Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan - Essay Example

COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN SUMMARY: Success in Afghanistan requires U.S. policy makers and planners to establish clear priorities for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Coordinated offensive and defensive military operations, and political and economic development strategies must be synchronized with building a stronger and more competent Afghan government. Specifically, winning the counterinsurgency war rests on the Afghan government's capacity accomplish the following: 1) demonstrate its legitimate authority to govern; 2) increase its indigenous security forces capability; 3) establish organizations to manage development programs; and 4) create a political environment that does not alienate ethnic populations. Accordingly, the primary focus should be to improve the quality of the police and other security forces, strengthen government institutions, and separated the populace from the insurgents. Contemporary counterinsurgency methodologies introduced in the Philippines, Malaya, Algeria and Vietnam prove when the government accomplished these tasks, it defused the insurgency's political and ideological premise, discredited their cause, and created a political environment unsuitable for an insurgency to thrive. DISCUSSION: Intelligence reports show clashes between Taliban and coalition forces have increased significantly in 2008, highlighting the Taliban's resurgence and complicating NATO efforts to stabilize the country. Taliban, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani militants have expanded their influence in rural regions where NATO/ISAF and the Afghan government cannot provide sufficient security. Violent attacks have tripled in these areas - particularly against civilian non-combatants perceived to be in support of the government. Consequently, the U.S. planners must convince NATO and commanders to employ specific counterinsurgency approaches to reverse these trends. 1. Secure the Afghan-Pakistan border. The most daunting challenge facing counterinsurgents in Afghanistan is the cross-border infiltration of militant combatants from Pakistan. Insurgent forces have long benefited from porous borders along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region by receiving assistance from established sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Thus far, US/NATO strike operations along the border and inside Afghanistan have not curtailed militant force infiltrations and security forces have been unable to pursue retreating insurgents across the border. In order prevent these incursions, a more audacious containment strategy must be implemented. Measures include increasing security force levels in select border regions, formalizing intelligence cooperation activities with Pakistan, and erecting barriers along major infiltration corridors. First, NATO must expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan National Army (ANA) presence in the remote border regions where infiltrations and armed attacks most often occur. Diligent law enforcement activities should be the primary focus in populated areas and villages to disrupt support sanctuaries and networks logistics networks. ANA forces should occupy security checkpoints and border encampments to interdict hostile incursions. In the meantime Afghan and Pakistani officials formally demarcate the Durand Line by establishing a mutually recognized border, then erect a series of defensive fences along known infiltration corridors to deny militants access into Afghanistan. Technology based surveillance systems and interdiction platforms must be employed in tandem with physical structures. French counterinsurgents successfully employed similar fencing startegy in Algeria when they built the Mortice Line to contain the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) insurgents. Within a year of construction, the eight foot electrical fence proved to be a decisive counterinsurgency additive. The combination of static defenses and mobile border forces had killed over 6,000 would-be intruders and intercepted thousands of weapons before they could reach the Algerian insurgents. Current fencing along the India-Pakistan boundaries in Punjab and Kashmir has neutralized cross-border incursions and dramatically reduced weapons and explosive material flows into India. 2. Initiate an Afghan-led development programs. Priority must also be accorded to strengthening Afghan government institutions. A crucial first step is to expand the Afghan government's role in civic-action and development programs, particularly those carried out by ISAF Pprovincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Regrettably, Afghan provincial leaders are not formally involved in the decision cycle, nor do they taken part in the planning and prioritization process, or taken a leading role during program execution. Thus far these responsibilities have remained functions of ISAF military commanders with only a modicum of input from Ministry-level officials. NATO and NGO officials must immediately grant Afghan government and provincial leaders more administrative over development efforts. Because CION success requires promoting Afghanistan's governing capacity, building legitimacy is an essential component to winning the hearts and minds. Accordingly, the Karzai administration must conceive specific government institutions that can implement and monitor an effective infrastructure development programs. As such the president should establish an Afghan-led institution to synchronize nation's development plans with PRT, USAID and other sponsoring nation initiatives. In the course the Malaya Emergency, General Briggs established administrative control through a formalized a committee system consisting of a chief federal agency and subordinate state and district war executive committees (SWECs and DWECs). Within a year, the entire government effort was directed by the war executive committees. Effective civil-military relations oversight ensured that the Briggs plan worked. Local leaders decided appropriate counterinsurgency strategies, and committee members prioritized projects such as schools, medical facilities and other quality of life services. During the Hukbalahap (Huk) counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines, the Civil Affairs Office effectively managed all national civic-action programs and quickly provided the populace with credible reasons to support the newly formed government. 