘s support was important for the USA and its geographical proximity and vast intelligence information on Afghanistan were seen crucial for any military action against the Taliban or al-Qaeda” (p, 37). Following the campaign of 9/11 as invasion in Afghanistan, the immediate focus of United States came towards Iraq and substantial visions of modifying the Middle East. However, unlike to the previous statements from the US administration, Washington asserted that the key of terrorism of global reach is inside the Pakistan. Al Qaeda has been successfully reestablished its roots by exploiting the weak spots in the Pashtun tribal belt, across the Afghan-Pakistani border. A western military commander of Afghanistan stated that "Until we transform the tribal belt, the U.S. is at risk." (Saving Afghanistan Author(s): Barnett R. Rubin) No doubt Pakistan is a close ally of United States and it also wants a strong, stable and peaceful Afghanistan across its western border. It has common interests with Afghanistan especially in terms of stability (New America Foundation p. 5). But unfortunately due to several reasons, United States couldn’t’t’t maintain its confidence on Pakistan. Even by 2007, the rejuvenation of Taliban and their several successful attacks on NATO forces forced the United States to ask for Islamabad to do more against the Taliban inside its boundaries (Daniel Markey, 2007, p. 90). The stance of Zardari Government and especially from Pakistan’s military establishment was not as positive as in the Musharraf’s regime. The presence of Usama Bin Laden in Pakistan and then his assassination was a major operation; however, this also has increased the reservations of Pakistan’s armed forces. This created the distances between the two countries, especially after the US military attacks on Pakistani security forces at Salala. In response, Pakistan had discontinued the logistic supply to the NATO forces. In the consequences of 9/11, Islamabad has provided it support to US and NATO forces in four major areas. (1) break up the ties with the Afghan Taliban and maximum assistance to America in the battle; (2) arrest and hand over the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership who refuge to Pakistan foe security (3) close off the border and stop Al Qaeda as well as Afghan Taliban to set up protected shelters inside the Pakistan border which might supply to assault United States and allied force in Afghanistan; and (4) to support the US driven worldwide community for the serenity and solidity in Afghanistan. These guarantees happen to be moderately satisfied. Regardless of detailing the troops, the Pakistani military didn't deny safe shelters to Al-Qaeda-linked militants simply because according to Pakistani spokesman, it seems quite difficult to close off the hundreds of kilometers lengthy and porous border along Afghanistan. While Pakistan does not pose any direct threat to USA, presence of extremist religious groups, uncontrolled influx of outraged militants from Afghanistan; who are a constant threat to Pakistan’s own security, and possession of its nuclear weapons remains a serious concern for the US and definitely United States will formulate or alter its strategy in the light of these outcomes. Although “Obama’s war” was a direct reference to the 2010 troop surge in Afghanistan, the policy was soon more active in next-door Pakistan, where the drone campaign was aggressively stepped up and focused on Al-Qaeda commanders in South and North Waziristan, which are strongholds of local and foreign militants. According to the New America Foundation, Obama has so far approved four times the number of drone strikes issued under the two terms of the George W. Bush administration. (Pakistan and the United States at a Strategic Crossroads The New America Foundation) Even though there's growing level of resistance in the US on ethical as well as lawful reasons regarding war on terrorism, however, it has been observed that in Pakistan situation is different both in respect of civil and military. Pakistan’s Parliament has passed several resolutions unanimously in opposition to drone strikes that are required to be stopped instantly in FATA. Numerously, the civil and military leadership of Pakistan stated that Washington is executing these military operations without the having Islamabad’s authorization. But Wikileaks has revealed that both Perfect Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and the Army Chief Ashafq Kiyani have repeatedly asked for more drone attacks. (Pakistan and the United States at a Strategic Crossroads: The New America Foundation). Bibliography Ahmed Farooqi (2003). Re Thinking the National Security of Pakistan, Defense Journal, May, 2003 Akram, Zamir (2002). Pakistani-U.S, Relations after 9/11: A Pakistani Perspective. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall Daniel Markey. A False Choice in Pakistan, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 2007), pp. 85-102 George, Perkovich (2010). Toward Realistic U.S.–India Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C Hussein, Zahid (2010). Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto, London: I .B Tauris & Co Ltd Imtiaz Ali. United States-Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, May, 2012 Kenneth, Katzman (March 8, 2013). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Council Kronstadt, K. Alan (2009). India-U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service Nicholas Burns. America's Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2007), pp. 131-146 Pakistan and the United States at a Strategic Crossroads. The New America Foundation-National War College Study Group, September 2011 Robert M. Hathaway, (December, 2002). The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush, The Journal of Strategic Studies vol 25, No. 4, December, 2002 Ronald, I.H., and Pippa, N (2003). The True Clash of Civilizations, Defense Journal, April 2003 Read More