Are Events Particulars - Essay Example

Events Are Events Particulars Events 2 Are Events Particulars What are events Any thing that has happened can be ified as an event. Events are not only restricted to Philosophy, aligned collateral fields like Psychology, Linguistics all have their respective bearing on interpreting events. The question arises, can we classify events so simplistically or looking at in metaphysical context do we need to reinterpret events - treating them like "facts" and interpreting them in the context of the aligned concepts (Simon Blackburn). In his essays on actions and events Donald Davidson goes into semantics of the language arguing that if we were to take events that have happened or have changed than such things are "unrepeatable particulars" (Donald Davidson, Essays on actions and events). He also critiques Chilosm's contention that there are recurring events - he gives an example of dropping a saucer in mud one day and doing it again the next. So how does one classify such an event, is a particular event How can we make these discrete events as one, one might talk of same event continuing but then in case of a continuous event recurring after a break, what if the event occurred with separate participants, two persons got married and two others did the same. Will this count as a same event or event sum! Even if one were to allow unrepeatable events, how can one solve the paradox of same event happening more than once, perhaps resumption of the event after a pause might suffice. Only he says if there are particular unrepeatable events than same event can occur on more than one occasions (Donald, essays). Davidson believes that events are particulars, so that same event can be cross referenced from more than representation, further Events 3 events causally related should also have interdependence under specific laws. Laws, he says, are "linguistic entities" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) which relate to events only under specific descriptions. He further claims that there can be no strict law relating a mental and a physical event even though these might be causally related; he classifies mental events as those rationalized by reasoning. This does not mean that correlations do not exist, it is only that such correspondences cannot be rendered in the precise mathematical form outlined by strict laws. Regarding equivalence of events and if events are indeed particulars he says that events should be similarly causal for them to be identical and also that the concerned events should occupy the same spatial location (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). The differentiation between mental and physical events is quite amorphous they are really two ways of looking at the same things viewed from two different perspectives. The question to ask is whether this event is constituent of or composed of event which is purely physical, a mental event might have hidden aspects, properties which are not immediately discernable, but by using exemplifications the associations might become clearer. (Helen Steward, ontology of the mind) Helen Steward discusses Jaegwon Kim and Jonathan Bennett's theories on events in his book "The Ontology of Mind". Events according to Jaegwon Kim, he says, are to be represented canonically such that their inherent metaphysical character is kept intact; events have a structure, its constituents are object(s) and time (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Any event can be represented by the expression [S, p, t] where S is substance, p is property and t time. Kim's events exemplify properties, but the property exemplified is the constitutive property while any number of non constitutive properties is exemplified (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Two events are identical only if the three variables match in the respective events and the concerned Events 4 event is a "dated particular" (Helen Steward) and event's identity is tied to a particular property. The issue is using event describing sentences using explicit times cannot be mapped on a particular event and "Kim's events are best understood to be fact-like, structured entities that correspond to sentences rather than to singular terms" (Helen Steward). The two separate theories move from realist to non realist domain, differentiating in degree of reality that can be attributed to events. Davidson views events as objects that can be referred to whereas Jaegwon Kim maintains dependency of events over material substances (R. Casati and A. C. Varzi). There are two basic requirements of Kim's theory: conditions for an event to hold and conditions for the event to be identical. According to Kim events are unique and concrete particulars; each event has its own spatiotemporal location; there is one constructive property that distinguishes distinctive events (Event, wikipedia). Also in Kim's case event's identity is tied in a special way to some particular property. According to Helen Kim's events are not particulars despite Kim's claim but are facts like entities (Helen Stewart). Common sense gives conflicting results, as a typical event can be viewed as concrete particular, "non repeatable entities with specific location and duration"(event concepts, Achille C. Varzi) but then common sense also prevails to classify events as timeless abstract - an event that is repetitious and occurs at multiple places i.e. same lecture is given by same professor at different places "(event, Varzi) Regarding classification of events, events may be concrete particular or abstract universals they both require some material objects which should have some relation with other events. Philosophers like Kim have argued concrete particular events are necessary for causation Events 5 analysis whereas abstract events are required when causation in terms of cause and effect are to be analyzed (event, Varzi). Another way of looking at event theories is through unifiers vis-a vis multipliers. Davidson in promulgating the unifier end has maintained that distinct linguistic expressions can be used to describe single events. The multiplier theory promulgated by Kim who has pointed out dissimilarities in meanings of expressions which Davidson says can be used to describe single events (R. Casati and A. C. Varzi). Different semantics of same event like, either killing of Caesar or assassination of Caesar, how will it be construed. Unifiers chunk up events to be objects whereas multipliers drill down events as facts. Looking at properties of events they are not universals rather particulars as property of a particular object is different from similar property of another object; one day's sunset is different from sunset of any other day located in spatiotemporal space - another view of property exemplification (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Further there are differences in how objects and events relate to time and space - some philosophers proclaim that it is not semantically possible to prove existence of events while others on the other hand view events as comprising of entities which may be grouped together with other objects (R. Casati and A. C. Varzi). Davidson points out that for the sake of ontological discussion natural language supplies terms denoting events and he urges us to accept the existence of non-recurrent particulars (Donald, essays). His approach to events is based on the analysis of underlying logical structure of sentences describing events and if we were to take causal relations then we would have to look at the semantics of sentences expressing such relations. Events 6 Events as promulgated by Davidson are particulars denoted by single terms and can be refereed by multiple descriptions and the governing laws are "linguistic entities" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) and two events are same if they have same cause and effect and if spatiotemporal condition is included then two events will be same if they occupy same space and time. According to Kim events are defined using [x ,P, t]; a unique event is defined by existence condition and identity condition (Event, wikipedia). Events 7 References 1. Steward, Helen (1997).The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States. Clarendon Press 2. Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press. 3. R. Casati and A. C. Varzi. (1997). 50 Years of Events: An Annotated Bibliography 1947 to 1997. pp. 1-8. 4. Roberto Casati, Achille C. Varzi (2005). Event Concepts. 5. Events.Wikipedia. Retrieved 28th Feb, 2007. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Event_%28philosophy%29 6. Donald Davidson. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 27th Feb, 2007. First published Wed May 29, 1996; substantive revision Mon May 23, 2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/ 7. Events. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 27th Feb, 2007. Retrieved 27th Feb, 2007. First published Mon Apr 22, 2002; substantive revision Mon May 8, 2006 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/events/ 8. Events. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 27th Feb, 2007 http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/events.htm Read More