3. Re-initiate the "Clear, Hold, and expand" strategy in conjunction with resettlement programs. One of the most successful approaches in Afghanistan was the clear, hold, and expand strategy in which coalition military forces established secure zones then slowly expanded them outward. Military units drove out insurgent combatants, occupied vital terrain along primary communication networks, and secured major cities like Kabul and Bagrahm. Coalition counterinsurgency forces then conducted offensive operations in contested areas where Taliban militia remained strong - especially in the south and east, and along the Borger region. While Afghan security forces played a significant role in these the operations, they were not yet an officially organized, national force. Consequently, when Coalition forces drove the Taliban and militant forces out of Afghanistan, indigenous security forces lacked the capacity to prevent the Taliban's resurgence. As a result, the clear, hold, and expand was limited to since there were too few U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces available to hold captured terrain and expand territories. The strategy was subsequently abandoned. NATO forces should reinitiate this offensive tactic and apply it to the current counterinsurgency environment with a greater emphasis on local security. This can be accomplished by 1) improving public safety and security in remote villages, and 2) Introducing non-coercive resettlement initiatives to offer Afghans alternative livelihoods in more secure parts of the country. In addition, resettlement programs may be used in conjunction with the Afghan government "reconciliation" program to encourage Taliban fighters to defect. In time, the Afghan government will establish itself as more legitimate institution by creating a political environment unsuitable for an insurgency to reappear. Policy makers and Counterinsurgency planners should emulate aspects of resettlement programs used in Malaya, the Philippines and Vietnam. In Malaya for example, a through, methodical British approach to protected of protected the villages from MRLA attack. In addition to national police and military forces presence, the Briggs Plan established a Home Guard in new villages closely monitored by a handful of British counterinsurgency forces that gradually transferred authority to indigenous law enforcement institutions. In the Philippines Secretary of Defense Magsaysay developed the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) resettlement program as a part of land reform. Granting exoneration to select Huk followers, the EDCOR program paired Huk defectors with retiring army veterans and presented them an opportunity to become landowners on public domain land. The Philippine military provided initial security and helped the settlers develop their communities by clearing land, building homes and establishing public utilities. The program continued to grow and eventually expanded into a general land reform program for the poor. This extremely popular program completely u HUK insurgency propaganda, and was the most influential strategy that led to the insurgency's collapse. Conclusion: failure to implement these COIN strategies will prolong the war in Afghanistan and prevent the Afghan government from becoming an administratively responsive government. The Malay Races Liberation Army (MRLA) and Hukbalahap insurgencies were defeated using these counterinsurgency objectives. While Counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam and Angola were prematurely halted due to U.S. and French domestic __, successful methodologies proved that when the government established functioning institutions, separated the populace from insurgents, and provided appropriate security, the public conferred their support. In order to defeat the growing insurgency in Afghanistan, our current strategy must employ these methodologies as core imparatives. ATTACHMENTS: REFERENCES REFERENCES 1. Gopal, Anand. "Deep in the land of the Taliban". Asia Times Online. (December 6, 2008). http://www.atimes.com/atimes/.html. 2. Dobbins, James F. After the Taliban: Nation Building in Afghanistan. (Washington, D.C., 2008). 3. Ramakrishna, Kumar. "The Southeast Asian Approach to Counter-Terrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia".Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. (Montreal, Quebec, Canada. 2004). 4. Durga Madhab (John) Mitra. "Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World". Paper Presented to the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. (February, 2007). 5. Tatum, Thomas H. "Combating Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Applying the Anti-Communist Counterinsurgency Successes in Southeast Asia to Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism". Paper presented to the Air War College, February, 2006. 6. "Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress" (Interim Guide). Department of State Publication 11456, Washington, D.C. Released October, 2007. Read More